



R.R. "Bob" Greive

R.R. "Bob" Greive began his political career in 1946 at the age of twenty-seven when he won his first election for the state senate. A Democrat from West Seattle representing the Thirty-Fourth District, Greive quickly moved up in his party's leadership ranks. He was an active campaigner and fundraiser for fellow Democrats and ultimately served sixteen years as the Senate majority leader. Greive's attention to detail and dedication to his political goals also made him a master of the redistricting process. Over three decades he served as "Mr. Redistricting" for the Democrats in the Legislature.

Read the full text of an interview with Senator Greive, [*R.R. "Bob" Greive: An Oral History*](#), on the Oral History Program's Web site.

CHAPTER 10

REDISTRICTING UNDER COURT ORDER: 1965

The 1965 legislative session opened in January under considerable duress. Not only was a newly elected Republican governor paired with a Democratically controlled Legislature, but the Legislature itself was under court order to solve the redistricting problem before passing any other legislation that session.

Ms. Boswell: Evans takes office as governor in 1965. What is your strategy then? He can veto any bill passed by the Democrats, right?

Senator Greive: A lot of what you see in Howard McCurdy's book we did not know. In other words, these are things that I picked up later. I don't know what their strategy was except that Evans was more a part of the Legislature than any governor we've ever had. He really was very, very close to the people who elected him. He'd had to beat Richard G. Christensen in the primary and beat the right wing, and then he was coasting through the final election. He was active. He knew something about redistricting. He knew where those people sat, and he'd been a part of the thing with Gorton and had it explained. He was much more knowledgeable. Rosellini wasn't that deep into it. He took my word for most of it, I think. Maybe somebody else's word, but he didn't monitor everything we

were doing. He just figured I'd take care of the legislators.

Evans was deeply involved. That's why, eventually, I could negotiate with him because he was enough of his own man that even Gorton didn't call all the shots. Gorton and he disagreed finally, and then Gorton changed to go along. Or else Evans changed. Whatever, he knew what he was doing.

Ms. Boswell: McCurdy suggests that, essentially, the plan that Gorton then began to work on once the session started was based on the earlier Hallauer plan.*

**Gorton and his aide moved into the expansive offices of the new Republican Secretary of State, "new breed" leader A. Ludlow Kramer, and began to prepare a Republican redistricting bill. They worked from the proposal drawn the previous summer with Senator Hallauer; it was essentially the same plan. Relying upon a preponderance of "swing" districts, the bill was designed so that a moderate increase in Republican votes would produce a landslide of new Republican legislators.*

McCurdy: 77

Sen. Greive: For one thing, they wanted a plan that satisfied different people in Eastern Washington. There were a few public power Republicans in that area. Washington Water Power was the great nemesis.

Every governor has had the glorious idea that he could be "King of the Hill" on redistricting. Rosellini had it. We didn't get along very well over that issue because I didn't

feel I was his floor leader—I was the floor leader of the Senate. Governors would get their name attached to something, and then it became their accomplishment. And I think there was nothing that Evans would have liked better than to have an Evans plan that swept through the Legislature to resolve that terrible redistricting problem. Now I don't think that's bad, and I'm not condemning him for it, but I think that was a prime motivation for him. Not only that, they can get a lot of publicity for anything the governor puts his seal on.

Ms. Boswell: It sounds as though you may have turned that around on him with the so-called test for fairness that Gorton proposed.

Sen. Greive: What do you mean?

Ms. Boswell: First of all, we talked about Gorton's idea, about what's fair redistricting.*

**Gorton insisted that any bill reflect standards of political fairness, and proposed a statistical test for this. The statistics were complex, but the standards were elementary—each political party should win that proportion of seats roughly corresponding to its share of the total vote for all legislative candidates.*

(Footnote: For example, in a state with 100 single-member legislative districts, a party receiving 55 percent of the total vote for all legislative candidates would receive 55 seats. When a party received over 55 percent, their percentage of seats would increase geometrically, due to the nature of the single-member district scheme).

Gorton suggested that returns for statewide candidates provided a better test than votes for legislative candidates, which were hard to manage. Thus a candidate for a statewide office, such as the governor, who received 55 percent of the vote would receive at least 55 percent of the votes in half of the legislative districts. He would show majorities (50 percent or better) in about 57 of the 10 districts—the 50 districts where he received at least 55 percent and the seven districts where he received between 50 and 55 percent.

McCurdy: 77-78

Sen. Greive: One of the bad things about politics is that rumors become true. The press and the media will adopt something, and suddenly that becomes so, just because they say it. Gorton had argued that this was a one-man, one-vote issue, and the Republicans had gotten more votes for the House than the Democrats had, and yet they didn't control. They only took control with the help of the coalition.

They were never willing to add in the Senate, though. If you added the senators, even though we gave them a third of the votes, there still would be more Democratic than Republican votes. But they never would go for that. However, they made big, big quotes and big speeches and so forth. Now, what I could have done was challenge them on that, but I felt that wasn't worth it. If I got into some ideological debate and I won, it would be that much harder to deal with. So we really didn't meet the challenge, which if I had to do over again, I would have done more adequately. But, I think most of all of us that

were on the inside—certainly maybe every legislator—recognized that it was just a makeshift argument. Every legislator knew it was a joke.

Later on, you'll find that Gorton, himself, came up with a plan that was gerrymandered. And then he came up with another plan for the governor that was out of this world, and that nobody paid any attention to. But that's details. It's a footnote. But I better be looking at it when I'm talking. McCurdy's statement is some sort of an idea that they would have single districts. It looks to me, from what he says here, that he meant that whatever percentage of the vote the governor got, that they would be single and the districts would be divided into two camps. The district wouldn't necessarily go to who got the most votes in every instance, but the governor would automatically have so many of those votes if he led, so that he would have control over the Legislature. It's something like the parliamentary system. In other words, if you have one hundred districts—and you may not have won a hundred districts—if the governor has seventy-four percent, then seventy-four of those would be for the governor, and then he'd leave the Senate alone. That's about as far from one-man, one-vote, as I can imagine. That's what it looks like to me, now.

Since I didn't draft this plan, I never took it seriously, never thought it was anything, and neither did the press. I'm not a leading authority on it, but the fact is, this is one thing that I learned in preparation for this interview. I got to reading this thing, which is something that I just skipped over before. The footnotes didn't mean anything. It may mean something different, but that's the way I interpret it.

Ms. Boswell: What I was talking about earlier, about the press, is that it appears that they did agree with you that this was a pretty strange idea.*

**Greive immediately called a press conference and lambasted Gorton's bill as horribly unfair, saying that it would cost House Democrats alone 15 to 17 seats at the next election. This alerted newsmen, who were scheduled to hear Gorton explain the bill and the statistics on Tuesday. As a result, Gorton faced a hostile press the next morning and after that was never able to convince anyone but fellow Republicans of the utility of the test.*

McCurdy: 79

Sen. Greive: I like to think that the press figured I'd told them the truth.

Ms. Boswell: But they jumped on this whole issue, too.

Sen. Greive: All through this argument it always amazed me, truthfully, that I did as well with the press as I did. I always figured I would be the whipping boy. I was scared to death about it, but I was treated, I thought, very fairly by the press. Of course, I had enemies and friends. But I wasn't really just trying to sweep the Democrats and give them things they weren't entitled to. I always told everybody, "You vote for the people in the seats." And I told that to the press, and I told that to the public, and I told it to the members. I think they disclaimed it. They didn't understand redistricting, anyway. Nobody could follow the twists and turns except my staff and myself, and Gorton and his staff and maybe Evans. The average legislator didn't know what was going on. They didn't have the whole picture.

Ms. Boswell: Talking about not understanding, can you explain to me this concept of swing districts? I don't understand that.

Sen. Greive: That's an entirely different story. That's a legitimate, very legitimate, position to take. I don't make fun of that. In other words, I made fun of this funny system Gorton had.

Democrats are better spread than Republicans—at least they were then. In other words, you had areas like West Seattle that were normally Democratic, but once in awhile might have voted for Evans rather than Rosellini, or something like that. But, they aren't all just Democratic. Republicans had a tendency to cluster around the view or cluster into the more wealthy neighborhoods. For instance, in the Seattle area Magnolia isn't all view, but there's something about living in Magnolia that gives you a step up, or Montlake and those places. Montlake has undergone a lot of changes now, but in those days, if you lived in Montlake or you lived in Sand Point, or you lived in Broadmoor, it was a status thing.

Well, it's harder to deal with those people because they aren't conveniently spread out, which means you've got to figure a Republican district. A legislator never wants to leave his district, but their idea was that they would have to design districts so they could get enough votes in those districts that they could control. Now, the Republicans hadn't controlled in the twenty years prior to this—almost since the 1930s—so it would be thirty years, almost. They'd had moments, like 1946, when I was first elected. But that was about all. And so their dream was that they would develop districts that were close, and if they had districts that were close, then they would bring out people of moderate character—like Evans and Gorton liked to think they were—and that they would get the

support of the press and take the control in that way. So, they were trying to spread their majority all the time.

The Democrats would have the same problem. In this last redistricting when they set up Jim McDermott's district, they made it so Democratic that there was no way you were going to defeat him once he was nominated. Anybody who concentrates all of their support—I'm talking about congressional districts, now—can be successful.

Ms. Boswell: So, it was smart for Republicans to try to do something a bit different or to confuse the issue a bit?

Sen. Greive: Oh, yes, that was good strategy. And it was a legitimate argument. I may not have liked it; in fact, I disliked it because it was so true. I thought it was a legitimate argument and one that serves their purposes, and a lot of districts could go either way. It's one of those things you talk about, but you really don't want. "In every district but mine. Make mine, dear God, be a little Democratic or Republican, but these other guys, they can run from awful districts."

Ms. Boswell: It sounded as though the Democrats then—I don't want to say they were split over all this—but you had this faction led by Representative Gary Grant who just didn't want to deal with your plan or you?

Sen. Greive: Grant wanted it to be his plan. He wanted to be the redistricting guru. He felt that he had a lot of—the deal with the coalition was fresh in their minds—control now. They wanted to refute it, if you can call it that. They wanted to make some changes for the better. I never took any one of his plans very seriously. He had one that I put through just because I figured that it was so radical that the public would never accept it. We let it go through. We used it as a bargaining chip,

but we knew Evans would veto it. There was no chance because, you see, I was always tending towards something that I thought had a little balance and some Republican support. If Hallauer or Grant were going to start off by drawing a plan, that's fine, but, eventually, they got to the point where if they were going to differ from me, then they'd have to make greater gains. We'd deal with the people in the seats, and they'd start talking philosophy: "We've got to beat more Republicans or more liberals—eliminate somebody," and that sort of thing.

Ms. Boswell: Did you just step back for a while and let him take over and see what he could do?

Sen. Greive: No. It's pretty easy to get publicity because the press never understood redistricting, but they liked the controversy. He was telling you he had a plan, and his plan was better...and so forth and so on. Grant got his name as the lead name in the story because he came up with a plan. He was chairman of Constitutions and Elections in the House, plus he could get a little push from O'Brien.

Ms. Boswell: A bill does pass in the House—S.B. 2.

Sen. Greive: It does pass.*

**Now Grant and Schaefer had to convince the senators of their strategy. But one of the major reasons for their militancy meant nothing to the senators. Grant and Schaefer feared negotiations because they knew Greive and Gorton would dominate them and*

resist the intrusion of the new House leadership. Still, the Democratic senators were interested in the House strategy because, by approving S.B. 2, they could test Evans' intentions. Many suspected that he might never wield his veto. Without approving either the House strategy or Grant's and Schaefer's reasons for it, the Senate Democratic caucus agreed to approve the House changes to S.B. 2 and send the bill to the governor. Greive argued for conference negotiations, but the Democrats ignored this.

McCurdy: 81-82

Sen. Greive: We helped them pass it. I lined up as many votes as I could. My attitude was that I didn't care whose name was on it; we'd put it through. However, I never thought it was going to fly because we knew—by this time Dean Foster and I had looked at the thing and all of us on the inside knew—it was much more Democratic than the ones I had proposed. But we thought, "Let's get it out of the way." We expected it would be vetoed, and it was.

Ms. Boswell: McCurdy suggests that you wanted it to go to a conference negotiation. I don't know how he knows that, but that's what I was going to ask you. How would he know that?

Sen. Greive: I don't remember all the details of what I wanted. Generally, I was against conferences. However, if you control both Houses, you don't vote against a conference. I may have wanted that because I wanted to involve the governor. I would think that would

be my motive if I did it. But I can't tell you at this sitting what my motive was, exactly. I was always a little jealous, as anybody would be. I did the work, and to see somebody come along and move in for the grand swoop and take the credit for it was difficult. On the other hand, I can honestly say that I don't think that I ever tried to block it, no matter how I felt. The real answer was that if we had to redistrict, we had to redistrict.

Ms. Boswell: There was something that McCurdy comments on—and I just wondered if you remembered any background on this—that the bill passed the Senate, and then it was held over for a long weekend. Seemingly, McCurdy's idea was that the Democrats held it over so that Evans would think about it and maybe change his mind and not veto it. Does that sound possible?*

**Greive put S.B. 2 before the Senate on Friday, January 22. The senators quickly approved it on a party-line vote. But for reasons that at first mystified the Republicans, adjourned for the weekend and refused to send the bill to the governor. In fact, the Democrats hoped that Evans would think about the matter for two days and decide not to veto the bill.*

Evans did not need the document to make his intentions known. He assembled the Capitol press and lambasted the Democrats for delaying a redistricting solution...He attacked S.B. 2 as a partisan bill that simply obstructed rapid settlement of the redistricting issue, and announced he would veto it and all bills like it, regardless of which party passed them.

The Democratic delay entirely backfired, delighting the newsmen, and gave Evans his first major victory in the press...

McCurdy: 82

Sen. Greive: Yes. All I can say is that it sounds possible. Obviously, I don't know. Evans wasn't communicating with me on a regular basis, you can be sure of that. So, I don't know what he wanted. I would imagine that's why we held it over. Was it held in the Senate or in the House?

Ms. Boswell: It was held in the Senate.

Sen. Greive: If it was held in the Senate, then I must have known what I was doing.

Ms. Boswell: But then, Evans, instead of mulling it over, in fact went right to the press and said, "I'm going to veto this," and so he got something of a head start in the press. Again, this is how McCurdy is describing it.

Sen. Greive: I have to do some guessing at this point because I don't fully remember. But, I would suspect this is what I was doing: I thought, "Here we've got a bill that hasn't got any chance of passing, it's too Democratic." So I couldn't turn to the Democrats and say that this bill was too harsh. That's the thing they accused me of—they said I wasn't a loyal-enough member. They said that I gave too much to the Republicans, that I was too easy, and that I was too soft. So I thought if I held it over and they could see how bad things were, they would come to me and reach a compromise, which apparently didn't work. Now that's my guess of what I was thinking.

That would be my normal path of thinking. If I knew a thing was very Democratic, I couldn't very well be against it, unless I had Republicans who would compromise—anything to prove to them what I was about.

Ms. Boswell: You did come up with another bill within a couple of days?

Sen. Greive: I had the other bill.

Ms. Boswell: You had it ready?

Sen. Greive: I had been down, or sent somebody else down, to talk to Gorton or talk to Evans, trying to work a deal out.

Ms. Boswell: Once that was vetoed, Grant then proposed another bill, although McCurdy suggests that it was pretty much the same bill as your bill, only with a different number on it. And that Hayes Elder was in there negotiating to try to get something accomplished.*

**Grant finally decided to go it alone; he would be Greive's equal and draw up a House bill for House Democrats (and do it in only two days). The news of the bill spread quickly, and the legislators hurried to tell Grant of their demands and supervise the drawing of their own districts. They overflowed Grant's committee room and harassed his staff, but Grant heard them all. Essentially the legislators reiterated the positions that Greive had already led them to. Thus the bill Grant produced was a replica of S.B. 2, although it did have a new number—H.B. 196. It was a very important number, one Grant would never forget.*

McCurdy: 85

Sen. Greive: I wouldn't doubt that. I don't remember. Incidentally, about this time, Evans was installed as the governor, and he was vetoing this and vetoing that. So Mike Gallagher got up in the Senate and he said, "I thought we had one Italian governor, now we've got another one, Danny Veto."

Ms. Boswell: That's a great quote. Evans, evidently, threatened to call the court in and say, "Okay, you're going to have to take over redistricting." Do you think that was an idle threat?

Sen. Greive: I don't remember that. I wouldn't think they'd come in as long as there was a chance of us passing a bill. I don't think I paid much attention to it. But I don't specifically remember. Everybody threatened everybody with something. If they thought you didn't want it, then that was one of the things they could be for.

Ms. Boswell: All along the way it appears that you had also been trying to negotiate again with Moos?

Sen. Greive: Moos. Everybody tried to use everything that they had around. I liked Moos. He was congenial, an easy-going guy. I thought he was a pleasant fellow to deal with, and I always had hopes that with his interests from Eastern Washington, if he got some of the things he wanted, we'd get things we wanted. Moos looked at himself as the next congressman from Spokane.

Ms. Boswell: Had he shown an interest because of his earlier constitutional amendment, too?

Sen. Greive: Oh, yes. He'd participated in the whole thing. He was probably on the conference committee. If he wasn't, he certainly was a player.

Ms. Boswell: It seems as though, at least according to McCurdy, that after this Evans is again secretly planning a different strategy, and that was actually to have an executive redistricting bill that he's going to propose. Did you know about that?*

**...Gorton was busy developing a new strategy, designed to shake the Democrats' confidence in their legislative majority and put even more pressure on Greive. Gorton, his aide, Evans, and Mrs. McCaffree were secretly preparing an executive request redistricting bill. It would be submitted to the House with bipartisan sponsorship, with the full weight of the Governor's prestige behind it.*

McCurdy: 87

Senator Greive: No. We knew he was going to have an executive request bill. We weren't very impressed with that. We couldn't see how his lofty position as governor was going to make that much difference. He didn't have the votes in the House or the Senate. It certainly would fit, though, in the strategy that the governor was running to the courts for a way around the bill. If you have an executive request bill and it's got a lot of support, the court might adopt that plan.

But, somehow, we never were very worried about it. I'm familiar with the fact that there was an executive request in the works, and we kept hearing about it. I remember that when we saw it, we thought we could blast the living daylights out of it. We called a press conference—I think we called the conference before they were able

to present their bill—and told them what the thing did. And the press, apparently, believed us because it went nowhere. It didn't get very favorable press. The same people who drew up their overall redistricting plan drew it up. Evans may have had a part in it, but I don't think it was any different than any other Republican bill.

Ms. Boswell: During this time, I wanted to ask you about an episode. McCurdy suggests that you had continued to negotiate, and that you'd come up with a new plan. In the meantime, the Republicans had developed a proposal, which they presented and they called it, essentially, an ultimatum. If you didn't go along, then the governor would put in this executive request bill. But, McCurdy suggests that there were some Republican demands that, "strangely enough, you went along with." One of them was over some districts in Tacoma. Tell me about that.*

**The Republicans made their first package proposal on Thursday night, February 4. It was a seven-point ultimatum...Moos explained the proposal to Greive and the other negotiators. He began with minor points, to which Greive mildly objected. Then Moos touched on an open sore. He insisted that Republicans retain the two districts they already controlled in Tacoma. Strangely enough, Greive accepted the Republican demand. It was strange because Republican solutions for Tacoma always eliminated one of the area's five Democratic senators, but Greive's reason for acceptance was even odder. The one Tacoma*

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senator whom Greive would gladly sacrifice was safely barricaded behind miles of solidly Democratic precincts. Greive, however, now devised a weird gerrymander, making that senator swap his district with another Tacoma senator, most vulnerable and most powerful. Moos, gazing at the shape of the district, gasped, “Why, we couldn’t show up on the floor with that.”

McCurdy: 88-89

Sen. Greive: Here’s the story on that. Number one, I disliked the senator, and I don’t deny that. I’d have loved to see him out of there because he was also competing with John McCutcheon.

Ms. Boswell: Who was this?

Sen. Greive: This was A.L. “Slim” Rasmussen. And I could tell you a lot of that old story. There are some very humorous parts of it.

However, I didn’t think to push the issue. There was another senator by the name of Ted Bottiger. He was a House member who wanted to be a senator, and he wanted to get Rasmussen out of his district. He’s the one that showed me the “stovepipe.” Furthermore, he said that he was one of the ones that wasn’t committed from Tacoma, and that he would vote for our plan if I stretched the boundaries a bit. And I thought it was one vote over in the House. He was a House member then.

He wasn’t a senator, yet. He was senator later. And so he was essential because I was having trouble in Tacoma, anyway. The public power people were in favor of dams locally on the Cowlitz River. The people of Tacoma figured it would affect their rates.

I was having trouble getting anywhere in Tacoma with the House. Bottiger came over to see me, and he showed me how to do it. Now, would I have done it without him? If I’d thought of it I would have, but I didn’t.

Ms. Boswell: When you say a “stovepipe,” you are referring to the shape of the district?

Sen. Greive: What happened was that Bottiger didn’t want to run against Rasmussen; he didn’t think he could beat him. He wanted to put him in another district—probably a Republican district—I don’t know what it was. And I had terrible fights with Rasmussen. I said a lot of things about him, and he said a lot of things about me, and we just really had it out. I thought I came out pretty well on the exchange. He was the one guy I didn’t like. Now, I hadn’t tried to do anything to him before. He eventually became mayor of Tacoma for one term, so he didn’t run again.

Ted Bottiger was one of the younger progressive Democrats and didn’t want to run against Rasmussen. So he’s the one who talked me into it. I remember telling him, “This looks terrible, but if it will get your vote, and we can put it together, I’ll do it.” That’s why I did it. In other words, I wasn’t just trying to be a hero. I also wasn’t the guy who dreamed up the whole thing.

Ms. Boswell: Okay. Then McCurdy mentions that it then came down to some Spokane districts.*

**Moos skipped onto the next trouble spot, Spokane. He insisted on no Democratic gains in the county, since Republicans wanted to retain the chance to unseat two vulnerable Democratic senators. Unfortunately, the two were faithful to Greive, and Greive insisted that their districts be strengthened. When Moos insisted again, Greive retorted, "We might as well go to the court." He would honor his promise to protect the two senators. The court could break the promise, but he could not.*

McCurdy: 89

Sen. Greive: That's true; however, what districts are they? One of them was William S. "Daddy" Day's district. He had a pretty strong in with the Republicans. One of them was Bill McCormick's district. In other words, the House members from those districts were two of the major dissidents, and when we got down to the final negotiations, Evans had called McCormick down and told him. He tried to get out of his promise. He'd made a pledge to them he wouldn't hurt them, either, but I didn't know that at the time. But, on the other hand, you make your reputation because you keep your word. And before we did the final redistricting, I had Karl Herrmann and John Cooney come down. We talked to them, and they finally gave me the okay before I did it.

Ms. Boswell: In this instance Evans went ahead and said he was going to submit his executive request.*

**On Friday morning Governor Evans revealed his intentions to submit the executive redistricting bill and begin a search for representatives to sponsor it. The announcement caught the Democrats unprepared. Since no redistricting bill had come before either house since negotiations had begun one week ago, they criticized Evans for scuttling negotiations.*

McCurdy: 89

Sen. Greive: That didn't worry me very much. They thought it would sweep. It would come with a sweep of publicity for the new governor, popularity, and all that sort of thing, but it didn't get anywhere simply because the press didn't understand it. They took our word for it. We said it was a rotten bill, and we got it defeated. McCurdy had brought a copy of it over, I think, the night before, and innocently let us look at it. So we knew what was in the bill.

Ms. Boswell: So, what was the result of all this posturing?

Sen. Greive: If we did something, then they did something, and we were thinking about it about as hard as we could. I'd get a new idea, and then we'd cast around and try it out on each other. We'd try this, and we'd try that. I just figured something had to give because redistricting was so important. The members wanted it. Everybody wanted it.

Ms. Boswell: We've been talking about the back-and-forth discussions that had been going on as redistricting moved into, essentially, its second session, and the fact that it was difficult to keep even the Democratic

caucus together behind different redistricting proposals. Do you want to add some more to that before I move into the specifics?

Sen. Greive: First of all, there is a difference in Democratic and Republican members. It isn't a party difference; it's a subtle psychological difference. Democrats are dissidents, or at least they were then. And they gathered together the people that were similar in party affiliations, but they often had different goals. In other words, labor contributes to their people. Labor is their chief supporter, but they vote on a lot more than labor issues, like teachers' unions, education, and all types of things. And so you have these various elements, and they have more influence with the members than they do with Republicans.

The Republicans—at least the ones there at that time—were straightforward, generally. They knew what they were for, and they were for a few simple issues. They would stick together like glue because they were in the minority, and that was the only way to have an effect. They voted as a unit, generally.

That's one thing to look at. Another thing to look at is why there was dissatisfaction. No matter what I did, there was always some dissatisfaction. There had to be because it was redistricting, and everybody was affected personally. Then there were the people who were in safe districts like Bill Gissberg, who was almost certainly going to be re-elected when he ran, unless he had an awfully strong opponent. However, Gissberg was ambitious. He wanted to be the floor leader, and he had a group gathered around him who plotted and worked together. They made some speaking arrangement with Web Hallauer's group. They communicated throughout this time in relative secrecy. They voted on a lot more than labor.

And finally there were people like Mike Gallagher who wanted to win. And I think that everybody wanted some kind of victory,

not only Gallagher. The way to get someone to vote for something is to go to the caucus and say that, "We're going to gain six seats by this, or three seats by that, and, by gosh, we'll have more, and we'll be better off." You couldn't do that because if it got out that you even thought that—and it got out to the Republicans—then that would be their battle cry.

The fact is that the Republicans used that tactic, and we used it several times. They would make a statement, and I'd have it mimeographed on a sheet of paper and put on everybody's desk: Republicans claim this and claim that. We'd make it in big letters. And we did it on a number of occasions. Then they'd see it, and what could they do? They couldn't deny it since we knew what we were talking about. So, the best you could promise a person is that you were going to try to solve the thing and keep the status quo.

Well, that doesn't really excite anybody because there's no win to it. You go to the Legislature because you beat somebody. You get up and fight against a bill because you beat somebody—you win something. It's like fans trying to have faith and confidence in a football team that loses all their games. They don't want to lose. Losing and winning are so deeply ingrained in people that you have no way of really combating it. All I was trying to do was get a bill through. I wasn't trying to make any gain whatsoever, believe me.

We checked it all the time, and we were always prepared to defend our position. I never once had a situation where Gorton or somebody came up and started telling me my plan was all wrong, and theirs was all right. They would attack it in generalities, but they wouldn't dispute it street by street because we knew what we were doing. But the conclusion is easy to beat because I never offered to win anything more. I was very, very careful about that. The most you could do was say, "Trust me." Well, that's all right, except after a

couple of sessions they don't trust you. You didn't solve it last time; you're not going to solve it this time. "Trust me to save your skins, and that is what I'll do." And even that is a hard thing to say, because if I put that in words—which I didn't—and the other side thought they could use it, why then it would be said it in front of the caucus. I could tell them, and then you know what would happen. It would be in the press, and they'd make an issue out of it. So you had to take a lot of blows that you otherwise would have answered, simply because you'd just say, "I am honest," or "Yes, it is fair." But you really didn't want to enmesh yourself in something.

Furthermore, somebody gets a district they think is fair and they're satisfied with, then you'd better not change it. What are you going to do if you have to change it because somebody overhears, and then makes a lot of it in the press? "See, I'm changing you here because of these other two districts here; we've got to do something for somebody else." What kind of a deal is this? The press then makes it a story. They had nothing to write about. See, the whole Legislature was shut down by court order. There went all their stories.

Finally, then, there are the people who are ambitious, and who think like Grant that they could get a bill and have their name on it. Then they are suddenly raised from lowly freshman, or whatever they were, sophomore senator, or sophomore House member, and into the leadership class. They thought that was a way of doing it. So, it made it almost impossible to keep everybody together all the time. They would float in and out. I had a core of people that stayed loyal.

All the time I was fooling with the guys, always stopping the proceedings and holding the bill. Sometimes we'd hold a bill for a month. We'd put it down if I didn't have the votes and had to work it awhile. When you finally had the votes, you'd let it float. I'd put

it on the floor, so we'd just move it any time. I did redistricting the same way. I held it until I thought I had everybody satisfied. Of course, they didn't always stay satisfied. When you thought you had them all satisfied, then somebody would come up with an adjustment or would jump ship and abandon the plan.

John Petrich. Fred Dore wanted to do something for Petrich. I didn't even know Petrich was in the thing; I thought we had taken care of him way back when. We certainly took care of Dore. Now, Dore said that we had to satisfy Petrich, too, because they were buddies. There's a lot of that. So the most difficult thing was to keep everybody in line.

Ms. Boswell: In one sense you're dealing a lot with personalities.

Sen. Greive: All personalities—all over the place. And with the egos. Of course, I had an ego, too. A lot of the things I said about the others apply to me. It's just the nature of where you are and what you're doing.

Ms. Boswell: You were mentioning earlier, too, that because there is such a turnover in the Legislature—and especially in the House—that people want to make their point, do it fast, and make their fame, too.

Sen. Greive: That's right. Become famous overnight. We've had several instances where people became Speaker after two or three terms. First was Robert M. Schaefer. Schaefer was nobody, really. He became Speaker. John O'Brien wanted a Speaker, but he didn't want a Speaker who would push him around. He wanted somebody he had a lot of influence with—I wouldn't say control, but influence.

Thomas Swayze was the same way. He was involved in the next-to-last redistricting. His ambition was to become a judge. He kind of framed out a career that would lead to that.

It isn't a long-term business for most legislators.

Ms. Boswell: You were saying that the average term was twelve years?

Sen. Greive: Well, no. I was always very proud of that. At one point in the Senate, there was a survey of sitting incumbents, to see how long they'd been in office, and so forth. We took the senators and figured it out, and we figured that the average was twelve years. I had twenty-eight years, and of course, several people were there longer. That was for all the senators.

But we were in control. We had thirty votes, which the Democrats had for a long time. But the trick was that you had to keep them satisfied. In other words, you don't go in and make a stirring speech and come out with the votes. People think that we would be in there making speeches. We never made speeches; we made deals. We took care of people. We worried about them—not just me, but anybody who was very successful. To be successful as the floor leader, or even as a Speaker, you're somebody who keeps people happy.

Ms. Boswell: So, your entire career was basically occurring behind the scenes?

Sen. Greive: Yes. Whether you're behind the scenes or not, you keep them happy. Sometimes it's pretty easy, but sometimes it isn't. But that's the nature of the Legislature—or it was then.

Ms. Boswell: Do you think it's not that way now?

Sen. Greive: Well, I suspect that it's that way, but I don't know. I'm not there, and I can't say. I've been away from there twenty years, now, and I don't know.

Ms. Boswell: Let's talk now about some of these back-and-forth situations that were going on in redistricting. We had talked about how Evans had decided, as governor, to step in and to push his own bill—what he called the compromise bill—which he tried to make look nonpartisan.

Sen. Greive: I think that was ninety-nine percent Gorton, and one percent Evans. But Evans was the key factor. That was one of the things about Gorton: he appreciated that he wasn't always that popular. I think he probably does today. He's always been the kind of a guy that works with somebody else and lets them take all the credit, for which I credit him his success. I admire him for that.

Ms. Boswell: One of the things that came out of this back-and-forth was a new proposal that was talking about a legislative referendum on redistricting.

Sen. Greive: We had a legislator from Vancouver, and he was a very studious guy. He was a lawyer, but he was the type who researched things, always studying, always looking for a better way and an answer to every question.

His name was Klein, William Klein. We called him "Deputy Dog." Apparently, there was a cartoon character in those days by that name, and he looked like Klein. I didn't give him that name, but people made fun of him and said, "There's Deputy Dog," all the time. He was kind of half-hunched over, but he was brilliant. He would get in there, and he'd be reading the bills when other people were just voting on them, so he really was a very smart guy. He was also very difficult to deal with—very, very opinionated. His claim to fame was that he caught some errors, some mistakes, and he understood the ramifications. He wasn't personally very popular with the members in the sense that he was Speaker or

anything like that. But he just did the work other people didn't do.

He came up with a theory. They kind of laughed at it at first—I know I was one of them—but his idea was that we could refer the redistricting directly to the people. In other words, we wouldn't have to go through the governor. His idea was that we would put a bill through both Houses and refer it directly to the people. The governor's veto wouldn't extend to that; therefore, he couldn't stop it.

So, that idea gave us some hope that we could do it that way. We had all kinds of reservations because we weren't at all sure we were that popular with the people. About that time, I thought we were awfully unpopular because we didn't get any good press, you can be sure of that. Redistricting is like the "Tar Baby"—the closer you got to it, the more people disliked you. They might appreciate that you were doing the work, but then the public didn't like it and the press didn't like it because nothing was happening. They had to write about every little nuance, and there wasn't anything that really justified their being around.

And so, Klein's solution was that the governor's veto shall not extend to—it's written in the Constitution, the state Constitution—initiatives by or referred to the people. Now, they said we constitutionally couldn't hold it up, but in our heart and soul we all thought we could do it. Referring to the people would be a feat in itself; it might never survive after that.

The thing that worried us was that we didn't know if that would slow down the court. The court might look to the Washington Constitution, which I'm talking about. The GOP are talking about the federal Constitution and looking at the whole picture. We were never quite sure that we could carry it off. I know the courts were pretty disgusted with redistricting about that time. I'm not trying to say that I had any super-human background,

or I was a constitutional lawyer or anything. I'm just saying that we had a majority, and if we did it then, we had something. If we didn't, we got another case on the list. The court knocked this down, and we're right back where we started. There wouldn't be any state judges deciding the matter. It would probably be decided by one or two federal judges from the Ninth Circuit Court. We weren't at all sure that they were going to be satisfied with something that took another election because, you see, that means we'd have to go through another election after this one. We'd already gone through an election and held it up with everything we could. We'd be out there in the field trying to do things. So, there were all kinds of problems with it, but Klein's was a great idea.

Ms. Boswell: Another player who seems to come in about this time, or, at least, comes in more dramatically than he had before, was Tom Copeland.

Sen. Greive: Tom Copeland was young, but he wasn't part of the so-called "new breed." He was from Eastern Washington; he wasn't from Western Washington. In other words, his set of friends was not the same as Gorton's and Evans' set of friends; however, he was a player. He had support, and he was very strong, and a number of people were loyal to him. It got to be an east-west sort of fight. He was much easier to deal with because he seemed to be much more realistic and willing to make an agreement. Incidentally, he was a pretty capable guy.

Ms. Boswell: In terms of redistricting, you had what were called secret meetings with Tom Copeland and others in a downtown hotel? Tell me a little about that.

Sen. Greive: Well, no, that is not quite true. We were trying to negotiate. Every time we

tried to negotiate, somebody would squeal, and the first thing you'd know, we'd have trouble. In other words, somebody would accuse us of doing something underhanded, and then we'd all go to a caucus—the caucuses are secret—and then somebody would make an issue out of it. And so it was impossible to have negotiations because if you were in there giving the store away, you were in real trouble. And so it was a terrible atmosphere. You couldn't do it.

So, finally, I rented a room or had somebody rent a room—I forget how I did it—on two or three occasions. We went down and tried to negotiate there, and we did quite well. But, then the next day, somebody found out about it. Then we got lambasted for secrecy. But, if you have a cadre of people standing around in a circle yelling and screaming, “Don't touch that district. It's mine!” you can't do anything.

Ms. Boswell: So, it was really just a means of trying to get away from the publicity and the pressure?

Sen. Greive: That's right.

Ms. Boswell: There's an implication in McCurdy, though, that Gorton was very angry because he thought you were trying to shut him out of the process. Was that true?*

**Most legislators dismissed the hotel talks, but Gorton and Moos were both furious. Both were working hard to win Democratic votes for the Governor's bill...By Thursday night, February 11, Greive and Copeland were proclaiming that a redistricting settlement was imminent. This was too*

much for Gorton. He was convinced not only that Copeland had devastated the strategy for the Governor's bill, but that the minority leader, who had entered the negotiations with only an elementary knowledge of redistricting, had surrendered the Republican position.

McCurdy: 92

Sen. Greive: Probably. Maybe he wasn't, but he looked to me like a solid rock that was unwilling to yield. If we dealt directly with Copeland, we had a chance to get something done because Copeland genuinely wanted to get a redistricting bill. Copeland was one of Gorton's strategists, and Gorton wanted to break somebody. He wanted to win. We got Copeland involved because we couldn't deal with Gorton at all.

Ms. Boswell: But then Gorton, at least according to McCurdy, sent in Pritchard and others to say to Copeland, “You either stop or else the caucus is going to vote you out.”*

**Gorton asked Representative Pritchard to get Copeland out of the negotiations. Pritchard, Moos, and two other House Republicans sternly confronted Copeland with the choice of pulling out of the negotiations or facing a caucus revolt and a vote of no confidence. Copeland made no definite reply, but his efforts to engineer a redistricting solution languished and died.*

McCurdy: 92-93

Sen. Greive: Like I've said on so many things, now you're in an area where I wasn't present, and I don't know what happened. It seems logical that happened, but I learned it for the first time when I read this account.

Ms. Boswell: It seems to me that all along the way Grant is still a wild card. He has his own agenda and his own bill.

Sen. Greive: He wants whatever is going to be a compromise, and that's fine. But it has to be the Grant compromise or the Grant bill. And the only way he could displace me and what I was doing was to say that he was cutting it short, and he beat me out of it. He said, "Let me do it, and we'll win. We're going to win. We'll get new seats." Now, that wasn't accurate. He couldn't do that—it couldn't happen—but then that's what he said. I wasn't present when he said it because he said it in caucus, and it was reported to me.

Ms. Boswell: Now you, ultimately, presented this referendum bill that Klein had suggested. How did the Republicans feel about that? What happened there?

Sen. Greive: They were quite concerned. They said they weren't concerned; they said the court would knock it over. They were confident that they had the necessary approval. Our answer, of course, was, "Okay, even if they put their own plan forward next time, and people pass that plan, it won't replace this plan." But, traditionally, it isn't a popular issue.

Ms. Boswell: But the referendum bill did pass, right? It passed in the House?

Sen. Greive: Yes.

Ms. Boswell: McCurdy refers to, at this point, a speech that you gave. I wondered if you

remembered this. It was a speech to some Chamber of Commerce group where you satirized the whole proceedings, and you and Gorton, I guess, in the humor of it, got together a little bit. What happened? Do you remember that?*

**The state Chamber of Commerce, in planning their annual visit to the Legislature, had invited Greive and Gorton to address them on redistricting. Both had accepted, and at the lunch on Saturday, February 13, Greive satirized his and Gorton's role. The touch of humor lightened relations between the two redistricting leaders. Together they walked back to the Capitol, reminiscing about their redistricting battle. The light talk continued for two hours in Greive's office.*

McCurdy: 96

Sen. Greive: McCurdy attaches more importance to that than I do. I remember it very keenly. I forget what I did to satirize, but we had all kinds of funny material, and I made fun of both of us. Gorton laughed, and I laughed, and we walked out together and sat down and talked and had a cordial conversation. But, at that time, I didn't realize the extent that Gorton was blocking everything. I always felt, somehow, that there was a way around it.

Ms. Boswell: But that talk, then, in that instance, didn't really change much?

Sen. Greive: I didn't think it changed that much, at all. I'm not in Gorton's shoes or

McCurdy's shoes, so when it comes to that I don't know.

Ms. Boswell: Right after that conversation, evidently, you had tried again to negotiate with Copeland and also Marshall Neill, but Gorton had come instead. Do you remember that incident?*

**...Greive sent for Copeland and Neill for a continuation of the hotel talks. Gorton intercepted the message and went himself. The two discussed how to map the seven-seven-two arrangement for Seattle-King County. All earlier attempts to draw this required the destruction of one of the existing Democratic districts. Now Gorton proposed a weird bird-shaped district, with a major Republican stronghold in the beak and a scattering of Democratic outposts in the body. By wedging the bird onto the Seattle district map, the seven-seven-two scheme could be achieved without disturbing the political complexion of the surrounding districts.*

McCurdy: 97

Sen. Greive: Yes. I don't know how that negotiation took place. The only time Neill came was when he was appointed by somebody to come. In any event, it sounded like it was a conference committee. That's when I told you that Marshall Neill said I had to understand his position; he couldn't go against a sitting governor. He said, "He's our governor. Nobody in their right mind would challenge him."

Ms. Boswell: Again, it appears that at least you were moving somewhat toward a compromise in something that, essentially, at least by McCurdy, was called "seven, seven and two." And that was that in some of the districts in question there would be seven Republican, seven Democratic and then two swing districts?

Sen. Greive: A lot of things I don't remember. He wrote them down when they were fresh, and it's been twenty years now. But my recollection, and what I expect I was saying at the time, was that Gorton wanted to make everything swing districts. Well, obviously, I wasn't going to do that under any circumstances. And so then the next question was, "What do we do with the different districts?" Finally, we decided on the seven-seven-two arrangement. It was Seattle we were talking about, or King County.

Ms. Boswell: Seattle was one of the ones that was up for grabs?

Sen. Greive: Seattle had a lot of districts in it. It's big enough that pretty near all the districts are partly in Seattle, or Seattle had an effect on them, certainly. The only exceptions were some eastern King County districts, and some southern districts, Auburn, Kent and so forth. We finally decided that we'd have seven, seven and we'd have two swing districts. Since I don't remember very well the details of that, I could very well have agreed to that.

One of those districts would be Mary Ellen McCaffree's, the Thirty-second, and we all knew it was a swing district before. My argument to the Democrats was, "Well, it was a swing district, and it's still a swing district."

Ms. Boswell: I think that one of the districts was Grant's district, or at least that came to be an issue.

Sen. Greive: In those days—and I think even today—parts of the south end are pretty Republican. They have a lot of airline pilots and horse owners, who tend to be Republican, and you put that with the small town, the backbone Main Street thing, and it was a close district. I think Grant’s was one of the districts, but I don’t know how important that was. Could be. I might have had a motive there, but somebody would have to refresh my memory.

Ms. Boswell: One of the things that I think happened, ultimately, was that some—particularly O’Brien and Schaefer—decided that they wanted to try to break some of the deadlocks by calling a formal conference committee, which you didn’t object to. So Evans moderated, or at least stepped in, and this conference committee met with him. The committee included from the Senate, Democrats Greive, Gissberg, and Bob Bailey and Republicans Moriarty, Neill, and Ryder. From the House were Democrats Schaefer, O’Brien, and Brouillet, and from the Republicans, Gorton, Copeland, and Goldsworthy.” At least, again, according to McCurdy, that committee was able to agree on a pretty large segment of what had been compromised.*

**On Tuesday afternoon, February 16, an army of legislators descended upon the Governor’s office. From the Senate came Democrats Greive, Gissberg, Washington, and caucus chairman Robert C. Bailey (Pacific County), and Republicans Moriarity, Neill, and John N. Ryder (Seattle). From the House came Democrats Schaefer, O’Brien, and Frank B. Brouillet (Puyallup), and Republicans Gorton, Copeland, and Robert*

Goldsworthy (Whitman County). Moos, busy selling the new Republican bill, did not attend, and Grant was not invited.

For two hours they talked. O’Brien insisted on a conference committee, but Gorton, Greive, and Evans talked district lines. District by district they ratified the progress that had been made earlier—the more definite agreements for the rural districts and Tacoma and the general plan for Seattle. Evans played the true mediator, proposing solutions, arbitrating, reconciling, interposing.

All this seemed to represent genuine progress.

McCurdy: 98-99

Sen. Greive: It’s always pretty easy to until you get down to the bottom, and then you have your trouble.

Ms. Boswell: Right. And it was that bottom ten percent or so that was really difficult. It appears that drawing the district lines themselves was a real sticking point. You could accept in principle the districts, but drawing the lines was difficult.

Sen. Greive: Yes.*

**Only a few districts seemed to prevent a final compromise. Other differences would surely have appeared had the legislators taken time to scrutinize all their agreements, but in*

continued on the following page

continued from the previous page

the haste of the negotiations only these five controversies stood out:

- 1) *The Thirty-second District in North Seattle...*
- 2) *The new Twenty-first District, to be carved out of the suburbs between Everett and Seattle...*
- 3) *The Fifth District in Spokane and its precinct and one-half.*
- 4) *The Twelfth District of Chelan and Douglas Counties...*
- 5) *The Sixteenth District in the Tri-Cities area....*

McCurdy: 101

Ms. Boswell: According, again to McCurdy, there were five real sticky districts or areas that were really holding back that last ten percent. One was the Thirty-second District in North Seattle. Could you tell me a little about some of these issues?

Sen. Greive: The Thirty-second had a bigger problem. Wes Uhlman came from that district, and he was a pretty good player in his own right. Then, eventually, Pete Francis. But, Mary Ellen McCaffree came from that district, and she was the pet of Gorton. McCurdy wasn't his chief assistant—it was Mary Ellen McCaffree, as I understand it. She had a lot more influence than anybody else. She actually did a lot of the drafting work and the head work. But she never surfaced in every effort to negotiate with her. Gorton made all the decisions, but she, we understood, was the motivation, and he was very anxious to protect her.

See, her husband was a professor of economics or something at the university—I

think it was economics. And her great friend was Lois North, whose husband at that time—they're since divorced—was a professor of economics. Lois North's and Mary Ellen McCaffree's districts came right next to the university, and that was partly in the University District.

Ms. Boswell: Then another sticking point was the new Twenty-first District, which was carved out of parts of Seattle and Everett?

Sen. Greive: Yes. Well, that's a district that was a line between King and Snohomish County, in both districts, and we always assumed it would be Republican, although it wasn't that Republican. It grew more Democratic. But, I think it's had more Republican representation than Democratic. Ray Van Hollebeke was there for two terms as a senator. I think Everett had a Republican senator then; they have a Democratic senator now, I think. But it was a strange area, and we just didn't know what was going to happen. It had the people in the north part of Lake Washington.

Ms. Boswell: The third of these areas under discussion was the Fifth District in Spokane. I think that is where you had some Senate friends.

Sen. Greive: Cooney was very close to me, and he also was very active in the redistricting. He knew what was going on. As I recall it was a split district, and had one Republican and one Democratic representative, and the Democratic senator was John Cooney. They had a Democratic House member called McCormick—that's not the McCormack from central Washington—that's Bill McCormick. And then they had a fellow by the name of Jerry Saling who was a Republican. It was a close district.

It might have been a controversy with us, but, apparently, if you believe McCurdy—and I wasn't there—he says that Evans had a deal with McCormick to protect him. When we finally got to our final compromise, when it got down to one or two districts, we called them down and Evans wanted to speak to McCormick privately, and they did. So, McCormick had a private conversation with him, and reminded him that he had a promise—that he'd promised to protect that district.

I didn't know anything about that, and I still don't. I just took it from the detail McCurdy gave in his account.

Ms. Boswell: Now, the fourth of these controversial districts was the Twelfth District, which was Chelan and Douglas counties.

Sen. Greive: The argument there was that we were putting two districts together, and who got the number. We knew what was going to happen, and we agreed on it.

Ms. Boswell: I see. And then, finally, the last one was the Sixteenth District, which was the Tri-Cities area.

Sen. Greive: I don't know why. I could tell you that there were all kinds of problems with that, from time to time. What the particular problem was at that moment, I don't know. A lot will depend on what's left over when you did some of the districts. You see, Pasco is very Democratic. Richland tends to be Republican. And what's the other one? Kennewick tended to be in the middle, probably a little Democratic. But, you see, that isn't the whole of it because you have the surrounding area. The surrounding area was made up of farm owners, and they tend to be Republican. But it was, basically, a

Democratic area. If you could break off Kennewick from Pasco, or Pasco from Kennewick, why then it would be Republican.

That was McCormack—the other McCormack—Senator Mike McCormack's district. That was one of the reasons he got interested. He was concerned about his own skin, as we all were.

Ms. Boswell: Once these problem areas had been identified, Evans, I think, tries to set up a meeting whereby the leadership gets together. Gissberg refused to attend; you wanted to try to compromise by dividing the differences in half. I think that began a whole new stage in the process, trying to come up with a compromise.

Sen. Greive: In the first place, I don't agree with his characterization of Evans, that he sat there as a fair arbiter, or that he put it together. You had to look at the players.

Ms. Boswell: I wondered about that strategy and where it came from?

Sen. Greive: I think that I was responsible for that. Now, part of my problem was that I had all kinds of problems back in my caucus, where I wasn't winning anything. We now controlled two houses; we were in control of redistricting. What are we doing? Let Dan Evans veto another one. I could be wrong on that—it was a long time ago.

Ms. Boswell: No. I'm sure you're right on that. One of the things that McCurdy mentions is that in this process, an aide of Gorton's goes and completes a version of this compromise where you draw out these boundaries. Later, again according to McCurdy, you accuse them of "fast penciling" on certain districts.*

see McCurdy quote on the following page

**All that afternoon and night Gorton's aide rushed to complete a draft of the Republican version of the compromise. When it was finished, he gave it to Greive and his aide and told them how to rewrite the plan in the five disputed areas. Greive accepted the ready-made draft. Later he accused Gorton of "fast-penciling" him on the lines of a few supposedly undisputed districts. In fact, those districts were then undisputed, but the agreement on them was usually vague enough that had Greive and Gorton drawn their own bills, slight differences would have appeared. Enough slight differences would collapse the compromise; that was the reason why Gorton's aide was so anxious to draw the final bill.*

McCurdy: 103

Sen. Greive: I remember that. We agreed in principle, and we described what it would be. I didn't think there was any aide in the room. I think that Evans drew it, but somebody sketched it out, and then the question became who would put that down in writing? Now, McCurdy may have been in the room, I can't remember, but anyway, they were going to draw something for us to look at. When they came back, it looked like the same district, but when we got down to doing the final drafts, they had altered it a bit. The streets make a big difference, you see.

This was in King County, too, where we were disagreeing. There were a lot of big populations. We felt that he weakened the districts. In fact, I don't remember exactly what we did, but I know darn well that I was convinced at the time that they had played with

the districts after we had agreed, and I was pretty disgusted. We should have drawn it, but they kind of wanted to do it, and it was all right with me.

Ms. Boswell: When you say "fast penciled," did that mean that they just didn't draw what you'd agreed on? Is that right?

Sen. Greive: Yes. In other words, their version maybe looked like it. There's always a possibility in a thing like this that I called "fast penciled," that they may have made a human error. I think they tried to skim it a little here and there in order to improve their position.

Ms. Boswell: One of the other interesting things that happens at this same time was that you are calling people in and telling them, "Here's what it looks like now." One of the people who came in was Jack Dootson, and one of the districts at issue, the Twenty-first, was going to be carved out of Dootson's. Again, according to McCurdy, he just said, "Do what you want," and was surprised that his district was at issue.*

**By the next morning...most of the controversy over the Twenty-first District disappeared as soon as Evans called Dootson into his office and explained the problem. Dootson was astonished. He admonished the Governor not to let this suspend the fate of what seemed to be an honorable compromise. "Do whatever you want with my district," he told Evans, "I am sure it will be the right thing."*

McCurdy: 104

Sen. Greive: In all my time in the Legislature, I met some screwballs, and one of the best screwballs was Jack Dootson. He had a lot of idiosyncrasies. He seemed to march to a different drummer. He was a railroad engineer who didn't get along with his union, but he was kind of a popular, affable guy, and he got elected. He was very loyal to the governor. He thought the governor was a great guy. Evans had his friend there, so he got the governor's vote. I, of course, didn't know he said that, but I heard that he said it. This isn't the first I've ever heard of it. But I don't know whether I believed it. Dootson—you just took care to make sure he was okay. He might do anything.

Ms. Boswell: As it turned out, he lost the next election, so he may have just talked himself out of a job.

Sen. Greive: That very well could be. And I can't say that I had any bad motives. He may have really believed that was the right thing to do. Of course, you've got to put his character in there, and as a footnote that he wasn't typical at all.

Ms. Boswell: You were having trouble with your caucus. In fact, McCurdy called it a "blood bath." O'Brien was accusing you of having given in and of trying to protect the Senate, but not the House. I guess that's how it went.*

**The two Republican senators walked back into what they described as a "Democratic blood bath." O'Brien and Schaefer had grown furiously suspicious that the bill protected Greive's Senate faction in exchange for relinquishing control of the House to*

the Republicans. Senators and representatives run in the same district, Greive had retorted; "This is your own senator you are protecting."

McCurdy: 104

Sen. Greive: It sounded good when you said it, but it's got all kinds of parts to it. We had a blood bath, no question. Anytime they brought up redistricting—I don't have to say which one—if I had a plan, it was a blood bath because people began to look at their own districts and were critical. About this time the people who were on the other side that had their own plans—incidentally, most of which I learned from McCurdy's thesis, I didn't know about it—they challenged me and said that it wasn't liberal enough, and that I'd given things away. I explained it away.

When my caucus was all over, I had a majority of the votes without any problem, at that point. I just knew so much more about it, and, in most cases, I had Dean Foster, or whoever it was, in there explaining it, so that I didn't take the burden of it. They explained what it did and didn't do. And we'd been fair with them, so we did pretty well.

However, that didn't wash with John O'Brien. O'Brien didn't know about redistricting; all he understood was the shifting of power. You understand, I'm friendly to O'Brien. After that, when he ran for office, I contributed to his campaign. I gave him one hundred dollars two or three times when I thought he was in trouble. I'm not against him, but his whole life was that you either won or you lost. There was nothing in between. There was no such thing as halfway. Now, he was saying, "Take care of the House

members—the House members.”

I never could understand that argument, really. To me it was so asinine. Why even bother to mention it? You take care of everybody because there may be a few instances where somebody wants a piece of territory that they were particularly popular in. That could have happened a few times. But, basically, we weren’t looking at it that way.

O’Brien really wanted to reassert himself in the House. I really believe that when he left—the man-made Speaker as it were—he just figured that he’d be the Speaker the next time. He was the House. He was the leader, and it wasn’t somebody else. He was a part of most of the decisions. He, number one, didn’t want us to get redistricting. Number two, it may very well be that he wasn’t as capable as some of the House members. But I don’t know whether those House members could back it up with figures.

Everybody that looks at his own district says, “Oh, damn it all, you’ve done me in.” We had all kinds of complaints that weren’t logical. We’d always said, “Well, let’s look at the figures.” The other problem is that I wasn’t in that caucus, and I didn’t have anybody, really, to represent my point of view, or the point of view of the statistics we had. So, you could say almost anything, and nobody could challenge it.

Ms. Boswell: Could Hayes Elder have played that role?

Sen. Greive: Well, really that wasn’t the wise thing to do. He’s dead now, but at that time, we thought about Hayes as having a bright future and being governor or something, someday. Why should he get into the middle of a blood bath with the people? When I needed him, he came through.

Ms. Boswell: Now, in your own Senate

caucus, you had pretty stiff opposition from Mike Gallagher, Martin Durkan, and others.

Sen. Greive: Durkan and I had never gotten along too well. Gallagher—you never knew what he was going to do, but he had to win. No such thing as a compromise to him.

Ms. Boswell: And they had, evidently, secretly or not so secretly, approached Evans with their own ideas about some plans, too.

Sen. Greive: That’s par for the course. Everybody approached everybody with secret ideas. We weren’t above doing that, either. In other words, some things are legitimate, part of the game. If they had a better plan, and they thought they could secretly make a deal with Evans, they probably should have. I didn’t like it. I felt that we could agree with them, but that doesn’t mean that was wrong. But the thing is—I was always comfortable in this—I didn’t figure anybody was going to come up with any better deal because they would have had to deal with the same forces I dealt with. You can imagine if they’d come with that plan fresh, then all the people that we’d taken care of would be up in arms and saying, “You haven’t taken care of me; you haven’t taken care of me.” They’d have to start all over and negotiate it.

Ms. Boswell: How did you meet their objections? I read in the McCurdy book that you prepared to submit the bill, and the senators locked themselves in the basement to talk about it.*

**To review Greive’s bill the senators abandoned their chambers and locked themselves in a basement hearing*

room, barring all but senators and staff. Those locked out included some very angry newsmen. District by district Greive and his staff explained their bill, and district by district Senator Gallagher questioned, embarrassed, and harassed. Gallagher spoke as the chief opponent of the bill, frustrating the supporters, stalling the proceedings, trying to force Greive to lose his temper and his control of the meeting. Laboriously Greive continued to explain the bill. Each senator received his due recognition, until all forty-nine districts had been explained. The senators filed back to the Senate floor.

McCurdy: 107

Sen. Greive: That sounds a lot different than it was. I had two offices in those days. I had one upstairs that the leadership had because I was a leader, and I never frequented it. I had somebody up there to answer the telephone. My offices were down in a little place I'd had for years—a little, little corner room with a round table in it. I met down there and did all my negotiating. We had a big room next to us with a bunch of tables where we'd just pull our maps out. It was a real good-sized room. It could almost be a ballroom if you took the chairs out. And that was the basement. So, when they talk about the basement, they talked about the room next to my office.

And we did get them in and locked the doors because we were always afraid of somebody running out and telling everyone something different. And so it was pretty much agreed by everybody that we'd have our caucus down there because we could lock the door and keep the press out. And we could

also watch the guys who were running to tell them—such as Dr. Cowen—he was always a great one to go and tell everybody what was going on.

Ms. Boswell: I see. There's an indication that you, literally, had to go district by district and explain exactly what you'd done.

Sen. Greive: That's what I did. We went down, and then we could also answer any questions if somebody wanted. As we were going through it, if they would want to know why, we could just stop and explain why. Or it might be, in some cases, that we said, "When you see it, what do you think?" It happened in the Forty-fourth District because the district had some of the same questions. We had numbers on them, like the Forty-fifth might be in between the Thirteenth and the Fourteenth, because we were taking districts from one place to another and the numbers were so important to see who ran when. And so, we'd say, "We can't discuss this now, but that will come out when we get to the other side. Then we can do something."

Ms. Boswell: It seemed that at this point you had, you thought, enough votes that it went to the floor, and one Republican who had agreed to go along had left to go talk to someone—I think to Gorton, perhaps—and as a result, the opposition was able to get an adjournment. Do you remember that particular situation?

Sen. Greive: Yes. I have a feeling that the person, at that point, was Perry Woodall. He and I were very close friends. And we used to go to leadership conferences together with our wives, and I was protecting him all the time. He hated to be the only guy on the spot because he'd been the floor leader the time before. I suspect that's who it was, but I don't remember. I know we were short a vote. But, I suspect it was him. He felt too much on the

spot. He may have talked to me, and I was probably the kind of guy that would have said, “Okay, take a walk this time, but we’ll get you on the final passage.”

Ms. Boswell: Then, as a result of that, you have to go back to the drawing board, especially, as I understand it, in the Thirty-second District. That seemed to be one of the big, key problems.

Sen. Greive: Everybody knew it. That wasn’t a secret problem. It was a problem because there wasn’t a senator there that understood redistricting. A few didn’t know anything; they just knew about their districts. That was the issue. And that’s what made it so hard to give in on.

Ms. Boswell: In terms of all the strategizing that’s going on—Republicans had their version of the compromise, and you’ve got O’Brien and Schaefer lobbying in certain areas. Then you’ve got Web Hallauer, too, and it seems as though Hallauer is trying to get some deals going on his own.

Sen. Greive: Actually, Mike McCormack fronted for it, but Hallauer was the force. Hallauer, by nature, wanted to run things. It’s the type of guy he is. He’s a very successful businessman, probably the most successful businessman in the Senate at that time. He made it on his own. He was just a bossy type. I don’t think his motives were bad.

Ms. Boswell: One of the things that McCurdy mentions again and again is a “scalping” strategy. I wondered if you would explain to me what that actually means.*

**Greive now began to twist the old “scalping” strategy, originally designed to focus on the “new breed” Republicans as a final, automatic vote. But it was now the House Democrats who would bury any new bill. Greive searched through the Senate redistricting committee and found H.B. 196, Grant’s original bill, and prepared to scalp it with the compromise.*

McCurdy: 111

Sen. Greive: That means you come out with one bill and put another bill in its place, or an amendment in place, that changes the whole thing. If you want to put in some language that makes a big change in it, you just scalp that and put it on as an amendment.

Ms. Boswell: So you put, literally, a whole different bill on it?

Sen. Greive: You can do that, or you can put in an amendment. McCurdy is talking about a whole bill. Add a number and that solves that. There were lots of stories about things like that—people who ended up with their names on bills that they didn’t want to be on. It was embarrassing to them. Occasionally, it was even done deliberately. They did that one time to Rosellini, so he said that any Catholic school had to be approved by the Superintendent of Public Instruction. They tried to put his name on it because they were mad at him. Al took on the whole Senate—that was when we had the Futile Fifteen, only

fifteen of us. And he took them on. He spoke and got it in the paper and made such an issue out of it that he turned the whole thing around, and they struck his name off.

Ms. Boswell: It sounds like in this particular circumstance, Grant's bill that's still floating around gets scalped with the compromise bill.

Sen. Greive: You have to have a vehicle. The bill comes over to you; you scalp it. It really means that you amend it—only in this case you wrote a whole new bill and sent it back to them.

Ms. Boswell: You have this potential compromise. You've still got the Thirty-second that's a sticking point. They evidently are able, I think, on the floor to get a vote on the Thirty-second to go their way. But, then, at least according to McCurdy, you retaliated with a revision of the Thirty-first. One change, again, begets another.*

**The redistricting committee met Monday evening. Greive was ready with his strategy. Only the Thirty-second District stood in the way of a final settlement, and as soon as the committee convened Ryder and Neill moved to add three heavily Republican precincts to the Thirty-second District. Ryder stressed that if the precincts were left out, Republicans would fight the bill all the way...Greive announced that the new Republican advantage must be matched. The Thirty-first District in South Seattle was not Democratic enough, he said, adding that the Republicans had "fast-penciled him and drawn it "swing."...Greive, insisting on another advantage,*

proposed to subdivide the Thirty-second District, insuring that one of its two representatives would almost always be a Democrat. Again the Republicans objected; again they were defeated.

McCurdy: 112

Sen. Greive: I don't remember. I remember the incident. I was there, and I remember vividly fighting with Gallagher and various things. What it looks to me now, looking back—but I'm not sure of this—what I did was, I was prepared for that situation. We lost on that one issue, and I immediately had an amendment all ready just to plaster and change the south end. So I moved that we change the nature of the Thirty-first. And, of course, it was a bonus to our side that we had to win. If we were going to lose in the Thirty-second, we were going to gain in the Thirty-first. The Republicans had pledged votes for their one compromise, but they hadn't thought of me making a move the other way. Now, that's what it looks like to me from this vantage point. That may not be accurate. I don't know how I could have scalped it that fast. I would have had to think up a whole different process to do it. But, I might have done it, and we may have done the rest of it overnight.

Ms. Boswell: It sounded like it was right in the same time. Gissberg was still fighting you on the floor pretty ferociously at that point, as well.

Sen. Greive: I don't know what that was about. I think, probably, he wanted to see the shift of powers, and he thought that if they had one with their name on it that would have protected Hallauer and done in some of my people.

I don't have a clear picture now of what Hallauer and McCormack's bill did. I know that we attacked it and that we were able to say that it was wrong, but you see, at that particular point, people figured I knew what I was talking about. So I don't remember what I said at the time. We could almost look at districts and know what they were; we'd been at it for two whole years.

Ms. Boswell: And then Robert Charette steps in, too. Can you tell me about him and what he was trying to accomplish?*

**Senator Robert L. Charette (Dem., Aberdeen) brought out a copy of the old Governor's bill and moved to substitute it for the compromise. The senators, Charette accused, were motivated by nothing but interest in their own districts. Since that was how the game was played, he said, he was presenting the one bill that "best takes care of me." He added that Greive had sold out for personal gain, and "as long as the Democratic Party has been sold a bill of goods, we might as well go all the way with Dan."*

McCurdy: 115

Sen. Greive: Okay. There were some shifts made down in Bailey's district. And Bailey picked up a considerable amount of territory because he had a small district, and he was a senator. But that district number was floating around, so that area had two senators until the next election. Same problem we talked about with Hallauer. Charette got elected for the unexpired term, so there were two senators from the same district.

So Charette was a loose cannon. He never said anything, hardly, and then finally it came to light. It was always a smarting under that because it was understood that Bailey was going to be the senator, and they wouldn't run against each other. And Charette's district was going to be eliminated, and he was going to be out. He wasn't a bit happy about it. But, what could he do? He couldn't be against the hero from his district because Bailey was very powerful. That was just his response to the thing. I don't know that it was very significant because he did run. Actually, what he did, he went back and ran for the House and became floor leader of the House. Very competent guy. And then after that, he was a judge. He's dead now.

Ms. Boswell: At this point, you can't predict what he'll do. In this case, he brought out the governor's bill again, which had been long dead.

Sen. Greive: Charette was never a friend of mine, and I never quite understood why. Probably because I was entrenched with the people who were there, and he was only going to be there one term. At that particular point I was supporting Bailey in whatever he wanted.

Ms. Boswell: It sounds like at that point, the Democrats were just going at each other, wildly though, trying to get their say and get their due.

Sen. Greive: You see, O'Brien said I gave in to the governor and that the governor and I made a deal. Gorton was there, but the governor was not, and they said I'd sold them out. That was the argument I had to try to stave off. I couldn't very well do it publicly because if I said, "We got this," or "We got that," why then I'd be in the press. So, you had to take it or say it behind closed doors. It was very sensitive. If you made the

Republicans mad, and they thought they were done in—well, the average House member didn't understand what was going on anymore than the senators did. They knew their district. That's the only thing they knew or they knew a little bit about a couple of districts around them. And they had to take a lot of it on faith. If I said, "Boys, let's get this thing; we've done them in," why then if that got in the press the whole thing would blow up. So, you had to take criticism from that, too.

Ms. Boswell: Sounds like such a thankless job. So, then you've got a compromise that is really close, but the Senate didn't vote for it, right? You had this compromise pretty well set up and then the other members shot it down?

Sen. Greive: Yes.

Ms. Boswell: Then you and Gorton, essentially, have to move together because you want to get this going. The court then, all of a sudden, intervenes?

Sen. Greive: First of all, you have to understand the situation. We had this agreement more or less, and I had my own group, which went just wild when they heard the news. And you had O'Brien and the House members all wild. On the other hand, where else were we to turn? We had enough Republican votes to put the thing together, so finally, we had a vote and it lost. Well, there were several of those people, I was convinced, that if we could have extended the session, would have turned around and changed their vote. See, their argument in the caucus was that we could get more—always you can get more, get more, get more. "We'll get it. We're going to win, going to win." They figured they weren't winning. But if it was voted down, they might change their minds, but then

they failed to call them back in session.

Ms. Boswell: Now, doesn't the court, at this point, say, "We want to have a meeting," and they put the fear of God in you.

Sen. Greive: Everything from the court came on high. If there were any negotiations, we weren't a part of it. John O'Connell might have been. I doubt if Gorton was. Court judges just decide things and tell you.

Ms. Boswell: But they had decided, I think, at this point in the negotiations, that they wanted to have a meeting and that everybody was going to get together. And the implication was that they were tired of all this messing around, and they were going to do something themselves. It sounded like it put the pressure on to get the final negotiations under way; a feeling among the legislators that, "If we don't get this done, now, we're going to be in trouble."

With that pressure, the Senate and the House took up the compromise bill one more time. What happened?

Mr. Greive: We got the bill passed.

It took the Legislature forty-seven days to agree on a redistricting bill. On February 26, 1965, Governor Evans signed Engrossed House Bill 196, originally sponsored by Representatives Gary Grant and Hayes Elder. But HB 196 was a compromise bill resulting from extensive negotiations between legislators—the final version looked quite different from the original bill presented by Representatives Grant and Elder.

Though legislators had a reason to celebrate the signing of their redistricting bill, final passage was not an unequivocal success; Washington State Assistant Attorney

General Phillip Austin had to defend the plan—specifically the population figures by district—in court. The court reluctantly ruled to uphold the legislators’ plan, and issued with their ruling the reminder that the plan would do only until 1971. In that year legislators would be required by the state constitution to redistrict using the 1970

census figures. Meanwhile, Washington’s population was rapidly growing. Thus, though the 1965 session adequately resolved the immediate redistricting problem, the solution was only temporary. The nature of Washington’s redistricting laws meant future legislative members would have to go through the whole process again.