



### **R.R. "Bob" Greive**

R.R. "Bob" Greive began his political career in 1946 at the age of twenty-seven when he won his first election for the state senate. A Democrat from West Seattle representing the Thirty-Fourth District, Greive quickly moved up in his party's leadership ranks. He was an active campaigner and fundraiser for fellow Democrats and ultimately served sixteen years as the Senate majority leader. Greive's attention to detail and dedication to his political goals also made him a master of the redistricting process. Over three decades he served as "Mr. Redistricting" for the Democrats in the Legislature.

Read the full text of an interview with Senator Greive, [\*R.R. "Bob" Greive: An Oral History\*](#), on the Oral History Program's Web site.

**Ms. Boswell:** When you got into it, having been through it once before, did you look forward to it? Did you enjoy doing it?

**Sen. Greive:** I don't know. I probably did or I wouldn't have put that kind of effort into it. When I think of it now, it was like a task that just went with the job. I used to tell the fellows on the second time around that I was their business agent, and I had to look out for them. That's what they elect you for. Somebody had to have that responsibility, and either I had to do it myself or have somebody that I trusted to work at it. I figured I'd work as hard as anyone else.

**Ms. Boswell:** And that you did, right? Tell me how you set up this whole second redistricting effort. How was it organized?

**Sen. Greive:** In the first place, I had a very close friend who was very independent—a guy named John McCutcheon. He was chairman of the committee that dealt with redistricting, I think. But essentially I was in charge of redistricting. But when there's somebody like that, you don't just take over his functions. You let him function as publicly as much as you can.

My ally from Eastern Washington, John Cooney, was the chairman the first time around in 1957, and McCutcheon was the chair in 1961. Cooney was very interested in redistricting. He was very fearful of it. And you had to have somebody that would get along with you and do what you wanted. It had to be somebody that you could sit down and reason with because even though it looks like, in a situation like this, that you're making all the decisions, in reality you're making decisions after you talked and sounded out how your friends felt. How many votes you had, and all of the considerations you had to

take in any move you made. You didn't just function independently.

**Ms. Boswell:** So, you operated your office, and then said what you were thinking to these people?

**Sen. Greive:** I set up a staff of people, and we set out to know more than anybody else did about the districts—how many people were in them, where they were, and so forth. You'd go through exercises—you'd clip a little here and you'd put a little there—and all that has a ripple effect in other parts of the state. We began to make redistricting bills out of it, to construct them and talk about it, and see how many votes we could get. We'd have people overseeing what they wanted to do. It was an intensive, one-on-one situation. They talked to me—everybody in the Legislature talked to me or my staff at one time or another—because you just couldn't do it without them. I was always convinced—I'm not sure that I was right in that—but that if they wanted to stay in office and, if you had something reasonable and took care of the people sitting in those seats, that you could do it. How, I don't know.

What happens is that you get all kinds of by-play; people used these as vehicles for other things and that becomes a part of the whole story.

Let's be clear: there's no great political profit as far as the people outside the capitol are concerned in working on redistricting. You don't get any stars in back of your name in West Seattle or in Ballard or Cheney or Vancouver because you're on redistricting. It's an in-house sort of function.

**Ms. Boswell:** If so much of your time and attention was devoted to redistricting, did it take away from the issues that would have been more popular with the voters?

**Sen. Greive:** As a practical matter, I've always figured I worked twice as hard as anyone else, so I didn't have to worry about that. You get up in the morning and you go to sleep at night, and in between, you work.

**Ms. Boswell:** So, you didn't think that redistricting really took away from that? It was just an addition to your other duties?

**Sen. Greive:** I didn't think of it in those terms. When you've been there for quite awhile—as far as the floor leader part of the thing—an awful lot of that is somebody else's ideas that are being pushed. What you're doing is scheduling and controlling the flow as much as you can. What you're doing is trying to rub off the rough edges, and on the big issues, you're trying to work out coalitions and things like that. But the issues aren't all new. It isn't something you haven't heard of before. They're issues that you're familiar with because you've been living with them.

From one session of the Legislature to the next, there are issues that look an awful lot like the ones that came before. You have budget problems, maybe in a little different place, and you have social problems—usually the same social problems of abortion, or free choice, or whatever it is, still left over from the last session. So it isn't something new that's going to hit you out of the blue. If it is, you have to get in a study—if it's workman's compensation or unemployment compensation. You have the advantage there that the other people on the floor don't know as much as you do. So if you've got a particular problem like that, then you have to sit down and learn about that one.

**Ms. Boswell:** There was a group of dissident Democrats at that time who switched sides. Can you tell me about that and the whole fight over the Speakership?\*

*\*The House Democrats caucused two weeks after the November election. John O'Brien was renominated as Speaker, but two dissident Democrats, William S. Day (Spokane) and Robert A. Perry (Seattle), insisted that they would never vote for O'Brien. Their announcement was an outgrowth of a series of conflicts between O'Brien and the dissidents, each generating irreconcilable hostilities, many purely personal. O'Brien's opponents tried to deny him renomination as Speaker in 1961 and, after a protracted battle, had failed by only a single vote. This time [1963] the Democratic margin in the House was so tenuous—two members—that the dissidents could deadlock the election of Speaker simply by withholding their votes.*

*The Republicans, relegated to the minority position, were keenly interested in the conflict. Ever since the 1961 session, when they had teamed with the dissidents, particularly on behalf of private power legislation, the "new breed" had closely followed the split and had met occasionally with Perry. In November Perry, Slade Gorton, and the "new breed" chief strategist, Joel Pritchard (Seattle) agreed to secretly bring together the dissidents and the Republican House leaders.*

*The group met at Gorton's home in early December. The dissidents claimed support from six Democrats and sympathy from a dozen others. All agreed that O'Brien should not be Speaker. The only viable alternative seemed to be election of one of their own. The Republicans were tempted to*

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*put Evans in the Speaker's chair, but feared the "old guard" representatives would not support such a potentially unstable arrangement. The consensus settled on Day. He was gregarious, well-respected, and might generate support from many who would vote for O'Brien.*

*For their part in the coalition, the Republicans requested full control of the House redistricting machinery, plus "some" committee chairmanships and half the membership of the powerful House Rules Committee. The dissidents, in turn, were promised control of the Legislative Council—Washington's interim legislative committee—and assured continuing support from all forty-eight Republicans.*

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**Sen. Greive:** First of all, part of the reason they called me an independent is that I retained a good relationship with those fellows. I figured that we had to have all the Democrats or we wouldn't get anywhere. It was painful to me when they split off, but I didn't have any choice over it.

John O'Brien was one of the toughest and most capable people that Olympia has ever known. He was something else again, and he liked to run things with an iron hand. He was never very fond of me because I was way too independent for him. He kind of felt that the Senate should be a part of his domain, which we never were willing to accept. But, nevertheless, he was an awfully capable and bright man, and usually right.

Let's put it this way, only O'Brien ever

got elected Speaker three times. As Speaker you have a temporary coalition of people, but it's awfully hard to keep that together from one year to another. It's easier in the Senate to keep a group of folks together because they run every four years. You only have half of them.

Number two: we had a crack political operation with which we helped our candidates a lot more than they did. We controlled their advertising and helped them get elected. Nothing like that existed in the House at that time. And so it was just one of those things, almost inevitable, that you won't serve as Speaker for so many times because there are other ambitious people.

**Ms. Boswell:** Who was part of this dissident group that formed after the '61 session?

**Sen. Greive:** The private power interests organized this particular dissident group, I think, more than anything else. As I look down at them, Day was a private power man, McCormick was a private power man, Mrs. Hurley was private power, Bob Perry was private power, Kink up in Bellingham was voting with the private power. So, they were all pretty much private power people.

In those days, Washington Water Power was by far the most powerful lobby in Olympia. They were more generous with campaign contributions, and they had better lobbyists. It comes and it goes, but this was their finest hour as far as influence. Public power was pretty much on O'Brien's side. I think that there was some ambition involved there with Evans, too. The two got very competitive, and so forth.

But in any event, Bob Perry eventually went to the penitentiary for income tax evasion, but he was another very, very capable man who knew what he wanted. He was in labor, in the electrician's union, when I knew him initially. He got in the Legislature, and

he got on Washington Water Power's payroll, and he got to be their spokesman. Now I know all that because it came out in the subsequent trial, and they were pretty much supporting him. But he also had a lot of organizing ability. He figured they'd be the pendulum, and he wouldn't have to vote for O'Brien. Now he and O'Brien apparently had a personality conflict, but I was never a party to that, and I don't know why.

**Ms. Boswell:** What about Bill Day?

**Sen. Greive:** Bill Day was the most affable of them. I think what happened as I understand it—now you understand I was never a part of their deliberations or anything—but as I understand Bill Day: he was a chiropractor, he was a big moose of a man, but he was a pretty affable guy, pleasant guy to get along with.

The Republicans could have tried to use the coalition to take control, but they didn't figure they could hold them all together, and they didn't want to be responsible for everything the coalition would do anyway, so they made a deal. They decided that one member of the coalition should be Speaker, and Day was happy to do it. He liked the idea of the publicity and liked the idea of being a big man, which he was in more ways than one.

**Ms. Boswell:** Wasn't redistricting part of this bargain, too?

**Sen. Greive:** Until I read Howard McCurdy's book, I didn't know that. I had no idea that it was. I knew they wanted power. The book, or whatever you want to call it—the thesis—pretty much says that that was it. I presume that McCurdy was next to Gorton, and since he was in their camp he knows a lot more about it than I do. McCurdy said that the Republicans had reserved the right of redistricting. That was their bailiwick, and

they got that out of it.

**Ms. Boswell:** So that wasn't something that was common knowledge to you at the time?

**Sen. Greive:** I always thought I could persuade Day and his members, and the fact is I made many, many efforts to talk to them. That's part of the reason why I had some problems back in my own caucus, because I was too friendly with them. I felt that they were the key, but I had no idea that they had a bound deal in which all redistricting matters were owned by the Republicans. The fact is, I can hardly believe it now, but apparently that's what the deal was made around.

**Ms. Boswell:** Were you surprised when the vote came to oust O'Brien in the 1963 session?

**Sen. Greive:** Oh, yes. In fact, I was over in the House chamber listening. I couldn't believe it. I just knew somehow O'Brien was going to put that together, and I thought even after that vote he'd put it together overnight. You see, he ran his shop with an iron hand. I knew that; hell, everybody knew that. What he'd done to them or what insults had taken place or what kind of fights they had over public or private power, I just didn't know about. While I was originally on the public power side pretty much, eventually I switched, although I never did it with any gusto. I never made speeches. I was just another vote. And that wasn't my issue, although I knew Jerry Buckley very well. He was the highest paid lobbyist for his employer—for Washington Water Power. He was later fingered by Perry and went to jail for corruption. He did contribute to my campaigns and to the campaigns of some of the people I had as surrogates, or I should say, as members of my team of legislators. He was always around, and of course I was a Catholic and he was a Catholic, so it was a nice fit.

**Ms. Boswell:** But in terms of the coalition, you just didn't expect that O'Brien was going to get it?

**Sen. Greive:** I just figured he had seven or eight votes to gain, and I thought that was way too many.

**Ms. Boswell:** I'm not sure I know what you mean by that.

**Sen. Greive:** He was seven or eight votes short. There wasn't a one-vote difference—there was enough difference so that he had to have several votes. I would have to look to see what the match-up was, but there were enough votes left over to oust him. They held it together when O'Brien had only one majority, or maybe it was Hodde that did that. It's a hard thing to lead your party. But it's easier for the people from Eastern Washington if they're against somebody in Western Washington, especially if it's Seattle.

**Ms. Boswell:** Once this had all happened, how did that affect the dynamics of the whole redistricting fight?

**Sen. Greive:** In the first place, I didn't know until I read McCurdy's thesis, which was years after. I hadn't really read it through until maybe ten years after, maybe even longer than that. Maybe it was just for this interview, the first time I really read it. So I didn't know what the deal was. I just thought that those people were up for grabs if they could be persuaded—if they got the right kind of a district, the right kind of a break. I thought they were Democrats and would stay Democrats, and I thought that even after they went over to the Republicans. If they wanted to be Republicans they would have changed their party; they didn't.

**Ms. Boswell:** The redistricting plan that was

worked out by the Republicans, how did their philosophy differ from yours?

**Sen. Greive:** I would say, "What redistricting plan?" In the beginning they had no plan. Gorton had some plan drawn, and incidentally, it was drawn at Republican headquarters. In the first session they were gone. I think that was Republican headquarters. The next one they drew in a committee room up there in the Legislative Building. Everything was secret and nobody had access to it. Somebody would tell you what was going on, and if you got it from a couple of sources, you could assume it was true. That's the way you would have to do it. But their plan from the general reaction, it wouldn't do it.

When we got down to drawing a plan, which was sometime after session started, there was still no philosophy. The philosophy came to light when they had to justify it. When they started presenting plans to the press they had to justify it by saying things like, "We want something where the Legislature truly reflects the vote." They added all the votes for the House up on one side and all of them on the other side, in total, not by district. My recollection is that the Democrats still had the control, but it was quite different than the number of faces in the Legislature. They would say, "Theoretically then, we should have control of the Legislature," which should be different.

It's a bunch of hogwash. That's the firm excuse that they were using or anybody would use. All of us from time to time tried to put a good face on something, just like any advertising people do. After all you, don't sell the steak, you sell the sizzle, and all that sort of thing. Books have been written about that. You put a "spin" on it—that's the latest thing—they call it a "spin" now.

**Ms. Boswell:** What kind of "spin" did you put on your plan?

**Sen. Greive:** All I said was—and it was really no spin—that, “If you’re going to get elected, you’ve got to do this thing. You’ve got to look at the people in the seats and give them what they want.” We needed enough of them to get it through. You can’t get it through any other way—it’s not going to go through by itself. Any other way is defeat.

**Ms. Boswell:** McCurdy goes on about your having the interest of the legislators in mind. That Gorton had the interests of the court decision—one man, one vote—and that was what always motivated him.\*

*\*The two redistricting bills were even more opposing than the two strategies, simply because of the disparate manners in which the two men approached the redistricting task.*

*Greive’s overriding interest in drawing his redistricting bill was the legislators who would vote for it. He was an expert in the interests in the districts of most legislators. To him redistricting was a job of piecing those interests together while insuring his supporters in and outside of the Senate the most favorable treatment. He was no umpire, but a powerful arbiter.*

*Gorton, on the other hand, insisted (at least initially) that the primary objective of his bill was achievement of the “one man, one vote” requirement. Greive agreed to this only to the extent necessary to satisfy the court...Gorton’s second objective, the crux of the battle between the two, was to change the overall political complexion of*

*the districts. A majority of people, Gorton argued, should be able to elect a majority of the legislators....*

**McCurdy: 22-23**

a straightforward sort of a guy. I may not be enthusiastically friendly with him, but he’s a straightforward sort of guy, and you might get an answer. I wonder if he’d say that now. But as a practical matter, it was just salesmanship. The philosophy was a mask; he wanted control for more and more Republicans, and he felt redistricting was the way to do it.

**Ms. Boswell:** That makes sense. Your unique interpretation of one man, one vote, and particularly the lumping together of the Senate and the House, has often been talked about. Can you explain that a little?

**Sen. Greive:** It depends. When Gorton would come up with his so-called philosophy, then of course we had to have an answer. And the first thing we did is, we added up all of the votes for the senators. Then we said, “We’ll take these.” Well, then we came out way ahead because we had thirty-some senators elected as opposed to seventeen Republicans, or something of that nature. So it was obvious that we had to have an awful lot more votes there. Well, they wouldn’t accept that. That wasn’t a true picture. And then the thought was that you could add the two of them together, we’d still come out ahead. They didn’t like that, either. I think we’re dwelling way too much on that which was nothing more than an advertising ploy. There was no deep, philosophical thing.

I mentioned abortion a while back. Well,

abortion has real principles, real feelings, and evokes real passion. People understand that issue, and they divide on it. But nobody ever divides on redistricting except the legislators and other people affected, and they don't want the other side to have control. It's like every man and woman must look out for themselves.

**Ms. Boswell:** Aside from trying to help individuals, who were already seated, were there any other interest groups that you had to cater to? Were there elements of rural versus urban, for instance, in terms of the way it was done?

**Sen. Greive:** We didn't have to do that; it was already done. We didn't change that a bit. All we tried to do was give everybody a better seat or improve their position if we could, and sell them on the idea. The ones we couldn't sell on the idea—they had to go along, so that was good. We didn't go to any of that fanciness.

After all, the legislators know very little about redistricting as a whole. It's way too complex for them, and there're too many changes, too many nuances, but they know their own districts. If you tell them, well, do you want White Center to be a part of your district if you're a Democrat? You're damn right they want it; they vote Democratic there. Do you want Bellevue to be part of a district on the East Side? If you're a Republican, you damn well do, too, because you want Republican to be consistent. Or do you want Mercer Island? Do you want Mercer Island because Mercer Island's going to give you the votes? They knew all that because they are worried about it. They had to run, they had to campaign, and they had to worry about issues that affected them. So they've got their ideas already drawn.

So when you sit down and talk to them, if you're really well versed and you understand them, you can show them pictures, drawings

of what went where. You'd show them polls or you'd show them mostly voting patterns. We would know what Evans got there, Rosellini got there, etc. Why, then they understand. But it had to be something they wanted. The way you do that, you have to talk to them.

**Ms. Boswell:** Did you follow pretty much the same procedure as you had earlier in terms of how you did this redistricting?

**Sen. Greive:** To the extent that we had to please the people who were sitting in the seats, yes. But by now we were much more sophisticated. We'd made some improvement—quite a little improvement—in the districts, from the first time. The first time was quite a step forward, considering it came out of the blue and we were forced to do it, but we had less to go on. However, we didn't have the motivation. Everybody before, they drew all new plans, and two or three people would be in the same district and so forth. We were very careful to try to keep everybody in his or her own district. Somehow, someway, we'd draw a district that kept them taken care of.

**Ms. Boswell:** How did you go about figuring that out?

**Sen. Greive:** You don't have to figure it out. You have some knowledge from the statistics. You see how their elections went. We always knew what the vote was for either the Senate or House members in that district because we went further and researched the county commissioners or whatever. Then we'd make a package up.

But first of all, we'd try to design a district which they'd say, "Well, that looks okay." Very often they'd say, "That's okay, but what's it do?" Then we'd have to go and do some research for them. So we started off by



drawing like you would anything else. If you go to sketch a ship, you start off by sketching the ship more or less the way you want it to look. Then you begin to get down to the nitty-gritty. You don't start and say, "I'll draw the keel, but I don't know what's going to happen next." You know where you're going.

So we tried to have maps that gave us an idea of where we were going and take it from there, because we knew, number one, we had to keep the legislators happy. Number two: we knew that they had to be compact because the court required that. Number three: we knew that people weren't about to vote themselves out of office. And that was our principal thing.

We were not really attempting to change the political atmosphere because we were satisfied with the way it was. The Republicans say, "Yeah, they owned the thing before they started, and they just didn't want to give up ownership." Maybe there's some truth in that. I suppose that's a different way of putting it. My way of putting it would be simply that if you're going to redistrict, you've got to take care of the people sitting in the seats.

**Ms. Boswell:** You mentioned that Dean Foster was your major assistant at this time. How did you two divide up some of the work that was involved in this effort?

**Sen. Greive:** He did it all. All I did was talk to people and things like that, and have numerous conferences and tell them what I wanted. He wasn't just somebody that sat out there and didn't know what was going on. He was a crackerjack. He could tell you what we did in those districts, and not only that—that's another thing I did—we let him talk to the Republicans as well as the Democrats. Anybody who came along and wanted to talk about their district, we talked to them about it.

**Ms. Boswell:** So you tried to make it a non-

partisan effort, then?

**Sen. Greive:** I didn't even think of it as a partisan effort. I knew the wrong way was to be secret, so we left it open. Everything was open. They'd come look at the maps. They could do anything they wanted.

Now when we got down to drawing a plan, until we got it together, we didn't want somebody interfering. But we'd very often stop in the middle of the plan and want to talk to John Cooney, or to the chairman, or we'd want to talk to John McCutcheon or somebody else who was going to have a problem with something. We were very conscious of what they wanted. And there were always some people who would slip around and whisper to you, "If you do this I'll go with you." There was a little backbiting involved there, too.

**Ms. Boswell:** Now, you mentioned to me that McCurdy, who was Gorton's assistant, also frequented the office, right?

**Sen. Greive:** Oh yes. He was over there all the time. I'd go to lunch with him or go to dinner with him, dinner usually. We'd talk to him. He tried not to give us too much information. Obviously, he had his secrets. For instance, I didn't know some things until I read his book. Our instructions were not to pump him or anything, but just to be friendly. That's the way the ball game works, that's the way Olympia works. You become friends first, and once you've established a rapport and trust, why then you can get things done. You can't do it by forcing a person to do it. In other words, you just don't buy it with any kind of action or money or anything like that. First of all, you have to have a working relationship.

**Ms. Boswell:** You said that Dean Foster did a lot of the legwork, the statistical work?

**Sen. Greive:** He had a staff. He had a couple

people working for him, but yes.

**Ms. Boswell:** Tell me a little more about him and how he got involved.

**Sen. Greive:** He was up in Bellingham at that time, as I recall, and he was a friend of Hayes—Hayes Elder. At this particular time Dean was just a college kid. He was with me several sessions. He worked in the bill room and so forth, and got acquainted with all of the people with an interest in politics. They had their own little world, and Hayes became a leader in that, and his buddy and right-hand man was Foster. It's been so long, I don't really remember.

**Ms. Boswell:** Dean Foster has told some humorous stories about you coming to pick him up in Bellingham and sending an escort to get him when you needed him to work. He was still a college student right, during much of it?

**Sen. Greive:** As I understand it, he was. I don't think he was going to school while we were in the session, but I'm not sure. The other thing about Foster is that he had a tremendous capacity for work, as did Hayes. In other words, he understood what was important. He understood the question of timing and everything else.

**Ms. Boswell:** Do you remember sending some state patrolman to get him? Tell me about that.

**Sen. Greive:** In those days we had control of the state patrol's very existence and anything that we wanted that dealt with the Legislature, they were "ours." They were most accommodating as long as it was something in an official capacity. If the majority leader in the Senate, or the chairman of redistricting or whomever, had something he had to have,

they would accommodate you. They did that for a lot of other things. I wasn't the only one who did it. But I did send the state patrol up to get him and take him down there to Olympia if I needed him. Of course I'd phoned them first and cleared it with them.

**Ms. Boswell:** Probably in the middle of the night, too, right?

**Sen. Greive:** Well, timing becomes awfully important. You can say, "Well, it doesn't make any difference," like anything else, but if that happened to you the one time when you could have done something, it's awful important to have that information.

We had a reputation that if somebody wanted to know what happened to a district or what was taking place here, there, or anywhere, we would have the immediate figures for them. We'd always tell them anything we knew. When you brought them down to make your final plan, of course, then you had to put twenty or thirty people in there, but we never were very secretive about it.

The maps were always rolled up, and they could roll them out and look at them. Somebody would say, "What's happening?" And we'd say, "We're working on a general plan now, but I think it's going to be pretty much like that one. Why don't you roll that out?" They'd roll it out and look, and they'd come back and say, "I don't understand this or that or what happens," and we'd go and look it up. Or he'd come talk to me about what we intended to do to him.

**Ms. Boswell:** I understand that you initially drew up a constitutional amendment. Is that correct?

**Sen. Greive:** I didn't necessarily believe in a constitutional amendment. I'm from Seattle and from King County where the big population is, and, of course, it was not

something that would be a part of my constituents' thinking. On the other hand, if you're going to deal with people, you've got to understand their motivation. The rural legislators and the Grange, with whom I had an alliance at that time, their argument was "Let's get rid of the Washington Constitution. Why do we have one House by territory and one House by population? If it's good enough for the United States, why isn't it good enough for us?" Pretty good argument. And the fact is a number of the states did have that sort of an arrangement until *Baker v. Carr*. That was the big thing they did; it wasn't just the one man, one vote. They struck down this idea of two houses so that they were represented by the same people. What we probably should have had was a unicameral legislature like they have in Nebraska. They only have one House. They have all the same problems we do from what my reading tells me, but they just have one House.

Especially in the farm areas, the people felt that there was something sacred about the soil, something sacred about the way people made their livings and went about their business. They believed that their politics should be protected and that they had rights to some protection. Obviously, that's what they wanted. They constituted a big enough block that if I was going to do any business, I had to give some concessions, and that's one of the concessions I made. Except every plan I drew, they were pretty mad at me because I always made restrictions on it or made problems, and they weren't satisfied with it.

However, if you got right down to it, and I could have gotten what I wanted, I might conceivably have satisfied them. But the thing that made sure I wouldn't have done that is that I had to satisfy the senators. You see, I had the senators; I didn't have the House members. What are you going to do—tell a senator that from now on you're going to be out of business or that we are going to let a

district, which for a matter of expediency was drawn just like the states were, that we're going to enshrine that forever? So we had a lot of problems, political science-type problems.

**Ms. Boswell:** Donald Moos had a separate plan, right?

**Sen. Greive:** He had a plan that was pretty much like the U.S. Constitution, by counties or something. That plan had been proposed in the early days when we were discussing the problem, but the state had turned it down. In the constitutional convention they tried to get that through. Each county would have so much. The reason it was turned down is a reason that's obvious to everybody who looks at the thing. There was a time when Whitman County had five legislators, or five senators I think, because it was big in those days. Well, now it's nothing. Now they don't have enough for one.

You see Whitman County, and Walla Walla, had the penitentiary. Nowadays they don't want penitentiaries in their counties, but they sure did then. The other county had Colfax as its headquarters, but it was dominated by Pullman, which had Washington State University. And so you could see where the power was. The power was in those two places, or they wouldn't have gotten those big institutions. You notice they didn't put a public university in Spokane, but I'm sure that Spokane would have liked to have one. They put them off on the side, and that's because they had a bigger share of the population. This was a very tiny state population-wise at one time.

**Ms. Boswell:** What would you have done if support had grown for the Moos plan?

**Senator Greive:** What I would or wouldn't have done I don't know, but we did make some

effort to take the gloss off it because that's what Don Moos was really determined to get, and Moos was a pretty reasonable guy. He wasn't worried about getting re-elected, I don't think. He'd always been re-elected by huge margins and his desire was to go to Congress. He thought he was going to become very popular with the rural areas with this constitutional amendment. It still would have had to have a two-thirds vote in both houses, and it would have had to pass the people. I don't think that would have ever happened, no matter what we did, but I don't know.

**Ms. Boswell:** What was the strategy to get your bill passed?

**Sen. Greive:** The strategy was as I said before, pure and simple, to satisfy enough people sitting in the seats that they'd vote for it. Get the votes.

**Ms. Boswell:** Once you could do that, that's all you really needed?

**Sen. Greive:** We wanted them to be compact. I'll can tell you one thing, any plan Gorton or I drew—I wouldn't say any plan, there's some exception to that—but generally our system was infinitely prettier than what we have now, or what was ever done by any commission. Today they do things that we wouldn't think of doing. We tried to go by rivers, and we tried to go by municipal boundaries, or county boundaries, and we tried to keep the lines straight. So we all tried to make them look pretty and neat and compact. If you had to put the thing together, you'd give a little on that, but you always started out with the idea that it would look straight.

**Ms. Boswell:** Did you feel pretty good about the plan as it evolved? Did you think it was going to pass?

**Sen. Greive:** It was a process, not a plan.

There were so many plans. There just wasn't one plan—there were probably twenty plans before we were done.

It's pretty self-evident. Especially the rural ones are pretty easy. You've only got so much—you've got a lot of land and you have areas that have been together. They are traditionally Republican, but a few of them are traditionally Democratic.

It gets more hairy when you get closer into the cities. Then you've got many choices to go one direction or another. The cities and the suburbs, I should say now, because the suburbs are bigger than the cities.

**Ms. Boswell:** Were there, in particular, any that were difficult to deal with in terms of the process?

**Sen. Greive:** All were difficult in their own right. You dealt with people, not with districts. You may think you're doing districts, but you're not. And anytime we'd do a plan, we pretty much had a sign-off from the members of the district. What it did to them was something they had to take somebody else's word for. So when O'Brien or somebody would say that this does the Democrats in, why they'd get all excited, or if someone else said it would do the Republicans in, they'd get all excited. But that's only because they know about their district, but they're not sure of the other districts.

**Ms. Boswell:** I guess I'm still a little confused as to how the process worked. Once you had developed a plan, then what happened?

**Sen. Greive:** We don't just develop a plan. We develop a whole lot of plans and things that you can do. First of all, you can sketch in certain areas that come pretty close to the norm with very little change, and they can be left alone. Then there's some obvious choices that look like they would make good sense, and

that's about the only way to go. Then after that, you begin to talk to each individual, and see what he or she would accept. You find it out first if you've gotten them something they will accept.

First of all, you have to talk to the legislators, and from there you take the next step. If they don't like it, then you've got to try to make them like it—find something they'll want and they think will be good for their interests.

**Ms. Boswell:** And so you do that by just having sessions and meetings with them?

**Sen. Greive:** They're nearly all private meetings. They'd come into my office. I'd see them on the House floor, or see them almost anyplace you could think of—out at night dancing. I'd be out at a dance. There was a lot of socializing, and I'd go over and see them sitting there and say, "Let's talk about the redistricting issue." And we'd draw on the back of a napkin if I had seen them in a restaurant. There's no such thing as regular borders. Some of them you'd call up and ask them to come see you. Usually I'd send Hayes Elder or Dean Foster to see if he could negotiate them over. If they were Republicans, at first they'd be very tentative and afraid to be seen over here. After a while, however, word got around that it was no disgrace—you could go over and look, so they'd come over and look. You don't have to work very hard to get people to come over and look at their districts, or what happened to them. They're pretty interested.

The Republicans, I'm sure, had some splits between the old, the young, and the new. Also, between the rural and urban. But the Democrats had more splits than that. The Democratic Party by its nature is a collection of dissidents—especially at that time. You see, the state had been Republican for years, and then Roosevelt came in and he had all kinds

of different regional allowances. You had religion that got to be a part of it. How liberal were they, or were they intellectual? That got to be a part of it. You had to know what their interests were.

For instance, geographically, Everett and Snohomish County always voted differently than King County. Not always, but they were a unit that had to be dealt with. The votes in Tacoma had to be dealt with because Tacoma pictured itself as a rival to Seattle. And the Legislature—O'Brien was from Seattle, Rosellini was from Seattle, I was from Seattle, so we sort of had a feeling of togetherness.

Spokane got into the public and private power fight. It was the private power bastion, and so the senators from there were loyal to the private power company. Washington Water Power spent a lot of money on campaign contributions and lobbying for all of us, but they especially had the Spokane people in their pocket.

Then there was a sort of Central Washington coalition of Hallauer, Washington, Hanna, and McCormack. They were public power and, by nature, were opposed to the private power people, so they hung together.

And of course, you got into other problems of the conservatives and liberals because in some instances, people by nature are more conservative. In other words, I wasn't a very liberal type. We had these many, many factions within the Democratic side, and we had to somehow get them all to vote. I couldn't press buttons and get them to go. Sometimes they'd go with me, and sometimes they wouldn't. I had a majority of ten, six, ten, fifteen, maybe, that I could count on, but that was the extent of my majority. Then I had to always watch myself as to what we did.

Then, in addition to those factions, we had the friendships. For instance, there were John Petrich and Fred Dore, who incidentally both became judges—Petrich was a federal judge

and Dore later became a Supreme Court justice, chief justice. Petrich didn't like his district. Dore wanted to be with him because he was such a good friend of his, and he didn't want to see him get eliminated. The same thing happened with other legislators. They'd come to you and they'd say, "You've got to make a change." And I'd say, "That's not your district." "I know, but it's my buddy's district, and I want him back. He says he can't get elected." So then you have to go to work and try to please them.

In addition to pleasing all those factions, you had to make some sort of a deal with the Republicans. From our point of view, they had divisions on their side. They didn't like Woodall, and they didn't like Raugust, because Woodall had been the majority leader before, and Raugust was an old-line guy, and maybe they had some other things against him. But the thing I had to deal with is that they wanted to gain. They were determined. The opposition said that it was a one-man, one-vote issue, but this wasn't about one man, one vote. I thought that was a lot of hogwash. They didn't really believe that themselves. Nevertheless, they kept saying that to the press all the time.

I kept wanting to know what they really wanted. If I knew what they wanted—if they told me they had to have three senators or five senators, then we'd have to face the problem in the caucus and decide whether it was worth it or not. How are you going to deal with somebody who won't tell you what they want? They knew what I wanted. I wanted a redistricting bill that pleased the majority, and I was willing to deal with anybody. In fact, you didn't have to be a Democrat or a Republican. Obviously, I had some friends that I wanted to protect. I had to be on their side.

**Ms. Boswell:** But you were saying that, essentially, to get anywhere, you had to protect

almost everybody?

**Sen. Greive:** Look, one of the functions of the majority leader is being a business agent. He—or she—is a business agent for the people he or she represents. Because the members want a lot of things, they don't want to talk too loudly. They want trips, they want appointments to interim committees—they want prestige for this and prestige for that. They want to be on a particular bill that's got an interest for their particular district, or they may just want to be on some bill that the governor's going to put through anyway that makes them look good. They want a lot of things, and you have to try to give them what they want. They come to the majority leader and talk it over. They also want to get re-elected, and we had a crack re-election team.

The Republicans complained that they were gaining numbers of votes overall, and therefore they needed a lot of representation. Well, they weren't gaining in the Senate, but they were gaining in the House. That's because we ran the Senate elections. We had a coordinated effort. We didn't like to talk about it, and I'd jump ten miles if somebody said, "the Greive Machine." I'd get real nervous—I've said this to you before—but that doesn't mean that we weren't electing them. We were picking them, targeting them, polling them, and doing a lot of things that they are doing now. And we were doing it centrally, and I made sure that it got done.

We had all of this factionalism to deal with, so, obviously, we wanted to know what the Republicans wanted. They wouldn't tell me what they wanted; they'd just say, "I want another senator." I'm not saying we would have turned it down. If we thought it would do the trick, we would probably have taken it up in caucus and had it out. I didn't want to do that and neither did they—nobody wanted to do that. That isn't a job you want to do. That's like doing surgery in a crowded room.

If you set it up—and then sometimes you might be able to make a deal where it weakened somebody’s district—it would hurt you. You can only do that once or twice because people get angry, and they get pretty excited when you fool around with their district borders.

**Ms. Boswell:** What was the purpose behind the Republicans’ refusal to essentially name their price? Was that a strategy?

**Sen. Greive:** They were afraid for one thing, I’m sure. But I think it was strategy. They knew it had to be a process, too. If they had told us that they had to have five senators, why then the whole thing would be out of whack. It would have been on the front page of the paper and everything else. So I don’t blame them for not answering, but that doesn’t mean that it wasn’t a legitimate inquiry. It’s probably one I wouldn’t have wanted to answer, either. I expected to gain and not have four more Republicans. If I’d said that, they’d get in a dither. They went around piously looking to Heaven, telling themselves how wonderful they were, and beating their breasts. Practically, they just wanted to gain. And at one point in our negotiations, Evans told me that. He said, “I’ll settle for this if you’ll give me two more senators,” or one more senator or whatever it was.

**Ms. Boswell:** But that was later on?

**Sen. Greive:** That was during the last negotiations, yes.

**Ms. Boswell:** Early on in the process, another issue—and we’ve talked about this before briefly—was this constitutional amendment that Donald Moos had introduced. I’d like to clarify that step.

**Sen. Greive:** The constitutional amendment

was the dream of Moos. Actually, the Washington State Grange wanted it. They thought that every county should have representation. Every county should have a senator—there were thirty-nine counties—and then we should apportion the House. Their argument, of course, was that it was the way the United States Senate was set up. How would we feel if we didn’t have a senator from the state of Washington? In other words, if we had two senators, but they had to represent Idaho, Washington and Oregon, we’d have our nose pretty much out of joint because that’s what we’re used to. Is that right? Well, who knows what’s right. We now would think it’s all wrong because we’ve lived with this two party system and a bicameral legislature at the national level for all these two hundred years, and we think it’s pretty dear. It’s a wonderful system, and it seems to work out. Well, I’m not so sure I’d feel the same way if I came from Los Angeles or New York City. We’re furnishing all the population, and we only get two senators, too. But nevertheless, that was what the Grange wanted.

Well, Moos came along and he wanted to be a congressman. He had his heart set on it. We used to call him, mostly behind his back, Congressman Moos. Sometimes, though, we’d call him that and he’d smile. He was an awfully nice guy, incidentally. He has a wonderful personality, and he was just determined that he was going to go to Congress. And, I might add, somehow he was going to get the constitutional amendment, which took two-thirds of both Houses to get passed. Let them vote on whether or not they wanted this representation by district. Well, you know from King County we weren’t going to support that. I’m not saying we wouldn’t vote for it—we certainly would vote for it; in fact, I did vote for one version. But we weren’t going to let him do it—accomplish it—whatever we said, unless we got something for it. We thought maybe that was enough

incentive, that we could have a shot. He still would have to get the people of the state to vote for it. So we'd give them a shot at that amendment if they would come along with us on some of the things we wanted. That's from my point of view.

He seemed to think he could do it by personality and persuasion alone because he thought his argument was so wonderful. Well, he had an argument, but I don't know how wonderful it was.

I don't think the Republicans, in the final analysis, were going to be too enthusiastic about that amendment either, just because Moos was popular with them. But if they came from King County, that would be a very hard vote. But, in any event, he needed two-thirds to even get it to the ballot. He had to do it with other people, put it on the ballot by the Legislature, and have it enacted by the people to amend the constitution.

**Ms. Boswell:** Right. Now, what was his relationship to Gorton and his redistricting plan?

**Sen. Greive:** Well, I have a feeling he helped Gorton get to where he was, and still helps Gorton now. He was bright and affable. Gorton is not very affable. He's not a bad guy. I don't mean he's got a bad personality, but he wasn't a real salesman type. He's an intellectual, and I think even he could be proud of that. Moos—he shakes your hand, he dances with your wife, and lets the senator do whatever—is just a real salesman type.

Moos had the idea that he would create his two-tier system. Well, you couldn't very well create a system where you have the smallest county—which at that time I think was Ferry with 1,200 or 1,300 people—that could have an elected senator just like a senator from King County, which was many, many times that number. So he had to come up with something else, and I can't remember

exactly what, and McCurdy's book doesn't tell me enough to know. It's like so much of what McCurdy has in his book—if you show me something, it all comes back again. But I have to have my memory refreshed to remember exactly what it was Moos proposed, but he had a system.

Well, the trouble was that his plan appealed to some of my people, and I thought it would appeal to Wilbur Hallauer and Mike McCormack. I thought, "Well, we can't very well afford to be against the thing," plus Big Al Rosellini and I were having a fight. The time before it was the Grange. They were the backbone—the field workers who helped us when we had the redistricting under the League of Women Voters—and we wanted to stay in with them anyway because they were quite powerful and friendly. So, for a variety of reasons, we felt that we had to draw one that we thought was a little more acceptable.

**Ms. Boswell:** When you say draw one, you mean a constitutional amendment?

**Sen. Greive:** Well, we were requested to study the senators' districts. The House districts—the constitutional amendment didn't spell it out in detail—but essentially you've got the senatorial districts and house districts along with a lot of things. So, how were we going to set the senatorial districts up? I felt that we had to put in more and give King, Pierce, and probably Snohomish something more. After all, they really hadn't blossomed in population at that point, but I had to give them a lot more. It is hard to say how many now. So I wanted to set more of them the way the population went, so if it did pass we'd have a workable system. In looking back, I wanted to see that it was going to go, but that doesn't mean that I was right. But Moos just wanted something to pass, even though his plan was pretty far out of reality. It wasn't going to pass the way he wanted it, anyway. So I came up with a



different version.

**Ms. Boswell:** So you had your version, and then there were other versions?

**Sen. Greive:** My version was the most representative. We drew it. I don't know that we introduced it, or who actually introduced it, but it had similar language. Finally, Moos got to thinking it over. He had convinced some of the Republicans of what he wanted, and it needed the two-thirds and so forth. So I remember we put an amendment on in committee that they didn't recognize until they had it on the floor, and it said that if the redistricting bill didn't pass, then the constitutional amendment was null and void. In other words, we had no intention of passing it. So whether that legally would have held that way—the courts might have decided for it—but that's the way we did it. They didn't like that.

**Ms. Boswell:** So your strategy was to tie the amendment to the redistricting?

**Sen. Greive:** My strategy was just to get it through. In other words, we weren't very choosy what we tied to it. We thought we had to make a sacrifice, and it was the ultimate sacrifice. Everybody had a personal interest in how the thing was done. We looked at everything—what would help, why we tried to do it, and if we could—because especially in a thing like redistricting, the process of amendment was very hard for those of us who came from a big county.

**Ms. Boswell:** In terms of introducing the two redistricting bills, Gorton had come up with one, and you had come up with one?

**Sen. Greive:** Gorton didn't really come up with one. He didn't have as good staff as we did. We had ours first, and we had many

versions of it. We'd done hours and hours of work. Gorton didn't want his to be seen by anybody. He didn't want people to work on it, and so he moved slower. He didn't want anybody to see what anybody else got. So he was, actually, as I recall, just a figurehead. Most of it was done in the Republican headquarters out in Tumwater. They had a nice place out there close to the Tyee Hotel; in fact, it was in the same parking lot. And we knew that they were working there and they took people in—you'd hear about guided tours for Republicans. They had to go over a couple at a time. But they didn't have everybody wandering in and out, and they certainly weren't going to let any Democrats see it. So it took them longer to put theirs together.

I think it's because we had better staff and started it first, but I might be wrong on that. Maybe the reason was because they had to move more cautiously than we did. We had a bill. We always had a bill up to a certain point, but we were never foolish enough to think we had the final version. So we always said, "This is where we've got it for now. We'll have more changes. How do you like your district, and what do you think of that?" And then the next question was, "What would it do?" Our calculations were that if this was the final plan with the changes we'd made and so forth, then it would have given us so many votes in the last election. We didn't know what was going to happen in future elections, since elections change. But we could, certainly, just like Gorton, sketch out the solid ones.

**Ms. Boswell:** In terms of your strategy for introducing your bill, it's just a process of getting to the point where you felt confident you had enough votes to pass it?

**Sen. Greive:** Absolutely, that was the big thing. And we felt we had good votes in the Senate for some period of time that we didn't have in the House. Eventually we got

promises, but a lot of the people didn't keep their promises. We had Republicans over looking at it, and we'd show them the whole bill. In other words, we didn't just give them one district. My instructions to Foster—I'm sure that's what Foster did—was to sit right down and negotiate with them. I let him do the talking. We'd sit there, and I'd let him talk. I figured they were more likely to believe the staff than they are somebody with the power. "Come on over, have a look here. Have a cup of coffee, and we'll look at it," and they'd go over it.

I'd sit there while he'd explain the bill, and he'd explain the other portions he thought were important. They might not like what he had done with Eastern Washington. Well, Eastern Washington was all but taken care of. "Do you know about that?" "Oh yeah, we want to see that," they'd say. "Okay, well, here are your districts. Of course then, when we get to your district, that's going to affect the districts around it, so you might affect Southwest Washington." But then "That's okay, we're interested in that," they'd reply, so we'd discuss it.

We had Perry Woodall over, and we had W.C. Raugust over, and we had, I don't know who else we had over. I'm sure we had great numbers of Republicans at one time or another. But Foster usually talked to them.

Please don't say I wasn't there. Sometimes, if there were two or three people who came down, then I may be in one corner of the room. We had the downstairs conference room, and I had a little office off to the side of it, on the first floor. If there were two groups, or three groups, or something like that, then we'd split them up. Basically, most of them were handled by whoever my assistant was, whether it was Hayes Elder or Dean Foster or eventually Steven Cough. He was from West Seattle, a very nice young man.

**Ms. Boswell:** So, you would do all this

legwork. Was there a point in time at which you said, "I'm ready to go"?"\*

*\*During the week of March 25 the Senate Democratic caucus told Greive to pass his bill over to the House. Their sudden decision surprised most legislators, although Greive had known for some time that his caucus was growing impatient...The sentiment to bring out Greive's bill and "scalp" it onto Gorton's was tied in closely with the growing impatience over the whole redistricting issue....*

*The tensions of delay encouraged Greive's opponents to strike at his redistricting leadership. As early as mid-February Senators Hallauer and Mike McCormack (Dem., Richland) had begun to plan an amendment that would displace Greive's bill for the eastern Washington districts. They had first met with Gorton on February 25, hoping to win Republican support for their amendment. During March when some senators from southwest Washington had started to write a whole bill, one that would "scalp" Greive's as he was "scalping" Gorton's.*

*At first Gorton had enthusiastically received senators' requests, hoping that they could collapse Greive's bill and with it his whole network of fragile agreements and expectations. But by the end of March, when he was meeting almost daily with Hallauer and McCormack, Gorton had begun to doubt the utility of his strategy. They might defeat Greive temporarily, but*

*they could not exclude him from any negotiations. Nothing, he thought, could prevent Lieutenant Governor Cherberg from appointing Greive to any conference committee.*

*Gorton's compatriots in this strategy—Pritchard and freshman Representative Mary Ellen McCaffree, the LWV [League of Women Voters] leader—tried to encourage the two senators and assure Gorton that a victory would allow them to negotiate a bill with Greive's opponents. On Thursday, March 28, Gorton agreed to pursue the strategy, told his aide to draw up the bill for Hallauer and McCormack, and set out to secure the votes of all seventeen Republican senators.*

**McCurdy: 36-38**

**Sen. Greive:** No, you're never ready to go. Apparently, I thought I knew it all, and I found from McCurdy's book there were several things I didn't know. There were negotiations apparently with Hallauer and McCormack and the Republicans, and I presume, Gorton. They never wanted me to have a bill. They didn't want a bill to come through, especially if we did it. If we were going to do it, they wanted to be in on it, which I understand because I'd have felt the same way. But Gorton didn't want a bill because he didn't think he had me to the point where he could force my group to give in. He had the amazing idea that somehow I could make them do it. If I went back with a bill in my hand while three or four people were screaming at me in the caucus, everybody would just be scared of it. A lot of times the votes would be against me, and it bothered me a lot.

It didn't bother me as much as it could, because I knew there was going to be a tomorrow. There was nobody else they could turn to. See, for the Democrats, who's going to do it? I had the figures, I knew it, and I didn't know how much work that Hallauer and McCormack did. I knew they put a bill out and we voted on it, but I didn't know how much studying they did. I don't think they did very much. At least they didn't do anything like we did. "We'll make a change in the Twentieth District," they would say, but you also had to know where the people were and why they were changing the district. I didn't know how strongly they felt. For instance, Mary Ellen McCaffree was going to be taken out by a change in the Thirty-second District. The Thirty-second District was out of proportion because I think they had a Republican senator by that time, and they had one House member who was a Democrat as I recall. So, you wanted a sure thing and basically—we got Pete Francis later and he beat Mary Ellen McCaffree in the election and she was out. She ran for senator.

Mary Ellen McCaffree was very important because she was the closest thing you could get to Gorton. She was his partner—his assistant—in this process. She did the work of the staff and a great deal of legwork. She was a member, but she also was similar to Dean Foster in his operation.

**Ms. Boswell:** But neither of you wanted to be the first to introduce your bill, right?

**Sen. Greive:** That was understandable. They didn't catch on at first, and I kept stalling. Finally it dawned on them why. I didn't even tell everybody why. We finally had to let them know because we got them restless. From the very beginning we realized that if we got it over there to the House, the other side would plaster an amendment on it and send it back for a vote. Then you have to vote it up or

down. And they had the same problem we did. Neither side wanted to send a bill over and let them plaster somebody else's amendment on it, and then begin voting on the amendment without going through the committee system—although the committee systems were pretty much of a sham.

**Ms. Boswell:** Why was that?

**Sen. Greive:** Well, both sides had a chairman of redistricting. One time it was John McCutcheon. This time it was Dewey Donohue. Cooney and McCutcheon were very close to me, but Donohue wasn't. Donohue had the smallest district—close to the smallest district, if not the smallest—and he didn't have a lot to lose. His district covered Pullman, Whitman County, Walla Walla, and the Tri-Cities area. He was a very capable and energized man. He flew over and met us in Yakima and had coffee, and we held the Senate's first campaign talk. He didn't turn out to be a good friend of mine. He turned out to be with another faction—the Martin Durkan faction—so he was pretty much against us, but we got along. We weren't enemies at all. But I didn't have too much influence except that he needed the protection from somebody from Seattle.

**Ms. Boswell:** So in the case of redistricting, it wasn't the committees that really made anything possible or difficult?

**Sen. Greive:** The committees made a difference. Whoever the person was that was in there—Cooney or McCutcheon—especially since they practically had their arms around each other. In other words, I didn't do anything without talking it over with them first. In effect, they were the second in command and I was the leader. Anything else they wanted went through the committee.

Why am I attending committee meetings?

I didn't sit in on the committees, though. Only on redistricting. They understood. For one thing, they didn't want to spend the time.

**Ms. Boswell:** In this early part of this redistricting effort, the attorney general was John O'Connell and he got involved to a degree, too, didn't he?

**Sen. Greive:** I never got along with John O'Connell. Why, I don't know. I would have thought naturally I would, but John O'Connell was the kind of a guy that thought he was going to get ahead by stepping on somebody else. In other words, he was one of the "Respectable Democrats." He was always reaching for a place. He wasn't part of the machine, and he wasn't part of the Independents. He tried to set himself apart politically. He would be the Democrat that the Republicans thought was a coalition builder. The Municipal League people, the League of Women Voters, and groups like that would love him. We were too involved in politics. He wanted to be on their side. He also didn't care for Rosellini because he wanted to be governor. The fact is that he was against Rosellini in his bid to run again. O'Connell eventually got defeated. He also was the guy who took the million dollars away from Al Rosellini. It came out that a group had given O'Connell a million dollars for him to run as governor.

It didn't come out until after the campaign. The law apparently read that the attorney general could have a private practice of clients. But at the same time, the State of Washington was vigorously prosecuting anti-trust cases—anti-trust suits. O'Connell was trying everything he was eventually tried for. They didn't convict him, and I don't think they could because I don't think he'd actually broken the law; he'd apparently researched it. But if it had been known, it would have blown him. After that he quit politics. So, he wasn't all

that wonderful, either. People create a posture and that was his posture.

**Ms. Boswell:** Did he essentially let it be known that he thought that your plan didn't meet the criteria the court had set?

**Sen. Greive:** Right. I didn't like him, but I never thought I was going to have to deal with it, anyway. The court upheld the state. And the district court did and then they convened the Appellate court from the Thirteenth District, a three-judge district. And they upheld it and then they went to the Supreme Court, and they upheld it. So, as a practical matter, I didn't really, or honestly, expect that that was going to make it.

The press had all these stories. They had nothing to write about. We had the whole Legislature stalled by everything we did. You couldn't go anywhere; you couldn't meet with secret agents. But that's about like what Gorton kept saying—he was always so pious. He adopted the pious look and would look to Heaven to save one man, one vote, when he knew as a practical matter that he didn't even follow it himself.

**Ms. Boswell:** Did you ever sit down with Slade Gorton and try to negotiate at all?

**Sen. Greive:** A lot of times. It was almost impossible. When you read McCurdy's description, Gorton was negotiating with people who thought they could displace me, and he could negotiate with them. Except that for what they wanted, their prices were so high that he couldn't accept their plans either. He had the feeling that if he could get rid of me—I had the hold on the majority of the Democrats in the caucus—he could probably make a deal with somebody. But he wanted to gain, that's the long and short of it. He insisted that he had to gain. The reason that I wanted to know what some of the senators had wanted—what

did we have, thirty-one to seventeen, something like that? We had so many more than they did that we weren't going to give them more House members, we were going to give them more senators. How could a senator be different than a House member elected in the same district? The only things you have are better candidates. Incidentally, that's what Gorton finally said on the last day.

**Ms. Boswell:** There is a passage from McCurdy's book, where Slade Gorton says that Senator Greive has been devoted to a solution to this problem for three years. "I never noticed that he was anxious to do in his own party...It's hard to see how a district that 'Saves our Senators' doesn't save our House members at the same time."\*

*\*This afternoon we have reached the end of a long road that began nearly two years earlier...In the sense that we were forced to deal with one another and have some weird and wonderful shapes and have spent more days than many legislatures, this solution may possibly have better results for the people of the state than would a solution dictated by one party...Senator Greive has been devoted to a solution on this problem. I never noticed that he was anxious to do in his own party. I hope I never have to deal with anyone who is tougher in working for his own party. It is pretty difficult to see how a district that "Saves our Senators" doesn't save our House members at the same time...As poor an arena as a legislature is in which to redistrict, we can say, that we have done so. You can feel triumphant in one respect. You have done the job. The legislature has done the job.*

**McCurdy: 99-100**

said that.

**Ms. Boswell:** Ultimately, though, in the first part of this fight, didn't he decide to introduce his bill first?

**Sen. Greive:** Yes, he had to. You see, we had better control. He had the dissidents, at this point, and he had to please them. He had the Republicans he had to please, and he had some problems, too. We figured that they couldn't hold out long. We were talking to them all the time, and we thought they had to give in. He essentially had no choice. He just about had to put a bill over. But he had the dissidents' written word or pledge that they would vote for it. So he probably had the votes, and then he got pretty scared because we almost got the votes.

**Ms. Boswell:** So his notion was that he introduces the bill first, and then if it gets amended, his people won't vote for it. Is that right?

**Sen. Greive:** That's right. Because you've got to vote it up or down. You can't put amendments on it. And if you don't agree, then it goes to a conference committee. And it did go to a conference committee, and I was on the conference committee, as was Gorton. But in the conference committee, there was no good faith at all. They wouldn't show up. Gorton was never there, somebody else wasn't there, or somebody just wandered in—one of the senators or House members—and wanted to look at districts when we were trying to conduct a meeting. We had an almost impossible situation because they really did not want to negotiate anything. I thought maybe we could negotiate it. I kept trying, and tried harder than anyone else, but I couldn't even keep the Republican committee members there. Gallagher was on the committee, and he was in an impossible

situation because he wouldn't agree to anything.

**Ms. Boswell:** But now, one thing that McCurdy says, and I'm anxious to hear your opinion on this, is that the difference in your perspective and Gorton's, was that Gorton believed that the court would ultimately redistrict, and you did not.\*

*\*Greive announced that the court would never redistrict the state but would threaten to make all legislators run together on an at-large ballot, thus frightening them into staying in Olympia until they produced a satisfactory redistricting bill. Still adamant in his position that the court would redistrict, Gorton impugned Greive's sources of information and insisted that the Republicans would eventually get a better bill from the court.*

**McCurdy: 31**

**Sen. Greive:** I don't know if he believed they'd do it or not. He was pretty nervous about it, especially at the very end. He was afraid the court would do it. But he always thought there was a possibility of that, I'm sure.

**Ms. Boswell:** What did he think would happen? If the court redistricted, then he thought that it would be more to his advantage?

**Sen. Greive:** He may have thought that later, but at that particular time I don't think we gave him any cause to think that it would be an advantage. Except that his attitude then might have been: "If you can't do it my way, we'll

just put their feet to the fire. If they want it bad enough, they'll give in."

**Ms. Boswell:** Who are "they?"

**Sen. Greive:** Me or the Democrats in the Senate. You see, he always had secret negotiations going, and I didn't know about the involvement of the Central Washington guys. There were more than that. They later included Mardesich and Gissberg from Everett, and several other people as well. He must have had seven, eight, or ten. Since I wasn't a part of it, I didn't know. I'll just take whatever McCurdy says at face value because I don't know how many he had. But I can imagine who the people were that were with him.

**Ms. Boswell:** So, the Legislature, if I recall, went into special session and you had insisted that the constitutional amendment be tied to the redistricting, right?

**Sen. Greive:** Yeah.

**Ms. Boswell:** How did you get that inserted?

**Sen. Greive:** Well, all I did was, I took the bill that came over from the House, and put it into committee. We didn't change anything much in the redistricting bill. I don't think I pushed their bill. I think we put their bill in committee, and then I brought out my own bill. And my bill was just about like their bill, except I put a provision into the bill that said that if they put the constitutional amendment on the ballot, that our redistricting bill had to pass—so that it was part of a package deal. I'm sure that I couldn't amend the bill that came from the House. Theoretically, you can't amend a bill that comes over. If a bill comes over for the first time, then I could put the amendment on. That's probably what I did. The bill came over, and I put the amendment

on.

**Ms. Boswell:** Now, at that point, I believe, Senator Donohue from Columbia County was the head of the Senate Redistricting Committee. He held hearings on the redistricting plans?

**Sen. Greive:** Senator Donohue was from the smallest district, I think, population-wise, in the state. And he was very strong for some sort of a senatorial area representation, like we have for United States senators. And so it was to his advantage to have a little fun with it, and get some publicity back home, and make statements that the farm areas would like. So that's why he held the hearing. It looked like we were doing something as well.

**Ms. Boswell:** We talked earlier about redistricting being primarily an insider or in-house issue. What interest would the public have in it?

**Sen. Greive:** You see, your senator was trying to preserve your right to have a senator from your area. It was to protect the farm areas and the home, and that's pretty good. Geographically, it also made your position pretty important. It would be covered by the Spokane papers and by your local papers—Walla Walla.

**Ms. Boswell:** Did the hearings, though, have any bearing on what would happen, or what could happen?

**Sen. Greive:** Basically, whatever we wanted, he went along with because he couldn't do it by himself, anyway. Furthermore, he was always too vulnerable to be going too far astray.

**Ms. Boswell:** Now, ultimately, you had to negotiate, didn't you, with Moos over the

constitutional amendment?

**Sen. Greive:** Well, we were always willing to do it, but we could never come to terms because I kept tying it to the bill. I said, “One has to go with the other.” If I gave that advantage away, we could never negotiate with them again. I figured if they wanted it bad enough, they might split and go with us.

See, Moos needed two-thirds. If you need two-thirds, you’ve got to be good to everybody. If a bill only needed a majority, a lot can happen, but if you needed two-thirds you have a problem for a constitutional amendment.

**Ms. Boswell:** McCurdy indicates that William S. Day was constantly trying to push for some kind of negotiations and some kind of compromise. Is that your remembrance?\*

*\*Representative Day, anxious to build his image as a Speaker who could “get things done,” had been pressuring Gorton for nearly a month to begin negotiations with Greive. When he heard of the chance meeting [between Greive and Gorton] on the House floor, he pressured the reluctant Gorton again. The result was two very short and inconclusive meetings between Day, Greive, Gorton, and Pritchard on February 21 and 22...Speaker Day, who was not a part of the “new breed” strategy to weaken Greive, again pressed for informal talks. At first Gorton simply stalled. Later, rather than directly confront Day with a strategy probably unacceptable to him, Gorton agreed to new talks.*

*The two redistricting leaders, plus Pritchard, Moos, and Perry, met Tuesday evening, March 12. The meeting instantly collapsed.*

McCurdy: 28, 31.

**Sen. Greive:** Oh, yes. I thought I was double-crossed by Day a couple of times because I thought I had him tied up, and I tied up the dissidents, and then they turned and went against me. But I negotiated with Day a number of times. He was the Speaker, and I tried my best to involve him. I figured if the dissidents were with us, we had it made and we could do something. Somebody had to bridge the difference anyway. The bitterness between O’Brien and his followers and the dissidents was enormous. I was probably the only person around that could talk to both of them. I had carefully tried to cultivate both of them. The fact is, to this day, I’m still friendly with the ones that are still around.

**Ms. Boswell:** Did that become your strategy? Instead of trying to get Republicans, it was to get the dissidents?

**Sen. Greive:** Oh, no. I was open to any kind of a deal from anybody. We talked to Republicans all the time. People like Paul Barden were often over talking to me. We’d talked to Horace Bozarth, and we talked to anybody who would talk to us. We’d pursue them, or they’d come over and talk to us. Mostly, they came over to talk to us. But we were open—we didn’t just limit it to one particular group. If I could put some sort of deal together, I didn’t care who I was working with—if we could get something through that we could agree on. We’d make half districts. We’d do most anything that we thought would



get the votes.

**Ms. Boswell:** What about Lieutenant Governor Cherberg's role?

**Sen. Greive:** John Cherberg was a very fair man. When I first knew him I thought he was kind of a lightweight, but over the years I concluded that he was a lot more knowledgeable than I was. I was never a big favorite of his, but he understood what I was trying to do. He was very loyal to me. He insisted that I be a part of the process because he felt if he didn't, that the thing would blow apart—that nobody else could hold it together.

**Ms. Boswell:** What role could he play in all this?

**Sen. Greive:** More of an ideological role than anything else. If they appointed a committee, why, he got to appoint the conference committee, so he had first shot at it. At one point he did tell them that he thought they should remove Gorton from the committee simply because Gorton fought everything. I'd frequently go in and brief him. I never left him out of the loop. In other words, my days were always filled with all kinds of conferences with everybody, for everything.

**Ms. Boswell:** He suggested Gorton be removed. What about you? Did he suggest you be removed, too?

**Sen. Greive:** I was in a little different position. At that point we didn't know what Gorton had. You see, Evans was the leader of the House Republicans, and Gorton didn't have any official position. I don't think he was even chairman of the Redistricting Committee. I don't think it was even an official position. Mostly, he was Evans' alter ego. But he kept blocking everything, constantly blocking everything, and it dawned

on all of us, including Cherberg, that he just wasn't going to let us have a redistricting bill unless it was what he wanted. See, Evans always kind of took the high road. He never took the brunt of anything. I now think that he had Gorton out front, just to take the brunt—somebody had to, so he had Gorton out front.

**Ms. Boswell:** Well, in the long run it didn't harm Gorton, I guess.

**Sen. Greive:** No, he did very well. They all did. Pritchard got to be a congressman, and then Lieutenant Governor.

**Ms. Boswell:** What role did Joel Pritchard play in all this?

**Sen. Greive:** Well, Gorton, Pritchard, and Evans were like the Three Musketeers. I don't know, they were together on almost everything. I think they discussed strategies, and Pritchard was a very affable guy, and very much unlike Gorton. He got along well with everybody—a big smile on his face, and "What can I do for you?" But I don't know what he had to do on this particular thing. I know he was a part of it.

**Ms. Boswell:** I think McCurdy mentioned certain meetings where you and Gorton were negotiating where Pritchard appeared to have been there, too.

**Sen. Greive:** Probably. I never cared if they had two or three people there. That didn't bother me. As a practical matter, when it got down to this, somebody had to do the drawing of the lines. I knew that in order to get what they wanted, that they had to go through me. I was unaware of all that McCormack was doing, and he may have gotten a lot of information from us, and maybe even some maps because we weren't against doing that.

**Ms. Boswell:** Finally, did you have to compromise with Moos?

**Sen. Greive:** No. I said that if we pinned the two together, I would make it work. Where we had people sitting in the seats, they had to run in the next election. They had to be elected in the next four years, and I could do a lot. But all I was talking about was putting it on the ballot. The people still had to decide it. If the people voted for a system of representation based on land for senators and population for representatives, why, that was all right with me.

**Ms. Boswell:** Now they had initially included in redistricting—I think it was in the constitutional amendment—this notion of automatically redistricting. What did that mean?

**Sen. Greive:** Well, that's all right. That's what they've got now, but they haven't drawn very good districts. The districts aren't very compact, but since we're not doing it, nobody publicizes it or makes an issue out of it. However, the idea that we'd have a commission of some sort to do redistricting is pretty common. All over the United States the commissions are having just as much trouble with it as the Senate. They get locked up, too. Individuals don't get on the commission until they promise they won't vote for something, and then they have a tough time getting what they want. Whoever the majority party is just does it. It's a little easier to do if you get a commission because you appoint five guys, and they're all pledged pretty much together. At least that's the theory.

**Ms. Boswell:** It's amazingly complicated. Once this compromise essentially came along, then what happened?

**Sen. Greive:** There were many compromises,

and they all failed for one reason or another. They adjourned the Legislature after the last one failed, and we couldn't come to any conclusion. Essentially, they failed because Gorton or Evans wanted more senators. I believe it was Evans, but it might have been the combination. Anyway, that's what they wanted.

**Ms. Boswell:** Now McCurdy suggests that Governor Rosellini got involved at the end in order to put a stop to all these machinations.\*

*\*Many feared that the high court would uphold the district court, throwing the case back to the state just before elections and thus forcing state officials to choose between a sudden, disorganized at-large election or a frantic special session during the election campaign. The Governor should call a special session immediately, some urged. Rosellini balked at this request, insisting that the court would never suddenly disrupt the state election machinery. He added that the legislators were too far from agreement; a special session would be lengthy, costly, and wasteful; and the Supreme Court might be preparing new redistricting guidelines, standards that would make all existing proposals unconstitutional.*

**McCurdy: 61**

**Sen. Greive:** Rosellini, by that time, was having a tough time. He was at low ebb politically, and for some reason—I think it was because the *Seattle Times* had taken him apart

on some stuff—he really didn’t want legislative business to tie him down. In other words, if we had gone into special session, he would be presiding over the Legislature and the redistricting all the way to the election. He just did not want that to happen. He wanted us out of there; he wanted to go campaign and talk about something else. He wanted to stall until after his election. Of course, he thought he’d be re-elected in 1964. It turned out he wasn’t.

**Ms. Boswell:** And then you lost Hallauer and McCormack, too. Is that right?

**Sen. Greive:** I hadn’t known I had them. What I think is that McCormack was hungrily trying to create some sort of a position of importance for himself in the press, in his district, and so forth. He wanted to be some sort of a leader because he wanted to run for Congress, which he did. He served, I think, six years or eight years and that was his big dream. Now looking back on it, that’s what I think he was trying to do. At least that’s the way I viewed it at the time. He tried to make a deal.

Hallauer had a different deal. Hallauer had the problem with his district and what number went on the district. It really isn’t very complicated. In each district, every other number has a four-year term, although originally it was two-year terms. Half the senators are up every other time. If you have a number and someone else had a number, and he was going to run and serve for two years more, then you would have to run against the incumbent. If they used Hallauer’s number, then it would have been up the next election, and he could run. David McMillan wouldn’t want to run due to his two-year holdover in his territory. That problem happened in Everett with August Mardesich and with Bill Gissberg, and some people like that. This is a very essential thing, and very important to both of them. I could understand it—they both had

a legitimate interest.

**Ms. Boswell:** Can you explain to me, again, the district numbering system?

**Sen. Greive:** There was one district left after redistricting from District One and Two. One went away when you combined the two of them. If McMillan’s number was left from the Second District, he could serve for two more years. If it was Hallauer’s number, District One, the election would be immediately. But McMillan still had two years left on his district, so he would have had to abandon two years if he wanted to run. He had to be in a different district because that number then would have gone somewhere else. So he couldn’t do both. It was very important to both of them, very important.

**Ms. Boswell:** What happened when you got into cases like that? How did you make the decision?

**Sen. Greive:** I had to make the decision on the basis of who’d been my friend for years and supporter, and naturally I supported McMillan. Everybody expected me to, and I did. I didn’t detect any bitterness from anybody else. Hallauer said he understood. I’m sure he thought it was a crummy idea, but he didn’t say he didn’t like it.

What happened was, Hallauer went to the Republicans and he had the pleasure of seventeen votes—which was all they had to go—for his number to be on the district, which is what he wanted. But then they got into a fight over the Thirty-first District when we tied the amendment in, and the Republicans insisted on changes, and we said, “All right, but we have to get such and such.” This fight happened on the floor, incidentally, during the vote. I lost on the vote. They won, and got enough votes from Hallauer and the other people who were part of the deal. That’s how

they got the votes. What I did is, I moved for some changes in the Thirty-first District, which strengthened us. They wouldn't go for that, and Hallauer was on the spot because he had pledged his support to the Democratic senator in the Thirty-first District. At that point Hallauer needed the Democrats as well as the Republicans to put his number on the new district. He couldn't very well run out on us on a crucial vote like that. Not a thing he could do about it. So the Republicans voted against him. McMillan got his district number.

**Ms. Boswell:** Were you ready? Did all this happen during one day?

**Sen. Greive:** We were many, many days. You probably wouldn't need to have a thing like this on the floor for two or three days.

See, McMillan had sixteen or seventeen votes, anyway—maybe more than that. It was an even fight, or else the Republicans split evenly. I think that is why Hallauer was going to lose. He needed the seventeen votes to go with what he had. But you see the reason the Republicans were willing to do something for him is that they had hopes that he would become the floor leader, and he'd take over. However, I don't think that he would have taken over redistricting and then knocked me out as floor leader. But, who knows, I'm not that good a judge. He may have had conversations with others and so forth.

I think Gorton and I became an obsession for each other, and we were looking at everything that the other did, and all that sort of thing. We both probably went too far. As a practical matter, as I look back on it, I think that Evans, Pritchard, and Gorton were so tied together that they would have never made a deal no matter what happened.

**Ms. Boswell:** As this session ends and the redistricting didn't go as you had hoped, McCurdy suggests that you felt you'd been

double-crossed.\*

*\*The House convened early Sunday evening [March 31], and with it a great crowd of senators, spectators, press, and state officials. To most, the outcome was fairly certain. Each thought his own side would win...O'Brien moved to approve Greive's amendments, and, as the more positive motion, this was considered first. Calling the bill fair and equitable, O'Brien implied that any move to set up a conference committee would send the issue to the court.*

*Then dissident Perry rose. The bill was not reasonable, he said; the issue could be resolved by Greive and Gorton in a conference committee.*

*Democrats wondered if Perry spoke for all dissidents. He did...Gorton moved that the House send the bill back to the Senate for reconsideration. Another regular Democrat broke, and the House approved Gorton's motion 60-37.*

*Greive left after the first vote. Later that night in the Speaker's office he assailed Day for supposedly breaking his word. As he left he shouted, "I don't mind telling you, I've been double-crossed. Some of the people I've been dealing with haven't kept their word." He claimed he was through with redistricting.*

**McCurdy: 43-44**

**Sen. Greive:** I had pledges from the dissidents, and I had pledges from several Republicans. I had more than the number of

pledges to have the votes I needed from the House by two or three. They evaporated when the caucuses bore down on them. I held the Democrats, but I couldn't get the Republicans and I couldn't get the dissidents. See, there were more Democrats than Republicans, so the dissidents were like a third party.

There had been many years when the Republicans and Democrats had a coalition. There was a different coalition than this one, and the Senate was always run by a coalition or by the loyal Democrats. I was with Rosellini, who was a loyal Democrat. We didn't have control. When I got to be floor leader, the thing I made sure of was that we didn't have dissidents. That's how I became so close to the Spokane people because that's where the dissidents came from. I did everything I could to make sure that we kept them in the Democratic Party and we didn't split.

There were some other factors in here that McCurdy doesn't deal with. I had a few close ties of my own in the Senate and in the House. I had a few people who were particular friends of mine who played a part in this. I was a very, very close friend of Mark Litchman's. I was also a very close friend of Wayne Angevine when I was in the Senate. He was my right-hand man, and he'd been in the Senate before he got back in the House. In both cases I helped to finance their campaigns, and a lot of other things. So I had a few votes of my own that were pretty loyal to me. But we didn't try to surface anybody's vote or put them on the spot until we needed them.

One of the reasons I always wanted to help the Thirty-first District, incidentally, was that Angevine was going to run for senator from that district. That's why we did the Thirty-first and the Thirty-second districts the way we did.

**Ms. Boswell:** Once your bill fails on the House floor, then something had to happen.

There had to be a compromise, right?

**Sen. Greive:** Well, the conference was appointed. I was on that committee and Gorton was on it, and Marshall Neill was on it. I forget who the others were. But, essentially, Gorton and I tried to negotiate something, but I never could get him to agree to anything. I don't know if they thought they had a deal or they could make a deal on the side with Hallauer. I don't know. I was never a part of any of that. But I have no reason to doubt it happened. I'm surprised McCurdy knew all of these things. They may have told him because he always pretended to us as though they wouldn't let him in on things.

**Ms. Boswell:** Tell me about your caucus at this point. How did they feel about what was going on?

**Sen. Greive:** Well, they didn't speak of one mind. Cooney once made the observation, "When you hear these people jump around in here and shouting and talking, you wonder how they had enough sense to get here in the first place." So, everything was fluid. You spent your time putting your finger in the dike wherever you could, and I had to depend on people like Cooney or McCutcheon, or whomever my close friends were, to come through and protect me. You have to protect them, and they protect you.

**Ms. Boswell:** During those behind-the-scenes caucuses, then, how did your fellow Democrats feel about what happened?

**Sen. Greive:** We'd have periods of elation when we thought we were going to get something passed. We'd also make all kinds of strategic moves. On several occasions, we did things just because we wanted to scare the Republicans. I'm trying to think of one time, but I can't remember the incident now. We

put out a vote and we voted down redistricting—it came up and we just voted it down.

That was nothing but a ploy. We knew what would happen. We wanted to make them think that they weren't going to have any redistricting, and we were going to go home. As it worked out, we didn't have any redistricting, and we went home. But at the time we thought that would crack them. We thought that when they got right down to the fact that they might not have a district to run in, why we'd get enough votes to do something.

**Ms. Boswell:** Wouldn't Gorton also think that you had possibly lost your support?

**Sen. Greive:** Yes, that could very well be. We just felt this way: If we weren't going to get the votes, we'd put them against the wall. Not just Gorton, but we'd put the whole caucus on notice, and they'd have to decide if they were going to accept it or not. That was the strategic move we made. It may have looked like I'd lost my support, which was a little embarrassing, but it was a practical matter. We thought that tactic might get them to vote for it. By now, I think they realized Michael Gallagher was a turncoat, and they realized that I was easier to deal with than some of the others. That was another thing that kept running through the debate. I never had the feeling that they believed—Gorton might have thought it—that I didn't want to get a plan. I wanted a plan bad enough that they didn't figure that I was pulling any shenanigans. If I could get a plan, I'd get it. Or if they took the hard-nose—Gallagher's hard-nose—they figured there'd never be a plan.

You see, Gallagher had been the county chairman for the Democratic Party in King County for eight years or something like that, and his big focus was on King County. He thought that all of King County should be

Democratic, and that sort of thing. He didn't want to give an inch. He always thought he could make a better deal if he was tough. We put him on the Redistricting Conference Committee because he *was* tough. He turned out to be a lot tougher than I thought. So it was stuff I couldn't do anything about. He had Ed Logan, his very close buddy who was the election officer for King County, come down. They had a plan, which I understand later was incorporated into Hallauer's plan. Gallagher wasn't able to carry the day, however. Everybody recognized that he was kind of the extreme. He was against everything.

**Ms. Boswell:** What was the alternative? Could you use as a bargaining argument, at least, that if they didn't go for something then the court would take over?

**Sen. Greive:** Well, we argued that. They say when you go to war, that the troops rush in under fire and all that sort of thing, and it reaches a point where people are no longer afraid because somehow they think they won't be hit. "It's going to happen to you, but nothing's going to happen to me." I think that was sort of the numb feeling that they had. They didn't know what was going to happen, but up to now they'd survived. They were willing to take a chance. In other words, they always thought there was going to be a tomorrow until the very end.

**Ms. Boswell:** That's interesting. I read, though, that you had suggested that one alternative would be that the court would make everybody run at large.

**Sen. Greive:** The three-judge panel's chairman was Judge William Beeks—I think that was his name—and he suggested that plan as an alternative. We thought it was crazy, but, nevertheless, we did a lot of talking about

it. When all you want to talk about is redistricting—the newspapers talked about it, everybody talked about it. So I seized on that as an alternative that they wouldn't like. One person, for instance, Senator Nat Washington, thought it was a pretty good idea. He said, "With the name Washington? I think I would come out pretty well." If you had enough publicity, you might come out very well, but some of the guys in these seats weren't going to have a chance. They were going to be running against football players or musicians, or anybody who had notoriety.

**Ms. Boswell:** Once there was this stalemate, then Cherberg could name the conferees to try to break the stalemate? Is that correct?

**Sen. Greive:** Automatically—if we pass a bill in the Senate and it goes to the House, and they put an amendment on it, it comes back to us. If we don't accept it, you've got to have a conference committee. You may have a chance to move to reconsider some things. For instance, at one point you may have noticed, both Perry Woodall and I changed our votes. Anyway, he changed his vote and I changed my vote—that's what the floor leader does. You change your vote if it's necessary. They let you change your vote, and then you move to reconsider.

**Ms. Boswell:** I see. Now, who were the Senate conferees? We talked about Gallagher and you, but Marshall Neill was also a conferee?

**Sen. Greive:** Marshall Neill was a very even-tempered, even-handed guy, and he eventually became a federal judge. He was very close to Perry Woodall. He was just there. He's a nice guy and all that. One time, I talked to him—I was giving him a hell of a time—I said, "We've got a deal and you won't do it because of Evans." He says, "Bob, you don't understand how it is. When the governor is

from your own party, you're not going to buck that." And then he said, "Oh, I forgot who I'm talking to." He said, "Maybe I'm wrong. You do understand how it is." We all laughed.

**Ms. Boswell:** When the conference committee was set, you had the Senate ones and then the House ones?

**Sen. Greive:** You have to have a majority and a minority, and so one minority and two majority votes.

**Ms. Boswell:** Right. And then the House committee would be the same thing?

**Sen. Greive:** The same thing. Then the six of you get together and you're supposed to decide. It could have more members than that, but that's what the rule called for. The Lieutenant Governor appoints, and the Senate confirms. Usually the Lieutenant Governor knows enough to appoint the right guys, or else he has them in, talks the thing over, and sees what they'll do.

**Ms. Boswell:** Gorton presented to those conferees some kind of a stop-gap plan?

**Sen. Greive:** Yes. He was going to propose something like that. The four smallest districts—he was going to combine those—and divide the four largest. He had something worked out, but I can't remember in detail what it did. I'm sure he was presenting a plan and had thought it out and I had another idea, but that's all I can tell you at this point. If I had some maps to go with this, I could tell you more. I can't remember what I did.

**Ms. Boswell:** But you had come up with your own new proposal by this time?

**Sen. Greive:** I think we had a new proposal almost every day. What happened was, if we

got wind of somebody willing to vote with us—where we could pick up a vote—or if a change would do it, then we’d go and try to make the change. But you just don’t make one change. Every change depends on every other change.

The worst part would be that you thought you had everybody satisfied, and then at the very last minute Fred Dore would come along and say, “You’ve got to do something for Petrich.” It never occurred to me that he was going to be a factor. And then if you tried to make a change there, you had to do something more. Nothing was set. If you were firm and said you wouldn’t do it, then you’d have an enemy. So you’d try to do what you could under the circumstances. And very often you’d have to talk to some Republicans and see how the change would go with them, and you had to test everything out all the time. If I took a town that you’d carried away from you and put it in somebody else’s district, then he might be mad or you might be mad, or both of you.

**Ms. Boswell:** Essentially, though, you and the conferees did come up with at least some compromise, but then the rest of the Legislature voted it down, right?

**Sen. Greive:** I knew how to persuade them to take it, and it would probably be just as well with what we finally got. I can’t remember what the changes were, but whether it was just as good or not, they were ready to go along with it because Gallagher kept saying he could do better.

**Ms. Boswell:** How does Moos end up in all this?

**Senator Greive:** Moos doesn’t end up very well. Everyone knew from the beginning that he couldn’t get his plan through. It was impossible. The Supreme Court said we

couldn’t have fixed boundaries.

He didn’t run again. At the beginning he was sincere—he thought he had discovered the world. We told him we’d been discovering the world for some time. He was affable, though, and tried to be fair.

**Ms. Boswell:** So, ultimately though, all of the compromises or attempts at compromise failed?

**Sen. Greive:** The real problem with the compromises—you called them compromises—was that they weren’t always compromises. If Gorton pronounced it was bad for Republicans, it was bad. If I pronounced it was bad for Democrats, it was bad. Nobody really looked into it to see what it was. I would know and Gorton would know, and time after time we were wrong. The trouble was that you were looking at thirty-nine districts, or fifty districts, and you don’t know what the change might be. If he presents something to you, you’ve got to go over the whole thing and review it because you don’t know where the changes have been made, and you don’t know where to make the changes. So you have to count the votes, and frequently—very frequently—we’d find that they were hiding more than they said. And then you’ve got to get people to believe you, and that’s hard because they figure you might lie just to help yourself, or to help your cause, I should say.

**Ms. Boswell:** So, the Legislative session ends, and we have nothing, right? We have no redistricting.

**Sen. Greive:** Except that we were going to get a special session. Some people would let it sit. Rosellini wasn’t going to let it sit. However, he did let it sit until the next election. He was convinced the court would let him use the districts.



**Ms. Boswell:** But didn't the courts intervene?

**Sen. Greive:** Yes, they did. At the time we thought maybe they'd do something, and, finally, with the help of O'Connell and his arguments, the courts decided to let it go one more time because we'd made progress. I didn't think they'd do that. I was kind of hoping they'd make us go back. I thought we were close enough that we'd probably do the trick—if we had come back then, we'd have done it.

**Ms. Boswell:** But the court did not?

**Sen. Greive:** No. They put it off, let everybody leave, and then had an election. Well, they were probably right. What I hoped for wasn't right. As a practical matter, somebody might get hurt, and we wouldn't have enough time to properly handle the situation. The court just felt it wasn't that necessary.

**Ms. Boswell:** Then that allowed the whole issue to be carried over until after the election?

**Sen. Greive:** Dean Foster was still with me—we had the next session to worry about, then. *At the close of the 1963 session, legislators*

*adjourned after a 60-day regular session and a 23-day special session without passing a redistricting bill. The following month, in May of 1963, the U.S. District Court for Western Washington declared existing legislative districts null and void. In July of 1963, Secretary of State Vic Meyers appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court for a stay of the District Court's ruling. But it was not until February of 1964 that the U.S. Supreme Court granted a stay of proceedings, thereby restoring existing districts; the stay was granted pending the state's appeal of Thigpen v. Meyers. On June 15, 1964, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the appeal in Thigpen v. Meyers, and thus upheld the original ruling of the District Court: Washington's legislative districts were once again null and void.*

*In October of 1964, the District Court ordered the Legislature to make redistricting their first order of business in the next session. The legislative members of the 1965 session could not pass any other legislation until they had secured a viable solution to Washington's redistricting problem.*