

Appendix A

National Institute of Corrections Report

NIC Review Team Report

Washington Department of Corrections
Monroe Correctional Complex
Washington State Reformatory

Incident Review of Death of Correctional Officer Jayme Biendl
January 29, 2011

March 2011

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Executive Summary

Eldon Vail, Secretary, Washington Department of Corrections (WDOC) submitted a request for the National Institute of Corrections (NIC) to conduct an independent review of Monroe Correctional Complex/Washington State Reformatory into pertinent systems and policies surrounding the policies and procedures relative to the death of Correctional Officer Jayme Biendl which occurred on January 29, 2011.

The Review Team consisted of NIC consultants, Joan Palmateer, Lead Consultant, James Upchurch, and Michelle Elzie. The Review Team was on site at the Monroe Correctional Complex (MCC), Washington State Reformatory (WSR) in Washington February 27, 2011 - March 4, 2011.

The report identifies systems, policies, practices, protocol, and technology within MCC/WRS which would reasonably have been connected to factors surrounding safety and security for staff and others within that compound.

It is important to note that the Review Team did not have access to the Chapel of the facility because it was still considered a crime scene and active for the criminal investigation. We did review the schematic of the entire chapel area to include camera placement or lack thereof.

The research, review of documents, interviews, and work formulating our conclusion and recommendations are in our opinion as Corrections Professionals opportunities to mitigate safety and security vulnerabilities. *There were numerous documents which could not be viewed due to the ongoing criminal investigation.* The recommendations may not only impact Monroe Correctional Complex, but the entire Washington Department of Corrections. Policies reviewed were generally department wide policies. It may be noted that beyond the department policy, there are often varying interpretations of how policy is carried out within each specific facility. There are reasons this occurs: physical plant differences in each facility, inmate visibility, inconsistent practices based on shift or supervisor expectations, security or custody levels, staffing accommodations, or even correctional staff interpretation of policy.

Complacency can exist among corrections staff at every level which may lull them into a false sense of security. Recognizing that complacency occurs periodically in all correctional environments is important.

Change of policy or processes will require considerations not limited to: communication, budget, and training. The consideration for how fast these changes occur should be accomplished based on prioritization from most critical to those with less risk factors associated.

We want to make special note that balancing programs with safety and security can still be accomplished. Every medium custody institution must have rehabilitation or reformation programs, and activities to provide opportunities for those inmates who will eventually return to the community. The balance is a delicate one; however, if the security and safety systems are designed to mitigate the risks associated with these programs/activities there can be enhanced security within the correctional environment. The “how” we accomplish those systems and practice safe operational protocol is what determines the safety level within the correctional environment. We also recognize there is no perfect system with all the answers on how to protect everyone, all the time, everywhere. We work in an environment which is inherently more dangerous than the average job.

The culture of an institution and how all staff responds to the entire operation and each other is as integral as the written policies and procedures.

Pre-Planning Meeting / Draft-February 11, 2011

Joan Palmateer met with Secretary Eldon Vail, Director of Prisons, Bernie Warner, and Deputy Secretary, Dan Pacholke on Friday February 11, 2011 for pre-planning for review request.

Briefing

Central Office staff and Monroe Correctional Complex staff.

Tour

- Monroe Correctional Complex/ Washington State Reformatory
- Chapel (specifically)

Review Chronology of Events:

- Time Inmate Schref arrives in Chapel
- Time Officer Jayme Biendl arrives in Chapel
- Last radio communication with Officer Jayme Biendl
- Last staff contact with Officer Jayme Biendl
- Count time (inmate discovered missing)
- Time of key and radio check from previous shift
- Inmate movement logs for day of incident
- Time of Officer Death
- Notification to shift management and Central office
- Notification to Medical Examiner
- Notification to police
- Securing of the Crime Scene
- Notification to other staff on shift
- Employee Assistance for staff affected

Security Policy/Protocol Review:

- Count
- Inmate Work Assignments
- Inmate Movement

- Emergency Plans
- Classification
- Chapel supervision schedule
- Communication equipment (radios, alarms etc.) (mandatory call-ins)
- Key Control
- Accounting for staff (shift to shift)
- Available logs, records pertaining to day's activities
- Camera placement and monitoring process from Chapel
- Specific officer safety training
- Personal body alarm system that may have been considered/available and/or any panic alarm,
- Procedure requirement for 30 minute security/safety/alertness calls to control, response requirements

Debriefing:

- Last day on site with Central Office, and Monroe staff

Written Review Report to be submitted by March 19, 2011 for review to BeLinda Watson, Chief, Prisons Division, NIC and Eldon Vail, Secretary, Washington Department of Corrections.

On Site Review: February 28-March 4, 2011

Documents

Inmate Byron Scherf - Hard file
 WDOC Official Memos on Staff Member's Death
 MCC Facility Information 2010
 Published News Reports on Incident
 Emergency Management Assessment 2010
 Operations Inspection Report 7/2010
 DOC Human Resource Management Report
 WSR Demographics and Data
 Training Program Information
 2009 Employee Satisfaction Survey Briefing
 Prison Management Expectations
 Classification and Custody Policies
 Risk and Needs Assessment
 Incident and Specific Event Reporting
 Post Orders and Post Logs
 Radio System Operation and Acquisition
 Counts
 Callout Systems and Rosters
 Searches of Offenders
 Security Inspections
 Key Control
 Religious Programs

Work Programs
Escape Preparedness
Facility Lockdown Procedure
MCC Custody Post Audit
Chapel Schedule
Recent Directive Changes incorporated since incident
Various other logs, documents, forms, memos and policies

Staff Interviews

It should be noted that we interviewed many staff for specific information and understanding relating to policy and operational practice at MCC/WSR. Some staff did not to be identified by name.

We were not able to interview some staff because to do so may interfere with the criminal investigation. We did allow staff to discuss their concerns or issues if they thought there were security enhancements which may be needed. We have provided a synopsis of those issues at the end of this report.

Michelle Wood
Alma Kingstad
Chaplain H. Fisher
Marjorie Peterson
Anna Williams
Karen Portin
Robert Pittzenberger
David Bustanoby
John Padilla
Lindsey Robinson
Lesley Chu
Captain Hardina
Sgt. Knox
Officer Jensen
Jonathon Johnson
Officer Parker
Todd Brown
Mr. Claussen
Two female industries staff
PAB Officers

We also discussed security protocols with various custody staff at their duty stations

Briefing and Report-Out

Review team met with Monroe Correctional Complex Management team and Central Office Administrators February 28, 2011 to discuss how the week would progress. We were assigned a liaison from Central Office; Devon Schrum, to assist with

whatever needs we had from central office. Michelle Wood was assigned as our Monroe Correctional Complex liaison for the needs required from MCC/WSR.

Management team attending the briefing:

Dan Pacholke, Deputy Secretary
Bernie Warner, Director of Prisons
Scott Frakes, Superintendent
Karen Portin, Associate Superintendent
David Bustanoby, Associate Superintendent
Bryan Hardina, Captain
Kenneth Bratten, Captain
Annie Williams, Correctional Program Manager (CPM)
Michelle Wood, Correctional Program Manager (CPM)
Eric Harding, CMHMP
Marc Glaser, (recorder) CMHMS
Angela Loesch, Superintendent Support

Review Team Primary Areas of Critical Review

Joan Palmateer:

- Movement Call-outs passes, main line, unit control protocols, job accountability
- Change process/follow through on directives
- Change process, lack of presence, supervisor oversight
- Cameras, placement, visibility, needs
- Post Orders, conflicting information
- Visibility, building and "stuff" removal
- Security Audit from outside for all three complexes
- Gate 7 criteria for inmates assigned
- Inmate Scherf or other inmates as volunteer clerks

James Upchurch:

- Officer Safety training program
- Tower
- Staffing
- Radio
- Personal Body Alarms
- Chemical Agents

Michelle Elzie:

- Classification
- Accountability for all staff, contractors and volunteers inside compound at end of each shift, hours of work duty.

Findings and Recommendations

Sanitation

Finding

We were all most impressed with the sanitation level that we observed at MCC/WSR despite the fact that they had been in various stages of lock down since the incident prior to our arrival. A high level of sanitation in a correctional facility is indicative of the management and supervisors' ability to "get things done" through their staff as well as all of the staff's ability to require the inmates to regularly perform all the tasks associated with maintaining sanitation in a prison environment and to perform these tasks at a high level of proficiency. This speaks well for the overall health of the Washington State Reformatory (WSR).

Recommendation

None

Staff Assaults

Finding

We reviewed the staff assaults that have occurred at MCC/WSR since 2006 in order to make a determination of the relative frequency and severity of such incidents at WSR compared to other similar facilities in other jurisdictions with which we are familiar. It is important to point out that a staff assault as defined in most correctional jurisdictions today can range anywhere from such incidents, noted at WSR, as an inmate throwing his ID card into the chest of an officer to pushing an officer's hand away when he is retrieving contraband and to actually placing a staff member in a head lock when angered at a response. Our review revealed that staff assaults in general at MCC/WSR as reported to us have diminished significantly over the last five years. The frequency and overall seriousness of such incidents are not inconsistent with the level that would be expected in a facility such as MCC/WSR nor are they inconsistent with the level found in other jurisdictions with which we are familiar.

This is not to say that security operational practices cannot and should not be enhanced in areas relative to such an incident. It is a well known fact that working in corrections is always a career that you come into with an understanding of the ever present danger of working with sometimes violent offenders. As with the community, we never really know what goes on in the mind of other persons whether incarcerated or not.

Recommendation

None

Treatment/Program - Custody/Control Balance;
Finding

It is important that a balanced emphasis exist in a correctional institution, particularly a facility such as MCC/WSR that houses some 137 inmates sentenced to life without parole (LWOP) for a variety very serious, violent offenses. An environment that is conducive for effective program and treatment opportunities for inmates does not and should not be one devoid of structure, discipline and control. Inmates should be encouraged and given the opportunity to take personal responsibility for their behavior within an environment structured to the extent necessary to provide for order and safety for all. Adequate control and discipline must be exercised by the staff when inmates fail to follow the rules and must be applied in a fair, firm and consistent manner. Failure by the facility to provide the necessary level of control and discipline is detrimental to safety and security for everyone in the facility and also serves to the detriment of the appropriate and successful delivery of the programs.

Recommendation 1

It appears to us that to attain the appropriate balance at WSR some emphasis shift toward increased inmate accountability and control is indicated. Security staff concerns and issues should be carefully considered and implemented when determined to be legitimate and appropriate. If not implemented, the reason for not doing so should be thoroughly explained. Accommodation measures implemented solely for inmate preference, convenience and comfort should receive a low priority when considered in light of staffing limitations related to insuring that inmate movement and behavior is carefully monitored and controlled to maintain a safe and secure environment.

We note in the executive summary that to achieve that balance, the security and safety systems and practices must be enhanced to allow safe programs conducive to inmate reformation opportunities while still providing structure and control. Security is dynamic, and as such it is ever changing so as program needs change, so should the security policy and practices.

Communication and Alarm
Finding

There is no personal body alarm (PBA) system at the MCC/WSR. Uniformed staff must depend on direct verbal notification when possible, telephone and/or their assigned portable radio to alert control and other staff to an immediate need for assistance should they be assaulted or should the threat of assault be imminent.

The radio system does feature an alert capability in addition to the normal radio transmission capability associated with depressing the microphone key and communicating verbally the need for assistance, location and identity of the transmitting officer. This alert capability audibly signals the control room area where the radio control station is located and simultaneously keys the microphone on the portable radio ('hot mic') possessed by the officer to transmit for a prescribed time period and override all other radio traffic to allow control and other radios tuned to the same talk group to hear any verbal/audible activity that may be occurring in the immediate vicinity of the radio. This function is initiated by depressing a small red button just proximal to the antennae connection point to the body of the radio. These options in many cases are sufficient to allow an officer to acquire assistance when it is needed. There are, however, concerns with depending on these options alone that are addressed with the installation of a PBA system and discussed below. These concerns are magnified in the case of non-uniformed/custody staff who are not issued a portable two-way radio and must depend on the telephone and/or shouting or screaming for assistance.

Recommendation 2

We recommend the installation of a personal body alarm system that when activated automatically alerts the institution main control room and provides the name of the officer and the officer's location within the institution -the current capability associated with the radio system described in the finding above only alerts to the specific radio from which the alert was received and not the name of the staff member or the location from the which the alert emanated. If desired the system can be integrated with the radio system to immediately announce from the radio console the alert and associated information to all staff on the talk group being utilized.

There are several vendors that can provide such a system thus fostering a competitive procurement process to hold down costs. It is recommended that the system selected include only those features required to make it functional to accomplish only what is necessary to provide for enhanced staff safety. This would include that the system be self-monitoring in terms of alerting control room staff when transmitter battery strength is low and if, for any other reason, a transmitter or receiver becomes dysfunctional. The system with which we are most familiar alerts when either a button is depressed on the transmitter worn by the staff member or when a lanyard attached to both the transmitter and to the belt or clothing of the wearer is dislodged by an inmate pulling the transmitter away from the staff member in an effort to keep them from depressing the alert button.

There are systems that feature transmitters worn by the staff that alert when the orientation angle of the transmitter to perpendicular changes significantly indicating that the staff wearing it has fallen or been forced or knocked to the ground. The issue of false alarms has served to dissuade many users from this feature.

For cost containment purposes the agency may also consider location specificity of the PBA system be limited to general zones or areas such as designated living areas and/or zones/sectors within large buildings such as industries at MCCWSR. For example, as opposed to the expensive requirement that the PBA alert system provide the location of an officer needing assistance in a cell block to within a 15 foot area and/or distinguish which tier level he/she is located, it is sufficient that the system simply advise that the officer needs assistance in a block to allow response staff to locate him/her in that area. Similarly, instead of requiring that the system provide the specific office from which an alert is transmitted from the programs area building (PAB) at MCC/WSR, two area/zone locations encompassing the main hallways would be sufficient.

We are available to assist your department further in developing the specifications for a system that is effective while simultaneously cost efficient in recognition of the difficult fiscal times impacting all of us in state government.

Chemical Agents

Finding

Uniformed custody staff are not issued and subsequently do not carry on their person any force multiplier option for their own defense in case of imminent or actual physical assault or to rescue/defend fellow staff or inmates from such assaults. Staff currently must rely exclusively on physical, hands on force options in such cases when non-force options fail.

While it is certainly true that the training provided to staff annually on defensive tactics is beneficial, it is generally known that proficiency in the tactics taught cannot be achieved in the limited training time designated for this purpose. A review of the training curriculum provided to custody staff in the Washington State Department of Corrections would also appear to support this observation. Additionally, the absence of physical fitness requirements can result in poorly conditioned staff being pitted against physically superior inmates in situations where staff personal safety is in jeopardy.

Physical, hands on confrontation with inmates also has the additional risk associated with the well-established higher prevalence of communicable diseases such as HIV and hepatitis C within the inmate population cuts, abrasions, etc. that allow for contact with bodily fluids during a physical struggle with an inmate pose a significant risk to staff.

Staff physical injuries sustained in hands-on struggles with inmates also frequently result in extended medical leave requirements and expensive workmen's compensation claims and medical expenses in addition to the associated pain and suffering such injuries can cause.

Recommendation 3

We recommend that all custody staff, be issued a 3-4 ounce OC/pepper spray canister.

- *A pilot with fewer staff carrying OC/pepper spray may be considered as an alternative to everyone receiving it. Issuance to Sergeants or supervisors or zones of control, and lone posts staff may be the first consideration.*

We further recommend that the canister be of law enforcement strength formulation. These canisters are sold by a number of vendors and utilized by numerous law enforcement and corrections agencies across the country. While it is certainly true that this additional tool provided to custody staff can be abused, the implementation of careful control, supervision and accountability procedures and narrowly limited parameters for its authorized use can serve to effectively mitigate these concerns to only very rare instances. As with many decisions considered in the corrections field, the questions to utilize the chemical agent or not becomes one involving a risk assessment – does the risk of abuse/misuse by staff when appropriate controls are put in place outweigh the benefits to be derived for the safety of staff and inmates? We contend that it does.

Experience in jurisdictions where this tool has been put into place has been very positive with instances of abusive use by staff occurring very rarely. Benefits in terms of staff safety and reduction in staff and inmate physical injuries have also been observed. The added initial concern that the chemical agent canister will be taken from the staff by the inmates and used against them has also proved to be unfounded except in the rarest of incidents. Lastly, the concern that staff will resort to the use of the chemical agent before and instead of utilizing other non-force options including providing verbal direction and employing verbal de-escalation techniques has proven to be minimally problematic when standard use of force requirements are stressed and careful reviews of each occurrence are conducted to insure that parameters for use are not violated. These observations are not intended to say that there will not be infrequent incidents of staff misuse of the chemical agent just as there have historically always been such incidents involving hands-on physical force by a very small percentage of our staffs. Accountability is a must in either case and those staff who are abusive of the inmate population must be dealt with sternly and when indicated removed from employment and held criminally accountable when appropriate.

The use of the chemical agent canisters carried by staff on their person should be clearly limited to spontaneous incidents where immediate response to an actual assault or imminent threat of assault by an inmate(s) on themselves, another staff member or an inmate is required and either there are no other viable options or all other options have been exhausted. All other use of chemical agents including those issued to each officer should continue to require prior approval of institutional supervisory staff as currently prescribed.

It is recommended that a numbered seal be affixed to each chemical agent canister carrier in such a manner that the canister cannot be removed from the carrier without breaking the seal. All canisters in the carriers will be checked out at the beginning of each shift and checked back in at the shifts end. The shift supervisor should be charged with verifying the condition of the numbered seals and periodically weighing random canisters to insure that they have not been used without the required reports, etc. associated with the use of force.

It was noted during our visit to WSR that custody staffs currently receive training on the use of chemical agents. The provisions for use of the canisters discussed above should be included in this training. It should be strongly emphasized to staff that abuse or misuse of these canisters will likely result in the loss of this valuable tool being made available to them as a personal safety enhancement.

Training Enhancement

Finding

We did not note in the annual training curriculum for staff in the WSDC any specific course designation for officer/staff safety. There were certain courses that included various types of information on what officers/staff should do to insure their safety. As we all know, prisons are inherently dangerous places where continuing vigilance and an appropriate level of alertness are essential to everyone's safety. Despite this knowledge, staff frequently becomes complacent and too comfortable in this volatile environment. This fact results from the frequently routine nature of the day to day job responsibilities and the fact that while volatility and potential violence always exist, they exist beneath the surface and only become evident when, regrettably, it is often too late. Frequent reinforcement by supervisors and managers of the existence of this danger is imperative.

Recommendation 4

Consider as a part of efforts by managers to insure that staff are continually reminded of the hazardous nature of work they have chosen, we recommend that a training course be added to the annual mandatory training requirements that addresses specifically officer/staff safety. This course should be approximately two hours in duration and include real life scenarios to encourage discussion and personal recognition of various situations from which concerns may arise. It should also include refresher information on the use of all equipment and notification systems associated with insuring staff safety. Examples of basic safety principles that should be included, stressed and reinforced in the training are the following:

- Never confront a confrontational, agitated inmate alone when it can be avoided – in almost all cases time is on your side and the inmate is not going anywhere – call for back-up.

- Inmates respond better to redirection counseling, etc. when they are alone and do not feel pressure to save face as with confronting them in the presence of their peers.
 - Always insure that other staff know where you are within the facility especially when you are away from your assigned area and that you are fully aware of your surroundings to include all available means of egress should you need to vacate the area quickly.
 - Ask yourself the “what if” question frequently as a means to assess any situation and to have some plan for what you will do should a threat arise.
 - When responding to another staff member’s call for assistance or any other emergency situation always pause briefly/stage just outside the incident area before entering the situation to assess it and if part of a response team wait on other team members. A response team’s effectiveness is significantly lessened if they enter the incident individually.
 - Practice simulating the use of any emergency communication device or equipment that may be available to you e.g. quickly locating the emergency button on your two way radio or PBA.
Remember the “Three Truths of Officer Safety”:
- Always expect the unexpected and have a plan! It can happen to you!
 - It is better to have mastered an officer safety skill that is never needed than to need a skill that isn’t mastered!

Although certainly not all inclusive, these examples should set the tenor for the training and when combined with others along this same line and with Incident Command System principles and facility specific information should result in a compilation of information critical to staff survival in a prison environment. Another way to emphasize the importance of the information contained in this training is to issue each staff member a pocket handbook to which they can refer as a refresher. The handbook should be a concise, abbreviated compilation of the information provided in the training. Individual elements of information contained in the handbook should be briefly referenced and discussed as necessary in roll call periods to provide a daily reminder of the importance of the concepts included in it. Upon your request, we will be willing to share staff safety curriculum developed in our jurisdictions as well as an officer safety handbook developed along the lines of that described above. We would only ask that you share with us anything that you may develop so that we can learn from each other in this critical area.

Custody Staffing

Finding

We reviewed the custody staffing level at WSR in order to determine relative sufficiency when compared to other jurisdictions with which we are familiar and to determine any recommendations for re-distribution of this scarce resource. We determined that there are 215 uniformed custody staff assigned to WSR. There is some additional custody staff assigned to the Monroe Corrections Center complex

who provide support in various areas as needed but, for the purpose of this assessment, only staff specifically assigned to WSR and the staff necessary to provide relief for them for their regular days off, vacation, sick leave, etc. are included. Considering that the current inmate capacity at WSR is 780 inmates, the staff to inmate ratio for the facility is approximately 1:3.6.

This ratio is indicative of a very adequate, if not very good, custody staffing allocation for WSR. In considering this ratio, it is important that we consider the design features of this old facility and the fact that 28 of the 215 total custody staff are assigned to various tower posts and, as such, are not available for direct supervision and management of the inmate population in the facility. All of this considered, it remains our belief that the institution is adequately staffed and no additional positions are necessary. There are a couple of recommendations to follow that could benefit the facility greatly and provide for enhanced safety and security and improved operation.

Recommendation 5

Particularly problematic to maintaining adequate staffing on site and on post at all times is the currently mandated 30 minute lunch break provided to all custody staff. Considering that this break begins and ends at the facility entrance/exit point, it frequently requires 45 minutes or more to actually complete and return to the assigned post. Additionally, the hours of the shift during which the break has to occur are also specified thus making the relief process all the more staff intensive and operationally disruptive. These breaks result in critical areas such as the cell blocks being posted at significantly reduced levels during high activity time periods. The result is an “artificial” staffing shortage that is disruptive and problematic. Discussions with custody staff at the WSR failed to produce anyone who was in favor of these breaks; in fact, the disfavor harbored for these breaks was a common thread vocalized in many of our interviews. We strongly recommend that this break process be revisited and revised with the custody staff working a schedule approximating the straight eight hour shifts previously utilized.

We further recommend that the operation of the numerous perimeter/wall towers be carefully evaluated. It appears that several of these towers operate primarily in order to operate and supervise gates located proximal to them. It may be that the staffing associated with at least one if not two of these towers can be utilized elsewhere at least on one or two shifts during which gate traffic can be disallowed. The wall at the facility constitutes a formidable barrier that can only be successfully breached with the aid of significant equipment items/tools/etc. and very inattentive staff. There are a number of options in terms of sensors that can be utilized on the wall to alert staff to any attempted breach. All of these considerations should be examined to possibly allow for the redistribution of some of the positions currently assigned to around the clock tower coverage to posts inside the facility with an emphasis on enhancing internal post coverage

We would encourage a review of how all posts are deployed so the staffing is based on peak activity areas and peak times of the day.

Single Officer Posts – Such posts are commonly found in all correctional jurisdictions with which we are familiar. In addition to the other officer safety strategies discussed in this report, the risks associated with such posts can be significantly mitigated by enhancing the inmate accountability practices associated with them. For example, inmates involved in any activity where security is provided by a single security officer should be counted into the area (checked off an approved attendance/movement list). This count should be conveyed to a control point such as tower 9 at WSR. At the conclusion of the activity the inmate participants should be grouped together and counted out prior to release back to the living area. Once released as a group, this count should again be called in to tower 9 from where the inmates can again be counted as they pass through the turnstiles already in place to facilitate this process. This insures that all inmates have left the area and returned to the living area. It is important to remember and to have procedures in place to account for the fact that inmates in groups will almost never support individual, wanton violence by a member of their population. Experience has shown that their presence serves as a deterrent and that they will actually intervene themselves on behalf of a staff member in such instances.

The predatory inmate plans for opportunities to get a staff member alone in an isolated area. Preempting this opportunity is critical to the safety of officers assigned to single person posts. Controlled and organized group movement procedures such as that discussed are the key to mitigating the primary threat associated with these posts.

Post Orders

Finding

We did review a number of post orders which relate to the Chapel post order, and find there are discrepancies, and conflicting information in the Chapel post order.

It is apparent the post orders have been revised annually as required; however, this is accomplished by one or two supervisory staff.

The revision may require inclusion of a team of custody staff to assist in determining current practice, required practice, and conflicting information. It is difficult for one or two staff to revise without custody staff seeing information which may not be practiced or in effect any longer.

Examples of critical conflicting post order requirements and practice:

Chapel Officer P.O. states;

- “Daily, 2030 hours or when Chapel is secure, Report to the PAB, help officer clear and secure building”. This has not occurred for a long time, if ever.

- “Daily, 2100 End of Shift, notify Shift Sgt. that you are leaving, turn in all equipment to control prior to leaving”. This was also not occurring.

These statements (requirements) are also not in the Shift Sgt. Post order nor the PAB officers post order.

Recommendation 6

- Review and revise post orders to ensure clear, concise directives and expectations.
- Assure supervisors know and understand their subordinate’s responsibilities and post order requirements.
- Assure supervisors are accountable for follow up and enforcement of post orders, and accomplish on the job training with staff at their posts on a frequent basis to mitigate complacency.
- Consider developing and implementing a supervisor handbook.

Inmate Movement/Call-outs/Passes

Finding

Inmate clerks in Chapel and Prison Activities Building (PAB) manage communications (kites) from inmates to access areas and programs, and screen communications (kites) to determine inmate eligibility for program; then place inmates on call-outs, (Offender Attendance Roster) for the programs. The call-outs then get posted in housing units to alert the inmates if they are authorized to attend program.

The inmate clerks then make another list for the Chapel Officer called the Offender Attendance Roster (different format than unit rosters). When comparing the roster for the staff, and the one for the unit inmates, we discovered numerous discrepancies.

The *staff attendance* roster authorizes more inmates than are on the *call-out roster posted in the housing units*, and the inmate call-out contains some inmates not listed on the staff attendance roster. The staff use the one created for them; and many inmates came to chapel that evening that were not on the roster posted in units.

All these documents were created by an inmate clerk with no check by staff. Staff responsible for checking these documents stated that there was no time in the day to check all the work the clerk did.

There is no accountability on either end of the process for inmate movement. The inmate clerks should never be involved in this process as it would be too easy to manipulate inmates authorized to go to an area for illegal or unauthorized activity. Though this did not have a direct impact on what occurred that evening; however, the system is flawed.

Inmate movement also occurs on a call-out basis through Offender Management Network Information (OMNI). This is a new system, and has not had the bugs

worked out to accommodate programs and activities. OMNI appears to cut the work load for staff when it comes to work assignments, but does not have the capability to manage a program that changes frequently. Manual input is required for the numerous daily changes for program and activity attendance. Upon discussion with staff who manage the OMNI call-out system, and other staff working within the MCC/WSR compound, it is clear the system is not accurate all the time, and the process still confusing.

The OMNI system can have one inmate scheduled for four different programs for the same time on the same day.

There is also great confusion among all staff on how the change in the call-out process is supposed to occur especially within the recent days while the inmates are coming off full lock-down.

The *pass system* is not workable, and does not account for inmates leaving and returning to units. The staff in housing units create a pass for an inmate; there is no carbon copy or log of the pass created, so if an inmate does not return to unit, and they find the inmate missing they have no point of reference of where the inmate was sent. This is an ineffective system at best.

Recommendation 7

The entire movement system for inmates for all work, activities program, passes should be reviewed, and a new system considered.

Inmate movement is a system which should be one of credibility and protects the integrity of safety within every facility.

We would also recommend a review of movement and call-outs in all WA facilities to assure whatever the process is used; it is as consistent as possible.

Consider a team of staff to be on a planning committee so custody staff and other department staff can add value to how the movement process works based on the fact that they are closest to the process. The practice of accounting for inmates is their responsibility on the ground working with the inmates.

If the system has no integrity, human nature is do what you believe is appropriate. This leads to complacency and vulnerability within the process.

Camera Placement and Visibility

Finding

We discovered upon reviewing the schematic of chapel locations, there are no cameras in the Chapel proper. There are cameras in corridors, and facing offices.

We recognize that technology is only as good as the staff that have the ability to monitor and observe those cameras; however, we also know that there is not enough staff to monitor all the cameras throughout a facility.

The monitors are all recorded at MCC, so if there is a camera, they can be used for investigating purposes. The monitors throughout MCC are of good quality and monitors were working during our visit.

The Industries area has cameras but the location of existing cameras was either nonexistent or were directed towards stationary material and not staff or inmate movement visibility.

Recommendation 8

There is a need for more cameras, redirections of lens, or relocation of them. We will discuss in the recommendation section immediately after this observation.

While we recognize budget cannot possibly allow for all cameras in all places; re-location and placement can make a huge difference.

As a matter of fact, the staff was working on relocation, and direction of cameras in the industries area the day after we spoke to them regarding this issue.

Recently there was a schematic of camera needs for MCC accomplished by maintenance staff; however, we recommend you consider using security staff and an electronics person to determine the location, placement, and direction of cameras to achieve the most appropriate, and effective coverage within the facility. The prioritization of new cameras should subsequently be based on high risk, limited staff supervision and budget considerations.

It may be noted that Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) also should be considered when identifying placement and camera needs.

Inmate Volunteers

Finding

Inmate Scherf was an inmate volunteer clerk for the Chapel. On the day of the incident he was on call-out for the Full Gospel program, yet according to the Chaplain he was in the clerk's office with Inmate Linderwood assisting him with a new call-out process.

The Chaplain did not know how he came to be a volunteer clerk. He thought perhaps he had been assigned or used as clerk by the previous Chaplain so continued the practice as routine. The Chaplain thought there may be a list in his office from the prior Chaplain but there is no access to the area since it is still a crime scene.

There are times when we all assume something is authorized and sanctioned, and it is not.

There is no policy or protocol written that relates to authorization for inmates to be "volunteer clerks". There is no screening process, or boundaries for inmates in this capacity to follow.

The paid inmate clerk for PAB has been working there for 40 years. There is a danger of crossing boundaries with inmates who are a position for such long periods of time because staff tend to have too much trust in them. Inmate clerks are relied on to complete tasks and do things we do not have time for. Staff refer to this particular inmate as “the go to guy”.

No inmate should be allowed to gain this much power in the correctional environment. This usually means we have no idea what they are doing on the computer or if they are manipulating the system. This leaves vulnerable to unauthorized or illegal activity by inmates.

Recommendation 9

It would be beneficial to review all inmates who have a capability to become an inmate volunteer clerk, and consider not having inmate clerks as volunteers unless a system is designed to accommodate such a practice.

We recommend you consider a time limit for inmates in work assignments to mitigate their power, and balance the boundaries so to speak.

Industries, back complex inmate access (Gate 7, security checkpoint) for jobs, programs, and movement

Finding

The process for determining eligibility for inmate work assignments is accomplished through the Correctional Program Manager (CPM), and Investigation unit based on limited criteria: that being; infraction time span, classification, gang affiliation, and inmate conflict potential in the work area.

This review does NOT include inmates assigned to horticulture or anything other than work assignments in the area behind Gate 7, security checkpoint. Gate 7 is not a magic end all for determining inmate access; there is the chapel, and other areas which are isolated for staff and volunteers (not behind Gate 7 checkpoint) where a criteria and more personal safety systems should be build into the system.

Recommendation 10

Consider reviewing criteria for life without parole inmates to work various areas, and what activities are necessary in high security areas.

Create a multi-disciplinary team to develop criteria and review LWOP, and dangerous inmates for any job or access to critical locations in the compound; especially if the areas are supervised by one staff or person. The multi-disciplinary team could consist of Security Staff, Counselor, Associate Superintendent, CPM and Investigator. The team should be balanced and have criteria other than infraction history, gang affiliation and conflicts.

If this is a difficult to manage process or the inmates would be unnecessarily limited freedom to accomplish programming necessary for their living environment, then consider placement in a facility that can accommodate those who require more freedom with necessary security precautions.

Visibility/ Safety

Finding

Tower 9 visibility is somewhat limited even with the camera system. There is a building immediately to the side of the Chapel not used for staff, programs or any activity at this time.

Industries areas have some limited visibility.

Recommendation 11

Consider removing that building to allow for a wider view of horticulture and other areas beyond Gate 7.

Continue the process of evaluating the cameras, monitors, and recording devices in the entire industries areas.

Security Audit

Finding

There are areas with tools, keys, computer use by inmates, and numerous other security systems which may not be as compliant as needed.

Recommendation 12

There are other security system issues which may benefit from an outside security audit for not only WSR but the other MCC complexes as well.

Current Change Process

Finding

Instructional Memorandums have gone out regarding operational change in movement and schedule for inmates, training on radio system acquisition and operation.

Follow through on change directives have been lacking by supervisors. Non-custody staff had never been told they would be trained on radio and alarms. This was told to us on 3-2-11, and the memo stated they would be trained by 3-1-11. Custody staff not involved in musters did not know of the training. It may be that they did not read the e-mail sent to staff; however, a better tracking system should be in place.

Operational Updates are e-mailed to staff as they come out. While these are comprehensive updates, it appears staff is very confused in many areas about how operations have changed and specifically going to occur.

It is possible that some staff do not read them because of volume or recognize the importance of the document, or cannot translate how the directions apply to their position responsibilities.

Recommendation 13

While confusion is quite normal during this type of change, especially when all staff are trying to heal and recover from this tragic incident, communication and follow up by supervisors and management is imperative. The paperwork and processes sometimes get in the way of what we need to accomplish.

This would be the perfect opportunity to lighten the supervisors' paperwork and allow management by walk around (MBWA) to field staff questions, train and support them as they manage their routine duties and help make those operational changes necessary.

It does appear the supervisors are spending much time in office rather than being out and on posts throughout facility. Follow-through, monitoring, and staff support should be a priority, especially at this time.

Classification Review – Inmate Scherf

Finding

Summary of Offenses

04-10-1978 - Assault 2nd Degree

05-05-1981 - Rape 1st Degree, Assault 1st Degree

10-06-1995 - Rape 1st Degree, Kidnapping 1st Degree, Unlawful Possession of Firearm

Abbreviated Classification Chronology:

06-19-97 Initial Classification

Close Custody Designated

Finding

09-30-97 Classification Referral/Administrative Segregation

Inmate Scherf requested protective custody on 09-09-97 based on alleged threats. Committee decided that there was not any verified need for protection. Comment made in risk assessment: "Inmate has demonstrated that he will manipulate staff to get what he wants". Return to G/P

06-12-01 Classification Referral Annual

Information indicates that Inmate Scherf had been admitted to Administrative Segregation at MCC-SOU (Sex Offender Unit) after a "serious suicide attempt wherein he ingested 90 Tylenol tablets. He was determined to be stable and indication of a multidisciplinary mental health evaluation was noted for completion by July 2001. Decision to transfer to WSR, change custody from close to medium with LWOP override.

2001 Comprehensive (Multi-Disciplinary) Mental Health Report

Referral History Completed on 06-07-01

Included section (page 10 of 20) Alerts to Correctional Staff

"Inmate. Scherf has indicated previously that he would have problems with women supervising him while on parole supervision." It is likely that this sort of difficulty would also present toward women in authority within the prison system.

Classification Policy WDOC 300.380 Effective Date 5-8-02

Section II E page 4,

"Any time there is new information regarding any of the categories in the CHS (Criminal History Summary), or ICD (Initial Custody Designation) scoring factors, or for offenders who have more than 4 years left to serve at the time of initial classification, the assigned counselor/staff will conduct an immediate review to determine if this information results in a change in custody level designation".

06-18-01

Inmate Scherf transferred to WSR

07-26-01 Risk Management Identification Form Initial Assessment

Sex Offender Level III. Should be considered as such

In section titled, Override

Recommendation: No

Rationale: Inmate(P) is an LWOP case. P has a history of repeated sexual violence that has included threats to the lives of three women. P has serious issues with women and has stated that there would be problems with supervision by female staff.

Classification Policy DOC 300.380 Effective date 5-8-02

Section VI G page 12

The Department will make discretionary decisions regarding the placement and movement of offenders regarding the placement and movement of offenders to lower levels based on the outcome of risk assessments and evaluations for offenders convicted of offenses that can be registered.

Annual Facility Plans, and Classification Referrals were reviewed and it was noted that some were held in absentia, and recommendations were not consistently recorded and/or filed in master file, and were not filed in the master file, some were electronically stored.

When inmates are transferred to MSR, one on one interviews are conducted with the assigned counselor.

Psychological Reports are not a part of the one on one counseling. Facility Risk Management Team (FRMT) reviews was scheduled consistent with one year Initial classification review.

The Classification and Custody Facility Plan Review Policy DOC 300.380, Revision date 8-04-08 is more definitive and explanatory in directing classification procedures and establishes measurable controls for staff compliance.

“Sound corrections programs at all levels of government require a careful balance of community and institutional services that provide a range of effective, humane, and safe options for handling adult offenders. Corrections must provide classification systems for determining placement, degree of supervision, and programming that afford differential controls and services for adult offenders, thus maximizing opportunity for the largest number”.

The Classification process is the system upon which corrections professionals rely upon to evaluate inmates to determine what their needs are, where they can best be appropriately met, assignment of security and custody levels, risk assessments while meeting the requirement to provide public safety. In ensuring that these areas are addressed, a system of supervisory oversight is necessary to monitor staff compliance with directives. The Classification process is designed to be objective but by no means a perfect science.

Recommendation 14

- The review of all LWOPs will prove to be a vital process to enhance overall security of the facility. The aforementioned classification documents, if reviewed and considered in the classification referral process, or establishing different criteria for access within the facility with specific criteria above and beyond the classification process, may have more appropriately managed Inmate Scherf's supervision level. Consider an enhanced process for inmate access to areas within the compound, and possibly other facilities.
- Validate and combine electronic Inmate Files with hard copy.
- Review all 137 LWOPs using current Classification Policy with added criteria based on hard file risk assessment criteria or revised criteria for work and activity access.

Staff Accountability

Finding

Correctional agencies have the responsibility to operate safe and secure facilities to ensure optimum public safety, safety of staff, contractors, volunteers and visitors who frequent their facilities. It is critical to have accurate accountability for all staff within for daily operations as well as emergency situations.

There currently exists at the Washington State Reformatory (WSR) musters for the day, swing, and graveyard shifts where oncoming staff are accounted for

There is no muster or centralized accounting system for staff assigned to different shifts nor non-custodial staff.

Recommendation 15

- Development of system and policy to accurately account for all staff, contractors and volunteers.
- Ensure that policies are disseminated, training conducted, and monitored for compliance.

Staff Comments

The comments noted made by staff are not all inclusive; however, there may be validity to many of the comments. Some staff preferred not to identify themselves but had comments. No staff displayed resentment while discussing issues with us, they appeared more frustrated than anything. This is also to be expected after an incident such Officer Biendl's death. You may note that some of the issues and concerns have been addressed through our review during the week.

Staff comments based on what they thought may be some security issues or concerns:

- Consider using the ID barcode to track and account for staff while inside the facility.
- Design an accountability process to know staff whereabouts to include all non-custody staff.
- Budget more staff so the units are not left with one officer during main line and peak hours of activity, especially since that is when a lot of staff are out for an hour for meals.
- Remove the glass plates from the microwaves in the units.
- Stop using inmates to repair cameras for yard and have staff doing this task.
- Do not pressure staff to join a joint inmate/staff choir.
- Stop using staff to water plants in the horticulture area. Inmates should be doing this.
- We need more cameras to detect what is going on in single posts and areas of limited visibility. Structure inmates daily activities. Too much movement too often.
- Line custody staff is not briefed on rules and policies that change. Make more time for us to understand.
- Some staff pencil whip logs and forms of importance, complacency.
- Tower 9 computer and monitors go down in the summer when hot, no cooling system installed.
- Inmates know operational changes before we do.
- Industries supervisors have to be in office up to 6 hours a day, that at numerous times has meant no one supervising the work in shops unless the custody officer makes the hourly check.

- The mattress factory behind industries building has trucks come in and park and no one is checking them or logs the driver in and out.
- Another count during the day instead of just start of shift would enable us to know if all inmates are accounted for.
- We don't see the Captain or Lieutenants often enough.
- The Tab shop has three keys for area, if two of the staff is not there and the TAB Shop supervisor needs to get out he cannot. Consider doing something for safety reasons.
- Female industries staff are concerned with cameras and being alone with numerous inmates and the inability to leave office often enough to supervise.
- Searches of industries area are "catch as you can". Never time to do this area in sufficient manner.
- The PAB can have as many as 102 volunteers and inmates at one time with up to 80 in one room. The rooms have not been capacity rated and we would like to see that happen.
- Housing Unit cell searches are supposed to be once every two months; however, this does not occur because of staffing shortages.
- Training is inadequate because they do not accomplish what they should in defensive tactics because they have too many injuries.
- Radio identification for staff is off in the numbering system, they need to correct that.
- Shift Sergeant, Lieutenants, and Captains need to get on same sheet of music. Some want policies followed to the letter, others want us to be flexible, but no one really know which ones are to be taken literally.

We wish to thank all staff for the open dialogue and discussion with us. We truly experienced hospitality from all we met within the Washington Department of Corrections.

End of Report

Appendix B
Engrossed Senate Bill 5907

CERTIFICATION OF ENROLLMENT

ENGROSSED SENATE BILL 5907

Chapter 252, Laws of 2011

62nd Legislature
2011 Regular Session

PRISON SAFETY--POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

EFFECTIVE DATE: 07/22/11

Passed by the Senate April 9, 2011
YEAS 49 NAYS 0

BRAD OWEN

President of the Senate

Passed by the House April 19, 2011
YEAS 97 NAYS 0

FRANK CHOPP

Speaker of the House of Representatives

Approved May 5, 2011, 9:50 a.m.

CHRISTINE GREGOIRE

Governor of the State of Washington

CERTIFICATE

I, Thomas Hoemann, Secretary of the Senate of the State of Washington, do hereby certify that the attached is **ENGROSSED SENATE BILL 5907** as passed by the Senate and the House of Representatives on the dates hereon set forth.

THOMAS HOEMANN

Secretary

FILED

May 6, 2011

**Secretary of State
State of Washington**

ENGROSSED SENATE BILL 5907

Passed Legislature - 2011 Regular Session

State of Washington

62nd Legislature

2011 Regular Session

By Senators Kohl-Welles, Holmquist Newbry, Kline, Hewitt, Keiser, King, Regala, Conway, Carrell, and Hargrove; by request of Governor Gregoire

Read first time 03/24/11. Referred to Committee on Labor, Commerce & Consumer Protection.

1 AN ACT Relating to implementing the policy recommendations
2 resulting from the national institute of corrections review of prison
3 safety; adding new sections to chapter 72.09 RCW; and creating a new
4 section.

5 BE IT ENACTED BY THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON:

6 NEW SECTION. **Sec. 1.** It is the intent of the legislature to
7 promote safe state correctional facilities. Following the tragic
8 murder of officer Jayme Biendl, the governor and department of
9 corrections requested the national institute of corrections to review
10 safety procedures at the Monroe reformatory. While the report found
11 the Monroe reformatory is a safe institution, it recommends changes
12 that would enhance safety. The legislature recognizes that operating
13 safe institutions requires ongoing efforts to address areas where
14 improvements can be made to enhance the safety of state correctional
15 facilities. This act addresses ways to increase safety at state
16 correctional facilities and implements changes recommended in the
17 report of the national institute of corrections.

1 NEW SECTION. **Sec. 2.** (1) The department shall establish a
2 statewide security advisory committee to conduct comprehensive reviews
3 of the department's total confinement security-related policies and
4 procedures.

5 (2) The statewide security advisory committee shall make
6 recommendations to the secretary regarding methods to provide
7 consistent application of the policies and procedures regarding
8 security issues in total confinement correctional facilities.

9 (3) The statewide security advisory committee shall include a
10 balance of institutional staff including, but not limited to, custody
11 staff. At a minimum, the statewide security advisory committee shall
12 include:

13 (a) The director of prisons or his or her designee;

14 (b) A nonsupervisory classified employee and/or sergeant from each
15 local advisory committee of a major facility and one nonsupervisory
16 classified employee and/or sergeant representative from a minimum
17 facility;

18 (c) A senior-ranking security custody staff member from each major
19 correctional facility and a senior-ranking custody staff member from a
20 minimum correctional facility;

21 (d) A senior-ranking community corrections officer; and

22 (e) A delegate from the union that represents department employees
23 located at correctional facilities.

24 (4) The statewide security advisory committee shall develop
25 guidelines to establish local security advisory committees for each
26 total confinement correctional facility within the department. The
27 chair of each local security advisory committee shall be the captain at
28 a major facility and the lieutenant at a minimum security facility.
29 The local security advisory committee should consist of a wide range of
30 nonsupervisory classified employees and/or sergeants from the facility,
31 such as medical staff, class counselors, program staff, and mental
32 health staff.

33 (5) The department shall report back to the governor and
34 appropriate committees of the legislature by November 1, 2011, and
35 annually thereafter. The report shall include:

36 (a) Recommendations raised by both the statewide and local security
37 advisory committees;

1 (b) Recommendations, if any, for improving the ability of
2 nonsupervisory classified employees to provide input on safety concerns
3 including labor and industries mandated safety committees and the
4 inclusion of safety issues in collective bargaining;

5 (c) Actions taken by the department as a result of recommendations
6 by the statewide and local security advisory committees; and

7 (d) Recommendations for additional resources or legislation to
8 address security concerns in total confinement correctional facilities.

9 (6) The department shall report back to the governor and the
10 appropriate committees of the legislature by November 1, 2011, on
11 issues related to safety within community corrections. The department
12 shall engage employees from all levels of the community corrections
13 division in preparing the report.

14 NEW SECTION. **Sec. 3.** (1) The department shall establish
15 multidisciplinary teams at each total confinement correctional facility
16 that will evaluate offenders' placements in inmate job assignments and
17 custody promotions. The teams at each facility shall determine
18 suitable placements based on the offender's risk, behavior, or other
19 factors considered by the team.

20 (2) At a minimum, each team shall have representation from a wide
21 range of nonsupervisory classified employees and/or sergeants from the
22 facility, such as medical staff, class counselors, program staff, and
23 mental health staff.

24 NEW SECTION. **Sec. 4.** (1) The department shall develop training
25 curriculum regarding staff safety issues at total confinement
26 correctional facilities. At a minimum, the training shall address the
27 following issues:

28 (a) Security routines;

29 (b) Physical plant layout;

30 (c) Offender movement and program area coverage; and

31 (d) Situational awareness and de-escalation techniques.

32 (2) The department shall seek the input of both the statewide
33 security and local advisory committees in developing the curriculum.

34 (3) The department shall deliver such training to applicable
35 correctional staff at in-service training by July 1, 2012.

1 NEW SECTION. **Sec. 5.** (1) The department may pilot the use of body
2 alarms and proximity cards within available resources.

3 (2) The department shall hire a consultant to study the feasibility
4 of implementing a statewide system for staff safety, utilizing body
5 alarms and proximity cards for staff within the department's total
6 confinement correctional facilities and report findings and
7 recommendations to the governor and appropriate committees of the
8 legislature by November 1, 2011. At a minimum, the report shall
9 include:

10 (a) Recommendations for the use of body alarms by security level;

11 (b) Recommendations for specific positions that should require the
12 use of body alarms;

13 (c) The information technological and infrastructure requirements
14 needed for body alarms and proximity cards;

15 (d) The training requirements for body alarms;

16 (e) Lessons learned from any pilot project the department may
17 implement in the interim;

18 (f) The estimated cost of the alarms and proximity cards and needed
19 supporting infrastructure, staffing, and training requirements.

20 (3) The consultant shall seek the input of both the statewide and
21 local security advisory committees in preparing his or her report.

22 NEW SECTION. **Sec. 6.** (1) The department shall hire a consultant
23 to study the deployment of video monitoring cameras within the
24 department to make recommendations regarding statewide standards for
25 the positioning and use of video monitoring cameras in total
26 confinement correctional facilities and report findings and
27 recommendations to the governor and appropriate committees of the
28 legislature by November 1, 2011. At a minimum, the report shall
29 include:

30 (a) Recommendations for the use of video monitoring cameras by
31 security level;

32 (b) Recommendations for specific locations within a total
33 confinement correctional facility which would benefit from the use of
34 video monitoring cameras;

35 (c) The information technological and infrastructure requirements
36 needed for effective use of video monitoring cameras;

1 (d) Recommendations for how video monitoring cameras would best be
2 deployed in current total confinement correctional facilities;

3 (e) Recommendations about how video monitoring cameras should be
4 incorporated into future prison construction to insure consistency in
5 camera use system-wide;

6 (f) The estimated cost of the video monitoring cameras, supporting
7 infrastructure needed, and staffing required by the total confinement
8 correctional facility.

9 (2) The consultant shall seek the input of both the statewide and
10 local security advisory committees in preparing his or her report.

11 NEW SECTION. **Sec. 7.** (1) The department shall develop a
12 comprehensive plan for the use of oleoresin capsicum aerosol products,
13 commonly referred to as pepper spray, as a security measure available
14 for staff at total confinement correctional facilities.

15 (2) The department may initiate a pilot project, within available
16 funds, to expand the deployment of oleoresin capsicum aerosol products
17 within total confinement correctional facilities.

18 (3) The department's plan for the deployment of oleoresin capsicum
19 aerosol products to staff shall include findings, if any, from the
20 pilot project, recommendations regarding which facility's use should be
21 limited to, what the training requirements should be, the estimated
22 costs, and an implementation schedule.

23 (4) The department shall seek the input of both the statewide and
24 local security advisory committees in developing its plan.

25 (5) The department shall report its plan, including costs, to the
26 governor and appropriate committees of the legislature by November 1,
27 2011.

28 NEW SECTION. **Sec. 8.** Sections 2 through 7 of this act are each
29 added to chapter 72.09 RCW.

Passed by the Senate April 9, 2011.

Passed by the House April 19, 2011.

Approved by the Governor May 5, 2011.

Filed in Office of Secretary of State May 6, 2011.

Appendix C

DOC's Critical Incident Review



INCIDENT REVIEW REPORT

Report Date 7-2-11		
Offender Name Byron Scherf	Offender DOC # 287281	Critical Incident Review # 033-11-P
Name of Initiator Dan Pacholke, Deputy Director of Prisons, Command A	Team Leaders Jeffrey A. Uttecht, Superintendent	Team Members Robert Herzog, Associate Superintendent; Sandi Diimmel, Associate Superintendent; Keri Towle, Correctional Officer 2; Lori Wonders, Administrative Assistant 4

INCIDENT	
Date and Time: 1/29/11 2100	Location: Monroe Correctional Complex Washington State Reformatory Chapel
<p>Brief Description of Incident:</p> <p>At 2100 a routine scheduled formal count was initiated. At 2114 while conducting count Unit "A" Officer Beecroft discovered that offender Scherf was not in his cell. Officer Beecroft notified Unit "A" control booth Officer Scott who then reported the missing offender information to Main Control Sgt. Graham. At 2114 Sgt. Graham notified Shift Commander Lt. Shimogawa that offender Scherf was missing from his assigned cell. Lt. Shimogawa assumed incident command and initiated an emergency escape response. Lt. Shimogawa took immediate and appropriate steps to verify the offender was missing by ordering Shift Sgt. C. Johnson to have a search of the cell and "A" Unit completed, and to initiate facility wide area and building searches. Other staff reviewed the offender out counts to determine if offender Scherf was in another approved location, and searched the visit room where Scherf had been earlier in the day.</p> <p>Sgt. C. Johnson immediately gave verbal directions to numerous officers to begin searches. Officer B. Fredericks and Officer S. Wahleithner were instructed to search the PAB and Chapel. While in route to those buildings they made contact with Officer C. Maynard.</p> <p>Officer C. Maynard observed the lights to the Chapel on and the front door to the Chapel open. Officer Maynard immediately informed Officers Fredericks and Wahleithner. At approximately 2119 all three officers entered the Chapel and Officer Maynard observed Scherf sitting in a chair located within feet of the Chapel entry doors. Offender Scherf was placed in restraints and escorted to Shift Commanders office.</p> <p>On First Shift at approximately 2218 during the equipment inventory staff in Main Control discovered the Chapel Officer equipment was still checked out to Officer Biendl. Knowing she should have been off shift an immediate notification was made to First Shift Lt. Briones. Staff twice attempted telephone contact with Officer Biendl at her personal residence without success.</p> <p>Lt. Briones ordered an immediate staff response to the Chapel to conduct a search for Officer Biendl. Upon arrival staff discovered Officer Biendl in the "sanctuary" and quickly began CPR. The Chapel was immediately secured as a crime scene and criminal investigation responsibilities became those of the Monroe Police Department.</p> <p>Offender Scherf was escorted to the fourth floor of the infirmary and placed on a continuous two person watch.</p> <p>WSR was officially placed on total lockdown.</p>	
<p>Name, Title, and Address of All Employees Involved: Lt. Jose Briones, Lt. Rodney Shimogawa, Lt. Kenneth</p>	

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DOC 18-022 (Rev10/08/10)

DOC 400.110
[4-4225-1]

Hellman, Sgt. Roland Johnson, Sgt. Chris Johnson, Sgt. Bradley Graham, Sgt. Michael Boe, C/O Richard Lima, C/O Brenda Fredericks, C/O Glyn Beecroft, C/O Jonathan Scott, C/O George Lyons, C/O Ebrima Ceesay, C/O David Young, C/O Byron McPherson, C/O Eric Bennett, C/O Charles Maynard, C/O Samuel Waleithner, LPN Johnnie Riley, RN2 Marvin Lilly, Joke van Stempvoort, LPN Riley, RN2 Lilly, RN2 Stempvoort, and RN Martha Kagichu. Contact address for all staff is Monroe Correctional Complex, PO Box 777 Monroe, WA 98272.

Name, DOC Numbers of All Offenders Involved: **Byron Scherf #287281**

Location and Description of Property Damaged: **Chapel, evidence identified and marked throughout the Chapel. Carpet from stage area has been gathered and removed as evidence.**

REVIEW

Chronological Summary of Facts/Events:

January 29, 2011

1330 -- 3rd Shift on-duty

 Uneventful shift prior to count

1430 -- (approx.) Scherf to Visit

1616 -- Count clear Scherf returns to unit

1750 -- Scherf to Chapel

2030 -- Recall announced by Main Control (No R/M or other officer posted in zone 3)

2031 -- (Time is approximate) Based on criminal investigation information, Offender Scherf exits the Chapel and as he approaches the Chapel gate informs another offender that he has to return to the Chapel for his hat. Scherf then closes the Chapel gate and reenters the Chapel.

2032:15-- K-241 radio keyed

2032:31-- K-241 radio keyed and a noise is heard that is unusual enough to catch several staff members' attention. The CIR team listened to the taped recordings of Officer Biendl's radio being keyed open. The recordings were reviewed in an office that was quiet and without other distraction. Additionally, the review team had the benefit of knowing in advance exactly when to listen for Officer Biendl's radio recording. The first radio transmission was extremely brief (approx 1 sec) and no noise (verbal or background) could be heard. The second radio transmission occurred approximately 16 seconds later and also was extremely brief (approx 1 sec). A sound is heard in the second recording. After listening to the second recording several times, the review team believed the noise to be of human origin. It is extremely important to note:

- The recordings were isolated to only those of Officer Biendl's radio. Other radio chatter occurring at or near the same time was not reviewed. The keying of Officer Biendl's radio could easily have been missed or unheard due to other radio transmissions.
- While listening to a radio, it is extremely common to hear background noises including human voices when a push-to-talk button is depressed. It is also common to hear a loud "screech or squeal" like noise when two radios are close to each other and one of the radios push-to-talk button is depressed.
- The review team members are not trained to conduct professional analysis of voice recordings and as such offer no opinion on the nature of the noise heard on the second recording.

2045 -- Tower 9 log book entry records Chapel clear. (Tower 9 Officer does not remember if Biendl radioed clear or waved. Typically it was 2030 or 2031 when she cleared. Lyons states he's cleared with Biendl 400+ times.

2100 -- Formal Count initiated

2110 -- Scherf (cell A112) discovered missing from cell by A-Unit Officers Beecroft and Ceesay. A-Unit booth Officer J. Scott notifies Main Control that Scherf is missing.

2114 -- Main Control (Sgt. Graham) receives notification from Officer J. Scott that Scherf is missing and reports information to Lt Shimogawa. "A" Unit officers search unit for Scherf.

2114 -- Lt. Shimogawa assumes Initial Incident Command and directs:

- Shift Sgt. C. Johnson to verify Scherf's absence from cell

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DOC 18-022 (Rev10/08/10)

DOC 400.110
[4-4225-1]

- Shift Sgt. C. Johnson to initiate facility wide area searches (**Note:** building searches never completed)
- 2119 -- Yard Officer C. Maynard goes to Chapel to search for missing inmate/finds lights on and door open in Chapel vestibule. Notifies Officers Wahleithner and Fredericks and discovers Scherf sitting in chair in vestibule area. Scherf states to officers he fell asleep. Scherf placed in restraints by Officer Fredericks and escorted to Shift Lt's office for interview.
- 2120 -- Picture card count initiated. Lt. Briones assumes Incident Command.
- 2120 -- Lt. Briones interviews Scherf.
- Note: During interview with Scherf Lt. Briones notes:
- That Scherf states he was hiding in the Chapel and planned to escape on graveyard by climbing the wall.
 - Sees blood on Scherf's clothing and Scherf states it happened earlier playing racquetball, has clothing secured as evidence.
- 2142 -- Scherf's cell secured as crime scene.
- 2201 -- Picture Count cleared.
- 2218 -- 1st Shift Officer Bennett (in Main Control to assist with equipment check-in/out) discovers Biendl failed to turn in her equipment and notifies 1st Shift Sgt. Johnson. Officer Lima also in control helping out.
- 2218 -- 1st Shift Sgt. Johnson attempts contact with Officer Biendl by calling Biendl's home phone, no answer.
- 2225 -- Lt. Briones informed that Biendl's equipment is missing, orders QRST to begin search of Chapel. Staff responding to Chapel include Lt. Briones, Lt. Shimogawa, 1st Shift Sgt., R. Johnson, 1st Shift Officers Lima, Bennett, B. McPherson, and Sgt. M Boe (3rd Shift Sgt. C. Johnson makes second call to Biendl residence then responds to chapel).
- 2226 -- Officer McPherson discovers Officer Biendl on Chapel stage. Emergency life saving measures begin. McPherson and Sgt. Boe unwrap cord from around Officer Biendl's throat. McPherson begins rescue breathing while Sgt. Boe begins chest compressions.
- 2228 -- 1st Shift Medical on-site. LPN Riley, RN2 Lilly, RN2 Joke van Stempvoort, RN Kagichu.
- 2230 -- Lt. Briones identifies Chapel as crime scene. Officer McPherson assigned as Crime Scene Officer.
- 2232 -- Lt. Briones requests additional staff from TRU and recalled ERT to assist in security and escorts.
- 2235 -- Monroe Fire Department Medics (Hunt, Sloan, Henning, O'Connell) and Monroe PD Officer Stamey, and Sgt. Fuller arrive. Medics begin assisting.
- 2245 -- Rescue efforts ceased.
- 2247 -- Superintendent Frakes arrived at the facility.
- 2259 -- MCC Duty Officer Captain Fritch arrived.
- 2254 -- EMS departs facility.
- 2255 -- ERT recalled (2310 All ERT notified).
- 2256 -- ERT Commander Long briefed by Lt. Briones. Assigned to secure facility access points and provide additional staff to shift.
- 2258 -- Officer Hoggard assumes crime scene security post.
- 2315 -- CISM staff Officer Logan (1st Shift) begins CISM de-briefs.
- 2318 -- Monroe Police Department Detective Robinson arrived.
- 2335 -- Scherf ordered secured in 4th floor of Hospital. Escort from IMU to Hospital completed at 0010.

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- 0010 -- Scherf 2 on 1 watch initiated.
- 0045 -- Captain Fritch assumes Incident Command.
- 0100 -- Snohomish County Medical Examiner on site/ departs shortly after arrival.
- 0110 -- Media Center activated.
- 0200 -- WSR placed on total lockdown
- 0220 -- Monroe PD Officer Erdmann on site with Evidence Tech.
- 0336 -- Video of Chapel cameras given to MPD Officer Stamey.

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0500 (approx) –Eldon Vail, Associate Superintendent David Bustanoby and HR Manager Linda Gilstrap make in person notification contact with Jayme Biendl family.

0545 – Lt. McTear designated as Operations Chief.

0600 – Formal De-brief held for WSR staff by Superintendent Frakes, Captain Hardina, and CISM staff.

Summary of Witness Statements (Include Name of Each Witness):

Emergency Response and Incident Command System Review:

Zones of Control

The third shift at WSR has [REDACTED] R/M posts seven days a week. For R/M coverage purposes the WSR is divided into three zones (see attached facility map). On third shift [REDACTED] R/M's are assigned to cover one of three zones. The remaining [REDACTED] R/M's are assigned as rovers and circulate throughout the facility.

Per the R/M Post Orders in effect on January 29 2011, unless approved to leave by the Shift Sergeant or Shift Lieutenant R/M's are required to remain in their assigned zone of control. During scheduled offender movement periods the Zone 1 R/M stands at the entry to A/B living units and the Zone 2 R/M at the entrance to C/D units. The Zone 3 R/M stands on the walkway where offender movement to and from the Program Activities Building (PAB) and Chapel buildings can be observed. The [REDACTED] rover R/M's would assist in supervising offenders leaving the Gym and moving through the Tower 9 turnstiles.

The main walkway extends from Tower 9 to Gate 7. The Chapel is accessed directly from the main walkway. Another narrow sidewalk intersecting with the main walkway leads to the PAB entrance. Movement on the sidewalk is contained by a chain link fence on one side and the PAB on the other. This narrow PAB walkway is of particular concern to staff. [REDACTED] From Tower 9 [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] by the Field House building. The [REDACTED] the entire walkway necessitates the posting of an officer in zone 3 where the PAB and main walkways intersect. From this intersection an officer can observe the front of the Chapel and the entire narrow walkway leading to the PAB entrance.

Staff interviewed stated the importance of being in this zone is to mitigate the risk presented by offenders using the narrow walkway during movements and to observe the PAB and Chapel entry areas. When different staff were interviewed and asked to identify on a facility map where the officer would stand to observe the movement in Zone 3, R/M officers consistently pointed to the same location that is within 30 yards of the Chapel entry.

Clearing Zones

From interviews with custody staff, the CIR team learned how zones and buildings were cleared of offender movement. At the 2030 recall movement all offenders are required to return to their assigned living unit. When the officers assigned to the PAB, Chapel, Field House, Gate 7, Education and Visit Room believe their area is clear of offenders; they contact Tower 9 and report their area as clear. Once the Tower 9 officer receives the "clear" announcement notification from each of these areas, a single entry is made in the Tower 9 logbook reporting these areas as "clear".

After giving the "clear" notification, the assigned officer(s) then conduct an interior security check of their assigned building to ensure all offenders have left, interior doors are secure and nothing else appears out of order. These officers then lock the primary entry doors of their building and walk out of Zone 3.

Once all the offender traffic on the walkways in Zone 3 has moved through the Tower 9 turnstile the Zone 3 R/M announces Zone 3 traffic as clear. As Zones 2 and 3 1 becomes clear of all outdoor offender traffic the Zone 1 and 2 R/M notify Tower 9 that their zone is "clear". The Zone 1, 2, and 3 "clear" announcements are not logged in the Tower 9 logbook.

Pre-Incident Tone-R/M Zone Assignments

Among the R/M's interviewed (except Officer Young) each complained that when Officer Young was assigned to Zone 3 it was common for him to leave the Zone 3 area of coverage. Officer Young stated that it was OK to be out of Zone 3 during movement and to stand near the base of Tower 9 to assist in pat searches of offenders exiting the recreation

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yard (a task assigned to the [redacted] yard officers). Third Shift Sgt. C. Johnson and Third Shift Lt. Hellman stated they expect the R/M's to be in their assigned zone during all movements unless an emergency has them ordered elsewhere.

Several third shift R/M's stated that Shift Sgt. C. Johnson was aware that Officer Young (when assigned Zone 3) was frequently out of his zone (though no one could state that they personally told him of their concern prior to January 29). Sgt. C. Johnson stated he would remind the R/M's to be in their zone and interviews with officers confirmed that Sgt. Johnson would remind them while also stating he was tired of hearing that officers were out of their zone during movement periods. (Note: Four of the R/M's interviewed identified RDO Shift Sgt., Sgt. Crabtree as a Sgt. who is always adamant about and ensures that R/M's are in their assigned zone during movements).

On April 6, 2011 the CIR team received a copy of a letter addressed from offender Scherf to Secretary Vail and Superintendent Frakes. The letter was originally postmarked with the date of April 4, 2011. Scherf states in the letter that there was no R/M on the walkway between Tower 9 and the Chapel during the 2030 recall movement. Scherf suggested in the letter that any meaningful investigation would include a review of why the R/M's were not posted on the walkway. One inference that could be taken from the Scherf letter is that he looked for and saw the opportunity to return to the Chapel undetected.

Initiating Movements

MCC Operational Memorandum, 420.155 "CALLOUT SYSTEMS" states that Main Control is responsible for announcing (initiating) each of the scheduled movements. In advance of the movement being initiated per the O.M. Main Control is responsible to verify that staff are in place at Tower 9 and the PAB/Chapel area. Officer Lyons (5 day a week Tower 9 officer) stated that Main Control used to confirm with him that staff were in place before initiating movement. Officer Lyons stated that this practice "just stopped" about 1- 1½ years ago.

Officer Lyons believes the practice stopped because other officers did not like him asking that they get to their assigned zones so movement could be initiated. Officer Lyons stated his asking other officers to get to their zones for movement was a big source of conflict so he quit asking. This conflict could not be confirmed in other interviews.

Main Control staff were not aware that an Operational Memorandum existed which requires verifying staff are in place and Main Control Post Orders do not require any verification that staff are in place in advance of announcing movement.

Third Shift January 29, 2011 2030 Recall Movement

On January 29, 2011 Officer Young was assigned as the Third Shift Zone 3 R/M. Typically on the weekends (as on January 29) the only buildings occupied by offenders are the Gym, Chapel and PAB. That was the case on this night.

Officer Young stated during his interview that on the 2030 recall movement (which returns all offenders to their assigned living unit) he was standing near the base of Tower 9. Officer Young confirmed that his location was outside Zone 3. The Tower 9 officer could not recall if an R/M was in Zone 3 during the 2030 recall and other R/M's stated no officer was present in Zone 3.

The Tower 9 logbook reflects 24 offenders were present in the Chapel at 1950 (the last movement for offenders to access the Chapel). At 2030 the recall movement was announced by Main Control and offenders began departing the PAB and Chapel. PAB Officer Fredericks cleared the PAB, left Zone 3 and moved to the area near the Shift Sgts' office.

Tower 9 Officer Lyons stated that he does not remember how the Chapel officer that night (Jayme Biendl) announced her "all clear". Officer Lyons stated that normally she would radio the announcement but sometimes she would wave to him from the front of the Chapel (indicating all clear) and then return inside to conduct her security check prior to closing the Chapel and exiting Zone 3.

Shortly after recall was announced several officers remember hearing a noise over the radio. This noise was described by different staff as a screech or a noise that was different enough from normal radio chatter to catch their attention. One officer stated that he waited for an emergency to be announced but not hearing any announcement he moved on to his next task. It should be noted that background noise is often heard on radios when the press to talk switch is

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depressed.

At 2045 Tower 9 Officer Lyons logs Chapel as clear. Once it was believed that all offenders had returned to their units, staff went about other routine assigned tasks such as completing the fire watch walk through of buildings located in the Industries Complex beyond Gate 7.

At 2100 formal count was initiated. At 2114 while conducting count Unit "A" Officer Beecroft discovers that offender Scherf is not in his cell. Officer Beecroft notifies Unit "A" control booth Officer Scott who then reports the missing offender information to Main Control Sgt. Graham. At 2114 Sgt. Graham notifies Shift Commander Lt. Shimogawa that offender Scherf is missing from his assigned cell. Lt. Shimogawa assumed Incident Command and instructed Shift Sgt. C. Johnson to verify that Scherf is not in his cell and to initiate facility wide area and building searches (OM 410.360 Escape Preparedness and Response (Escape Response Emergency Checklist)).

Sgt. C. Johnson gave verbal directions to numerous officers to begin searches. Officer B. Fredericks and Officer S. Wahleithner were instructed to search the PAB and Chapel. While enroute to those buildings they make contact with Officer C. Maynard. *(During an interview with Officer Wahleithner he stated that when he met up with Officer Fredericks she commented that she is concerned that she locked offender Scherf in the PAB earlier. During the CIR interview with Officer Fredericks she stated that she did not search several rooms in the PAB because they were dark and she was nervous thinking an inmate would jump out at her)*

Officer Fredericks and Wahleithner head towards the PAB and Officer Maynard heads toward the Chapel to conduct building searches. As Officer Maynard nears the front entry to the Chapel he noticed that the Chapel lights were on and the front door was open.

Officer Maynard then called out to Officers Frederick and Wahleithner to join him. The three officers enter the Chapel and discover offender Scherf sitting in a chair located just inside the Chapel entry area. Offender Scherf comments to the staff that he had fallen asleep. Officer Maynard then reported by radio that offender Scherf was discovered in the Chapel and is instructed to escort the offender to the Shift Commanders office. Officer Fredericks and Wahleithner escorted offender Scherf to the Shift Commanders office. Officer Maynard documents that he then inspected and secured the Chapel. *(In the interview with Officer Maynard he stated that he did not search the sanctuary area where Officer Biendl's body was later found)*

At this time (approximately 2120) First Shift Commander Lt. Briones has assumed Incident Command and ordered a picture card count. Lt. Briones and Lt. Shimogawa begin interviewing Scherf. Scherf states to the Lieutenants that he was going to escape. Lt. Briones asked Scherf how he made it through the clearing of the Chapel and Scherf stated he hid behind the pews. Other comments made by Scherf during this interview include:

- Scherf explained the blood observed on his clothing by stating he was hit by playing racquetball; and later stated he was tired of being in prison and had planned to escape on graveyard by climbing over the wall.

Lt. Briones then took pictures of the blood on Scherf's clothing and had the clothes placed in evidence. Scherf was escorted to the IMU for pre-hearing confinement and photographs of injuries found on his body were taken. At the IMU Scherf told the escorting officers that he had been jumped by some Mexicans in the unit stairwell earlier in the day. A review of unit video did not support Scherf's claim of being assaulted.

Lt. Briones and Lt. Shimogawa believing an escape had been prevented had the on-duty Third Shift staff complete incident reports. Based on Scherf's different statements that he had fallen asleep in the Chapel, had hidden in the Chapel planning to escape and a claim that he was assaulted earlier, Lt. Briones felt another plausible explanation was Scherf stayed behind at the Chapel as a way to place himself in protective custody. The Picture Card Count cleared at 2201 and Third Shift staff were allowed to exit the facility.

On First Shift R/M Officers Bennett and Lima enter Main Control to assist in running gates to allow movement in and out of the Main Control Salleport and conduct an equipment check. At 2218 Officer Bennett discovers the Chapel officer keys and radio are still checked out to Officer Biendl and reports this missing equipment to First Shift Sgt. R. Johnson.

Two telephone attempts to contact Officer Biendl failed to receive an answer and at approximately 2220 Lt. Briones

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was briefed that Officer Biendl's equipment was missing and she could not be contacted at her home telephone number. Lt. Briones ordered an immediate search of the Chapel. Lt. Briones, Lt. Shimogawa, Sgt. R. Johnson, Sgt. Boe, Sgt. C. Johnson and Officers Lima, Bennett and McPherson respond to the Chapel.

At 2226 upon entry to the Chapel Officer Bennett and McPherson enter the sanctuary. Officer McPherson observed Officer Biendl lying on the stage and he makes an immediate radio call reporting that a staff member was down. Officer McPherson and Sgt. Boe unwrapped the cord observed wound around Officer Biendl's throat (3 wraps as reported by McPherson). Officer McPherson began rescue breathing while Sgt. Boe began performing chest compressions. At 2230 the Chapel was identified as a crime scene by Lt. Briones.

At approximately 2228 medical staff LPN Riley, RN2 Lilly, RN2 Stempvoort, and RN Kagichu arrive and relieve the custody of medical response, RN2 Stempvoort started an IV drip. RN2 Lilly began using the AMBU bag to provide oxygen while Sgt. Boe continued with chest compressions. At approximately 2235 Monroe Fire Department medics Hunt, Sloan, Henning, O'Connell along with Monroe PD Officer Stamey and Sgt. Fuller arrive. MFD took over life saving activities. At approximately 2245 rescue efforts were ceased.

Superintendent Frakes arrived at the facility at 2247 and MCC Duty Officer Captain Fritch arrived at 2259. Monroe Police Department Detective Robinson arrived at 2318.

At 2335 offender Scherf was escorted to the fourth floor of the infirmary and placed on a continuous two person watch. At 0045 Incident Command was transferred to Captain Fritch.

The remainder of First Shift involved taking the following actions:

- Recalling additional staff from Twin Rivers and the ERT to assist in security and escort functions;
- Making local and Headquarter Duty Officer notifications;
- Implementing CISM; and
- Activating a full Incident Command System response.

At 0200 the WSR was officially placed on total lockdown. At 0600 a formal de-brief was held for WSR staff by Supt Frakes, Captain Hardina, and CISM staff.

From January 30 to March 2, 2011 the WSR transitioned from total lockdown through partial lockdown and back to normal operations. The period of time forward from January 31 was not reviewed in detail by the CIR team except to review official ICS documentation.

Why didn't the chapel get searched?

There remains a question of why a search of the Chapel was not completed. A variety of reasons existed that should have led the incident commander to ensure a search of the Chapel was completed. Upon discovering Scherf in the Chapel and after interviewing him, some basic follow-up actions if they had occurred would have led to an earlier discovery of Officer Biendl.

Scherf stated that he hid in the Chapel and was planning on escaping later by climbing the wall. This story should have been viewed as extremely suspicious and not consistent with an inmate who is going to attempt an escape. He was discovered in a building with the front door open, lights on in the area he was discovered, and not attempting to conceal himself in any way. Additionally, Scherf initially told the discovering officers that he had fallen asleep. These inconsistent and implausible explanations by Scherf should have given an experienced uniformed correctional employee immediate reason to ensure the Chapel is given a thorough search.

First; Scherf's story that he was planning to escape is so suspicious that an immediate search should have been conducted to determine if another reason existed that would explain his presence.

Second; after hearing Scherf state he was planning on climbing the wall a basic follow-up action would have been to search for any escape paraphernalia. Obvious locations for that search would have included the Chapel.

Scherf gave two explanations for the blood observed on his clothing. First, he said he got hit playing racquetball and

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later stated that he was assaulted by Mexicans in the unit stairwell. In an attempt to verify his assault allegation, video of the alleged location was reviewed. The recorded video did not confirm Scherf's story of being assaulted. This left the question still remaining: How did blood get on Scherf's clothing? The review of video (an excellent follow-up action to confirm or disprove Scherf's statement) took until near the end of Third Shift. Any additional follow-up to this blood issue which may have led to a search of the Chapel looking for signs of a disturbance may or may not have occurred before First Shift discovered the missing equipment.

Staff in charge of the shift and those dispatched to perform interior searches were of a single minded focus. They knew an offender was missing from his cell and believed a possible escape had occurred or was being attempted. Upon finding Scherf, the discovering staff were instructed to escort him to the Shift Commander's office. As such, securing and escorting the offender became these staffs primary responsibility. Officer Maynard secured the Chapel but did not search the building (his written incident report includes a statement that he inspected and secured the building and a review of the Chapel video indicates a thorough inspection of the building did not occur). He reported to the shift commander's office to brief the Lieutenant and complete a report.

In summary, there was a focus on the fact that the missing offender was apprehended and a belief that the emergency was resolved. The focus shifted to completing the picture count, securing Scherf, and having staff complete reports due to Third Shift ending in less than 40 minutes and staff wanting to leave on time.

Did you consider the chapel officers whereabouts?

After all CIR interviews and review of incident documentation completed by involved staff the question remained: Was there any thought by on-duty Third Shift staff as to the possible whereabouts of Officer Biendl? One person commented that they thought that when Officer Biendl returned to work she was going to be in trouble for not ensuring the Chapel was clear of inmates before going home. Another staff member leaving at the end of his Third Shift commented that his gut just did not feel right. He was concerned enough that on his way home he contacted another Third Shift staff and asked if they had seen Biendl leave work. Between these two staff, they felt concerned enough that one of them made a phone call back to the facility. By then Officer Biendl had been discovered.

Again, after the discovery of Scherf in the Chapel, no one gave any consideration that Officer Biendl was anywhere but off-site. Her shift ended at 2100 so assumptions were that she was gone from the facility.

Since it was believed that an escape attempt had been averted. Attempts to contact Officer Biendl to verify she had searched the Chapel prior to securing the building would have been a normal follow-up response to as serious an emergency as an escape attempt. By attempting this follow-up action her equipment may have been discovered missing and repeated attempts to call her without success may have raised greater suspicion.

What happened between the time of finding Scherf in the Chapel to the discovery of Officer Biendl in the chapel?

After the discovery of Scherf in the Chapel and prior to the discovery of Officer Biendl staff engaged in the following tasks:

- Written incident reports were completed by staff involved in the discovery of the missing offender, staff involved in the search for Scherf, and staff involved in the escort of Scherf to the Shift Commanders office and IMU,
- Reviewing video in an attempt to validate Scherf's allegation that he was assaulted,
- Recovering and securing Scherf's clothing as evidence and taking photos of Scherf's body for evidence of being in a physical altercation,
- Securing Scherf's cell to preserve any evidence related to an escape attempt, and numerous duties related to preparing for shift change and pass down with the on-coming shift.

Chapel Callouts

To some extent the NIC Review Team Report addressed issues surrounding the callout and inmate movement systems that allows/authorizes offenders to move to and from program areas. In review of the process to account for offenders accessing and leaving the Chapel the CIR team heard that an offender created the two lists. One list was the call-out for general population offenders and another that identified offenders who worked in paid positions or volunteered in the Chapel. These two "callouts" were given to the Chapel officer by an offender who created the callouts. It was reported that Officer Biendl would combine the two lists by writing the names of the paid workers and

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volunteers onto the general population call-out document for the Chapel. Officer Biendl would then put a check mark by or hi-lite the names of the offenders as they accessed the Chapel during movement periods. After each movement officer Biendl would document in her logbook the total number of offenders remaining in the Chapel and report the same to Tower 9. Tower 9 would also document this count of offenders remaining in the Chapel. (NOTE: on January 29th there is a discrepancy in the number of inmates recorded in the Chapel logbook after the 1800 movement (60 offenders) and what was documented in the Tower 9 logbook (6).) Process did not include reporting the number of offenders exiting the Chapel during movements. (See NIC report "Single Officer Posts" and "Inmate Movement/Call-outs/Passes".

Cartoon

It was reported that a cartoon drawing allegedly created by Scherf and given to Officer Biendl by Scherf depicted a wolf dressed in sheep's clothing sitting on a ledge looking down on some other sheep. Purportedly Officer Biendl received the drawing earlier during her shift on January 29 from Scherf and showed the drawing to an offender. The drawing was then placed on the bulletin board in the Chapel office. According to MCC Investigator 2 John Padilla the drawing did exist and was taken from the Chapel by Monroe Police during a search of the Chapel and it is now in their possession.

Emergency Response and Incident Command System Review

January 29, 2011

Phases of Response for Missing Offender Emergency

Once the Shift Commander Lt. Shimogawa is notified that Scherf is missing from his cell he initiates an emergency response believing a possible escape or escape attempt has occurred.

Lt. Shimogawa took immediate and appropriate steps to verify the offender was missing by ordering a search of the cell, a search of "A" Unit, a review of out counts, and search of the visit room where Scherf had been earlier in the day.

Lt. Shimogawa instructs staff to secure Scherf's cell and orders Shift Sergeant to initiate interior searches. A facility wide emergency notification is not made resulting in a very limited number of staff being aware that a missing inmate emergency exists. Staff unaware that an inmate search was underway includes perimeter officers (a specific checklist item) and officers completing fire watch searches of the industries complex buildings. Many staff became aware that an inmate was missing when a radio report was made announcing the missing inmate was discovered in the Chapel.

The missing offender was quickly found. Additional evaluation and planning for ongoing emergency response actions in this phase was not necessary.

Scherf discovered in Chapel by search officers. Offender placed in restraints and escorted to Shift Commanders office. Initial emergency and escape checklists being completed.

Transfer of command occurs after missing offender found. This transfer of command occurred within a very short time from the initial discovery that offender was missing until offender was found. Discussion between Lt. Shimogawa and Lt. Briones believing the emergency was resolved included a transfer of command to avoid late relief of Third Shift Lt.

Offender was interviewed, clothing secured as evidence, offender assessed by medical and placed on pre-hearing confinement and escorted to segregation. Involved staff completed incident reports. The demobilize/recovery checklist requires accounting for all staff. No formal accounting for staff occurred. Verification was not sought or received that building searches were completed.

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Phases of Response for Missing Staff Member

Staff in Main Control discovered the Chapel Officer equipment was still checked out to Officer Biendl. Knowing she should have been off shift an immediate notification was made to Lt. Briones. Staff twice attempted telephone contact with Officer Biendl at her personal residence phone number.

A staff response was directed to the Chapel to conduct a search for Officer Biendl. Upon arrival and discovery of Officer Biendl, first aid was immediately initiated.

Shift Commander Lt. Briones recalled additional staff from TRU and the ERT to assist in security and escort.

The Chapel was immediately secured as a crime scene and criminal investigation responsibilities became those of the Monroe Police Department. The Line of Duty Death emergency checklist was initiated quickly by Lt. Briones.

Initial demobilization and recovery activities included the securing of evidence, the movement of Scherf to the infirmary for a 2-1 watch by ERT members, collecting staff reports, and supporting the criminal investigation. Line of duty death notifications were completed and the facility was placed on total lockdown. Long term demobilization activities included managing a long term lockdown, providing CISM services, memorial service planning, and returning the facility to normal operations.

Summary

The emergency response to a missing staff person was managed quickly and effectively. Appropriate checklists were utilized. All applicable ICS forms for each of the ICS sections were utilized with daily objectives and planning documents utilized. The evaluation of the long term lockdown is beyond the true scope of this CIR. Those staff involved would best be able to debrief and identify things that went well and where improvements can be made.

Classification Summary:

Classification:

- Current cause began June 5, 1997.
- From 1997 to June 2002 Offender Scherf was assigned close custody.
- From June 2002 to January 2011 Offender Scherf was assign medium custody.
- There is no clear documentation of Deputy Director approval for medium custody designation.
- Offender Scherf was required to have annual classification reviews. Classification reviews were conducted timely except in 2004. The review for 2004 was conducted March 2005.

Work Assignments:

- During the current incarceration, Offender Scherf worked in Maintenance, Chapel, Kitchen and Correctional Industries.
- Current work assignment was Correctional Industries.
- Other programming included Office Technology, Information Technology, MRT, Family Dynamics and Fathers

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Day Event.

- Work and other programming assignments were documented in RPM.

Volunteer Activities:

- Inquiries reveal Offender Scherf had volunteer status in the Chapel for at least two years.
- As a volunteer, Offender Scherf had routine and ongoing access to the Chapel. Volunteer activities included assisting in the Chapel library.
- Offender Scherf routinely participated in evening chapel programming.
- Volunteers were not documented in RPM.

Callouts:

- An offender clerk prepares the callout for religious programming.
- On January 29, 2011, Offender Scherf was on the callout for Full Gospel in the Chapel.
- An informal process was used to document chapel volunteers' participation.

Summary of Facts

MCC OM 410. 360 Escape Preparedness and Response (Escape Response Emergency Checklist)

Some initial emergency checklist items were initialed as being completed that appear not to have been. They include:

- Initial Emergency Checklist Item 2e. [REDACTED]
- Initial Emergency Checklist Item 2h. [REDACTED]

Without a formal emergency notification made to alert all staff, some staff voiced a concern that they were placed at risk by not knowing an inmate was missing. At the time of the emergency some staff were involved in routine duties that placed them in various unoccupied buildings. They stated that it would have been nice to know that an offender was missing so they could have been aware of the risk.

410.050 Emergency Management Plan: Requires an ICS level 300 trained staff to command this incident. ICS Training records for Lt Briones and Shimogawa do not reflect ever receiving this level training.

The apprehension of the offender occurred very quickly after confirming that he was missing (less than 10 minutes). Had Scherf tried to remain hidden in the Chapel he most likely would have been discovered by the only officer headed to the Chapel to conduct a search. Single officer building searches in an emergency are extremely risky. See recommendations.

The emergency response to a missing staff person was managed quickly and effectively. Appropriate checklists were utilized. All applicable ICS forms for each of the ICS sections were utilized with daily objectives and planning documents utilized. The evaluation of the long term lockdown is beyond the true scope of this CIR. Those staff involved would best be able to debrief and identify things that went well and where improvements can be made.

MCC OM 420.155 Callout Systems: OM requires Main Control to verify staff are present at pre-identified key locations including Tower 9 and Breezeway near the Chapel/PAB in advance of initiating offender movement. Main Control staff state they were unaware of this OM and requirement. From staff interviews the CIR team heard that verification did occur in the past but stopped approximately a year to a year and half ago.

WSR R/M Post Orders; Relief Procedures Section, Item #1. : R/M Post Orders state "You are not to leave your zone of control at any time during the shift without authorization of the Shift Sergeant or Lieutenant." From interviews the CIR team heard that no officer was present in Zone 3 during the 2030 "recall movement".

LIST OF APPLICABLE RCWs/WACs/DOC POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

410.020 Department Emergency Operations Center
410.040 Incident Command System (ICS)
410.050 Emergency Management Plan
410.160 Emergency Information Management
410.255 Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) Teams
410.345 Emergency Staffing Plan
410.360 Escape Preparedness and Response
410.375 Facility Lockdown
410.430 Health Services During An Emergency
410.700 Employee Line of Duty Death or Life-Threatening Injury
410.800 Emergency Management System (EMS) Training Requirement
MCC OM 420.155 Callout Systems
WSR Response and Movement Officers Post Order

RECOMMENDATIONS

- **Verify in advance of initiating movements that staff are in their pre-designated zones of control. Define on facility map or in writing where staff are to be posted in their Zone during movements.**
- **Ensure supervisors routinely observe movement to ensure compliance with offender movement process.**
- **Develop, implement and monitor a staff accountability process that verifies the status of all staff at the end of their regularly assigned hours of work.**
- **Ensure Incident Commanders verify that all emergency checklist items have been completed or accomplished. Different statements given by Scherf supported opinions by staff that he was attempting to escape or at was seeking protective custody. Staff believed they had prevented an escape or that Scherf had fallen asleep (as stated) in the Chapel. This tunnel vision appears to have helped facilitate the failure to complete interior building searches.**
- **During non-emergent operations, use at least two staff to secure buildings. Use teams of a least two staff to conduct building searches during emergency operations.**
- **Implement current Callout Policy.**
- **Reinforce supervisory expectation to work as a team and report significant security/safety issues (staff not on post)**
- **Ensure that a facility wide emergency notification is made whenever an emergency is detected.**
- **As it applies to closing down buildings define "all clear" to mean the interior building has been searched and secured as necessary, all staff are out of the building and exterior entry/egress doors are locked and secured.**
- **Consider having Tower 9 responsible for verifying staff are in their assigned locations for movement and initiating movements. This post has the capability to observe whether staff are or are not in place.**
- **Update custody Post Orders to reflect accurate duty assignments during movements and define in writing the process for "clearing zones" after offender movements.**
- **If offenders are allowed to volunteer in the Chapel, the offender should obtain the same review/approval as would be required for a paid job. This offender should also be listed on the formal callout with a set schedule.**

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Things That Worked Well;


Distribution: ORIGINAL-Risk Management Office COPY-Appointing Authority, Assistant Secretary/Initiator

DOC 18-022 (Rev10/08/10)

DOC 400.110
[4-4225-1]


- Missing inmate concern was called in immediately, before completing count
- Evidence Handling/crime scene preservation were extremely well managed.
- QRST Response on First Shift was well done.
- Escorts to the IMU and Hospital were professionally conducted.
- Life Saving measures were done well.
- Program assignments/classification were completed well documented in RPM/OMNI.

JEFFREY A UTECHT
Team Lead (Print)


Team Lead Signature


7-8-11
Date

Dans Paeholke
Assistant Secretary/designee (Print)


Assistant Secretary/designee Signature

7/11/11
Date

The contents of this document may be eligible for public disclosure. Social Security Numbers are considered confidential information and will be redacted in the event of such a request. This form is governed by Executive Order 00-03, RCW 42.56, and RCW 40.14.



Appendix D

Budget Summary

Prison Safety Initiative Action Plan

	ESHB 1087 (Budget Bill)			Comments
	2009-11 GF-S	2011-13 GF-S	2011-13 WATPA	
<i>Technology</i>				
Radio System Panic Button on Microphones	50		200	Recommendation from the NIC Report
Pilot body alarm system at MCC			1,600	
Pilot proximity card system WSP			440	Recommendation from the NIC Report
Study to standardize body alarm or proximity card system statewide, and video cameras			150	Recommendation from the NIC Report
<i>Policy, Procedure, and Overall Security</i>				
Expand access to OC Spray (pepper spray)	118			Recommendation from the NIC Report. This includes training costs.
Remove Building - MCC/WSR	65			blocked view from Tower 9
<i>Staff Training</i>				
Train all first-level supervisors on enhanced security awareness	100		416	Recommendation from the NIC Report. Costs are for relief for certain supervisory positions while training occurs. Estimated that 20-hours of training for supervisors and 2 hours for line staff. Line staff training is incorporated into annual training.
<i>Staffing</i>				
Staff Accountability Positions			2,853	\$2,853 and 17.35 FTEs would provide funding and FTEs for positions dedicated to staff safety.
Restore 2 counselor positions			350	
Total	333	-	6,009	

Appendix E
Local Advisory Committee Charter
And
Suggestion Form



SECURITY CONCERNS/SUGGESTIONS

Submitting Staff Member

Facility: _____ Date: _____

TO: Local Security Advisory Committee FROM: _____

Category:

- Technology
- Staff
- Physical Plant
- Policy/OM Procedure

Concern/Suggestion:

Local Security Advisory Committee

Received: _____ Meeting Date: _____

Is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.

Comments:

May have statewide impact and is being forwarded to the Statewide Security Advisory Committee.

This issue involves the following:

- | | |
|---|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> New DOC Policy Development | <input type="checkbox"/> Revise Edit Current DOC Policy (#) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Additional Staffing | <input type="checkbox"/> Additional Equipment |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Offender Programs | <input type="checkbox"/> Program Elimination |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Other _____ | <input type="checkbox"/> This issue is being routed to the facility safety committee for action. |

Comments:

Date: _____ Final Action Date: _____

Statewide Security Advisory Committee

Received: _____ Meeting Date: _____

- | | | |
|--|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Is a Local Facility Matter with | <input type="checkbox"/> Major Budget Impact | <input type="checkbox"/> Minimal Budget Impact |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Is a Statewide Matter with | <input type="checkbox"/> Major Budget Impact | <input type="checkbox"/> Minimal Budget Impact |

Is being assigned to _____ for further analysis and recommendations.

Due Date: _____

Comments:

Approved

Deny

Refer to Secretary/Designee with recommendations.

Final Action Date: _____

DOC HQ Impact Advisory Team Review

Received: _____

Meeting Date: _____

Comments:

Secretary/Designee

Received: _____

Meeting Date: _____

Comments:

Approved

Deny

Requires further review/action.

Final Action Date: _____

Facility Security Advisory Committee

Executive Sponsor: Superintendent

Process Owner: Correctional Captain

Purpose	<p>To enhance safety and security in prisons.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Heighten staff awareness of security issues.• Increase line staff participation in local and statewide policies and practices regarding security and safety.
Process	<p>A multi-disciplinary facility Security Advisory Committee will meet regularly and work collaboratively to identify and address security concerns at the facility and statewide level.</p>
Scope	<p>The Security Advisory Committee is tasked with:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Responding to assignments from the Statewide Security Advisory Committee.2. Proposing security concerns and recommendations to the statewide Security Advisory Committee.3. Evaluating local security policies and practices and making recommendations to the Superintendent.4. Overseeing implementation of approved changes.5. Evaluating outcomes in newly adopted security practices and protocols.
Actions	<p>The Security Advisory Committee will:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Meet at least every other month.• Manage an agenda and action plan.• Review security issues which can be managed locally and refer issues that cannot be managed locally to the statewide committee.• Conduct best practice research on local initiatives.• Publish meeting minutes.
Stakeholders	<p>DOC staff, Legislators, Teamsters, offenders, facility contractors, facility visitors and volunteers.</p>

Appendix F

Local Advisory Committee Summaries



October 2011

MEMBERS

Aff, Linda
Secretary Senior
Albertson, Rena
Classification Counselor
Anderson, John
Electrician
Bolinger, Stephen
CO2
DeBusk, Nicholas
CO2
Erickson, Catarina
CO2
Fleming, Jerry
Athletics Specialist
Flom, Cindy
Food Service Mgr
Harbolt, Anthony
CO2
Haynes, Ron
Captain
Henderson, Paula
Program Manager
Hicks, Tommy
Safety Officer
Hoffman, Vicki
IS1
Leyerle, Deanna
Records Tech
McMains, Denise
CO3
Ridgeway, Jennifer
CO2
Sauter, Dwayne
CO2
Smith, Geoff
CO3
Window, David
Lieutenant
Key, James
Associate Superintendent

Status Update on ESB 5907

Airway Heights Corrections Center Prison Safety Updates

Local Staff Leadership: We currently have 28 Local Statewide Committee Members (SAC) and have held 5 committee meetings as of September 31, 2011.

Suggestions/Concerns Received: We have submitted 42 suggestions/concerns. 13 items have been resolved locally. One of the suggestions that has been resolved locally is the forklifts/gators/ mowers now all have tamper proof governors put in to significantly reduce the speed they can currently do. This would reduce the risk of injuries to staff inmates or a similar situation that happened at CBCC.

Number of suggestions forwarded to SAC: 4 issues have been referred to the Statewide Advisory Committee for their input/review.

Next Best Practice: All custody staff are accounted for at the end of each shift by a sergeant (utilizing the day's roster) marking them off as they exit the facility.



October 2011

MEMBERS

Jack Brumbaugh
Warehouse Operator
Elaine Harmon
Classification Counselor
Jessica Anderson
AA3
Julie Shinn
Psychology Associate
Gerald Isham
Lieutenant
Greg Garringer
Chaplain 2
Paris Albertsen
CO2
Terry Powell
CO2
Gary Kirschenmann
CO3
William Schrock
CO3
Kenneth Towne
CO2
Stacy Doucette
Office Assistant
Debra Byers
Classification
Counselor
Jeff Blodgett
Classification
Counselor
Laura Thorson
Classification
Counselor

Status Update on ESB 5907

Cedar Creek Corrections Center Prison Safety Updates

Local Staff Leadership: We currently have 18 Local Statewide Committee Members (SAC) and have held 4 committee meetings as of September 31, 2011.

Suggestions/Concerns Received: We have submitted 5 suggestions/concerns to the SharePoint Site.

Number of suggestions forwarded to SAC: 3 issues have been referred to the Statewide Advisory Committee for their input/review.

Next Best Practice: A Staff member has gone to Basic Education for Instructors (BESI) training and will be going to Behavioral Management (BMG) training next week so that they (a licensed mental health counselor) will be able to provide enhanced communication instructions at in service training.



October 2011

MEMBERS

Adamire, Lawrence
CO
Maines, Mike
Sergeant
Stubbs, John
CIS4
Nicholas, Faye
CO
Banner, Gerald
Sergeant
Banner, Kathy
Sergeant
Bookter, Lloyd
CO
McHaffie, Jerry
Sergeant
Nicholas, Glen
Sergeant
Calley, Jamie
Food Manager
Reetz, Edwin
Captain
Stubbs, Yvette
AA3
Dauth, Norbert
Classification Counselor
Granum, Pete
Electronic Tech
Hulse, Elwyn
Psychology Associate
McLean, Caryn
Records Tech
Sims, Dave
Nurse
Bates, Amber
CO
Bellamy, Gregory
CO
Berry, Tim
CO
Dailey, Steven
CO
Earls, Jason
CO
Wilcox, Craig
CO

Status Update on ESB 5907

Clallam Bay Corrections Center Prison Safety Updates

Local Staff Leadership: We currently have 23 Local Statewide Committee Members (SAC) and have held 6 committee meetings as of September 31, 2011.

Suggestions/Concerns submitted: We have submitted 32 suggestions/concerns. 13 items have been resolved locally.

Number of suggestions forwarded to SAC: 2 issues have been referred to the Statewide Advisory Committee for their input/review.

Next Best Practice: We lock-down MSC during graveyard shift.



October 2011

MEMBERS

Ramsey, Andrew
Classification Counselor
Kessler, Tracy
Office Assistant
Lund, Tara
Psychology Associate
Proctor, Tara
Secretary Lead
Culey, William
Cook
Thompson, Ronald
Captain
Simons, Roy
CO2
Arnett, Barb
Corrections Specialist
Wiley, Robbie
CO2
Schaeffer, Brandon
CO2
Murphy, Sean
Captain
Beus, Sandy
Secretary Lead
Owens, Richard
CO2
Lynch, David
CO3
Carmody, Amy
Secretary Senior
Duncan, Richard
Lieutenant
Meraz, Jaime
CI Sup
Mendez, Genesis
Administrative Asst
Carlson, Brent
Maintenance Project Sup
Schaeffer, Jessica
Office Asst
McCombs, Greg
CO3
Olssen, John
CO2

Status Update on ESB 5907

Coyote Ridge Corrections Center Prison Safety Updates

Local Staff Leadership: We currently have 18 Local Statewide Committee Members (SAC) and have held 4 committee meetings as of September 31, 2011

Suggestions/Concerns Submitted: We have submitted 57 suggestions/concerns to the SharePoint site. A submittal that has recently been resolved is the "Cuff Keys" A suggestion was made to include a cuff key on all key rings that are issued to staff with wrist restraints. The problem with not having one is that it is impossible to perform a proper functions test on your issued restraints without a cuff key. Offenders can become "spun up" and actively resistant which is dangerous if the wrist restrains don't function right or don't come off after arriving at SEG. When this happens staff have been injured.

Number of suggestions forwarded to SAC: 5 suggestions have been submitted to Statewide Advisory Committee for review and consideration.

Next Best Practice: We have developed a radio cuff and case holder cabinet- placed in the main control. Holds 140 radios, 100 restraints. We also put together a log that sits next to the checkout system that shows the position of all staff in the institution.



October 2011

MEMBERS

De la Rocha, Chris
CO2

Greene, Bobby
Lieutenant

Francis, Mark
CO3

Snell, Tam
Administrative
Assistant

Robinson, Vince
Classification
Counselor

Barge, Brian
Athletics Specialist

Yadon, Susan
Office Assistant

Rock, Dan
Equipment Tech

Brown, James
CO2

Rowe, Maria

Hettinger, Terry
Electrician Supervisor

Larsen, Tim
CO2

Lewis, Scott
Cook

Luppino, Jennifer
CO2

Olivera, Roberto
CO2

Stevens, Denise
Supply Support
Specialist

Status Update on ESB 5907

Larch Corrections Center Prison Safety Updates

Local Staff Leadership: We currently have 17 Local Statewide Committee Members (SAC) and have held 5 committee meetings as of September 31, 2011

Suggestions/Concerns Submitted: We have submitted 12 suggestions/concerns to the SharePoint site. 11 have been resolved at the local level.

Number of suggestions forwarded to SAC: 1 suggestion has been submitted to Statewide Advisory Committee for review and consideration.

Next Best Practice: After receiving the Physical Plant Safety we will be identifying and scrubbing down a different building/area each quarter, to reinforce staff awareness in the facility year round.



October 2011

MEMBERS

Milo Ames
Custody Officer
Christie Apker
Classification
Theresa Boyer
Support staff
Heather Carlson
Mental Health
Joel Conger
TC program
Mike Farris
Maintenance / CI
Ernest Gately
Custody Sergeant
Brenda Gatling
Medical / Dental
Kerry Halvorsen
Recreation
Linda King
Warehouse/Bus office
Alena McGowanFolsom
AC Cook
Katherine Newsom
Custody Officer
Imo Smith
Religious program

Status Update on ESB 5907

Mission Creek Corrections Center for Women Prison Safety Updates

Local Staff Leadership: We currently have 14 Local Statewide Committee Members (SAC) and have held 3 committee meetings as of September 31, 2011.

Suggestions/Concerns submitted: We have submitted 12 suggestions/concerns. 10 items have been submitted and require local resolution.

Number of suggestions forwarded to SAC: 2 issues have been referred to the Statewide Advisory Committee for their input/review.

Next Best Practice:



October 2011

MEMBERS

Anderson, Beth
CO3
Balanean, Ioan
Cook
Balyeat, Benjamin
CO3
Boardman, Carrie
Sec Supervisor
Carberry, Randy
CO3
Dopson, Douglas
CO3
Dormer, Christopher
CO2
Elmore, Viron
CO2
Escobar, Agustin
Social Worker 3
Ferber, Jill
Offender Treatment Spec
Hall, Frances
Classification Counselor
Hansen, Troy
Maintenance Mechanic
Heise, Lynda
Food Service Mgr
Kirk, Daniel
CO1
Kullojka, Arben
CO3
Logan, Kirby
CO1
Lopez, Christopher
CO3
Lyons, Tracie
CO2
Maxson, Peter
Corrections Specialist
McIntyre, Craig
CO2
Miller, Greg
Social Worker
Swan, Jeff
CO3
Thurston, Carol
Nurse
Whisman, Kris
Acting Dean
White, Lolinda
CO2
Williams, Mary
Mental Health

Status Update on ESB 5907

Monroe Correctional Complex Prison Safety Updates

Local Staff Leadership: We currently have 23 Local Statewide Advisory Committee members and have held 7 committee meetings as of September 31, 2011.

Suggestion/Concerns submitted: We have submitted 43 suggestions/concerns to the SharePoint site for review. 3 suggestions have been resolved locally. One example was to involve all staff in drills. It was recognized that there was a clear lack of direction for non-custody staff and more training needs to occur for non-custody. Of course, not every person hill-wide can be involved in every drill, but the purpose was to involve all staff in an area. For instance a drill on a unit would have custody, counselors, the unit CUS, possibly medical staff. This group also addressed the issue of pre-planned drills.

Suggestions forwarded to SAC: 8 suggestions have been forwarded to the Statewide Advisory Committee for review and consideration.

Next Best Practice: Two to open two to close- it always takes two staff to open or secure a building and that expectation has been implemented.



October 2011

MEMBERS

Archibald, Lynn
CO2
Banner, Greg
Plant Manager
Buchmann, Deanna
Program Coordinator
Burr, Margaret
DNR
Claussen, Jeffrey
Food Service Manager
Gibbs, Sue
Administrative
Assistant
Gooding, Richard
CO2
James, George
Therapeutic Comm.
Tech
Kitchel, Phillip
CO1
Lawson, Lori
Corrections Specialist
Olson, Leanne
Office Assistant
Riggan, Nicholas
Fiscal Analyst
Speer, Scott
Lieutenant
Thomas, Marc
CO3
Wade, Timothy
CO3
Wakeman, Gary
Chaplain
Woody, David
Maintenance Sup
Zander, Tandra
Program Manager

Status Update on ESB 5907

Olympic Corrections Center Prison Safety Updates

Local Staff Leadership: We currently have 20 Local Statewide Committee Members (SAC) and have held 3 committee meetings as of September 31, 2011.

Suggestions/Concerns submitted: We have submitted 13 suggestion/concerns, 6 have been resolved locally. An example of this is the Pilot of the straight/8 hour shifts for 1st shift personnel at OCC to assist in mitigating single post conditions in the living units. Currently Shift Commanders report that there is no coverage for meal breaks and added to required duties outside the living units, officers are left by themselves. Two practices have arisen: Staff are often taking their breaks at the work site and when staff are left single posted they move inside a secured duty office

Number of suggestion forwarded to SAC: 2 suggestions have been forwarded to the Statewide Advisory Committee for review and consideration.

Next Best Practice: We have instituted a discussion and review of high risk offender(s) at the Local Statewide Advisory Committee meeting. We review the incoming chain for issues we might face with offenders, but this new process takes it full circle. This results in documented considerations or risk posed and strategies for managing. We then distribute this report to staff and solicit feedback.



October 2011

MEMBERS

May, Clint
Captain
Johnson, Michelle
AA3
Rohrer, Liza
CPM
Swain, Bill
CUS
Matsen, Ronnie
Sergeant
Porter, Ben
Lieutenant
Nelson, Bill
CO
Matthews, Doug
Sergeant
McCann, Sue
AA3
DeHaven, Joiann
Classification Counselor
Boerner, Paula
Education
Theissen, Sally
CI
Bolden, Gerry
Maintenance Sup
Senderauf, Greg
Union Rep
Cotton, Jeneva
Psych
Karsowski, Diana
Cook
MacKinder, Shelly
Secretary Supervisor
Cory Whaley
I&I
Sauer, Ronnie
Training
Sgt Judd
Armory
Thomas, Amanda
Hearings
Ross, Lisa
Secretary Senior
L'Heureux, Tom
Correctional Supervisor

Status Update on ESB 5907

Stafford Creek Corrections Center

Prison Safety Updates

Local Staff Leadership: We currently have 24 Local Statewide Committee Members (SAC) and have held 4 committee meetings as of September 31, 2011

Suggestions/Concerns Submitted: We have submitted 16 suggestions/concerns to the SharePoint site.

Number of suggestions forwarded to SAC: 5 issues have been referred to the Statewide Advisory Committee for their input/review. A couple items under review-statewide are the policy revision for Escorted Leave; an extra officer for vehicle gate escort due to CI expansion and retrofitting housing units for remote lockdown capability.

Next Best Practice:



October 2011

MEMBERS

Wofford, Debra
Captain
Carson, Milanda
CO3
Stanley, Ed
CO3
Johnson, Larry
Athletics Specialist
Dunnington, Philip
Tony
CS4
Stark, Tammie
Secretary Senior
Ames, Kim
CO3
Denison, Kim
Office Assistant
Greenfield, JC
Program Manager
Adams, Josh
CO3
Adams, Shawn
Lieutenant
Tellez, Tony
Cook
Metzcus, Greg
Safety Officer
French, Doug
CO2

Status Update on ESB 5907

Washington Corrections Center Prison Safety Updates

Local Staff Leadership: We currently have 26 Local Statewide Committee Members (SAC) and have held 11 committee meetings as of September 31, 2011

Suggestions/Concerns Submitted: We have submitted 21 suggestions/concerns to the SharePoint site. 6 of those suggestions have been resolved at the local level. One example of a local resolution is the offender restraints on the tables in the COU-Offenders who have mental health issues are very unpredictable. Currently they are placed in a restraint on the table for meetings with various staff. They have a lot of reach and could hurt someone. The suggestion was to duplicate the table at IMU so the offender has less reach and is more secure. The restraints were reconfigured and this issue has been resolved making for a safer work environment.

Number of suggestions forwarded to SAC: 11 issues have been referred to the Statewide Advisory Committee for their input.

Next Best Practice:



October 2011

MEMBERS

Bailey, Gerald
CUS

Green, Michael
Captain

Wooten, Dairyene
Counselor

Lamb, Mary
Safety Officer

Gilbert, George
I&I

Eyre, Alyssa
CI Supervisor

Browne, Tanya
Psychologist

Jones, Edward
Lieutenant

Jordan, Susan
CO

Hunter, Donald
CO

Parnell, Jane
Superintendent

Malae, Sitai
Secretary Senior

Status Update on ESB 5907

Washington Corrections Center for Women Prison Safety Updates

Local Staff Leadership: We currently have 16 Local Statewide Committee Members (SAC) and have held 4 committee meetings as of September 31, 2011.

Suggestions/Concerns Received: We have submitted 32 suggestions/concerns to the SharePoint site. 11 items have been resolved locally. One of the concerns submitted recently was to replace the phone in Control- The emergency phone in Control was a rotary dial phone. When someone dials extension 222 it goes directly to this phone. The phone did not have a read-out of where the call is coming from. There were occasions when this phone rings once or twice and then stop or there was no one on the line. There is no way to tell where the calls were coming from and no way to check on the area that called 222. **This phone has been replaced.**

Number of suggestions forwarded to SAC: 7 issues have been referred to the Statewide Advisory Committee for their input/review.

Next Best Practice: Post Orders/Operations Manuals



October 2011

MEMBERS

Jackson, Kathy
Registered Nurse
Johnny, Watts
Safety Officer
Ogle, Angela
Administrative Assistant
Garrison, Heidi
Classification Counselor
Hensley, Kathleen
Cook-AC
Hanson, Burl
CO2
Humbert, Tawny
Secretary Senior
Bly, Darlene
Office Assistant
Piver, Robert
Captain
Schmidt, Corey
CO2
Weber, Leland
CO2
Doll, Daniel
Electronics Technician
Johnson, Matt
CO2

Status Update on ESB 5907

Washington State Penitentiary Prison Safety Updates

Local Staff Leadership: At WSP we currently have 13 Local Advisory Committee Member and have held 5 committee meetings as of September 31, 2011.

Total Local Suggestions/Concerns submitted: 32 suggestions have been submitted to the DOC SharePoint site for review.

Suggestion resolved locally: We have resolved 11 suggestions/concerns locally. An example of a suggestion we just resolved locally is WSP will now send out a memo to remind control point staff to be consistently checking ID Badges. Sending the message-If you see someone without a badge you must confront them.

Next Best Practice: We have strongly suggested and are pushing the idea forward to stop putting elastic in the legs of sweat pants so offenders cannot conceal contraband.

Appendix G
List of Local Advisory Committee
Suggestions

Concern/Suggestion	Facility	LSAC Status	Concern/Suggestion Description	LSAC or SSAC Comments	Local Resolution
Monitors in Segregation Booth	WA Corr. Cntr for Women	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	New monitors in Segregation Booth. New cameras for better visibility of everyone entering Z bldg and the yards. There is a line running through that destruct from visibility.	CUS Bailey to review/assess	CUS reported back to committee on current request -worked IT maint. the problem was not the monitor but the system, repair parts have been ordered and replaced.
Trash Runs	WA Corr. Cntr for Women	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	It has been observed that there are some security issues in conducting trash runs from the units to the trash compactor behind the MI kitchen. CCU inmates are/were departing CCU with bins of garbage and traveling unescorted.	Facility team to review/improve process	
Radio's	WA Corr. Cntr for Women	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Radio's are going dead with no warning at all. This poses a severe safety and security risk to staff.	Facility maint. assigned to update/reprogram radio feature.	
Portable walk about radios for Segregation	WA Corr. Cntr for Women	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Need portable "walk about radios" (walkie-talkies) for segregation ONLY. It increases the communication between the staff without interfering with radio traffic elsewhere in the institution. This was a VERY EFFECTIVE tool used at MICC.	Work order submitted for talk about channel to communicate in Segregation between staff.	CUS reported back to committee results w/current request - worked with IT maint. & concluded that Segregation will utilize channel 3 on current radio to communicate between Seg. Booth Officer and Seg. Floor Officer inside Segregation.
Additional Staff in Medium Security Unit	WA Corr. Cntr for Women	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Have 2 staff at all times in MSU when staff taking 30 minutes break. There is only 1 female staff with 255 offenders. At time there is no other staff in the unit.	This concern will be addressed & improved w/upcoming 8 hour shift adjustments.	
Officer in Chapel	WA Corr. Cntr for Women	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Have an Officer in the Chapel when any offenders or Volunteers are conducting programs. On Saturdays there are 30-40 offender off all custody levels in the Chapel with 1-2 Volunteers (red badge) and no Officer present only on hourly checks until 1230, or have volunteers call in 30 minutes check.	Assigned to Lt. Jones for follow up.	A team charter was assigned to Associate of Programs M. Gilbert (along with other co-team members) by Supt. Parnell to problem solve the safety concerns with volunteers and volunteer programs at WCCW, with a completion date of 10/12/2011.

Concern/Suggestion	Facility	LSAC Status	Concern/Suggestion Description	LSAC or SSAC Comments	Local Resolution
Perimeter Fence	WA Corr. Cntr for Women	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Security issue within the inner perimeter which could potentially lead to an attempted escape. Between B bldg & F bldg there is a fence that separates the main compound from the loading area. May be fairly easy to access the roof of B bldg. Once on the roof, could "access the A bldg roof. From the A bldg roof, could drop down into the area between the R bldg gate and A bldg.	Facility maint. assigned to correct.	Jon Reynoldson report back to local security advisory committee that work on fence that separates the main compound from the loading area behind the old clinic is complete. Email was sent to Captain's office upon completion of work 08/03/11.
Counselors need office hours	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Counselor's should have office hours to ensure they are having uninterrupted time to work so that they are referring inmates to the appropriate classes and work programs. Office hours will allow counselors to do their jobs more efficiently and effectively, which will translate to a safer and more secure operating facility.		
Laundry delivery to units	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Contraband Potential -Staff believes these laundry carts should only be delivered by staff to the back of the units (like store is delivered) by DOC staff only. The carts should then be checked in by unit officers. The officers should check through the carts before inmates are allowed to pass out laundry.		
Hinged cuffs	Airway Heights Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	We currently use swivel cuffs. What are the advantages, costs, etc. of possibly changing to hinged or have both hinged and swivel?	Group agreed what we have is adequate.	
Painted lines on breezeway to direct flow of foot traffic	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Offenders tend to spread out the entire width of the breezeways during movement. By painting a yellow line down the center of the sidewalks, much like roadways have painted lines, offenders would be required to remain on the right side of the yellow line. This will be primarily helpful in two ways: 1) If an incident occurs during movement time, it will allow for responding staff to respond without having to weave through a crowd of offenders. 2) Helps to prevent offenders from walking up behind staff. If staff (either custody or non-custody) are walking the breezeways during movement time, the staff can avoid having to walk with the offender crowd by walking on the left side of the yellow line, opposite of the offenders.		

Concern/Suggestion	Facility	LSAC Status	Concern/Suggestion Description	LSAC or SSAC Comments	Local Resolution
<p>Public Access porters - Request to look at possibly using Main porters only, not MSU as is current practice. Or possibly check into contracting the janitorial duties.</p>	<p>Airway Heights Corr. Cntr</p>	<p>This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.</p>	<p>Without direct supervision in this area the porters have access to the break room, wellness room, and locker rooms. Due to the lockers being easily tampered with they have access to staff car keys, cell phones, wallets, tobacco, etc. Having access to the staff entrance door gives them the opportunity to move contraband / civilians in and out of the bldg. Their close proximity to the Armory is also a security threat. REMEDY #1: Ensure these porters have direct supervision. REMEDY #2: Take day and swing shift porters out of the equation, and utilize a graveyard crew as most other businesses do.</p>	<p>Further research by LSAC.</p>	
<p>Visitors in the "secure perimeter" - Request to move visiting processing area to Public Access.</p>	<p>Airway Heights Corr. Cntr</p>	<p>This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.</p>	<p>What do ya think about the visitors getting into the "secure perimeter" without being identified as visitors? Only passed through the metal detector then allowed in and then checked. Lots of security and liability issues with arbitrarily letting civilians into a prison don't ya think. Visitation staff should be checking them in at public access.</p>	<p>Further research by LSAC</p>	
<p>Assigned seating in Main Dining Halls- currently being done. Suggestion made to look into tightening it up a little and model like MSU does.</p>	<p>Airway Heights Corr. Cntr</p>	<p>This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.</p>	<p>Even though I will be starting my new post in SMU on Sunday 26th, I would like to propose assigned seating in the main dining halls. I would have to say that the assigned seating was the best thing since sliced bread in the MSU, and has been the most organized venture to happen in the camp in my time here. My proposal is a slower call rate of tiers (but holding the 20 minute policy for eating). The assigned seating in dining would minimize the movement of offenders and by placing one extra officer in the dining halls will enhance direction. My thought was to try the assigned seating with one dining hall, and give ample notification to staff and offenders of the current process.</p>	<p>Further research by LSAC.</p>	

Concern/Suggestion	Facility	LSAC Status	Concern/Suggestion Description	LSAC or SSAC Comments	Local Resolution
Pulling 1 officer out of the units in non lock down units on graveyard for drills or real events should be reduced or eliminated	Airway Heights Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	The practice of pulling 1 officer out of the units in non lock down units on graveyard for drills or real events should be reduced or eliminated. Team 2 members should be out of lock down units. When an event occurs all porters should return to their rooms for lockdown until the event is completed. This is essential for newer officers. Non-lock down units should consider having an R&M attempt to be in the unit when 1 is on break. Even lock down units should be considered.	This is more a staffing issue. Lt. Window and Lt. Rivera will look into this. RESOLVED.	
Emergency hospital run - need to call in extra staff	Airway Heights Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	When a emergency hospital run is initiated on any shift if there is not any extra staff, they should call in staff and not run short to save money.	Usually is more of a problem on graveyard. Referred to Lieutenants group. RESOLVED.	
Forklifts/gators/mowers	Airway Heights Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	The forklifts / gators/ mowers should all have tamper proof governors put in to significantly reduce the speed they can currently do. This would reduce the risk of injuries to staff inmates or a similar situation that happened at CBCC.	Referred to Electrician Supervisor John Anderson.	
MSU offenders should be under the supervision of their designated Supervisor.	Airway Heights Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	I believe that the MSU offenders should be under the supervision of their designated Supervisor. Often the maint. crew have drills and saws they work with they are checked in by the officer and wander through-out the unit to see if anything needs done. When they work on major projects they often have larger equipment that they bring into the unit. If we need to do trash runs or we leave the unit for our break that leaves one officer. They often come to the unit during informal count and stay until lunch. The offenders leave for their lunch during the busiest time of the day and we have to stop what we are doing to do tool inventories.	Sub-Committee formed - Harbolt, Erickson and Troutt. Possibly request a new staff person in C7.	
MSU Unit trash runs	Airway Heights Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	I also want to suggest that the trash be picked up in the back of the unit by the truck like it is done in the main. This would keep the officer in the units. Often in the winter time the sidewalk to the bin is not maintained and poses a walking hazard.	Sub-committee formed - Sauter / Erickson	

Concern/Suggestion	Facility	LSAC Status	Concern/Suggestion Description	LSAC or SSAC Comments	Local Resolution
Offsite transports	Airway Heights Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Brief Description: The proposal will address staffs safety concerns during offsite transports of offenders. Two main issues will be focused upon; proposing that two officers will be assigned to all transports regardless of custody level and both officers will be armed while on offsite transports. Transports will include Death bed visits, Funeral trips, Prison transfers, Jail transfers, Medical office visits and Hospital runs, Scheduled and Non-Scheduled. There are multiple policies that regulate when an officer can carry a firearm and on what trips they are authorized to carry. These policies state that there is always one officer that is armed and one unarmed.	Sub-committee formed - Bolinger/Harbolt/Window. Suggestion made to do comparisons with other states and see what their practice is.	
Metal Rakes in Units	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	The removal of metal rakes from the living units. The metal rakes that offenders use to rake the rocks between bldgs and walkways can be used as a dangerous weapon. The rocks can just as easily be swept using a push broom to keep a clean appearance throughout the facility. The brooms do not have pointed metal rake fingers that could do some serious bodily injury to staff members.		
Implement dress code for CC's	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	What we would like to do is implement a dress code for Sage unit counselors that will show a sign of authority and would make it so we can be identified at a glance. We would like to take a look at BDU's for pants and polo shirts ordered from EBA with the CRCC emblem on it. We feel that if we implement our own uniform system at our own expense that it will identify us as classification staff at a glance, help decrease the cost of work clothing and show a sense of authority and professionalism. If we can put this into place our hope is that maybe the other units will follow.		

Concern/Suggestion	Facility	LSAC Status	Concern/Suggestion Description	LSAC or SSAC Comments	Local Resolution
Rock Wall	WA Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	The rock wall on the TC walkway in front of Evergreen Hall is starting to crumble and fall apart. It is unsafe to have large rocks loose on the walkway. Suggest either repairing or removing the rock wall.	The wall will need to be replaced with an acceptable replacement because it is a retaining wall. We will get cost estimate and ideas from maint. for replacement.	Rock wall was removed.
Trash compactor	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Concern - escape. Suggestion - Trash Compactor should be inside the secure perimeter.		
Log books	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Reduce the number of log books in the units to one. With one log book officers can hourly if not more check on their partner via the log book. An officer can go all day without seeing his partner till he/she comes over to tell you that they are going on break.		
Stop calling chain bus on and off grounds	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	I believe that we need to stop doing is Control calling the chain bus on and off grounds.. Reason: it gives the offenders time to contact an outside person and to let them know when and where the chain bus is. The offenders don't need to know when the chain bus arrives and leaves.. especially leaving. And it doesn't need to go over the radio how many they are dropping off and picking up. Doing these practices is giving these offenders and open invite for trouble and could possibly be putting the transport staff at risk.		
Eliminate the un-programmed radios!	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	There are currently radios in the facility that are being used by staff that pose a huge threat to staff's safety. Some of the radios being used by staff do not show call signs in the Master Control radio cubicle. These radios are un-programmed. I have talked to other Master Control staff that told me there are numerous radios being used in the facility that do not show accurate call signs when the radio microphone is keyed. I'd suggest that radio checks be implemented at the beginning of each shift for ALL staff. This will let us know which radios are un-programmed so this problem can be eliminated.		

Concern/Suggestion	Facility	LSAC Status	Concern/Suggestion Description	LSAC or SSAC Comments	Local Resolution
Movement issues	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	When offenders leave their work area IE: anything past clean , for a call out, medical, school, counselor, whatever. That they need to stay in that area of their call out till open movement or if that's not possible return to their living unit until open movement and not return to work when that call out is done. Working my position as TR I work a lot of posts and I see this as becoming a real big safety and security issues where we have offenders just walking around when there is no movement going on... This is something that we can tighten down on at this level before it's too late and we have a big issue.		
Laundry carts have no way of being secured/enclosed	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	My suggestion is one that will in theory provide a higher level of security for this process and save the facility money in the long run. The current laundry carts have no way of being secured/enclosed. My idea for a solution involves these steps: 1. Modify existing carts to be fully enclosed and padlocked with a key that the unit staff would have access to OR 2. Build or purchase new carts with this ability (could be a project for maint. staff), 3. These carts would be loaded ONLY under the supervision of the Laundry Officer and a C.I. Staff member 4. The carts would then be brought up by the laundry offenders to be searched underneath by the Clean Room Officer. 5. The carts would be considered secure and ready for pickup by unit laundry offenders who would not have access to the contents inside. Carts should also be searched as they are brought in and unlocked by unit staff. This would ensure that each cart is searched twice before its contents reach the hands of offenders.		
Control - stop saying cease all movement	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Concern - Master control should stop saying cease all movement when an incident is occurring in the facility. This announcement is telling offenders that something is going on and is an open invite to hurt another inmate/staff or escape ect...	LSAC will discuss at next meeting	

Concern/Suggestion	Facility	LSAC Status	Concern/Suggestion Description	LSAC or SSAC Comments	Local Resolution
Enlarge privacy windows on several M Bldg Doors	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	The following doors have small privacy windows-M-102 (Grievance office), M-103 (Grievance office), M-126 (Classroom), M-126A (Classroom). Requesting that these doors be replaced with doors that have full sized windows for security/safety reasons.		
1st Shift Security Checks	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Require only one staff to perform outside perimeter security checks since two armed officers are also patrolling the outside perimeter. This will free up an R&M if an emergency occurs during this time, since 1st shift is very limited on staff. Also, rather than having an R&M officer go outside with unit staff for unit security checks, consider having that officer inside the unit with other staff, so the unit staff won't be left alone inside the unit.		
Medical callouts	WA Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Medical has offenders coming from all areas of the facility, the upper R units and the lower R units where we have many offenders housed separately due to gang issues. Large groups of offenders coming into medical for callouts without enough staff to monitor them is dangerous. Insulin Line is currently monitored by the booth officer who has other duties as well. Syringes have disappeared before due to this practice. I suggest that we slow the movement and be sure that the units are separated so there is less likelihood of fights.	This is a movement schedule issue & the local committee is currently addressing the this schedule. We are also looking at how we staff areas with large numbers of offenders such as medical.	
Offender restraints on table in the COU	WA Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Offenders who have mental health issues are very unpredictable. Currently they are placed in a restraint on the table for meetings with various staff. They have a lot of reach and could hurt someone. Suggest duplicating the table over at the IMU so that the offender has less reach and is more secure.	Work orders in place.	

Concern/Suggestion	Facility	LSAC Status	Concern/Suggestion Description	LSAC or SSAC Comments	Local Resolution
staff accountability	WA State Penitentiary	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	<p>Staff / visitor / volunteer Accountability Process</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Site Supervisors, Security managers will create a check in / checkout point for their area that accounts for staff assigned to them. For accountability, staff will have to be physically seen, to verify they have reported to their work station. 2. Once the staff member, Supervisor and Area Manager have been accounted for, a continuous log of activities should be created that identifies an approximate location of the staff person not in the bldg / area. <p>If the need arises to account for staff during an operational period:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Central Control will announce three times on the radio that all staff must report to their immediate supervisor for accountability. 2. Central Control will activate a facility-wide audible alarm which means that all staff, not in their assigned areas, must report back to their duty stations. For engineers only, if an engineer is in a location where telephone contact can be done, that engineer will check in by phone and be verified by another staff member that they are present. No single person self-reports will be accepted. 3. All Staff will be accounted for in 10 minutes from the sounding of the alarm. 4. Staff / visitor / volunteer not responding or not found will become a priority. All facility activity will stop. The focus of the facility will be to identify the location of the missing staff member. <p>Volunteers</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Any volunteer must first check-in at the West 	Developed as a group effort by local team. In review.	
Reflective window covering/Blinds in offices	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Taking the blinds down out of the OAS' offices and adding reflective window covering to the one window in each Sgt office. If this is done, you would have a clear view into both offices via the big window's and the small window in the Sgt office being covered would keep offenders from viewing documents on the desk or on the computer.		

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Lock Issue for 2-sided doors	WA Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Of the 4 staff in R-2 (Sgt,C/O,2-Counselor) only one has a 2-sided door lock (one that can be deadbolted from the inside or outside). I had staff "accidentally" lock me in my office and I had to call to have someone let me out. The same thing could happen if an offender got ahold of a set of keys. Also in case of a major disturbance, with a 2 sided lock I could lock myself in my office-so an offender would need more than a comb to get in. I will be submitting a work order for RK126 as when I was checking it out I realized that it takes a "CUS" key on the outside and an "H-5" on the inside.	We are going to access the facility to see if there are any other locks that cause similar issues and report back to the committee. We will put a work order in to the locksmith to change the locks.	
Improve the current staff accountability system to account for all staff	Clallam Bay Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Develop an Operational Procedure for accountability of all custody and support staff at any time. This would also be initiated for all Picture Counts.	Developed a new Operational Procedure - Staff Accountability / Picture Count, related to Policy 420.150 Counts	
Add MK4 and MK9 OC to Control Points 1, 2, and 3 for rapid check-out.	Clallam Bay Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	To allow for faster access to Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) during emergent situations, as directed by the Shift Commander.	Install lock boxes to hold OC, that can be secured by a plastic easily break away serial numbered seal located inside the control point booths.	
Cup holder for x ray machine	WA State Penitentiary	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Create a multiple cup holder so that cups people carry into the facility can be sent through the x ray machine	Will submit local work order	
MSC Fences in front of G/H entry.	Clallam Bay Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Wire ties on fencing accessible to offenders are made of metal that can easily be removed without tools and quickly fashioned into a weapon. Recommend the removal of all such ties and be replaced with a harder more durable metal that requires a mechanical device to remove them.	Removed the aluminum wire ties and replaced with steel wire ties.	

Concern/Suggestion	Facility	LSAC Status	Concern/Suggestion Description	LSAC or SSAC Comments	Local Resolution
Physical Offender Accountability	Monroe Correctional Complex	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	The suggestion is to create a system to track specifically where an Offender is at any given time. The system's purpose would be to locate offenders much faster than a picture card count. Examples are given by staff to use the call-outs to check offender's in-out of an area. Or to Collect ID cards and place them on a board and secure the board, then when it's time for the offenders to leave, pass out ID's. The idea behind this being that if an Offender is hiding in an area, the staff member will be able to look and see who hasn't collected their ID.		
DNR Check Out (2011.05.01)	Larch Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Security for DNR Foreman at checkout time. A clear escape route is needed, that is not blocked by inmates. Make a new podium for the DNR Foreman to stand at, which is located next to the exit door. UPDATE 8/17/11: DNR checkouts have been monitored and have greatly improved. CO presence is not always required, as whatever staff is there who holds a blue badge can take control of the situation and hold the inmate(s) accountable. One recent particular incident was a DNR Foreman's responsibility. DNR Dan Rock advised DNR Superintendent will address with the Foreman.		This concern is now closed, as per consensus of LCC SAC.
Radio issued to Medical Staff (2011.06.01)	Larch Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	PA was working outside of normal working hours, when her key got stuck in a lock. There was no way of calling for help or advising another staff member because there was no officer in the booth of the bldg, and no telephone accessible. She would have had to walked away from her keys and left the entire key ring unattended.	the committee agreed radios should be issued to all staff. CC2 Robinson volunteered to hold a non-custody radio operation/etiquette class (approx 10 mins) on demad as needed.UPDATE 8/17/11: Medical Dept has been issued one radio. The first staff arriving will receive the radio and the last staff to leave in the P.M. will return radio to control.	This concern is now closed, as per consensus of LCC SAC.

Concern/Suggestion	Facility	LSAC Status	Concern/Suggestion Description	LSAC or SSAC Comments	Local Resolution
Video Camera(s) in Kitchen (2011.07.01)	Larch Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Install video camera(s) outside/behind the kitchen to monitor inmates from the kitchens office. UPDATE 8/17/11: No cameras will be installed in the kitchen. Lt Greene advised Kitchen staff have been advised that a kitchen staff member will be present with the inmate(s) when the door is open. A kitchen staff as well as a CO will be present when any vehicle is loading/unloading from the kitchen.	It was agreed upon by all members that no cameras would be installed, as staff presence is needed instead of a camera. It was brought to the attention of the committee that an alarm was installed years ago. maint. will accompany Lt. Green to show where it is located and confirm if it is still operational.	This concern is now closed, as per consensus of LCC SAC.
Relocate AA and NA from Chapel to Education	Clallam Bay Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Consider moving evening volunteer programs to the Education floor.		
Evening Volunteer Programs	Clallam Bay Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Evaluate Evening Thursday - Friday programming security needs and hours of operation.		
Staff Lockers	Clallam Bay Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Relocate staff lockers from locker rooms to the front mezzanine at the Public Access entry. This would allow staff to remove unauthorized items before proceeding through Public Access.		
Issue a radio to medical staff	Clallam Bay Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Nursing staff need to have a way of hearing and transmitting communication when they are performing rounds in the units.		

Concern/Suggestion	Facility	LSAC Status	Concern/Suggestion Description	LSAC or SSAC Comments	Local Resolution
T bldg Security: Staff and offender accountability	Stafford Creek Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Security surrounding T bldg and offender accountability. Refer to attached T bldg Meeting Minutes dated July 28, 2011.	Staff and offender accountability within the bldg. T Blding staff capably addressed the issue for staff and offender accountability for the work area. As the mtg minutes reflect, access for offenders is clearly defined, to include emergent access needs. Additonally, procedure is clearly in place for staff responsibilities when an offender on call-out does not arrive as scheduled, and for staff accountability in the bldg.	
Visiting Room Tables	Monroe Correctional Complex	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	This concern addresses the lack of visibility in MCC's visiting rooms. The suggestion is to replace our visiting room tables with a clear plexi-glass or lexan table top with single column stands. This purpose of this is to be better able to hold offenders and visitors accountable to appropriate behavior, reduce introduction of contraband, and increase overall visibility for the staff monitoring the cameras.		
One Way Movements	Monroe Correctional Complex	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	This concern addresses one way movements at MCC. The suggestion is to have one way movements, going to and coming from. They also suggest specific movements, such as education movement, recreation movement, etc, and once an offender goes to yard/gym, they stay until recall. Another similiar suggestions is sending out movements specific to the area, and having one movement period for everyone to return.	This already is in effect on some shifts, at some facilities.	

Concern/Suggestion	Facility	LSAC Status	Concern/Suggestion Description	LSAC or SSAC Comments	Local Resolution
Review Religious Services	Monroe Correctional Complex	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	This concern addresses the Religious Services and suggests a vast reduction of the number of services. The suggestion specifically outlines having one in the morning, one in the afternoon, and one in the evening. Each service would be for a different group with a schedule. Only one religion would run a service at a time. They suggest it would allow closer observation of the offenders and would increase security.		
Pilot 20 SafetyNow Pal6 Personal Body Alarms at SCCC	Stafford Creek Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Pal6 Personal Body Alarms emit a 130db alarm when activated. Pilot the use for staff who do not carry radio for enhanced staff safety in the event of an urgent/emergent issue/concern.	LSA recommends purchase of 20 personal alarms for various staff who do not carry a radio to pilot. FR Submitted and approved. Facility expects receipt of the 20 alarms within a week. Pilot will be staff in T Bldg; Health Services; Education.	
Movement from Recreation Yards	Stafford Creek Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Review of recent offender fights exiting the yard shows both yards exiting for movement simultaneously. This provided opportunity for an offender from one Medium unit to enter the opposite yard to engage in a fight with an offender from another Medium unit. Further review via Violence Reduction efforts demonstrate fights occurring on the breezeway during movement from yard.	Committee notes a modification to existing movement from yards has been placed into practice.	
Thirty minute accountability checks for uniformed staff.	Stafford Creek Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	While SCCC has implemented the 30 minute staff accountability checks, the existing process is not consistent for all shifts, and radio traffic for reporting negatively impacts emergency radio traffic as reporting "steps over" emergency radio calls.	LSAC has designated a sub committee for review of existing SCCC procedure/practice for the thirty minute staff accountability check.	

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Radio Traffic	Clallam Bay Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Control 1 should use the phone to notify units of inmates returning from the visit room. this would cut down on radio traffic.	To be discussed at the next meeting.	R&M staff need to be advised when offenders are moving about the facility when not on the callout. The committee agreed movement should be controlled and a reminder email to all staff regarding proper radio communication and courtesy to cut down on unnecessary radio traffic.
Video camera's	Clallam Bay Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Install new video camera's and DVR to the G, H, I, and J units.		
30 minute check-in process	Clallam Bay Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Develop a process for 30 minute check-ins for the single man post.	Change in Post Orders	
Offender Call-out	Clallam Bay Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Ensure accountability in/out of program/work areas.		
Post Orders	Clallam Bay Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Update Post Orders for single person post regarding check-ins and the closing of post. Also identify post orders with zone check responsibilities.	Post Orders	
Responce and Movement Staff	Clallam Bay Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Expand zone of control regarding zone checks.	Post Orders changes	
Offender Volunteers	Clallam Bay Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Identify the need for offender volunteers versus workers.		
Evening Volunteer Programs	Clallam Bay Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Evaluate Evening Thursday-Friday programming security needs and hours of operation.		

Concern/Suggestion	Facility	LSAC Status	Concern/Suggestion Description	LSAC or SSAC Comments	Local Resolution
Radio Transmission	Clallam Bay Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Develop a procedure for follow-up regarding transmissions not being understood/identified.	To be added to the Post Orders, and/or Operational Memorandums	
Security Inspections	Clallam Bay Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Consider inspections/checks completed with two staff at all times.		
Radio Reception	Clallam Bay Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Finish update to improve radio reception/transmissions throughout the facility.		
Recreation Staffing	Clallam Bay Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Evaluate staffing for gym/yard.	Adjustments have been occurring to the determine the best practice for staff presense in the Recreation Department.	
Hobby Craft	Clallam Bay Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Relocate Hobby Craft issuance/distribution to Main Property.		
Radio Alarm Duress Response	Clallam Bay Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Develop a written process for response and testing.	Operational Memorandum	
Radio Antenna	Clallam Bay Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Staff are clipping their microphone to the antenna when turning them in after their shift ends.	Memo sent out on proper equipment handling.	
Area Duress Buttons	Clallam Bay Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Add more duress buttons in areas throughout the facility where there are one man posts and areas where staff do not have radios.	Assigned to Committee Member Faye Nicholas to review current duress alarm system in B Unit and research alternate duress alarm systems.	

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Courtyard Egress Door	Clallam Bay Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	The Court Yard egress door from MSC court yard to the main court yard is often held open by inmates entering and exiting the main court yard. door can be defeated and the area of containment would stretch from the MSC slider gate to the Steam Plant door down past the Control One booth. MCC and WCC have one way turnstiles that can be locked by a control pt. Is it structrually possible to have 2 turnstiles installed in place of the court yard door?	Sergeant K. Banner and Sergeant Mike Maines will research if the turnstile gate can fit in the location identified. Things to consider are the fire lane, and laundry and trash carts for passage through area.	
Upper Management Shadow Line Staff	Monroe Correctional Complex	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Make mandatory for ALL upper management starting from the Captain and above to shadow the Shift Lt. once per month on every shift. This is intended to provide a direct contact with the line staff and have a feel for the tone of the facility.		
The off-hook alarm phone	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	The off-hook alarm phone located in the Master Control Sergeant's cubicle currently does not show the full location and extension of a received call, unlike all of the other 'Avaya' brand phones located throughout the facility. The reason for this is that a message (**OFF HOOK**) is displayed before the location and extension of the incoming call. This extra wording cuts off this important information and leaves Control staff with an incomplete location of where an off-hook alarm is originating from and usually cuts off the numerical extension of the alarmed phone entirely.	This matter needs to be addressed ASAP.	
1st shift trash runs	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	1st shift should not be allowing offenders outback of the units for trash run because of low staffing levels. Trash runs can wait until 2nd shift when more staff are working.		
Put Handcuffs in all the transport/hospital bags	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Put handcuffs in all the transport/hospital bags. This will allow staff to restrain the offender to the bed if needed.		

Concern/Suggestion	Facility	LSAC Status	Concern/Suggestion Description	LSAC or SSAC Comments	Local Resolution
To address concerns the Unit Staff at TRU had expressed about late night offender porters and offender phone call privileges.	Monroe Correctional Complex	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	"Due to skeletal staffing levels on Shift 1 and an alarming trend of more offenders being put onto the late shift to complete the tasks that should be completed on the other shifts due to the confused priorities between programming (working) and recreation. Staff were concerned that any type of emergency response during the time when the offenders were out would compromise response times and the safety and security of the facility due to the time spent "yarding in" the offenders before they could respond."	inmate Shift 1 porter job description and duty changes	
Move the magazine rack and Kiosk in the education bldg	Mission Creek Corr. Cntr for Women	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	The current location of the magazine rack and kiosk are creating blind spots in the education bldg.	This issue was resolved by the Safety Officer, the magazine rack was moved and it was determined that the kiosk is in the best possible location.	The magazine rack was moved and after a walk through of the area, it was determined that the kiosk is located in the best possible place for staff visibility.
Unsecured tables and bookshelf	WA Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	evergreen man has unsecured tables in the dayrooms, main hall, and the bookshelf in GH dayroom. In the main hall are floor container plants . All of these items can be picked up by the inmates and used as a weapon against staff or other inmates. I am respectfully asking that the Security Advisory Committee seriously consider securing these items or removing them before they can be used as weapons against staff.		
Different colors for offender coveralls	WA Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Inmates in R6 should be not be in Gray Coveralls, they intermix at the Infirmary and Education bldg making it hard to distinguish whether they are from R6 or the Lower R Units, which are closed custody. You would have no ideal if one of them came to R6 to assault one of our offenders if they should be in the unit or not. It just seems they would be in a different color of coveralls.	Committee assigned staff to research different colors that are available and get cost.	

Concern/Suggestion	Facility	LSAC Status	Concern/Suggestion Description	LSAC or SSAC Comments	Local Resolution
Kitchen worker movement during mainline	WA Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Concerned about the amount of times the Gate Outside of B Side Dining Room is opened with upto 220 Inmates seated in B Side Dining During each mainline, and this does not account for the offenders on the walk ways usually up to two full units out at one time. Kitchen workers should be making it to work before mainline begins running. We open the gate multiple times, which distracts us from our main reason to be there, which is to observe the offenders in the dining room. This opens up the vulnerability of Garden Tools, 90 Day Ware House, maint. Dock, Greenhouse, and the back gate.	Movement schedule currently under reconstruction. The Movement subcommittee will meet with stakeholders to discuss the plan of how to get offenders to work on time. Key control is also under reconstruction. Limited keys will be issues to the gate in question as we replace old key rings with new ones.	
Securing Cedar Hall's front door	WA Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Permanently remove the metal latch blocks that are locked in place each day on the main door of Cedar Hall. Currently in order to secure the unit, staff must remove a pad lock, then remove the metal contraption, then shut the door. This makes it extremely difficult or even impossible to secure the foyer and/or isolate an incident.	We are working up a cost analysis for repair.	
Inmate Movement when Movement is Closed (2011.08.01)	Larch Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Call out times from all departments should only be when movement is allowed. All staff needs to be knowledgeable of the call out and movement rules. Some inmates may need escorting to or from outside of the scheduled movement times. Movement times are called on the intercom first so all inmates can hear, and then called on staff radios. CONCLUSION: When an inmate is required to move outside of scheduled movement times, the inmate will contact the closest staff member and verify via radio/telephone to the expecting department if inmate is indeed expected to arrive at said department. Only when confirmed will the inmate be allowed movement outside of scheduled movement times.	Superintendent Vernell requested Lt Greene advise Sergeants to address this at muster with all COs and to also advise the tier reps so that word can also be addressed to all inmates.	This concern is now closed, as per consensus of LCC SAC.

Concern/Suggestion	Facility	LSAC Status	Concern/Suggestion Description	LSAC or SSAC Comments	Local Resolution
Mainline Operations: Third Shift	Stafford Creek Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	To ensure supervisory coverage of mainline operations on Third Shift.	A suggested sneaule was submitted to committee reflecting Unit Sergeant support for supervisory coverage during Third Shift mainline. Committee has assigned to CUS for review/recommendations via Unit CUS's and Sergeants.	
self-defense/verbal tactics	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Non-custody staff should receive annual or bi-yearly training for self-defense/verbal tactics.	Unsure if this extra training would truly require much more staffing to make this a budget concern.	
Vehicle gate mirrors	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Purchase and install two security mirrors in the vehicle sally port. The mirrors are the same size as the ones already mounted on the sides of the gate house. The mirrors would allow the gate officer to look on top of the incoming and outgoing vehicles. One mirror should be mounted above the top right corner of gate #3 and above the top right corner of gate #7.		

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Ensure radios function properly/create email distribution lists	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	I believe this is a simple and effective way to improve officer safety without any additional cost and minimal effort on behalf of DOC. For about two months now, one of our radios in our unit has been cutting out making it extremely difficult to hear incoming traffic when it does come through. We have informed our supervisors of this on many occasions and yet it still cuts out, despite the efforts our supervisors have made. Officer equipment as we all know is one of the most important things when it comes to the safety and security among ourselves and our fellow co-workers, for it is one of the only tools we have to defend ourselves in an emergency situation, whether it's to hand cuff an offender to further prevent him from causing harm, Using your keys to unlock a door to get yourself out of harms way, or using your radio to notify/be informed of an emergency situation. One thing we can do to ensure officer safety is to create a separate email account for officer equipment such. A separate email account, this will allow officer equipment to be separated from other incoming work orders and become a priority task to whom it may concern.		
Install video cameras in the intake area	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	I recommend cameras be installed in the intake area, the only cameras there point at the doors, we have porters that work in that area without supervision. I also have an OA that works in that area with the offenders, along with Records coming down to do ID's and release paperwork for offenders.		

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Enforcing unit rules	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	There are general rules in place for the medium custody side of CRCC that were put in place on 7-1-11 and available for staff and offender viewing. As I have worked in all of the units now my concern is that some units are choosing to enforce certain rules and not others. This creates a great conflict when relief staff come in and attempt to follow the rules put in place for all of the units. Since I have begun working at DOC it has been ingrained in to my training that we must be "firm, fair and consistent". With out the rules being followed consistently we are missing on some of those core values. I really hope that staff can be made aware of the handbook put out on 7-1-11 and be held accountable for enforcing the rules contained with in it.		
Radios left in units	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	I have recently noticed Radios being left in Units when the position they are for is unfilled. This seems like a poor security practice to me. When these positions are vacant there should be accountability of all equipment at one central location. Yes I believe this would create more work at Minor Control or which ever location was chosen for this. However, these are sensitive items and should be under some kind of staff supervision when not in use		

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public access officer doing outer perimeter check	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	I was recently assigned as the officer at the Public Access desk. While assigned there I was told that I needed to conduct an outer perimeter check by myself. I do not understand why there is only one officer conducting an outer perimeter check when we have two R&M's conduct the inner. I believe that when this perimeter check is conducted the EOP officer is unassigned and could assist in conducting the check. I strongly believe it is very important for this to be a two person check when walking the fence line. The Post Orders for Public Access also do not contain any information about completing the outer perimeter check and appear to be incomplete. I was told about conducting this check by a facility perimeter officer.	check post orders	
Video cameras between M & L bldgs	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	While working as a relief officer I have had to work in Master Control a few times. I believe there is a lack of camera coverage for the exterior of M-Bldg. I have not found a designated camera that covers the area located between M & L Bldgs on the Minimum side. When minimum offenders are reporting to that bldg they leave camera coverage and can not be seen in between the bldgs. This is a major security concern. There is a camera located on the southwest corner of the bldg that can pan around and look at different areas but does not always stay assigned to the area between the bldgs		
Padlocks to the roll doors	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Add padlocks to the roll doors in the CI plant to prohibit offenders from exiting the bldg without being controlled or monitored.		
Use scanners in cellhouse entry-way	Monroe Correctional Complex	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Reintroduce the W2 and W3 unit entry scanner posts to improve custody presence and reduce contraband being introduced into the living units. The entry scanner officers also served as a deterrent for offenders, to prevent loitering or slow walking back into the units.		

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Review of staff utilization (expand WSRU 3rd flr Sgt. responsibilities)	Monroe Correctional Complex	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Reintroduce the Watch 3 Zone Sergeant, to be responsible for all areas outside of the livings units. Dayrooms, Yard, Gym, Chapel, Gate 7, Education, bldg 4, etc. The concern was determined by the committee, during a meeting, to expand this to reevaluate all staff and how they are utilized.		
New locks for lower R-Units	WA Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	The new locks in the lower R-Units greatly increase the response time for an emergency-- you must put your hand through the opening with the keys in the lock to remove the lock and then relock the lock to remove your keys before able to respond to the emergency	Staff will continue to train on the use of the new locks. They are there to prevent staff from leaving locks unlocked. Committee will continue assess.	
Windows	WA Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	The windows located in G-bldg in the barber shop and the property room are very large pieces of glass. This would seem like a large safety concern and all windows should be replaced with Lexan	Committee will consult with maint. about what it would take to change glass to lexan, with cost and time. After cost estimate Captain will meet with Superintendent and business office to discuss budget.	
Hospital Security	WA Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	There is an office used for offender medical files for offender physicals: and blood pressure in front of the hospital floor officers station that needs to be moved. The Booth Officers are not able to close the gate due to too much traffic by the DR's, PA's and nurse's going to get there files out that office. That area is too small for that much congestion.	The committee agrees that this office should be moved because the gate needs to be secured. This is a security issue and staff and offender safety concern. Sergeant Carson and Captain Wofford will discuss with medical.	

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Video cameras that can't be viewed by the booth officer at MSU	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	This is a potential safety issue due to not be able to monitor all camera covered areas at MSU by the booth officer. Master Control does have them available but it is a very rare occasion that any MSU cameras are monitored by them. I would like to suggest that the MSU booth is given another monitor that would allow us to monitor up to 16 additional cameras. There is one camera not listed that cannot be monitored, the old segregation has recently been remodeled and 2 cameras were added, only 1 is available for viewing.		
Officer desk in the minimum units (MI3)	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	The location of the officer's desk in the MIN Units creates many hazards for the staff as well as the offenders. The officer's desk sits just far enough out from under the upper tier that an officer sitting at their desk is out in the open with the tier above them. By placing the desk on the other side of the dayroom against the windows the upper tier would not be over the officers head and there would not be any opportunity for offenders to come up behind staff who are working at their desk. The current location of the desk creates many blind spots with in the dayroom. If the desk was moved over by the windows on the other side of the dayroom and raised a few feet you could see every cell, porter closet, laundry room, counselor offices, and restroom. There would also be a straight line of sight from one officer desk to the other one in the other pod. This would keep your partner in sight anytime they were are the desk. I hope that you consider this as an option to further improve my safety and all my partners.		

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Locking the weight deck during the yard times	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Awhile back we had been back and forth about locking the weight deck in the yard at MSC. The one major thing that was holding us back to do that was the locks. Now that the locks have been changed we have come with a proposal of locking the weight deck during the yard times. Now we know that there are no bathrooms, and we have proposed that during any movement times we would open the weight deck and give the offenders a chance to use the bathroom. I think it would control a lot of the traffic of inmates going in and out, or intimidating other offenders of getting out the weight deck when it's not their turn.		
Replacing Radio Batteries	WA Corr. Cntr for Women	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Radio (HT 1000) batteries should provide the user an audible indicator allowing enough time to obtain and replace the battery before it becomes depleted. Currently batteries have no such indicator, and the user only becomes aware when they attempt to transmit and are unable to do so.	Currently being addressed by IT maint. via reprogramming of radios ***Pending Process*** Captain Green discussed radio reprogramming status with Lou Murkowski (IT maint.) 1 on 1. Lou will provide a synopsis status report to Captain Green by 08/24/11.	
Replace Phone in Control	WA Corr. Cntr for Women	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	The emergency phone in Control is a rotary dial phone. When someone dials extension 222 it goes directly to this phone. The phone does not have a read-out of where the call is coming from. There are occasions when this phone rings once or twice and then stops or there is no one on the line. There is no way to tell where the call came from. Can we check to see if a modern caller I.D type of phone will work as this power-fail phone? We should check on the areas that call 222 and then hang-up.	See if phone can lock on to the number that called. If not get caller I.D phone installed get with IT maint.. ***Pending Process*** Captain Green discussed with IT maint. (Lou Murkowski) 1 on 1 concern regarding the phone in Control. Lou will email Captain back upon completion of request discussed.	

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Issuing Offender items from RDC	WA Corr. Cntr for Women	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	To assist with living units it would be helpful for RDC staff to issue RDC offenders a pillow, lock and a third blanket which would be added to their property matrix. This will alleviate having to issue them a lock and pillow when they travel from unit to unit. It would be a one-time issue and trade out with property as necessary except for the third blanket	This security suggestion/concern request was returned to CO Cooper to submit through chain of command as request to Cause Change. ***Request Submittal Change*** Local Security Advisory Committee reviewed & concluded that request be submitted on a "Request for Cause Change" form and routed through CO's chain of command.	
MSU Podium	WA Corr. Cntr for Women	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Move the Officers podiums back towards the back of the dayrooms in MSU.	Return to Officer to provide additional detail addressing concern in regards to suggestion.	
Staff not utilizing radios assigned to them	WA Corr. Cntr for Women	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	I am concerned that all staff assigned a radio and call sign do not always wear or take their radios with them when they are out of their office. I suggest that anyone, custody or non-custody, assigned a radio have it with them at all times while working at the institution.	Captain Green will alert supervisors of the necessity for staff to carry issued radios at all times.	

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MI Campus -- Horticulture Shrubbery Removal	WA Corr. Cntr for Women	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	The planting of shrubbery, plants & trees within the confines of the Main Institution by the Horticulture program has severely impeded/obstructed the direct line of sight of staff and offender's on the main walkways causing a high safety risks & security concerns. There remains a high probability of lag time in Officer response in assisting staff or offender being injured/assaulted specifically due to the lack of clear visibility.	Captain Green will send an email to Horticulture addressing security concerns and get together with Shift to discuss their concerns ***Pending Process*** Captain Green discussed with Horticulture Ed Tharp 1 on 1 the concern & request that the shrubbery be cut down for clear walkway visual. Horticulture Ed Tharp will report back to Captain Green upon completion of this request.	
Offender move from unit to unit	WA Corr. Cntr for Women	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Please consider setting one day/time a week that offenders are scheduled to move from unit to unit and from unit bed to unit bed. This would allow the units to be more prepared to receive new offenders, take the constant burden of having Control continually updating the facility movement sheet and having Records update OMNI daily and the support counselors who have to manage new offenders being processed in and out of their units.	***Request Submittal Change***Request return to CO Cooper to submit on a Request to Cause Change form and route through the chain of command.	
Discontinue Perimeter staff exiting their vehicles	WA Corr. Cntr for Women	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Discontinue the current requirement for armed perimeter staff to exit their vehicle and perform an hourly safety check at the mail room on 2nd shift. After 0800, offenders are present in all the surrounding areas of the mail room. This requirement, significantly diminishes the safety of all persons within that bldg, surrounding vicinity due to armed staff and offender traffic in that area.	Request submitted discussed/reviewed & concluded that Captain Green discontinued on 08/17/11 upon becoming aware of this practice.	Captain Green discontinued on 08/17/11 upon becoming aware of this practice.

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Fence behind F bldg	WA Corr. Cntr for Women	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Walkway leading behind F bldg needs a fence. Area unsecured all the way to back of bldg where there is approximately a 10ft fence with no concertina wire on top that an offender could climb over and be on the MI Inner Perimeter without staff being able to see them. There is a section of fence attached closest to the sidewalk that could be disconnected from the ground and possibly swung around and attached to side of F bldg which would cut off access to the walkway and cutoff access for offenders to get behind F bldg.	Reviewed by local committee, concluded that Lt. Jones coordinate assessment, complete work order and follow up with maint. for completion	
MSU CLEAN ROOM PROPOSAL	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	The current standard for inmate movement at WSC through the Mud Room is as follows; Inmates enter from units Sage and Camas, they then precede to the dress-out area. At that location they receive a Badge for Off-Site work crews or simply move through to the CI areas or Automotive bldg. PROBLEM: Inmates exiting the inner perimeter or facility pose some exposure to the introduction of contraband upon their return to the inner perimeter of the facility. At today's standard we require two to three staff to manage the exit process and three to four to manage the re-entry of inmates due to necessary Strip Searches and or Pat Searches. This consumes a great deal of time for the many staff and tie's up most of the staff used for other inmate movement, leaving all other inmates un-observed for this period of time. Inmates wear the same clothing to and from their work and training areas outside the inner perimeter, i.e. the fenced salle porte at the back of CI and in front of automotive. This allows inmates to have time to conceal contraband in the clothing and especially in the winter when heavy coats are common. We propose the following as a measure to reduce the introduction of contraband and increase efficiency of		

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Counting procedures in the Food Factory	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Check the counting procedures in the Food Factory i.e. When a truck pulls in, say from AHCC, the product is off loaded then whatever our Food Factory has made is then on loaded. The doors are locked, the truck pulls forward then a count is done. My concern is that right now only one officer is counting. I'm suggesting that there be two officers counting to eliminate the possibilities of a staff being compromised and an escape occurring.		
Seals on cable plates	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	The idea I was bringing to you was about putting a piece of seal tape on the cable outlet plates in the inmate cells. The inmates take these plates off and hide contraband in them, and it is hard to detect without taking the panel off. What I was thinking is we can take the shiny seal tape and put it on the cable plate. This way if the seal gets removed, it should tear or lose the shiny bit on it, and if it is cut then that would be pretty obvious. We would be able to easily and quickly check what is honestly a great hiding spot, because as it is right now, this hiding spot is not feasibly accessible to us during a routine cell search.		
Too many staff are being sent to training at one time	Mission Creek Corr. Cntr for Women	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Too many staff from the same shift are being sent to training on the same day, causing staff shortages.	Lt. Scarr will review training schedules with the training manager, George Gasson	After reveiwing the process, MCCCW determined that by partnering with WCC for some of our in-service needs, in addition to working with WCCW, creating a larger time frame to complete in-service and allowing our training manager to send fewer staff at one time, lessening the impact on shift operations.

Concern/Suggestion	Facility	LSAC Status	Concern/Suggestion Description	LSAC or SSAC Comments	Local Resolution
S bldg entry	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	My concern is in regards to the S bldg staff entry point. What if a staff members ID/Prox card was taken by force. That person could gain entry into the facility since the neither entry door does not have a C/O posted in that area and take hostages so there demands are met. The superintendents office is in that bldg with a prox card entry as well as many other staff. The reason that I wonder about security checks is that if a staff member is assaulted (body hidden in restroom shower or other area not regularly checked or frequented) or injured how long would it be before they were discovered?		
Key Suggestion	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	I believe there are several issues pertaining to the unit issued custody keys. First of all, I believe that at the very minimum one custody staff should be issued a key to operate unit sliders. I have been involved in more than one emergency situation at CRCC where responding staff were held on the opposite side of the unit entrance unable to respond to the situation do to sliders not being opened by control. Both situations, unit staff had already restrained the inmate and escorted him to the front slider before responding staff were afforded access. This would also give us a more efficient means to isolate and contain a unit when the need be in the case that control is preoccupied with another emergency. Currently unit custody staff are not issued keys to counselor, OA, or CUS offices. There is always the possibility of an offender gaining control of these keys and securing a room with only them and the staff member inside. We are issued one Schlage key for the Sgt.'s office and one for general purpose rooms. I believe that these keys should be common with one another allowing us to reduce the amount of keys on our ring. Also if the suggestion above concerning counselors offices was to be implemented, then that key as well could be common to the two previously mentioned. The less keys to maintain and shuffle through the safer it is for us as correctional staff in an emergency situation. To go even further with this idea, the cell master key		

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Unit Designation Sticker	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	<p>Myself and many staff are consistently finding inmates in out of bounds areas. They are crossing pods, double traying at mainline, etc.. I believe I have a suggestion that would provide a simple solution. Currently we are issuing an ID sticker with the unit letter designation on it. Since each unit is already designated with an assigned color, we could utilize the color of the sticker alone to identify the unit each offender lives in. At this point you can use a black sharpie marker to color in either the upper or lower half of the sticker which would designate their corresponding tier. In the remaining half that has not been colored you then write the letter of their assigned pod, "A" or "B". If we were able to implement this throughout the facility, we would be able to address many issues that are associated with offenders being in an area in which they are not authorized. With a sticker system that can identify the inmates assigned pod, and tier it will be easy for unit officers and relief staff especially, to identify whether an inmate is in an authorized location or not. Although my suggestion with the sticker does not</p>		
Cuff keys	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	<p>I would like to suggest to include a cuff key on all key rings that are issued to staff with wrist restraints like living units. The problem with not having one is that it is imposible to perform a proper functions test on your issued restraints without one and I don't think I need to tell you just how quickly an offender can become "spun up" and actively resistant sometimes, even dangerously if the wrist restrains don't function right or don't come off after arriving at SEG. It's happened and staff as well as the offenders have been injured in the past at other older facilities when this happens.</p>		
extra radio(s) for medical staff	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	<p>Extra radio(s) available for numerous medical staff to use when going out in to the facility (MH staff goes to units/Seg, Medical staff goes to Seg, as well as medical office assistants going to the units, etc). Could be one specific radio with a sign out sheet for staff to "check-out" when they leave out in to the facility with it. Kept at officer station maybe?</p>		

Concern/Suggestion	Facility	LSAC Status	Concern/Suggestion Description	LSAC or SSAC Comments	Local Resolution
unit toilet paper	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	<p>The current procedure to restock MI3 inmate toilet paper is a serious safety/security issue. We as staff are required to accompany the unit porters to each bathroom and then enter each stall (16 total) to unlock the dispensers. This is a very vulnerable position that we as staff are required to be in every day, sometimes more than once. There are indeed multiple blind spots overseeing this area, furthermore making this an unsafe practice. This would be a very opportune time for an inmate to take advantage of any staff member. I would like to propose a couple alternative methods to remedy this situation. 1. Provide the inmates the opportunity to retain their own rolls within their housing assignments and provide a one for one exchange period at a set time throughout the week. 2. Convert dispensers to a tamper resistant locking dispenser. I believe that this method, although it would incur an initial expensive, would be the overall safest and most efficient way of performing this task. This way will also allow us as staff to monitor the amount of product that is distributed and in the long run will allow cost to remain at a minimum.</p>		
Line staff feel they are overstretched	Mission Creek Corr. Cntr for Women	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	<p>Custody staff have expressed that there is too much activity going on during 2nd and 3rd shift that distracts them from their regular duties not allowing them to properly keep up on essential security function such as security inspections and searches. Examples cited, include special events, non-emergent transports, and unbalanced work loads</p>	<p>Despite fewer staff, workloads and expectations have not decreased, increasing the workloads of all staff, including management.</p>	<p>Clarification from the superintendent regarding supervision of special events was put out, relieving some of the pressure from shift staff. Staff volunteer's will conduct most tasks to coordinate events, ensuring minimal resources are drawn from shift. Post orders and work loads for shift staff will be reviewed on an on-going basis to ensure work is distributed evenly and continuously seek process improvement.</p>

Concern/Suggestion	Facility	LSAC Status	Concern/Suggestion Description	LSAC or SSAC Comments	Local Resolution
Improve communication for transports	Mission Creek Corr. Cntr for Women	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Non-custody unit staff have requested improved communication with custody staff regarding transports. This will allow non-custody staff the opportunity to assist unit custody staff in preparing offenders for transports safely		Shift sergeants will notify unit officers at muster of the request by non-custody personnel to be notified so they can assist.
Mail processing has become over taxing for one person	Mission Creek Corr. Cntr for Women	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	MCCCW has one person to work the mailroom, the current process is overwhelming for one person and is causing problems with getting mail processed timely and properly.	Sgt. Newsom is developing a proposal	Sgt. Newsom has developed a comprehensive proposal for moving the mail room to more secure location with more work space, developing an ergonomic work station, eliminating non-mail related workloads from this post and utilizing available resources on 1st shift to better assist with part of the mail process. The MCCCW Exex team has review this process, developed a CAP and is working to implement most of the proposed suggestions.
Not all "tools" are being accounted for in the kitchen	Mission Creek Corr. Cntr for Women	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Some "tools" (utensils) are not being inventoried. AC staff expressed that these are items that are inventoried at WCCW and believe they should be inventoried here.		Lt. Scarr discussed this with the Food manager. All items that need to be inventoried are being inventoried.
Volunteers are bringing in laptops unauthorized	Mission Creek Corr. Cntr for Women	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	There have been occasions when volunteers bring in laptops and other equipment without prior approval. When they are told they can't bring it in, executive staff allow an exception.		Discussed with exec team who agreed that all equipment needs to be approved through proper channels and last minute requests should be denied.
Cuff ports are needed in the SHU	Mission Creek Corr. Cntr for Women	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	There are no cuff ports for two of the cells in the SHU.	This issue is known by administration and maint.. There has been research done to try to fix this, we are currently waiting to here back from maint. staff if there are any doors from MICC that would work here.	Due to cost, This issue is still unresolved

Concern/Suggestion	Facility	LSAC Status	Concern/Suggestion Description	LSAC or SSAC Comments	Local Resolution
Is the A/B conference room phone secured?	Mission Creek Corr. Cntr for Women	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	A question was raised regarding the telephone in the A/B conference room. the room is used by offenders and it is uncertain if the phone is secured and/or if it has an outside line.	Joel will follow up and report back at the next LSAC Meeting	
MSC staff on Graveyard Shift	Clallam Bay Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	MSC staff on Graveyard Shift are Especially Vulnerable for Something Bad to Possibly Happen, Especially while doing their Tier Checks! Suggestion: One or Two Extra Staff Would Be A Real Plus! By Just Locking Down the Units, during Tier Checks, Could Limit the Potential for Something Bad to Happen.	Sergeant McHaffie is tasked to interview MSC staff for the feasibility of the locking down of the unit during tier checks on first shift. This would be an option for staff to utilize by their choice, not a mandatory requirement for tier checks.	
Personal car keys in Public Access Drawer	Clallam Bay Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Staff leaving personal car keys in Public Access Drawer	A Memo Reminder to staff.	
Pink ID Cards	Clallam Bay Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Staff issued pink i.d. cards walking around without escort.	A memo about Identification Card Procedures.	
Telephone Emergency Alarm	Clallam Bay Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Some of the phones are real quick to activate the emergency alarm in Com Center when left off the hook and some phones take a minute or more to activate the alarm system. Request a time response of all phones to activate emergency alarm system in Com Center.	Communications Center will run a test on all landline phones to get a time on when the alert happens.	
Cameras in gym	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Issue: limited amount of camera's in the gym. There are three area's that I feel are of concern, in the order of their severity: The pool table room , mini gym next to the pool room, the equipment room inside the gym. I am not sure if anything can be done about these area's, but it seems that allowing offenders free reign over pool sticks and gym equipment could become a possible security issue.		
Rearview mirrors	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Add large rearview mirrors in blindspots in the units.		

Concern/Suggestion	Facility	LSAC Status	Concern/Suggestion Description	LSAC or SSAC Comments	Local Resolution
Road signs	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Road Sign (similar to the one in dining hall) with top 10 C unit rules that reinforce better behaviors. 6 ft. x 3 ft		
Whistles	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	Provide whistles to unit officers, it will help with ER getting inmates to yard in.		
Intake teams	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	It was reported that an area of potential violence is during intakes. I recommend that we have intakes teams that receive specialized training, similar to SEG staff. This would help with staff all being on the same page and make the procedure run smoothly		
Blind spots in MI3 units	Coyote Ridge Corr. Cntr	This is a facility matter and may be resolved with available resources.	In the MI3 Units of CRCC we have 4 man cells as I am sure you are aware. The security concern I see with these cells are the offender bunks are located on the same wall as the door to the cell, thus causing a large blind spot in the cell right over all four bunks. During count there has been some problems with the offenders concealed within these blind spots and thus far the answer has been to open the door and check to see if the offender assigned to the bunk is present if there is no response after knocking. This practice could place staff in a routinely dangerous position when exposing ourselves to these blind spots every count. This has been looked in to here at CRCC and it was determined moving the bunks to the back wall of the cell would be too cost intensive. I however would like to have this matter looked into once again and see if there would be a more effective way of doing this with perhaps an offender work crew.		

Concern/Suggestion	Facility	LSAC Status	Concern/Suggestion Description	LSAC or SSAC Comments	Local Resolution
PA System	WA Corr. Center for Women	May have statewide impact - Referring to SSAC	<p>Upgrade process and equipment for the ability to have one person broadcast critical announcements to offenders without having unit staff/program staff repeat the same announcement. Currently the announcements made by Control are received over the radio and out in the yards only. Other announcements made by staff need to be repeated in the units by unit staff and again out in the yards. Our intercom PA system throughout the living units/programs areas are very dated and antiquated and do not meet the needs of the facility or its staff. Most of these announcements are critical to the safety and security of the facility as shown below: Counts in progress; blood sugars to the clinic; sick call; dental sick call; recall; mainline; medline; first and second movement; program cancellations; restricted movements; cease movements; calling offenders for other appointments not on the callout. It is very difficult especially during normal working hours to perform all the normal duties of a unit officer. If it was possible to cut down on repeating every announcement it would allow the custody to get out of the office and show more of an active presence and manage the needs of the unit.</p>	Statewide Committee: Several staff from other facilities reported there were ways to utilize the phone system.	
Design of the units	WA Corr. Center for Women	May have statewide impact - Referring to SSAC	<p>Due to the design of the units on the hill there are many blinds spots. Mirrors are not effective especially on single post units. Cameras are already placed in each wing and hallway it would be very practical, safety effective to have monitors placed in the staff office so custody staff can monitor wings/halls, same as the shift office.</p>	Forwarded to statewide committee due to additional funding needs.	

Concern/Suggestion	Facility	LSAC Status	Concern/Suggestion Description	LSAC or SSAC Comments	Local Resolution
Man the operation booths in Medium units for 2nd and 3rd shifts	Coyote Ridge Corr. Center	May have statewide impact - Referring to SSAC	We have the operation booths in all four of our medium units here at CRCC. Preferably, we would like to request that 2nd shift and 3rd shift utilize these booths. This would mean each medium unit would receive 1 additional officer on 2nd shift. Officers in the booths have the high ground to oversee the unit. They have an extra set of eyes to monitor both pods more effectively. They would have the capabilities to lockdown the unit much quicker when an incident arises and control the unit pod sliders to eliminate pod crossing. Officers will have the ability to monitor offenders with the video cameras; thus, ensuring staff and inmates are safer. Officers can also eavesdrop on cells to gain valuable insight into upcoming plans and current unit issues to thwart their attempts to reduce safety in the facility.	Statewide Committee: committee thought this would apply to all medium units. Consensus to move forward with request.	
Tasers	Coyote Ridge Corr. Center	May have statewide impact - Referring to SSAC	These devices, when deployed properly, cause the offender to become incapacitated and unable to control their muscular system in the affected area. This gives staff several benefits: 1) Gives distance in situations where staff may be vulnerable to attack; 2) Allows staff to utilize a tool to control an offender rather than having to resort on hands on tactics, thus reducing the likelihood of staff and offender injury; 3) Can be used as a deterrent to avoid having to use force; 4) No decontaminating necessary. The biggest benefit would be being able to deploy the device rather than going hands on. I am suggesting the Taser as a Correctional tool available to response and movement officers and sergeants (shift and all units). Other thoughts/facts - Devices can have a tether option which will render the device useless if the tether becomes disconnected. These devices can be equipment with cameras if this is a concern, which records each discharge for video review. Just as with Firearms, staff will be taught its justified use on the Use of Force Continuum. Having tools to reduce staff injury should supersede cost issues!	Statewide Committee: this request was not in the top five requests for funding. One comment was that this could be revisited after the pilot on pepper spray was completed.	

Concern/Suggestion	Facility	LSAC Status	Concern/Suggestion Description	LSAC or SSAC Comments	Local Resolution
Video surveillance proposal	Airway Heights Corr. Center	May have statewide impact - Referring to SSAC	<p>Currently AHCC has 91 operational cameras, 55 of which are inside our perimeter. 57% of these cameras are used to operate doors and sliders though out the institution (30 cameras). Leaving only 23 cameras to monitor activities inside the institution! To give you an idea of how inadequate this is CRCC has over 400 operational cameras in its facility! To look at it another way AHCC has approximately 37 Inmates for every 1 camera, CRCC has approximately 6 Inmates for every 1 camera and with only an additional 200 Inmate capacity. Considering the day and age we are in this is unthinkable that we are so under monitored, there are more security cameras in Wal-Mart than in this facility. Not to mention the technology currently being utilized is out dated (i.e. lines of resolution, tilt/pan option, recording length, and monitoring ability just to name a few). My proposal is to drastically upgrade our video surveillance system though out the facility. Adding cameras/additional cameras to the following areas; kitchen, H-bldg, G-bldg, RAC, B-bldg, D-5, J-bldgs, Yards, court yards, Minimum units, and vehicle sally port. As well as creating an additional post in Master Control who's primary responsibility is to monitor</p>	Statewide Committee: Need to wait for consultant's report to be completed.	
Movement control officer	Coyote Ridge Corr. Center	May have statewide impact - Referring to SSAC	<p>CRCC would benefit from having a movement control officer. This would take the burden off master control and make it safer for everyone in the institution. Additionally, this officer would have a better idea of how movement should be ran.</p>	Statewide Committee: Consensus to move forward with request.	

Concern/Suggestion	Facility	LSAC Status	Concern/Suggestion Description	LSAC or SSAC Comments	Local Resolution
Add extra gate by cleanroom	Coyote Ridge Corr. Center	May have statewide impact - Referring to SSAC	The chain link gate next to the Clean Room (G-56) is the only thing separating the inmates from the door that leads out of the Clean Room to the living units. It wouldn't be difficult to wait until the officer is inside processing out other offenders to pass something through the chain link fence and pick it up after being processed. I would like to be able to isolate inmates from this area in order to limit the ability to do something like this without increasing the staffing level for the area or pulling away other staff from their zones of control. One solution may be to put another gate in front of G-56 that would be up as close to the exit door as possible. This would create a buffer zone and make it extremely difficult to retrieve anything or even to make an attempt to move contraband.	Statewide Committee: No consensus to move forward. Some Members felt that this could be taken care of at the local level.	
Offender Jackets	WA Corr. Center	May have statewide impact - Referring to SSAC	The WCC committee suggests the offender coats issued in the Pic-a-Pac bags be made of a single ply cloth (have no lining) and have no pockets to cut down on movement of contraband in all institutions.	CI has been asked to review this proposal	
PCO Staffing	Cedar Creek Corr. Center	May have statewide impact - Referring to SSAC	Cedar Creek Corrections Center's first shift staff safety is jeopardized by lack of an officer within the PCO (Perimeter Control Office) to hear a duress alert when a body alarm is activated by staff. On second or third shift when a duress alarm is pushed by a staff member, an alert will come through to the PCO Office. The PCO Officer will then announce that there is a staff member in duress. On first shift Cedar Creek Corrections Center does not have the PCO staffed, which puts all of our first shift staff in danger as they do not have anyone to hear/respond to their duress alarm if needed.	Statewide Committee: Consensus to move forward with request.	

Concern/Suggestion	Facility	LSAC Status	Concern/Suggestion Description	LSAC or SSAC Comments	Local Resolution
Cascade/Shu Staffing	Cedar Creek Corr. Center	May have statewide impact - Referring to SSAC	Cascade unit currently houses 238 offenders and the SHU (Secured Housing Unit) averages 4 offenders with a maximum capacity of 8. This is managed by 2 officers. Any movement within the SHU requires 2 officers at all times. This doesn't allow any staff presence for the remaining 238 offenders. An additional officer position is needed to remain in compliance with DOC policy/OM (Operational Memorandum) in managing the SHU and the rest of the living unit.	Statewide Committee: this request was not in the top five requests for funding.	
To gain one hundred percent radio communication and have accountability of staff during the 2nd and 5th hour of their scheduled work day, so available Officer can respond to emergency that are broadcast over the radio during. This will enhance the safety	WA State Penitentiary	May have statewide impact - Referring to SSAC	<p>current process is that R & M Officer respond to an emergency with the facility of WSP. Each R & M Officer that is based on First shift helps with counting procedures and assists with Officers break period. There are currently six R & M Officers within the institution; two Officers for the East Complex and four for the West Complex. During the 2nd and 5th hour of scheduled work these Officers are relieving other Unit Officers or Officers who are assigned to a Control Booth for their regular schedule breaks. Officers who go on break do not have to wear a radio and can even leave the facility. If an emergency happens within this time structure staff response can be very limited and only resulting to one Unit Officer and the Shift Sgt. and or the Unit 4 Sgt., depending on the location. During this time frame it's almost essential to call a phase two response and that limits every other Unit/Post within the facility.</p> <p>Suggestion would be to make it mandatory for all Officers to wear a radio during their regular scheduled work period, whether you're on break or not. To make this mandatory our Union contract must be changed. The contract already has adjustments and amendments for staff that have an interrupted break period. This section of contract can be handled to cover all staff.</p> <p>A solution to this would be to have every Officer who works an 8 ½ scheduled work day be compensated a ½ hour of standby pay during their break period. During this time they must wear a radio, cuff and key and be able to respond during any emergency during</p>	Contract issue that can not be handled locally.	

Concern/Suggestion	Facility	LSAC Status	Concern/Suggestion Description	LSAC or SSAC Comments	Local Resolution
Extra staff in hospital	WA State Penitentiary	May have statewide impact - Referring to SSAC	We need an extra officer to be placed in the OPC. The current officers have to rotate out of the unit leaving only the booth officer for breaks as well as there is no officer on the mental health K tier. Throughout the institution we have more cameras but they do little but document when you are being assaulted	Statewide Committee: Consensus to move forward with request.	
Communication/Safety Concern	Olympic Corr. Center	May have statewide impact - Referring to SSAC	At MI2 facilities, there are no dedicated FTE's which which to monitor radio consoles for body alarm alerts. There is consensus from CCCC, LCC, MCCCW, and OCC Superintendent's to request a custody FTE be assigned to each facility for 1st assignment to monitor radio communications and body alarm alerts. This request is in alignment with the Prison Safety Bill for enhanced technology for body alarm and response capabilities.	Statewide Committee: Consensus to move forward with request.	
SHU Handcuff Key (2011.06.02)	Larch Corr. Center	May have statewide impact - Referring to SSAC	when a CO is placing inmate into a holding cell a separate had cuff key is being requested to be placed in the SHU key box. UPDATE: Sgt Miller had been researching and trying to locate the same hand cuff key currently used by LCC. A SISR is being completed, an order for 20 additional hand cuff keys will be given to the warehouse. Two of these new keys will be placed into the SHU key box, and the remainder will be accounted for in the Armory. UPDATE 8/12/11: Asked Sgt Miller is he had ever in fact ordered the hand cuff keys as described in previous update, he advised he never ordered the keys. UPDATE 8/17/11: Lt Greene advised 12 long hand cuff keys have been ordered. Two (2) will be placed in SHU lock box the remainder will be property to the Armory.		
			This concern is now closed, as per consensus of LCC SAC.	Taken care of at the local level.	
Custody FTE to Monitor Shift 1 Communications and Body Alarm alerts	Larch Corr. Center	May have statewide impact - Referring to SSAC	Custody FTE to monitor shift 1 communications and body alarm alerts	Statewide Committee: Consensus to move forward with request.	

Concern/Suggestion	Facility	LSAC Status	Concern/Suggestion Description	LSAC or SSAC Comments	Local Resolution
Staff Carrying OC	WA Corr. Center	May have statewide impact - Referring to SSAC	Let all uniformed staff including officers carry OC to prevent and stop staff injuries. This would protect staff and reduce L&I claims due to the injuries. Currently it is too hard to get to the locations where OC is stored and to get it authorized for use.	Statewide committee: Wait until completion of pilot.	
Accounting for Staff-computerized/bar code	Monroe Correctional Complex	May have statewide impact - Referring to SSAC	This concern suggests the use of a bar code reading system, utilizing a computer at control points, checking staff in/out of the facility. The suggestion submitted goes on to describe that all staff already have a bar code on their ID's, and that the union has already agreed with this type of device as long as it is not used for time keeping or attendance issues.	Statewide committee: Wait until completion of pilot.	
Policy 340.000; Escorted Leave and Furlough for Offenders	Stafford Creek Corr. Center	May have statewide impact - Referring to SSAC	Concern/Suggestion: Sending escorting staff to private residences increases the potential of placing staff in harms way. Staff are not assured of who is in the private residence, who will be present, weapons in the home, location of residence etc. Committee suggests removal of the policy language and simply state that attendance at a private residence is not allowed.	Statewide committee agreed that the policy needs to be updated to not allow deathbed/funeral visits to private residences. Move forward with policy change.	
Implement quarterly staff vehicle searches	Monroe Correctional Complex	May have statewide impact - Referring to SSAC	Checking staff and their vehicles quarterly. This concern suggests using specialty teams to search staff vehicles once a quarter. It is specific in saying these searches should be random and even the specialty teams should be unaware of the searches until they arrive to work that day. Within this concern, they express the want for a place to secure staff weapons, as they feel having firearms in staff vehicles also creates a safety hazard.	Statewide Committee: No consensus to move forward. Some Members felt that this could be done currently at the local level.	
CCU Officer Staffing	WA Corr. Center for Women	May have statewide impact - Referring to SSAC	At WCCW we have 2 floor officers and one booth officer at our Close Custody Unit. Having three floor officers would provide more safety and security to the close custody unit. It would allow one officer to monitor the foyer and also pat search the offenders going in and out of the unit. It would also allow the other two officers to stay in the individual pods to monitor the unit at all times.	Statewide Committee: No consensus to move forward. Some Members felt that this should move through the normal requests for staffing, per the staffing model.	

Concern/Suggestion	Facility	LSAC Status	Concern/Suggestion Description	LSAC or SSAC Comments	Local Resolution
MSC monitor in CO office	WA Corr. Center for Women	May have statewide impact - Referring to SSAC	Due to the configuration of the MSC living units that are designed in a "H" shape it is a challenge to monitor the halls except for literally walking up and down each wing this is before and after hourly safety checks. Obviously a one staff post or even 2 staff posts cannot be in 4 places at once. Currently there are cameras installed in each wing and a monitor is located in the Shift Commander's office. This monitor is used to view video after an incident/accident has occurred rather than have the unit officer monitor the wings to deter incidents from happening. Unit staff are required to do an array of administrative paperwork throughout the day which sometimes keeps them in the office. This would be very helpful to Shift 1 and Shift 2 who are alone in the unit processing this paperwork that is vital to keeping the unit running smoothly and still have an eye on the wings.	Statewide Committee suggested cost of an additional monitor could be purchased at the local level.	
Reconcile Offender Pass	WA Corr. Center for Women	May have statewide impact - Referring to SSAC	Per DOC 420.155 Callout Systems: Non-scheduled movement should be kept to a minimum. Processes will be established to handle all non-schedule movement. The current DOC 20-062 Offender Pass does not meet the current needs of offender accountability allowing offenders to move to any location with no reconciliation of issued passes.	Statewide Committee: No consensus to move forward. Some Members felt that current pass worked well.	

Concern/Suggestion	Facility	LSAC Status	Concern/Suggestion Description	LSAC or SSAC Comments	Local Resolution
Custody Staff Float between MSC Units	WA Corr. Center for Women	May have statewide impact - Referring to SSAC	Please consider having another custody staff member for each unit or at least a float they can run between J,K,L Monday through Friday excluding holidays Shift 2. This could assist in the units and the overwhelming duties that #242 needs to perform, i.e. assist with count and taking sheets to Control, escorting nurse to and from and med line, standing mainline, escorting offenders that are leaving the facility and performing security checks for each bldg in MSC. Shift 2 conducts the same duties with one staff member as Shift 3 conducts with 2 staff members. This position can be utilized to assist with room searches, assist #242 with escorting offenders leaving facility, putting and returning the property keys from control, assist with security checks when necessary help process administrative paperwork, daily moves.	Statewide Committee: No consensus to move forward. Some Members felt that this should move through the normal requests for staffing, per the staffing	
Duress Alarms	Coyote Ridge Corr. Center	May have statewide impact - Referring to SSAC	Duress notification: Currently there are no means of duress notification installed within any of the living unit offices. With Class Counselor 2, and OA positions not being issued a radio, this leaves them only with an off the hook phone alarm as a means of notification. It takes approximately 15 seconds after a phone is removed from its base to activate this alarm. A lot can happen within a 15 second timeframe. These staff members are currently in the position of serious risk. I suggested the implementation of duress alarms/buttons being installed not only in counselor, and office assistant offices, but all unit offices utilized by staff. These buttons should be placed in a strategic position within the office to provide easy access to staff if the need arises. When depressed, this button will activate an audible alarm which will be heard both in master control and within the living unit. A beacon will also accompany the alarm and be located in a visible location outside of the office, and above the door to identify the location of duress.	Statewide committee: Wait until completion of pilot.	

Concern/Suggestion	Facility	LSAC Status	Concern/Suggestion Description	LSAC or SSAC Comments	Local Resolution
Straight 8 schedules	Olympic Corr. Center	May have statewide impact - Referring to SSAC	Pilot straight/8 hour shifts for 1st shift personnel at OCC to assist in mitigating single post conditions in the living units. Currently Shift Commanders report that there is no coverage for meal breaks and added to required duties outside the living units, officers are left by themselves. Two practices have arisen: Staff are often taking their breaks at the work site and when staff are left single posted they move inside a secured duty office.	Statewide committee: Wait until completion of pilot.	
Replace "sky watch" with a permanent/higher structure (tower).	Airway Heights Corr. Center	May have statewide impact - Referring to SSAC	Replace "sky watch" with a permanent/ higher structure (tower). We are the only major institute in the state without a yard tower. When winds reach over approximately 5 mph the "sky watch" shakes vigorously. Also you cannot see the southwest or southeast corner of the yards when it's at its maximized height. Less lethal option (distraction/diversion and cs) would be ideal for deployment as well. A temporary solution for the blind areas of the yard can be to shorten the yard (close the west end softball field) since it's rarely used anyways. And now that the garden is being utilized it keeps a greater distance from the garden. And one yard officer should be issued a mk-9, since all c/o's are qualified to use it. Replacing the horseshoe pits with ladder golf would be a safer solution as well. And last but not least .The soccer goals (metal frames with netting) should be removed permanently, because it can be used to place against the fence and used as a ladder to escape.	Statewide Committee: Consensus to move forward with request.	
Need camera set up for Gates 60 & 61	Airway Heights Corr. Center	May have statewide impact - Referring to SSAC	I have a request: Could someone look into the possibility of getting a camera set up for Gates #60 & 61? After hours, there is NO ONE on the ground verifying the actual staff leaving through those gates from Food Factory. It could be anyone in a uniform (possibly taken from staff while in the Food Factory).	Statewide Committee: No consensus to move forward. Some Members reported that they handled a request for one to two cameras at the local level.	

Concern/Suggestion	Facility	LSAC Status	Concern/Suggestion Description	LSAC or SSAC Comments	Local Resolution
Requesting new staff in C7	Airway Heights Corr. Center	May have statewide impact - Referring to SSAC	Requesting a new staff in C7. Current practice is that the Rec. officer on dayshift processes all offenders out of C7. This pulls him away from his job and leaves no custody staff in C7. With a new officer in that position it would allow movement only under his	Statewide Committee: No consensus to move forward. Some Members felt that this should move through the normal	
MSU: Curfew for Offenders(No Late Nights)	Monroe Correctional Complex		The concern suggests that due to the limited staffing model, and mandatory breaks, Watch 1 at MSU operates a large portion of the night with no Phase 1 responders. Allowing the porters to gain an additional hour on their books is not worth the lack of supervision, and potential for a serious incident.	Statewide Committee: Consensus to move forward with request.	
Offender Accountability for Behavior	Monroe Correctional Complex		This concern is related to Offenders being held accountable through the infraction process. Staff feels that the Offenders are not being taught accountability through the infraction process. It is also believed that this attitude may be crossing over with them after the offender releases. Believing their original conviction was unfair. Staff is not sensing guilt, accountability, or responsibility from the offenders when they act out. There is also the sense from staff that their infractions are being discouraged or discarded at every level of the disciplinary process.	Statewide Committee: some members felt this may be a training issue.	
Gate Movements	Olympic Corr. Center		I have noticed that throughout my time here at OCC that there is far too much movement/ movement times of Offenders. I would like to suggest that the movement times be streamlined to match that of other facilities. I suggest that movements are changed to a every hour for a ten minute period only. This would enhance our movement security and accountability of offenders.	will be reviewed at the local level	

Concern/Suggestion	Facility	LSAC Status	Concern/Suggestion Description	LSAC or SSAC Comments	Local Resolution
Movement/check ins and outs	Olympic Corr. Center		Inmates should return from work areas in one movement. On a daily basis staff from the Hoh unit must make several trips to count/let offenders in the gate. Today we made three trips just fro maintenance. Same with medical, they will call for inmates several times making staff and 220 (transport officer) mare several trips. If possible these trips would be more efficient if they could go on one trip. This is a simple fix and would cause less movements.	will be reviewed at the local level	

Appendix H

Letter to the Secretary



STATE OF WASHINGTON
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
P.O. BOX 41100 • Olympia, Washington 98504-1100

October 10, 2011

TO: Bernard Warner, Secretary
FROM: Clela Steelhammer, Legislative and Policy Coordination Manager
THROUGH: Statewide Security Advisory Committee
SUBJECT: ESB 5907 Prison Safety Recommendations for 2011

The Statewide Security Advisory Committee met in Olympia on September 14 and 15, 2011 to review each of the security concerns and suggestions having statewide impact.

The security measures that are being piloted by the Department have not been included in the prioritization. It was the consensus of the committee, that while these measures are expected to be of great importance in increasing staff safety; it would be best to delay making recommendations on these measures until the pilots are completed. These security measures include a system of staff accountability which may be comprised of body alarms and/or proximity cards; the increased usage of video monitoring cameras; and statewide usage of oleoresin capsicum spray (pepper spray). After the completion of the pilots, all of the measures will be reviewed for recommendations around future requests. In addition, there was interest in the use of electronic immobilization devices (Tasers), but there was a suggestion to wait until the pilot of pepper spray has been completed.

Below is a summary of security concerns that have been forwarded from the Local Security Advisory Committees at each prison facility to the Statewide Security Advisory Committee. The ideas were reviewed by the statewide committee members and then combined into several groups: those that can be implemented without legislation or new funding, those that will require new funding, and those that should be looked at again at the local level.

For the upcoming biennium, the statewide committee recommends funding for five of the security concerns submitted.

Security Concerns – Requiring Additional Funding:

With Group Consensus - in order of importance:

1. Communication/Safety Concern – This concern was for standalone minimum facilities, where there are no dedicated FTE's to monitor radio consoles for body alarm alerts on first shift. There is consensus from CCCC, LCC, MCCCW, and OCC Superintendents to request a custody FTE be assigned to each facility for shift 1. This FTE would monitor radio communications and body alarm alerts. The majority of the statewide committee members felt this was the most important request.
2. AHCC Yard Tower - This suggestion is to replace the current “sky watch” with a permanent/ higher structure (tower) with communication capabilities. When winds reach over approximately 5 mph the “sky watch” shakes vigorously. The southwest or southeast corner of the yards cannot be seen when the sky watch is at its maximized height.
3. Movement Control Officer – CRCC requests a movement control officer. This would take the burden off master control and make it safer for everyone in the institution. Additionally, this officer would coordinate all major movements of inmates within the facility.
4. Extra staff in hospital at WSP – This request is for an additional hospital officer to be placed in the out-patient clinic. The current officers have to rotate out of the unit regularly to escort SMI offenders to other appointments. This creates a lack of custody presence on the mental health tier.
5. Staff the CRCC Medium operation booths – This would have each medium unit receive 1 additional officer on 2nd shift. Officers in the booths have the high ground to oversee the unit and monitor both pods more effectively. This also gives the unit faster control over the pod doors and would prevent pod crossing.

Other security concerns receiving votes, but not consensus (see attached spreadsheet for descriptions):

- ✓ Requesting new staff in C7 (AHCC)
- ✓ “Tasers” (electronic immobilization device)
- ✓ Duress Alarms
- ✓ PA system for WCCW – system wide

In addition to the ideas summarized above, there were individual staffing or facility specific requests that the committee thought should be routed through the current process for staffing requests or structural improvements.

Security Concerns: Policy or Procedure Changes Only:

- With Group Consensus:
 - ✓ Escorted Leave Policy – Amend policy 340.000 (Escorted Leave and Furlough for Offenders) by removing the ability for deathbed or funeral attendance that take place in a private residence.
 - ✓ Curfew for Offenders – Establish a policy that sets standards for when offenders are to be in their bunks at minimum units. Late nights are in effect during times when the facilities/living units are the least staffed, i.e., 1st shift. This policy would discontinue the practice of allowing offenders “late nights” on holidays or weekends.
- Without Group Consensus:
 - ✓ Reconcile Pass System - WCCW recommended a change to DOC form 20-062 “Offender Pass” so that offender accountability could be increased by not allowing offenders to move to any location without reconciliation of issued passes. Discussion from staff at other facilities indicated that they thought the current pass worked well in their institutions, but they did not have an objection to a change in the pass.
 - ✓ CI Jackets – There was a recommendation that offender coats be made of a single ply cloth (have no lining) and have no pockets to cut down on movement of contraband in all institutions. There was discussion surrounding the need for additional warmth of the liner and pockets that was important at the facilities in colder locations. More information will be provided at the next meeting, concerning cost associated with changing the style of a product and the feasibility of changing to a hemmed, loose liner.

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- ✓ Offender Accountability for Behavior - This concern is related to offenders being held accountable through the infraction process. Submitting staff feel that offenders are not being taught accountability through the infraction process. Discussion with the group suggested that this could be addressed through training.
- ✓ Straight 8's – There was a suggestion to pilot straight/8 hour shifts for shift one personnel at all stand-alone MI2 facilities to assist in mitigating isolated post conditions in the living units and maximize staffing. Shift one is staffed at critical minimum with a maximum of 7 total staff for facilities with offender populations that range from 305 at MCCW, 381 at OCC, to 480 at CCCC & LCC. The committee thought that this was something that should be considered
- ✓ Vehicle Searches – This security concern was suggested that staff vehicles should be searched quarterly. Searches could be random and conducted by specialty teams without advance notice. Most of the committee believed the current search policy was sufficient.

In addition to these security concerns that were forwarded to the statewide committee, members had the opportunity to discuss security concerns and best practices that are being implemented at the local level. These will be included with the report due to the legislature.

Thank you for the opportunity to provide input on what can be done to increase the safety of staff that work in prisons. The committee feels the process has been both valuable and insightful. Facilities are already sharing best practices and innovative approaches to common security concerns.

The committee meets next on October 26, 2011 in Olympia.

Appendix I
New or Amended DOC Policies
(Multidisciplinary Teams)



OFFENDER I.D. DATA:

(Name, DOC#, DOB)

HEALTH STATUS REPORT

FACILITY	LIVING UNIT	DATE
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1. PURPOSE (Check one box for A and one box for B)

A. Initial Evaluation Change in Status Work/School/Assignment Transfer/Transport Other

B. Medical Dental Mental Health Food Service DNR Camp Work Release

Other (specify): _____

2. RESTRICTIONS/LIMITATIONS (Check as applicable – Use Comments section for additional clarification)

<p>A. Housing Restrictions/Limitations</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Single Cell</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> No Upper Bunk</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Lower Tier</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Limited Stairs – Specify in Comments (3) if needed</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> No Stairs, may do limited steps</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> No Steps</p> <p>B. Assignment/Work/School Recommendations</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> No Lifting more than _____ pounds</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> No Vigorous Activity</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> No Standing more than _____ minutes</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> No Sitting more than _____ minutes</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> No Machine Operation</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> No Work on Scaffolding/Ladders</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> No Uneven Ground or Steep Hills</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> No DNR (Dept. of Natural Resources)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> No Food Service</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Work-hour Adjustment – Specify in Comments (3)</p> <p>C. Daily Routine</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Bed rest</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Meals In</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Restricted to Living Area/Unit</p>	<p>D. Dietary</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Clear Liquid</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Full Liquid</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Puree</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Mechanical Soft</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Gluten Free</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Mainline Alternative</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Food Allergy – Specify in Comments (3)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Snack <input type="checkbox"/> Green <input type="checkbox"/> Yellow <input type="checkbox"/> Blue</p> <p>– Specify time and quantity in Comments (3)</p> <p>E. Durable Medical Equipment</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Crutches #: _____</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Cane #: _____</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Walker #: _____</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Wheel Chair #: _____ <input type="checkbox"/> Pusher required</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Extra Pillow(s) x _____</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Glucometer/Sharps Container/Lancets/Test Strips</p> <p>F. Transport</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> No Restrictions/Limitations/Holds</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Restrictions/Special Requirements – Specify in Comments (3)</p> <p>G. Other</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> Metal Implant(s) – Specify in Comments (3)</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> See Comments (3)</p>
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3. COMMENTS (e.g., restrictions not listed above, equipment issue date if different than date of HSR, multiple expirations)

4. EXPIRATION DATE: Unless otherwise indicated, HSRs expire one (1) year from the date written. It is the offender's responsibility to request renewal of an HSR at least 30 days before expiration.

MEDICAL CARE PROVIDER (Stamp/Print and Initial)	DATE	DENTAL CARE PROVIDER (Stamp/Print and Initial)	DATE
MENTAL HEALTH CARE PROVIDER (Stamp/Print and Initial)	DATE	HEALTH CARE MGR/AUTHORITY/DESIGNEE (Stamp/Print and Initial)	DATE

DISTRIBUTION:

<input type="checkbox"/> Health Record (Original)	<input type="checkbox"/> Offender	<input type="checkbox"/> Shift Sergeant	<input type="checkbox"/> Laundry/Clothing	<input type="checkbox"/> Supply Tech
<input type="checkbox"/> Central File	<input type="checkbox"/> Recreation	<input type="checkbox"/> Unit Sergeant	<input type="checkbox"/> Dietary	<input type="checkbox"/> Other:
<input type="checkbox"/> Counselor/CUS	<input type="checkbox"/> Control	<input type="checkbox"/> Education	<input type="checkbox"/> Correctional Industries	<input type="checkbox"/> Other:



**APPLICATION FOR
OFFENDER VOLUNTEER POSITION**

Date Received: _____ Received By: _____

Volunteer Position applying for: _____

Offender Name(First, Last, Middle): _____ DOC Number: _____

Counselor: _____ Custody Level: _____ Housing Unit/Cell: _____

Earned Release Date/Max Ex Date: _____ Next Board(If applicable): _____

List areas of special interest as they relate to this position:

List special skills as they relate to this position:

List special equipment you can operate as they relate to this position:

Briefly explain why you are applying for this position:

If accepted, by my signature I agree to abide by the rules, regulations, policies, and procedures set forth by the Department of Corrections and this facility and understand that my failure to do so may result in my termination from this volunteer position.

Applicant Signature _____

Date _____

UPON COMPLETION, PLEASE SUBMIT THIS APPLICATION TO YOUR ASSIGNED COUNSELOR.

The contents of this document may be eligible for public disclosure. Social Security Numbers are considered confidential information and will be redacted in the event of such a request. This form is governed by Executive Order 00-03, RCW 42.56, and RCW 40.14.

FOR REVIEW PURPOSES – APPLICANT NOT TO WRITE BELOW THIS LINE

Eligibility Criteria (to be completed by Assigned Counselor):

	Yes	No
The offender currently does not hold any other volunteer position.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
It has been a minimum of 12 months since the disposition of a guilty finding for any Category A infraction or drug related infraction.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
It has been a minimum of 6 months since the disposition of a guilty finding for a Category B or C infraction.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
There are no pending major disposition sanctions.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The offender has no HSR restrictions contrary to the type of voluntary work selected.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The offender has not held any volunteer position within the last 6 months.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The offender has not been removed from any volunteer positions within the last 12 months.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The offender has demonstrated positive adjustment and compliance with any behavioral and programming requirements.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Counselor Signature

Date

Review Committee Comments:

	Yes	No
The offender is recommended for approval for the volunteer position applied for.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Comments(to include any restrictions regarding participation):

Review Committee Signatures:

Offender Volunteer Coordinator Signature

Date

Correctional Program Manager Signature

Date

Health Services Representative Signature

Date

Custody Representative Signature

Date

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STATE OF WASHINGTON
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

POLICY

APPLICABILITY
PRISON/WORK RELEASE
OFFENDER/SPANISH MANUALS

REVISION DATE
10/17/11

PAGE NUMBER
1 of 18

NUMBER
DOC 300.380

TITLE
**CLASSIFICATION AND CUSTODY FACILITY PLAN
REVIEW**

REVIEW/REVISION HISTORY:

- Effective: 7/1/89
- Revised: 6/1/90
- Revised: 1/19/93
- Revised: 8/16/93
- Revised: 11/1/95
- Revised: 12/31/96
- Revised: 10/13/00
- Revised: 5/8/02
- Revised: 12/24/04
- Revised: 11/26/06
- Revised: 1/9/07 AB 07-001
- Revised: 10/4/07 AB 07-025
- Revised: 11/1/07 AB 07-031
- Revised: 2/4/08
- Revised: 8/4/08
- Revised: 4/9/09 AB 09-012
- Revised: 10/17/11

SUMMARY OF REVISION/REVIEW:

Major changes. Read carefully!


APPROVED:

Signature on file

BERNARD WARNER, Secretary
Department of Corrections

9/13/11

Date Signed

 <p>STATE OF WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS</p> <p>POLICY</p>	APPLICABILITY PRISON/WORK RELEASE OFFENDER/SPANISH MANUALS		
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REFERENCES:


DOC 100.100 is hereby incorporated into this policy; [RCW 9.94A](#); [RCW 71.24](#); [RCW 72.09](#); [ACA 4-4295](#); [ACA 4-4296](#); [ACA 4-4297](#); [ACA 4-4300](#); [ACA 4-4301](#); [ACA 4-4302](#); [ACA 4-4303](#); [ACA 4-4444](#); [ACA 5A-02](#); [ACA 5A-03](#); [ACA 5A-04](#); [ACA 5A-05](#); [ACA 5A-06](#); [DOC 300.500 Work Release Screening](#); [DOC 310.150 Reception, Initial Classification, and Custody Facility Plan](#); [DOC 320.100 Indeterminate Sentence Review Board \(ISRB\)](#); [DOC 320.200 Administrative Segregation](#); [DOC 320.250 Intensive Management/Treatment Status Placement/Transfer/Release](#); [DOC 320.400 Risk and Needs Assessment Process](#); [DOC 330.600 Prisons Compact](#); [DOC 350.300 Mutual Re-Entry Program](#); [DOC 630.500 Mental Health Services](#); [DOC 690.400 Offenders with Disabilities](#); [ESB 5907](#); [Mental Health Transfer Procedure](#)

POLICY:

- I. [4-4444] Classification is the management tool used to assign offenders to the least restrictive custody designation that addresses programming and other needs, while providing for the safety of staff, the community, and offenders. The classification process will be documented in the applicable Custody Facility Plan in the offender’s electronic file. [4-4295] [4-4296] [5A-03]
- II. [4-4444] The classification system provides for graduated release through a systematic decrease in supervision and corresponding increase in offender responsibility and re-entry into the community. The system is designed to encourage offender participation in work, education, treatment, and other offender change programs.

DIRECTIVE:


- I. General Requirements
 - A. All initial classification will be conducted per DOC 310.150 Reception, Initial Classification, and Custody Facility Plan.
 - B. A screening committee will review and evaluate all incoming transfer manifests.
 - C. The primary components of a Classification Review are custody designation, program needs and expectations, and facility placement.
 1. Offender Release Plans and family need issues will be considered when determining facility placement.
 - D. For classification purposes, convictions for any offense classified as attempted, conspiracy, or solicitation will be treated the same as a conviction for the offense itself.

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- E. Reviews will be considered timely if completed within 30 days before or after the Next Review Date (NRD).
- F. Classification committees, reviews, and activities will include multidisciplinary participation from health services/mental health, employment, intelligence and investigations, and other staff involved in the offender’s supervision/treatment when required by law or indicated in this policy.


II. Screening Committee

- A. Prisons and camps that receive transfer manifests and Prisons that receive transfers from out of state will establish a screening committee and develop procedures to review and evaluate incoming offenders. Screening committee participation will be multidisciplinary and include, at a minimum:
 - 1. Correctional Program Manager (CPM)/designee,
 - 2. Correctional Captain or Chief Security Officer/designee,
 - 3. Health Care Manager/designee,
 - 4. Mental Health Lead/designee, and
 - 5. Intelligence and Investigations Lead/designee.
- B. The screening committee will meet and complete DOC 02-374 Screening Committee Incoming Transport Review Checklist for each offender on the transfer manifest. Routine transfers in the Reception Diagnostic Centers, in maximum custody, and between Intensive Management Units are excluded from this requirement.
 - 1. Prior to the offender’s scheduled arrival date, DOC 02-374 Screening Committee Incoming Transport Review Checklist will be completed and scanned into the offender’s electronic imaging file per facility practice.
 - 2. The facility will establish a process for completing DOC 02-374 Screening Committee Incoming Transport Review Checklist within 3 working days after arrival for offenders who are late additions to the transfer manifest.
- C. The screening committee review will be documented on DOC 02-374 Screening Committee Incoming Transport Review Checklist and will include, at a minimum:
 - 1. History of predatory violence and/or predatory sexual offenses,
 - 2. History of medical and/or mental health conditions that affect housing or programming or require immediate referral for medical/mental health services,
 - 3. Safety/security concerns that may impact housing or programming, and
 - 4. Employment screening.

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III. Facility Risk Management Team (FRMT)


- A. The FRMT will address custody designation, program expectations, offender needs, and facility placement recommendations in the Custody Facility Plan. Offender privileges (e.g., visiting, Extended Family Visit Program, recreation, escorted leave) may also be addressed.
- B. The FRMT will include, at a minimum:
 1. The offender, unless s/he waives participation,
 2. The assigned Counselor,
 3. The Unit Supervisor, and
 4. A custody/security representative.
- C. Recommendation and/or decisions will be documented in the comment section of the Custody Facility Plan.
- D. Multidisciplinary FRMT
 1. A multidisciplinary FRMT must be convened for all employment referrals and custody promotions and for any FRMT activities for offenders housed in Mental Health Residential Treatment Units. A multidisciplinary FRMT is responsible for all activities of a FRMT.
 2. For offenders releasing from Intensive Management Status (IMS), the multidisciplinary FRMT will develop an IMS transition plan targeting programs, custody, and placement to address transition into general population.
 3. Each of the following disciplines must be represented when they are relevant to the offender being reviewed. Participating team members will be documented in the comment section of the Custody Facility Plan. An FRMT is only considered multidisciplinary when one or more of the following are included as documented members:
 - a. Current or proposed employment supervisor, for employment related decisions.
 - b. Medical professional, for offenders with specific medical related PULHESDXT "P" codes of 4 or higher.
 - c. Supervising Psychologist/designee, for offenders with PULHESDXT "S" codes of 3 or higher and/or "H" codes of 4.

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- d. ADA Coordinator, for offenders with PULHESDXT “L”, “E”, or “X” codes of 3 or higher.
 - e. Other program area supervisors who have direct supervision of the offender’s activities and knowledge of his/her behavior.
4. For offenders with a documented history of predatory violence or predatory sexual offending, additional mental health and/or other staff may be included to provide general input about areas of potential risk based on history.
 5. Custody Facility Plan decisions for custody promotions not previously reviewed by a multidisciplinary FRMT must be submitted on Plan Change reports.
 6. The multidisciplinary FRMT may screen for job changes as referred by the Counselor per DOC 700.000 Work Programs for Offenders.
 - a. If no custody change is indicated, only the DOC 02-373 Job Screening Checklist should be used and no Custody Facility Plan is required.

IV. Custody Facility Plans [4-4295] [4-4297] [5A-03]


- A. All Custody Facility Plans will be initiated by a Counselor/Community Corrections Officer (CCO) through the FRMT. This includes Intake Plans, Regular Reviews, Plan Change Reviews, Targeted Reviews, and Re-Entry Plans.
 1. Notice of the FRMT meeting will be provided to the offender at least 48 hours prior to the review using DOC 05-794 Classification Hearing Notice/Appearance Waiver, unless precluded for security or other substantial reasons. [4-4302] [5A-04]
 - a. DOC 05-794 Classification Hearing Notice/Appearance Waiver must be scanned into the offender’s electronic imaging file.
 2. The offender will be encouraged to attend the meeting.
 3. The Unit Supervisor will create a process to document reasons why offenders decline to participate in FRMT meetings and will submit a quarterly report on the reasons to the CPM.
 4. The CPM will develop a process to identify and resolve barriers to offender participation in FRMT meetings.

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- B. Criminal Conviction Record (CCR) reviews will be conducted annually or on the anniversary of the offender's Earned Release Date (ERD). The Counselor will:
1. Review of the CCR for accuracy.
 2. Notify the Criminal Conviction Record Unit via e-mail of any additional convictions needing to be entered in the CCR and/or any mistakes found in the current CCR.
 3. Notify the offender that a copy of the conviction criminal history record can be purchased from the Washington State Patrol, and provide Attachment 2 as needed.
 4. Ensure that all offense descriptions are entered in the CCR for all active causes in the offender's electronic file and add any missing/incomplete information using the official version information.
 - a. If official versions are not available, request documents through the local Records Unit and document that the request has been made using a CA type chrono.
 5. At the next review, send a request to the Criminal Conviction Record Unit via e-mail to activate the offense description narrative field.
 - a. This request must identify which cause(s) needs an updated or complete offense description.

V. [4-4301] Classification Reviews

- A. All classification reviews will be documented in a Custody Facility Plan in the offender's electronic file and will identify the offender's future eligibility for custody promotions and transfers (i.e., targets).
- B. If an offender is not targeted for custody promotion, the Custody Facility Plan will include an explanation.
- C. An offender may request to review his/her progress or program status with the assigned Counselor/CCO, who will determine if further action is necessary.
[4-4303]
- D. Offenders will not be granted programming points in the Custody Facility Plan any time prior to the DOC time start.
- E. All changes in custody or transfer recommendations must be approved by the Superintendent or designee at the Correctional Program Manager level or above.


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F. Intake Plans


1. The receiving Counselor will complete an Intake Plan with the offender within 30 days of the offender’s arrival at the facility.
2. The receiving Community Corrections Officer (CCO) will complete an Intake Plan with the offender within 14 days of the offender’s arrival at Work Release.
3. The Intake Plan will be documented in the offender’s electronic file. Completion of the plan will include:
 - a. Reviewing the previous Custody Facility Plan with the offender,
 - b. Creating, reviewing, and/or updating the Offender Needs Assessment,
 - c. Setting expectations for the current facility, and
 - d. Completing referrals for programming, which will be:
 - 1) Prioritized to address areas identified as Moderate and High need in the Offender Needs Assessment.
 - 2) Consistent with approvals documented from the Screening Committee where applicable.
4. The Intake Plan requires Unit Supervisor/designee approval.
5. An Intake Plan with Plan Change requires multidisciplinary FRMT approval and will only be done when:
 - a. A factor has significantly changed since the last review (e.g., warrant status).
 - b. There are custody or facility assignment changes.

G. Regular Reviews

1. Regular reviews are used to document an offender’s compliance with the current Custody Facility Plan.
 - a. Regular reviews will be conducted: [4-4296] [4-4300]
 - 1) Annually on the anniversary of the Department of Corrections admission date for offenders sentenced to Life Without Parole (LWOP).

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- 2) Annually on the anniversary of the ERD for offenders 5 years or more to their ERD.
 - 3) Every 6 months, or as targeted in a previous Custody Facility Plan, for offenders within 5 years of their ERD. [5A-05]
 - b. Offenders housed in segregation for disciplinary reasons will have their annual or 6 month review as scheduled.
 - c. Offenders housed in segregation for administrative reasons will have their annual or 6 month review completed as scheduled per DOC 320.200 Administrative Segregation.
 2. The Counselor will verify that the offender remains eligible for prior custody and facility targets. If not, the Counselor will follow the Plan Change Review process.
 3. The Counselor will complete the DOC 13-457 Intellectual Disability Review for offenders with PULHESDXT “H” codes of 4 in compliance with DOC 690.400 Offenders with Disabilities.
- H. Targeted Reviews
1. Targeted reviews will be used to assign an offender’s custody promotion that was authorized in the “in effect” Custody Facility Plan.
 2. Targeted reviews may be approved at the Unit Supervisor/designee level.
- I. Plan Change Reviews
1. Plan Change reviews will be used to address any changes that impact an offender’s eligibility to remain at the current custody and/or facility assignment.
 2. Plan Change reviews may occur:
 - a. In conjunction with the Next Review Date, or
 - b. Anytime an unscheduled custody or facility placement change is indicated or recommended.
 3. A multidisciplinary FRMT must be convened for custody promotions and/or job/volunteer referrals.
- J. In addition to Classification Review types, Custody Facility Plans can be used for other specific purposes as listed in the Custody Facility Plan Job Aid.


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K. Re-entry Plans will be used for offenders within 12 months of their ERD. A Re-entry Plan may be completed with any review type. The Counselor will refer to the Custody Facility Plan Job Aid for guidance on completing the Re-entry Plan.


VI. Facility Assignment and Transfer [4-4301]

A. Offenders will be placed at facilities that:

1. Address the risk and balance the overall needs of the offender, community supports, and the Department.
2. Meet supervision requirements of their custody level.
3. Are consistent with their health (e.g., medical, dental, mental health) requirements and in compliance with DOC 610.110 Transfer of Offenders for Health Reasons.
 - a. Headquarters will not transfer an offender to a facility where s/he has medical or mental health conflicts unless both the sending and receiving facilities have reviewed and approved the offender as appropriate, as documented in the Custody Facility Plan.
 - b. Offenders with PULHESDXT “S” codes of 3 or above and offenders transferring in or out of a Mental Health Residential Treatment Unit will be transferred according to DOC 630.500 Mental Health Services and the Mental Health Transfer Procedure. This includes transfers to camps, but not transfers to Segregation or an Intensive Management Unit.
 - 1) The Counselor is responsible for notifying the Mental Health Lead of a transfer request when a specific facility has been identified.
 - 2) The Mental Health Lead will provide a copy of the completed DOC 13-465 Mental Health Transfer Screening to the Counselor within 30 days of notification.
 - 3) Transfer requests will be approved/denied based on the determination documented on DOC 13-465 Mental Health Transfer Screening.
 - 4) The decision will be documented as consultation in the Custody Facility Plan.

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- B. Other factors that will be reviewed/considered when making facility placement recommendations and decisions include:
1. Safety and security issues, including facility prohibitions and offender separations.
 2. Programming needs to address risk/needs, crime related and other disruptive behaviors, and court ordered treatment requirements. [5A-02]
 3. Location of the offender's community supports and his/her release plans.
- C. Placement decisions made by the Headquarters Classification Unit are final.
1. The receiving facility's Superintendent/designee may contact the Headquarters Classification Unit if there are concerns based on new information or a belief that an error has been made.
 2. The Chief of Classification/designee will resolve the dispute or refer the case to the Headquarters Community Screening Committee (HCSC).
- D. Offender program participation, demonstration of skills learned in offender change programs, and infraction behavior may impact facility placement eligibility.
- E. Offenders will not usually be transferred to a same-custody facility within 12 months of arrival at the current location.
1. Significant need for medical, mental health, programs, and/or community support may be reviewed for exception on a case-by-case basis.
 2. This does not apply to transfers from the Washington Corrections Center for Women - Minimum Security Unit (WCCW-MSU) to Mission Creek Corrections Center for Women (MCCCW).
- F. Offenders within 60 days of release will not be transferred or targeted for transfer. Exceptions may include:
1. Safety, security, and protection reasons,
 2. Significant need for medical, mental health, program, and/or community support,
 3. Transfers within a facility/complex,
 4. Transfers approved by the sending and receiving facility to assist in re-entry/transition of higher risk cases,
 5. Custody demotions, and

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6. Reception Diagnostic Center offenders.

G. Other than transfers to Work Release, offenders who refuse a facility transfer will be infraacted.

H. Offenders classified as Minimum custody who have been approved for Work Release may have their transfer order finalized prior to their Work Release eligibility date to allow appropriate victim/witness notification.

1. The offender must still be Work Release eligible at callout.

2. The finalized bed date may not be more than 180 days prior to ERD.

3. Upon notification of a finalized transfer order, the Counselor will update the Custody Facility Plan to reflect MI1 prior to the callout date, provided the offender remains eligible for that custody level.

VII. Custody Level Designation [4-4296]

A. Custody Level Eligibility

1. Close Custody: Custody Review Score 0-39

a. Inmates sentenced to the Death Penalty (ISDPs) will initially be housed in maximum custody in the Intensive Management Unit at the Washington State Penitentiary (WSP) or WCCW for a minimum of one year.

1) Custody will not be promoted without Secretary approval and will not be less restrictive than Close.

b. Unless otherwise approved by the Assistant Secretary for Prisons/ designee, a minimum of 4 years Close custody will be assigned for offenders:


1) Committed for Murder 1.

2) Sentenced to LWOP.


3) Whose sentence structure puts their ERD past their reasonable life expectancy (i.e., 80 years for males, 85 years for females).

2. Medium Custody: Custody Review Score 40-55

a. All Medium custody recommendations and facility placements for LWOP offenders require:


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- 1) Multidisciplinary FRMT recommendation, and
 - 2) Approval from Headquarters Classification and the Assistant Secretary for Prisons/designee.
- b. Out of State Boarders may not be assigned less restrictive custody than Medium without written approval from the sending state through the Chief of Classification/designee.
3. Minimum Custody: Custody Review Score 56 and above
- a. Minimum Custody MI3
- 1) MI3 designation will be assigned to offenders who score Minimum custody and:
 - a) Have more than 4 years to their ERD.
 - b) Have less than 4 years to their ERD, and whose medical, dental, and/or mental health needs exceed the resources available at a camp or Work Release.
 - c) Are under Indeterminate Sentence Review Board (ISRB) or Community Custody Board (CCB) jurisdiction with a life maximum term, and have not yet been found paroleable.
 - d) Are less than 4 years to their ERD and have a felony warrant documented in their electronic file as:
 - (1) Instate County Detainer
 - (2) Detainer from Other State
 - (3) Immigration Customs Enforcement (ICE)
 - (4) Federal Detainer
 - (5) Pending Felony Detainer Copy
 - (6) Juvenile Detainer
 - e) Are less than 4 years to their ERD and have been referred for 71.09 Civil Commitment as part of End of Sentence Review.
 - 2) Offenders who have received a Deportation Order will not be housed in less restrictive custody than MI3.


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- 3) LWOP offenders will not be assigned MI3 except under extraordinary circumstances. These placements require:
 - a) Multidisciplinary FRMT recommendation, and
 - b) Approval from Headquarters Classification and the Assistant Secretary for Prisons/designee.

- b. Minimum Custody MI2
 - 1) MI2 designation will be assigned to offenders who score Minimum custody and:
 - a) Have 4 years or less to their ERD.
 - b) Are under ISRB or CCB jurisdiction. For this assignment, offenders must also be:
 - (1) Within 4 years of their Maximum Expiration Date,
 - (2) Recommended by the multidisciplinary FRMT,
 - (3) Approved by the HCSC.
 - 2) Offenders scoring Minimum custody and within 4 years of their ERD and previously referred for RCW 71.09 Civil Commitment as a Sexually Violent Predator may only be assigned MI2 by the HCSC.
 - 3) Offenders may be referred for early placement at an MI2 facility using a Long Term Minimum override for medical purposes regardless of sentence structure. These placements require:
 - a) Multidisciplinary FRMT recommendation,
 - b) Approval from the HCSC, and
 - c) Approval from the Assistant Secretary for Prisons/designee.
 - 4) Offenders committed for Murder 1 may only be assigned MI2 through an approved Mutual Re-Entry Plan per DOC 350.300 Mutual Re-Entry Program, or a Long Term Minimum override approved by the HCSC and Assistant Secretary for Prison/designee.

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- 5) Offenders scoring minimum custody, with a Pending ICE Detainer who have not been previously deported, may be considered for MI2/camp after completing 6 months in a major facility.
 - 6) Notification detainers will not preclude MI2 assignment.
- c. Minimum Custody MI1
- 1) MI1 designation will be assigned to offenders who do not meet the criteria for more restrictive custody and who score minimum custody with 6 months or less to ERD.
 - 2) Offenders with any type of felony warrant will not be eligible for Work Release assignment.
 - 3) Offenders with a weapons enhancement under RCW 9.94A.533, or who are serving a mandatory minimum term of confinement under RCW 9.94A.540, will not be eligible for Work Release until the mandatory portion of the sentence is completed.
 - 4) Offenders currently committed for Murder 1 may only be assigned MI1 and Work Release through an approved Mutual Re-Entry Plan per DOC 350.300 Mutual Re-Entry Program and approved by the HCSC and Assistant Secretary for Prisons/designee.
 - 5) Offenders with a PULHESDXT "S" code of 3 or higher may only be transferred to MI1 if approved through the Mental Health Transfer Procedure.
- d. Offenders who committed the following offenses may only be assigned MI2 or MI1 by the HCSC:
- 1) Rape 1 and 2
 - 2) Attempt/Criminal Solicitation of Rape 1 and 2
 - 3) Rape of a Child 1 and 2
 - 4) Child Molestation 1 and 2
 - 5) Kidnapping 1 and 2 with Sexual Motivation
 - 6) Indecent Liberties with Forcible Compulsion
 - 7) Incest
 - 8) Assault 1 and 2 with Sexual Motivation
 - 9) Assault of a Child 1 and 2 with Sexual Motivation

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- e. Offenders who committed other sexually motivated offenses or prior violent sex offenses may be referred to the HCSC for MI3/MI2/MI1 assignment if, after review of the criminal descriptions or plea bargain agreement, the multidisciplinary FRMT requests higher review.

VIII. ISRB and CCB Jurisdiction

- A. ISRB and CCB offenders may not be assigned MI2 or MI1 prior to being found paroleable by the Board unless they are within 4 years of their Maximum Expiration Date.
- B. ISRB and CCB offenders with a life maximum term will assigned MI3 if they score minimum custody and have not yet been found paroleable.
- C. For offenders who are 4 years to their ERD, the assigned Counselor will initiate a Classification Action Report (CAR) in the Custody Facility Plan to address the offender's potential release/transition.
 - 1. For offenders under ISRB jurisdiction, the CAR will be completed per DOC 320.100 Indeterminate Sentence Review Board (ISRB).
 - 2. Acquired skills are expected to mitigate risk and facilitate transition to less restrictive custody and/or release to the community.
- D. The multidisciplinary FRMT will solicit input from the ISRB when considering whether or not the offender's risks have been mitigated sufficiently to allow for camp or Work Release placement.
 - 1. If the multidisciplinary FRMT determines the offender's risks have not been mitigated, the team will recommend programs and behavioral expectations to help mitigate the risks.
- E. The CAR will be forwarded to the HCSC for review and approval/modification.
 - 1. The ISRB will be represented at the HCSC review of the CAR.
 - 2. The CAR does not:
 - a. Take the place of a Mutual Re-Entry Plan,
 - b. Establish any expectation that the Department or ISRB will request or approve a Mutual Re-Entry Plan.

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F. Program and behavioral expectations documented by the multidisciplinary FRMT and/or HCSC in the CAR will be included in subsequent Custody Facility Plans.

1. Subsequent Custody Facility Plans will document and track the offender's progress towards expectations.


IX. Headquarters Review, Overrides, Holds, and Exceptions

A. All referrals to the HCSC must be submitted as Plan Changes or a CAR.

B. All custody promotion related referrals to the HCSC must be submitted with a recommendation by a multidisciplinary FRMT.

C. HCSC review is required when:

1. The Superintendent/CCS/designee submits a recommendation for ISRB to conduct a disciplinary or .100 Hearing.
2. The Superintendent/CCS/designee submits a recommendation for a Prisons Compact transfer per DOC 330.600 Prisons Compact.
3. A Mutual Re-Entry Plan request is submitted to the Headquarters MRP Coordinator.
4. Custody recommendations are submitted requesting a Headquarters Community Risk (HCR) override for public safety and/or notoriety of the offense.
5. An Extraordinary Medical Placement is requested.
6. Directed by the Headquarters Classification Unit.
7. A Work Release denial is submitted that is not addressed by DOC 300.500 Work Release Screening.
8. The HCSC previously assigned a more restrictive custody during the current incarceration than what is being requested.
9. The HCSC has prohibited camp or Work Release placement.
 - a. Any HCSC prohibition from prior or current incarceration remains applicable until closed by the HCSC.
10. A Headquarters Mental Health override is requested to assign a more restrictive custody per Override Reasons/Decisions for Custody

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Assignments (Attachment 1) based on the offender’s needs for mental health services.

D. Overrides [4A-06]

1. Overrides may be requested when documented behavior, medical, dental, mental health, or other program needs or detainers indicate it is most appropriate to:
 - a. Assign a custody level other than what is indicated by the Custody Review Score, or
 - b. Promote or demote offender custody.
2. Override requests for custody promotion must be made by a multidisciplinary FRMT.
3. Override requests will be documented and supported using a current Custody Facility Plan.
4. Authorized override codes and the level of approving authority for each are identified in Override Reasons/Decisions for Custody Assignments (Attachment 1).

E. Holds

1. When circumstances arise that temporarily impact an offender’s eligibility for transfer, a hold may be placed in the offender’s electronic file. The hold must include a “Hold Until” date.
2. The assigned Counselor will monitor facility holds and make recommendations to remove, extend, or close holds as appropriate.
3. The CPM will monitor the facility’s holds and ensure they are reviewed and extended or closed as appropriate and in a timely manner.
4. Holds placed by Health Services, including health, mental health or chemical dependency may only be closed by the appropriate health services staff related to the hold.
5. The following will be considered when placing a program hold:
 - a. Offender time structure,
 - b. Likelihood that the program will impact specific and significant risk/needs in an offender’s offense pattern or cycle,

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- c. Availability of the program at other locations,
 - d. Whether the program is open entry/open exit,
 - e. Priority of the offender if/when referred, and/or
 - f. Whether or not the program is identified as a treatment or need area in the Offender Needs Assessment report.
6. Hold exceptions may be considered if the need for a transfer affects the offender's ability to continue/complete a program and/or the stability and business needs of an Industries program.
 7. Holds for programming that prevent offender transfer to a less restrictive custody facility require Superintendent/designee approval. Approval will be documented in a Custody Facility Plan.

X. Appeals [4-4296]

- A. [4-4301] Offenders may appeal classification decisions to the Superintendent/CCS at the facility where the decision was made. The Superintendent/CCS decision is final.
- B. Offenders may appeal Prisons Compact transfer decisions to the Secretary/designee.
- C. Offenders may not appeal decisions by the Headquarters Classification unit and the HCSC.
- D. Appeals for IMS assignment can be made to the Assistant Secretary for Prisons.

DEFINITIONS:

Words/terms appearing in this policy may be defined in the glossary section of the Policy Manual.

ATTACHMENTS:

- [Override Reasons/Decisions for Custody Assignments \(Attachment 1\)](#)
- [Washington State Patrol Request for Conviction Criminal History Record \(Attachment 2\)](#)

DOC FORMS:

- [DOC 02-373 Job Screening Checklist](#)
- [DOC 02-374 Screening Committee Incoming Transport Review Checklist](#)
- [DOC 05-794 Classification Hearing Notice/Appearance Waiver](#)
- [DOC 13-457 Intellectual Disability Review](#)
- [DOC 13-465 Mental Health Transfer Screening](#)

OVERRIDE REASONS/DECISIONS CUSTODY ASSIGNMENTS

For Superintendent/designee and Headquarters Classification Use

Type	Description
Administrative Segregation	For escape risk, threats to others or self, or pending an investigation on any of the above. Offender is on administrative segregation status at the time of review and is going to be continued on the administrative segregation status. Custody cannot be promoted, except when placement is for protective custody reasons. Generally used to maintain the current level of custody. Should not be used for any offender in general population.
Boarder	Offender is a boarder from another state and the sending state requires custody more restrictive than the one the offender currently scores, or when a Washington offender is a boarder in another state and his/her custody is limited by the other state.
Death Sentence	Offender is sentenced to death and can only be designated Close or Maximum. An offender must be assigned maximum custody for at least the first year of his/her sentence. S/he may be considered for close custody at the end of the first year.
Dental	Offender dental needs exceed resources of any facility at lower custody levels. Placement/ transfer to less restrictive levels of custody will not be precluded on PULHESDXT code conflicts alone.
Detainer	Offender has an immigration detainer and a previous deportation that precludes less than Minimum (MI)3, or an ICE detainer or untried felony detainer that precludes MI2 custody or Work Release.
End of Sentence Review	Offender cannot obtain MI1 custody. Offender pending End of Sentence Review Committee decisions. Used to prevent assignment of MI1 custody.
Indeterminate Sentence	Offender is under the jurisdiction of the Indeterminate Sentence Review Board (ISRB). For offenders sentenced to "old guidelines", pre-1984 terms, or determinate plus terms under the jurisdiction of the ISRB, not yet found parolable or releasable.
Life Without Parole	Offender has Life Without Parole or de facto life without parole sentence and cannot be considered for less restrictive than close custody without approval of Headquarters Classification Unit and Assistant Secretary for Prisons/designee.
Medical	Offender has medical needs that exceed the health care resources available at a less restrictive custody level. Placement/transfer to less restrictive levels of custody will not be precluded on PULHESDXT code conflicts alone.
Murder 1 st	Offender has Murder 1 conviction and cannot be considered for a lower custody level than Close during the first 4 years. Offender with Murder 1 conviction cannot be considered for MI2 or less restrictive custody without an approved Mutual Re-entry Plan (MRP). Used when an offender's custody review score indicates a less restrictive custody level may be assigned, but s/he does not meet the time requirements based on the offense of conviction.

OVERRIDE REASONS/DECISIONS CUSTODY ASSIGNMENTS

Type	Description
Prior Headquarters Decision	Custody has previously been assigned by the Headquarters Classification Screening Committee (HCSC) or Headquarters Classification Unit, and no significant change in offender adjustment necessitates change in custody. Used to assign a custody level more restrictive than the one the offender is scored or time eligible to be assigned. (Note: Only 2 consecutive PHD overrides are permitted. If the previously assigned custody is still appropriate, the case should be referred back to the original Headquarters source of the custody assignment.)
Policy	May be used to assign MI2 when offender has less than 6 months remaining to Earned Release Date (ERD) when Work Release has been denied, or when there are community victim concerns that require mitigation prior to being eligible for Work Release.
Risk Management 1	When a Category B or C infraction or lost program points would result in a more restrictive custody. Custody may be maintained or adjusted if the offender is otherwise in compliance with his/her Custody Facility Plan and there are other positive indicators, such as programming involvement, staff and/or family support, and the facility's ability to continue to manage the offender's behavior and adjustment.
Offender Refuses Custody Assignment	Offender refuses MI2, assign MI3. Offender refuses MI1, assign MI2.
Sex Offender Program	Offender assigned to sex offender treatment program at Twin Rivers or pending a decision to participate will be assigned MI3.
Sexually Violent Predator	Offender has been referred for civil commitment by the End of Sentence Review Committee. Requires HCSC approval to have custody lower than MI3.
Time Left to Serve	To provide gradual transition through the levels of custody/housing assignments for offenders serving long terms (i.e., greater than 10 years) or who have an extensive history of negative behaviors when previously housed in less restrictive environments.

For Community Corrections Supervisor and Headquarters Classification Unit Use Only

Type	Description
Prior Work/Training Release Terminated	Offender is terminated from, or voluntarily terminates Work Release assignment.

OVERRIDE REASONS/DECISIONS CUSTODY ASSIGNMENTS

For Headquarters Classification Unit Use Only

Type	Description
Community Corrections Transition	Offender would benefit from Work Release placement for purposes of re-entry planning and/or programming, and his/her Custody Facility Plan and behavior support assignment to MI1 custody.
Community Corrections Violation	Offender has been returned to a total confinement facility from community custody. When a violator is placed in a Department facility and his/her previously assigned custody prior to release on community supervision is not appropriate for the current placement. May be used to assign a more or less restrictive custody level.
HCSC Assigns Community Risk	Offender poses significant risk for assignment of MI2 or less restrictive custody designation.
HCSC pending	Offender scores minimum in the Reception Diagnostic Center (RDC), but is assigned MI3 pending HCSC review.
HCSC Assigns Mental Health	Offender has mental health needs/issues that exceed the resources available at a less restrictive custody level. Facility request for HCSC to review due to mental health. Must include documentation of the offender's behavior to support the request, to include updated PULHES codes.
Intensive Management Status (IMS)	An offender on IMS at the time of review. When an offender has been referred for placement on IMS in an Intensive Management facility, or when maintained on status with maximum custody after initial placement. Custody cannot be promoted.
Infraction	Offender found guilty at the RDC of an infraction that would result in a more restrictive custody level.
Institution Security	Offender is score and time eligible to be assigned one custody level, but a more restrictive custody level is necessary as s/he poses risk to staff/offender/visitor/public safety/security.
Juvenile Rehabilitation Administration	Juvenile offender placed with the Department of Corrections at the request of the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS).
Long Term Minimum	Offender's medical/mental/ health needs require specific facility placement, or placement at the Department's assisted living facility. HCSC and Secretary/designee must approve for offenders who are ineligible for MI2 per policy.
Management at a Lower Custody Level	Offender scores close or medium custody due to Category A serious infractions, escape behavior, or felony warrants, and is deemed manageable at a lower custody level.
Mutual Re-entry Program	Offender is actively participating in the Mutual Re-entry Program and assigned custody is based on the Custody Facility Plan previously approved. When an offender meets the policy criteria and is approved for development of and participation in a MRP, the offender will be assigned a custody level consistent with the approved plan.
Work Ethic Program	Offender assigned to Work Ethic Program. Requires MI2 custody.

WASHINGTON STATE PATROL

Identification and Criminal History Section

PO Box 42633

Olympia WA 98504-2633

(360) 534-2000

<http://watch.wsp.wa.gov>



REQUEST FOR CONVICTION CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORD (RCW 10.97)

INSTRUCTIONS: PLEASE COMPLETE THIS FORM WHEN REQUESTING **CONVICTION** CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORD INFORMATION FROM THE IDENTIFICATION AND CRIMINAL HISTORY SECTION. MAIL REQUEST TO ADDRESS NOTED ABOVE WITH \$17.00 CHECK OR MONEY ORDER OR COME TO OUR OFFICE AT 3000 PACIFIC AVENUE, OLYMPIA, WA. **NOTE: IT MAY TAKE 7 TO 14 BUSINESS DAYS FOR RESPONSE WHEN MAILED. FOR AN IMMEDIATE RESPONSE, ACCESS OUR WEB SITE LISTED ABOVE TO CONDUCT YOUR CRIMINAL HISTORY REQUEST FOR \$10.00 USING A CREDIT CARD.**

NOTARIZED LETTERS ARE AN ADDITIONAL \$10.00 PER NOTARY SEAL _____ Notarized Letter(s)
(available by mail only)

NOTE: The requested record information is furnished solely on the basis of name and/or description similarity with the subject of your inquiry. Positive identification or non-identification can only be effected upon receipt of fingerprints. Applicant may be advised of inquiry.

A SUBJECT INFORMATION: (Please type or print clearly)

Applicant's Name: _____
Last First Middle

Alias/Maiden Name: _____

Date of Birth: _____ Sex: _____ Race: _____
Month/Day/Year

B REQUESTOR INFORMATION: (Please type or print clearly)

DATE: ____/____/____ (print) Name/Title of Requestor Requestor's Signature
Mo. Day Yr.

Receive background results electronically Phone No. (____) _____

Email address Password (must be at least 8 characters)

REQUESTOR'S ADDRESS: (type or print clearly)

Subject's Right Thumb Print (Optional)

Name

Address

City State ZIP Code



STATE OF WASHINGTON
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

APPLICABILITY
PRISON
OFFENDER MANUAL

EFFECTIVE DATE
10/17/11

PAGE NUMBER
1 of 6

NUMBER
DOC 490.100

POLICY

TITLE
OFFENDER VOLUNTEERS

REVIEW/REVISION HISTORY:

Effective: 10/17/11

SUMMARY OF REVISION/REVIEW:

New policy to implement the Offender Volunteer Program. Read carefully!


APPROVED:

Signature on file

BERNARD WARNER, Secretary
Department of Corrections

9/18/11

Date Signed

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REFERENCES:


DOC 100.100 is hereby incorporated into this policy

POLICY:

- I. The Department has established guidelines for the use of offender volunteers to enhance offender programming opportunities and reduce offender idleness while maintaining a safe and secure environment.
- II. This policy does not apply to Reception Diagnostic Center units or minimum facilities.

DIRECTIVE:

- I. General
 - A. Offenders will not:
 1. Serve as a volunteer in any position that is a documented paid offender job assignment.
 2. Assist, complete, and/or participate in the normal duties assigned to a paid offender.
 3. Receive compensation for participation in a volunteer program.
- II. Facility Plan
 - A. Each facility will develop and maintain a written Offender Volunteer Program Plan for the use of offender volunteers. The plan will include, at a minimum:
 1. A specific position description for each position within the facility that will contain, at a minimum:
 - a. Volunteer position justification,
 - b. Duties,
 - c. Qualifications,
 - d. Start and end times,
 - e. Access to records and documentation, and
 - f. Level of supervision provided.
 2. The application process.
 3. Comprehensive offender screening procedures.

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4. The development and coordination of volunteer waiting lists.
5. Procedures for removing an offender from a volunteer appointment.
6. Review and approval process for selections, suspensions, and terminations.
7. A system to track volunteer position use and timeframes.

III. Responsibilities

- A. The Superintendent will designate a staff as the Offender Volunteer Coordinator, who will plan, monitor, and coordinate offender volunteer activities and:
 1. Oversee implementation of the Offender Volunteer Program Plan,
 2. Address offender volunteer issues,
 3. Ensure adherence to timeframes for service and application waiting periods,
 4. Report suspended or terminated volunteers to the Superintendent and document any offender actions and suspension/termination details in the offender's electronic file,
 5. Track and document the number of hours per month each offender is being used in the volunteer position, and
 6. Submit a monthly report to the Superintendent detailing activities within the offender volunteer program.

IV. Eligibility


- A. All eligible offenders will be given equal consideration for appointment to a volunteer position for which they are qualified.
- B. Offenders may hold only one volunteer position at any given time.
- C. Offenders will meet the following minimum requirements to be considered for any volunteer position within the facility. Any exceptions must be approved by the Superintendent:
 1. A minimum of 12 months since disposition of a guilty finding for any Category A infraction, or drug or violence related infraction.

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2. A minimum of 6 months since disposition of a guilty finding for a Category B or C major infraction.
 3. No pending major disposition sanctions.
 4. A demonstrated positive adjustment and compliance with any behavioral and programming requirements.
 5. An expressed voluntary interest (i.e., application).
- D. Offenders with restrictions/limitations documented on DOC 13-041 Health Status Report and signed by a Health Services staff may be restricted from participating in some or all volunteer programs based on the restriction.

V. Approvals and Removals

- A. Offenders will submit DOC 12-028 Application for Offender Volunteer Position to be considered for any volunteer position.
- B. All appointments of offender volunteers will be subject to a comprehensive screening and approval process as detailed in the Offender Volunteer Program Plan.
 1. A multi-disciplinary team will review each offender volunteer application and make recommendations to the Superintendent. The team will:
 - a. Be chaired by the Offender Volunteer Coordinator and include a Correctional Program Manager, a custody representative. The team will also include the following Health Services staff, as applicable:
 - 1) Supervising Psychologist/designee for offenders with PULHES "S" code value of 3 or higher.
 - 2) Medical professional for offenders with a PULHES "P" code value of 4 or higher.
 - b. Make recommendations regarding the appropriateness of the offender for the type of volunteer position requested based on identified risk, location, and supervision.
- C. The Superintendent/Associate Superintendent will provide final approval for all offender volunteer appointments.

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VI. Participation

- A. With the exception of dog program appointments, offender volunteer appointments will not exceed 12 months from the date of appointment approval. Offenders must wait 6 months from the completion of one appointment to apply for any other volunteer position.
- B. Staff who supervise offender volunteers will track the number of volunteer hours completed each month and forward the information to the Offender Volunteer Coordinator.
 1. The Offender Volunteer Coordinator will review the information for excessive use of the volunteer process. If the hours reported exceeds 64 hours in a month, the Offender Volunteer Coordinator may request the volunteer position become a paid offender job assignment.
 2. The Superintendent/Associate Superintendent will make the final determination of whether the position remains a volunteer position or is established as a paid offender job assignment.

VII. Suspensions and Terminations


- A. Staff who supervise offender volunteers may recommend termination of an offender from a volunteer position based on documented evidence of unacceptable behavior and/or poor job performance.
 1. If removed from any volunteer position for unacceptable behavior, the offender must wait 12 months from the time of removal to re-apply for any volunteer position.
- B. An offender who poses a threat to security or is disruptive to the program environment may be temporarily suspended pending investigation.
- C. All suspensions and terminations of offender volunteers will be subject to an internal review and approval process as detailed in the facility Offender Volunteer Program Plan.

DEFINITIONS:

Words/terms appearing in this policy may be defined in the glossary section of the Policy Manual.

ATTACHMENTS:

None

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	TITLE OFFENDER VOLUNTEERS		

DOC FORMS:

[DOC 12-028 Application for Offender Volunteer Position](#)

[DOC 13-041 Health Status Report](#)



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DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

APPLICABILITY
PRISON/WORK RELEASE/FIELD
OFFENDER MANUAL

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POLICY

TITLE
MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES

REVIEW/REVISION HISTORY:

Effective: 3/8/01
Revised: 11/25/06
Revised: 7/19/10
Revised: 10/17/11

SUMMARY OF REVISION/REVIEW:

Major changes. Read carefully!

APPROVED:

Signature on file

G. STEVEN HAMMOND, PhD, MD, MHA
Chief Medical Officer

9/12/11

Date Signed

Signature on file

CHERYL STRANGE, Assistant Secretary
Health Services

9/12/11


Date Signed

Signature on file

BERNARD WARNER, Secretary
Department of Corrections

9/13/11

Date Signed

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REFERENCES:


DOC 100.100 is hereby incorporated into this policy; [RCW 71.05](#); [RCW 72.09](#); [RCW 74.09](#); [ACA 4-4368](#); [ACA 4-4370](#); [ACA 4-4371](#); [ACA 4-4372](#); [ACA 4-4374](#); [ACA 4-4404](#); [ACA 4-4435](#); [ACA 4C-15](#); [DOC 300.380 Classification and Custody Facility Plan Review](#); DOC 420.250 Use of Restraints; [DOC 490.820 Prison Rape Elimination Act \(PREA\) Risk Assessments and Assignments](#); [DOC 610.010 Offender Consent for Health Care](#); [DOC 610.040 Health Screenings, Appraisals, and Status](#); [DOC 610.110 Transfer of Offenders for Health Reasons](#); [DOC 630.540 Involuntary Antipsychotic Administration](#); [DOC 630.550 Suicide Prevention](#); [DOC 630.590 Offender Re-entry Community Safety \(ORCS\) Program Review](#); [DOC 640.020 Offender Health Records Management](#); [Guidelines PULHES Codes](#); [Mental Health Transfer Procedure](#); [Offender Health Plan](#); [Safety Watch Procedure](#); [Telepsychiatry Procedure](#)

POLICY:


- I. Medically necessary mental health services will be provided per the Offender Health Plan (OHP), Mental Health Services Procedures, and the Mental Health Care Review Committee.
- II. Mental health services that are not medically necessary but that support correctional objectives will be provided as described in this policy.

DIRECTIVE:

- I. Responsibilities
 - A. The Director of Behavioral Health is responsible for directing mental health services, and directs and coordinates the functions of the:
 1. Chief of Psychiatry,
 2. Mental Health Administrator,
 3. Chemical Dependency Services Administrator,
 4. Offender Re-entry Community Safety (ORCS) Program Administrator, and
 5. Behavioral Health Transition Manager.
 - B. The Chief of Psychiatry and the Mental Health Administrator are responsible for developing and implementing clinical Guidelines, Procedures, Protocols, and Algorithms which are evidence based and in alignment with the Offender Health Plan.
 - C. The Mental Health Administrator is responsible for statewide implementation of this policy.

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- D. The Mental Health Administrator will designate a Mental Health Lead for each facility responsible for implementing this policy within the facility and ensuring that:
1. A Primary Therapist (i.e., mental health staff responsible for coordinating the offender’s mental health care) is assigned prior to arrival at the facility for each offender with a PULHES “S” code of 2 or higher.
 2. A facility mental health staff is designated to coordinate release planning for Serious Mentally Ill offenders. The name of this staff member will be provided in writing to the Mental Health Administrator.
- E. Primary Therapists are responsible for coordinating mental health services for each offender assigned to them, in accordance with the Offender Health Plan and this policy.
- F. Designated release planning staff are responsible for ensuring that offenders with mental illness receive release planning services as outlined in this policy.
- II. Access to Care
- A. Offenders will have access to mental health services through:
1. Screening,
 - a. [4-4368] [4-4370] All offenders newly admitted to the Department (i.e., intersystem) will receive a mental health screening by health services staff, completed on DOC 13-349 Intersystem Mental Health Screening.
 - b. [4C-15] All offenders transferring between facilities or placed in Rap House/Lincoln Park Work Release (i.e., intrasystem) will be screened by health services staff on DOC 13-421 Intrasystem Intake Screening per DOC 610.040 Health Screenings, Appraisals, and Status.
 2. [4-4435] Self Referral, and
 - a. Offenders may request mental health services by:
 - 1) Submitting DOC 13-423 Health Services Kite.
 - 2) Declaring a mental health emergency or expressing acute mental health symptoms to staff.

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b. Mental health staff will use DOC 13-477 Mental Health Crisis Screening to document the outcome of their response to the offender.

3. Staff Referral.

a. Facility staff will report signs of mental illness to mental health staff.

1) Routine staff referrals are submitted on DOC 13-420 Request for Mental Health Assessment.

2) Urgent staff referrals are made through immediate verbal contact with mental health staff. DOC 13-420 Request for Mental Health Assessment will be completed by the referring staff following an urgent referral.

3) Mental health staff will use DOC 13-477 Mental Health Crisis Screening to document the outcome of their response to the offender.

B. [4-4368] Consent for services will be obtained per DOC 610.010 Offender Consent for Health Care.

III. Mental Health Services Provided under the Offender Health Plan


A. [4-4435] Crisis Services

1. [4-4368] Crisis services are provided for offenders with symptoms of an acute mental disorder that impairs the offender's ability to function in areas such as self-care, social functioning, communication, and/or judgment. The offender may pose a safety risk to themselves and/or others. In addition to the services that are provided under DOC 630.550 Suicide Prevention, crisis services may include:


a. Emergent/urgent mental health crisis screening, which will be the basis for prioritizing the offender for further mental health appraisal using DOC 13-477 Mental Health Crisis Screening, if applicable.

b. Immediate access to services if a crisis exists at the time of evaluation.


c. Delivery of emergent/urgent psychiatric services and/or psychotropic medications per DOC 630.540 Involuntary Antipsychotic Administration.

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- 1) Restraints will be used only as permitted by DOC 420.250 Use of Restraints.
- d. Delivery of brief crisis counseling services.
2. If mental health staff are not available at the facility during a mental health crisis:
 - a. DOC 630.550 Suicide Prevention and DOC 420.250 Use of Restraints will be followed as appropriate.
 - b. The Shift Commander will direct safety and security measures to address the crisis.
 - c. These responses will continue until mental health staff are available or the offender is moved to a facility with the appropriate mental health services.
3. Mental health staff may make housing recommendations to the Housing Unit Supervisor using DOC 13-478 Mental Health Close Observation Aftercare, DOC 13-477 Mental Health Crisis Screening, or DOC 13-420 Requests for Mental Health Assessment. Recommendations may including:
 - a. Remain in general population or an Intensive Management Unit.
 - 1) Mental Health staff will determine if any alerts for potential victims or predators are indicated, and alert custody staff as necessary.
 - b. Urgent/emergent transfer to another facility with clinically appropriate crisis services.
 - c. Urgent or routine transfer to a Mental Health Residential Treatment Unit.
 - d. Placement in a Close Observation Area (COA), which can be made by any mental health professional or by the Superintendent/designee if acute care is needed that cannot be provided elsewhere.
 - 1) Offenders in COA will be assessed daily by mental health or nursing staff.

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- 2) Prior to release from COA, mental health staff will complete DOC 13-478 Mental Health Close Observation Aftercare.
 4. Based on an offender's behavior and mental health status, mental health staff may request a safety watch for an offender per the Safety Watch Procedure located under Health Services on InsideDOC.
 - a. Mental health staff will use DOC 13-393 Conditions of Confinement - Mental Health to establish any necessary conditions of confinement.
- B. Routine Mental Health Services
1. Appraisal
 - a. A mental health professional will complete a mental health appraisal per DOC 610.040 Health Screenings, Appraisals, and Status within 14 days of screening for offenders identified as needing mental health services. [4-4371] [4-4372] [4-4374] [4-4404]
 - b. In order for an offender to qualify for outpatient mental health services or admission to a Residential Treatment Unit, DOC 13-376 Mental Health Appraisal must be completed and the offender must have a qualifying condition as defined by the Offender Health Plan.
 - 1) The Mental Health Administrator may approve immediate Residential Treatment Unit placement for offenders with acute needs. DOC 13-376 Mental Health Appraisal will be completed upon admission.
 2. DOC 13-476 Mental Health Update must be completed for all offenders who have a PULHES code "S" 2 or above and are in active treatment:
 - a. Within 14 days of an intrasystem transfer, unless one has been completed in the past 90 days.
 - b. Within 14 days of admission to a Residential Treatment Unit.
 - c. When there is a significant change in mental status that results in providing increased treatment.
 - d. At least every 12 months from the original DOC 13-376 Mental Health Appraisal or most recent DOC 13-476 Mental Health Update.

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3. [4-4368] There will be a treatment plan documented on DOC 13-379 Mental Health Treatment Plan for all offenders in active treatment, including brief services.
 - a. DOC 13-379 Mental Health Treatment Plan must be initiated at the beginning of routine mental health services and must be updated at least:
 - 1) Annually for Outpatient Services.
 - 2) Every 90 days for Residential Services.
 - b. DOC 13-379 Mental Health Treatment Plan for offenders in active co-occurring mental health and chemical dependency treatment will be jointly developed by chemical dependency staff and the Primary Therapist using DOC 14-051 Chemical Dependency Co-occurring Disorder (MH/CD) Treatment Plan.

IV. Residential Treatment


- A. [4-4404] Residential treatment is provided for offenders with a significant mental disorder, the symptoms of which result in serious impairment in adaptive functioning and may include a safety risk for the offender and/or others. These offenders are unable to function in general population.
- B. Residential treatment will be provided as defined in the Offender Health Plan at Monroe Correctional Complex, Washington State Penitentiary, and the Washington Corrections Center for Women.

V. [4-4368] Outpatient Services

- A. Outpatient services are provided for offenders with mild to moderate symptoms of mental illness. Services will be prioritized based on acuity level and functional impairment, with the most highly acute/impaired being the highest priority for services.
- B. Outpatient mental health services are provided as defined in the Offender Health Plan at all Prisons except Larch Corrections Center and at Rap House/Lincoln Work Release.

VI. Telepsychiatry Services

- A. Telepsychiatry services may be provided for offenders with serious mental illness or offenders who have significant behavioral or cognitive defects per the Telepsychiatry Procedure located under Health Services on InsideDOC.


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VII. Transition Services


- A. Transition services include relapse prevention planning and/or other clinical services. Transition services will be available to offenders who qualify under the Offender Health Plan to help them successfully transition into the community. This includes offenders who are:
1. In Residential Treatment Units,
 2. Receiving outpatient mental health services, or
 3. Not currently receiving mental health services, but qualify for transition services as described in the Offender Health Plan.

VIII. Release Planning for Offenders with Serious Mental Illness

- A. Six months prior to the offender's Earned Release Date (ERD), the designated facility mental health staff will review seriously mentally ill (SMI) offenders listed in the monthly SMI Report, along with supporting information, to determine which offenders will need community mental health aftercare.
1. For offenders identified, the designated facility mental health staff will:
 - a. Assist with referrals to community supports and appropriate benefits or entitlements.
 - b. Collaborate with Classification Counselors and Community Corrections Officers in planning and preparation for offender transition into the community.
- B. Three months prior to ERD, the designated facility mental health staff will:
1. Assist identified offenders in completing their application for expedited Medicaid eligibility for medical benefits as required in RCW 74.09.555 by completing the following forms:
 - a. DOC 13-450 Behavioral Health Discharge Summary
 - b. [DSHS 13-789 Citizenship Documentation and Identity Declaration](#)
 - c. [DSHS 14-001 Application for Benefits](#)
 - d. [DSHS 14-012 Consent](#)
 - e. [DSHS 14-050 Statement of Health, Education, and Employment](#)
 - f. [DSHS 14-194 Medical Coverage Information](#), if applicable
 - g. [DSHS 14-224 Statement from Landlord/Manager](#), if applicable
 - h. [DSHS 14-251 Revocable Burial Fund Provision Supplemental Security Income \(CCI\) Related Statement of Applicant/Recipient of Other Person](#), if applicable

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- i. [DSHS 18-235 Interim Assistance Reimbursement Authorization](#)
- 2. Submit the packet of completed forms to the local Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) [Community Services Office](#) found on the DSHS website.
- 3. Coordinate with the local DSHS Community Support Office by telephone or email to determine the outcome of the application for Medicaid benefits.
- 4. Request an intake appointment from the Regional Support Network in the probable county of residence, if the offender is presumed eligible by DSHS for Medicaid benefits. Contact information for the [Regional Support Networks](#) is found on the DSHS website.
- 5. Save the completed DOC 13-450 Behavioral Health Discharge Summary to the Health Services SharePoint site.
 - a. DOC 13-450 Behavioral Health Discharge Summary will be accessible after hours for response to requests from law enforcement and mental health providers per DOC 640.020 Offender Health Records Management.
- 6. Send the completed DOC 13-450 Behavioral Health Discharge Summary to the Community Corrections Office that is assigned in the Offender Release Plan.
- C. Release planning for offenders who are designated for the Offender Reentry Community Safety (ORCS) Program must be provided per DOC 630.590 Offender Re-entry Community Safety (ORCS) Program Review. This includes participation in the planning meetings and responding to all information requests by ORCS Program staff.
- D. Civil Commitment
 - 1. If there is concern about imminent harm to self or others or grave disability that would potentially meet the civil commitment requirements of RCW 71.05, the Primary Therapist or psychiatric prescriber will coordinate with the supervising psychologist (i.e., psychologist responsible for clinical oversight of mental health services provided for an offender) to:
 - a. Contact the designated mental health professional in the community one week prior to the release date,
 - b. Request that the offender be evaluated for civil commitment,

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- c. Provide any background or additional information needed for the evaluation, and
- d. Document the process in the offender health record.

IX. Mental Health Services Provided Outside the Offender Health Plan

A. Services provided within Intensive Management Units (IMUs) by mental health staff include:


- 1. Routine rounds to assist in ongoing monitoring of IMU offenders.
- 2. Participation in individual behavior management plan development to increase safety for staff and offenders.
- 3. Facilitating offender change programming.

B. Consultation services provided include:

- 1. Participation in Facility Risk Management Team (FRMT) meetings regarding:
 - a. Offenders with PULHES “S” codes of 3 or higher,
 - b. Offenders who have specific mental health information in their history or case file that causes mental health concerns, or
 - c. Requests for clinical reviews under DOC 490.820 Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) Risk Assessments and Assignments.
- 2. Participation in regularly scheduled Screening Committees per RCW 72.09 and DOC 300.380 Classification and Custody Facility Plan Review.
- 3. Coordination between the Custody Facility Plan and DOC 13-379 Mental Health Treatment Plan.

C. [4-4372] Comprehensive Mental Health Evaluations

- 1. Types of evaluations provided include:
 - a. Indeterminate Sentence Review Board (ISRB)/End of Sentence Review Committee (ESRC) forensic evaluations.
 - b. Other forensic psychological evaluations as resources permit.
- 2. These evaluations will be conducted by a:

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- a. Licensed psychologist,
- b. Licensed psychiatrist, or
- c. Mental health professional or clinical intern/resident under the close clinical supervision of a licensed psychologist or licensed psychiatrist, and as designated by the Director of Behavioral Health.

X. Consultation regarding Offenders in Work Release (except Rap House/Lincoln Park) or on Community Supervision

A. [4C-15] Community Corrections staff who express concerns to Department mental health staff about an offender’s mental health will be referred to:


- 1. The local community or private mental health provider, if the offender is currently receiving routine treatment.
- 2. A Department Psychology Associate at the Community Justice Center (CJC) for consultation.
- 3. Local community mental health crisis services or emergency room for urgent treatment.
- 4. A designated mental health professional in the community, if there is concern about imminent harm to self or others or grave disability that would potentially meet the civil commitment requirements of RCW 71.05.
 - a. The Community Corrections staff will request that the offender be evaluated for civil commitment and provide any background or additional information needed for the evaluation.

XI. Facility Transfer

A. Offenders will be transferred per DOC 300.380 Classification and Custody Facility Plan Review and DOC 610.110 Transfer of Offenders for Health Reasons.

B. Additional requirements for transfers to/from a Mental Health Residential Treatment Unit and transfers of offenders with a PULHES “S” code of 3 or higher are as follows:

- 1. The offender must be transferred according to the Mental Health Transfer Procedure located under Health Services on InsideDOC.
- 2. DOC 13-465 Mental Health Transfer Screening must be completed.

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3. These requirements do not apply for offenders transferring to Segregation or an Intensive Management Unit.

XII. Recordkeeping

- A. Mental health staff will document all Department mental health services and the offender's responses to treatment in the offender health record. At a minimum, there must be documentation of:
 1. Crisis, acute, and residential treatment services, and
 - a. Each clinical contact, evaluation, psychological assessment, and/or medication review,
 - b. Status/progress of the offender at least weekly, and
 - c. Current and updated PULHES codes and Offender Based Tracking System (OBTS) DT85/86.
 2. Facility screenings, outpatient care, appraisals, and evaluations.
 - a. Each mental health screening, appraisal, outpatient contact, evaluation, and/or medication review.
- B. Mental health staff must complete DOC 14-128 Patient Mental Health Encounter Coding or DOC 14-131 Patient Psychiatry Encounter Coding for each patient encounter.

DEFINITIONS:


The following words/terms are important to this policy and are defined in the glossary section of the Policy Manual: Seriously Mentally Ill. Other words/terms appearing in this policy may also be defined in the glossary.

ATTACHMENTS:

None

DOC FORMS:

[DOC 13-349 Intersystem Mental Health Screening](#) [4-4370]
[DOC 13-376 Mental Health Appraisal](#) [4-4371] [4-4374]
[DOC 13-379 Mental Health Treatment Plan](#)
[DOC 13-393 Conditions of Confinement - Mental Health](#)
[DOC 13-420 Request for Mental Health Assessment](#)
[DOC 13-421 Intrasystem Intake Screening](#) [4-4370]
[DOC 13-423 Health Services Kite](#)

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[DOC 13-450 Behavioral Health Discharge Summary](#)

[DOC 13-465 Mental Health Transfer Screening](#)

[DOC 13-476 Mental Health Update](#)

[DOC 13-477 Mental Health Crisis Screening](#)

[DOC 13-478 Mental Health Close Observation Aftercare](#)

[DOC 14-051 Chemical Dependency Co-occurring Disorder \(MH/CD\) Treatment Plan](#)

[DOC 14-128 Patient Mental Health Encounter Coding](#)

[DOC 14-131 Patient Psychiatry Encounter Coding](#)

Appendix J
In-service Training Plan 2010

DOC – Annual (In-Service) Training Plan FY 2010

Overview

Introduction	This document provides information regarding the in-service courses for the Department of Corrections for fiscal year 2010.
Purpose	The purpose of this plan is to communicate the basic in-service requirements for staff in the agency. It is recognized some staff members have specific job duties or assignments which require specialized training above and beyond the basic in-service plan.
Exceptions	Agency New Employee basic academies, supervisory and leadership courses, and Special Teams training are not limited by this plan.
Modifications and Additions	Any modifications or additions to the basic requirements must be approved in writing by the Organizational Development Director and the respective Assistant Secretary.
Contractor Training	Many of the courses required by policy and/or ACA are also requirements for contractors. These requirements may be completed at DOC sites or credit is to be awarded for classes conducted by the contractor.
Contact	For information regarding this plan please contact: Kevin Bovenkamp Organizational Development Director (360) 725-8517

Prison In-Service

Purpose The purpose of this document is to provide detailed information about the in-service classes for all staff who work in or at a prison facility.

FPC Considerations When planning their delivery strategy, Facility Performance Coordinators should consider:

- Flexibility in meeting contractor training requirements
 - Specialized training requirements
 - Developing strategies to accomplish requirements
-

Non-Custody The following courses are required for all non-custody staff who work in or at a facility.

Course	Time
IDC Annual	1 hour
Fire Extinguisher	.5 hour
IT Security	.5 hour
Sexual Harassment Prevention	2 hours
Confidentiality of Medical Information	.5 hour
Vehicle Safety – Defensive Driving	1 hour
PREA	1 hour
Emergency Response Planning	3 hours
Suicidal Offender: Signs and Symptoms	1 hour
Facility Specific	1.5 hours
Total:	12 hours

Continued on next page

Prison In-Service, Continued

Custody

The following courses are required for all custody staff.

Course	Time
IDC Annual	1 hour
Fire Extinguisher	.5 hour
IT Security	.5 hour
Sexual Harassment Prevention	2 hours
Confidentiality of Medical Information	.5 hour
Vehicle Safety – Defensive Driving	1 hour
PREA	1 hour
Emergency Response Planning	3 hours
Suicidal Offender: Signs and Symptoms	1 hours
Facility Specific	1.5 hours
OC Update	.5 hour
Control Tactics Level 1	7.5 hours
Defensive Tactics Level 2	4 hours
Weapons Qualification	8 hours
Totals:	32 hours

PD Safety Audit Lessons

In addition to the above requirements, the Prison's Division Safety Audit requires that certain staff be trained in all/some of the lessons listed below.

- Fork Lift
 - Confined Space
 - Lock out/Tag out
 - HAZCOM
 - Respirator, Custody
 - Respirator, Maintenance
 - Respirator, Medical
 - Asbestos Awareness
-

Contact

For information regarding Prison Division plan contact:
Pam Clevenger-Shanahan
Organizational Development Manager
(360) 725-8819

Community Corrections and HQ In-Service

Purpose

The purpose of this document is to provide detailed information about the in-service classes for staff who work in Headquarters, CI Headquarters, and community corrections locations.

This includes staff from the following:

- Community Corrections
 - Government, Community Relations and Regulatory Compliance
 - Offender Programs
 - Organizational Development
 - Health Services
 - Administrative Services
 - Prisons
-

**ASD,
Offender
Programs,
HQ, CI HQ,
and
Government,
Community
Relations and
Regulatory
Compliance**

The following courses are required for all staff who work in Administrative Services, Offender Programs, Headquarters, Correctional Industries Headquarters, and Government, Community Relations and Regulatory Compliance staff.

Course	Time
IDC Annual	1 hour
Fire Extinguisher	.5 hour
IT Security	.5 hour
Sexual Harassment Prevention	2 hours
Vehicle Safety – Defensive Driving	1 hour
Confidentiality of Medical Information	.5 hour
PREA	1 hour
Totals:	6.5 hours

Continued on next page

Community Corrections and HQ In-Service, Continued

CCD Support Staff

The following courses are for all Community Corrections Division support staff:

Note: Emergency Response Plan will be delivered in Unit meetings.

Course	Time
IDC Annual	1 hour
Fire Extinguisher	.5 hour
IT Security	.5 hour
Sexual Harassment Prevention	2 hours
Confidentiality of Medical Information	.5 hour
Vehicle Safety – Defensive Driving	1 hour
PREA	1 hour
Emergency Response Plan	2 hours
Totals:	8.5 hours

CCO, CCS, Specialist, CO, & FA

The following courses are for all Community Corrections Officers, Community Corrections Supervisors, Community Corrections Specialists, Correctional Officers and Field Administrators:

Note: Emergency Response Plan will be delivered in Unit meetings.

Course	Time
IDC Annual	1 hour
Fire Extinguisher	.5 hour
IT Security	.5 hour
Sexual Harassment Prevention	2 hours
Confidentiality of Medical Information	.5 hour
Vehicle Safety – Defensive Driving	1 hour
PREA	1 hour
Emergency Response Plan	2 hours
Defensive Tactics	15.5 hours
OC Update	.5 hour
Weapons Qualification (for armed staff only)	8 hours
Totals:	Unarmed without OC: 24 hours Unarmed with OC: 24.5 hours Armed: 32.5 hours

Continued on next page

Community Corrections and HQ In-Service, Continued

Work Release Staff In addition to the above listed courses, all Work Release staff must complete the Suicidal Offender: Signs and Symptoms class.

Contact For information regarding the Community Corrections and HQ plan contact:
Melinda Kupers
Organizational Development Manager
(360) 725-8822

Additional Training Initiatives

Introduction

Several additional training initiatives in the agency are already in the planning or implementation stages as noted below. These initiatives are planned and coordinated from DOC HQ's and will be implemented in addition to the basic in-service requirements as time and resources allow during the next fiscal year.

Continued Deliveries

The following table represents courses that will be offered during fiscal year 2010.

Course	Time	Audience	Comments
Emergency Management System Level 300	24 hours	Incident Commanders	Offered June-Sept 2009
Supervision & Leadership Academy	40 hours	Lead workers, First level Supervisors, Managers	Offered monthly
Drug Free Workplace: for Managers and Supervisors	1 hour	Key HR staff, CI Managers, and ELT	
Investigator Training	16 hours	Staff newly assigned to conduct investigations	Offered by DOC HR, DOP, and AG's Office
ERT Academy	50 hours	New ERT members	
SERT Academy	50 hours	New SERT members	
CNT Academy	40 hours	New CNT members	Fall 2009
CCD Weapons Academy	40 hours	CCD staff who are approved to be armed	Offered as Needed

Continued on next page

Additional Training Initiatives, Continued

Planned Deliveries

The following table represents courses that are currently under development and will be offered during fiscal year 2010.

Course	Time	Audience	Comments
Joint Operations Academy	TBD	Administrators, Executives, Incident Commanders	Planned for delivery in mid-Fall 2009.
Gender Responsiveness	16-24 hours	Staff at facilities with female offenders	WCCW, MCCCW, and PLCCW
Leading Workplace Learning/FTO for CCD	40 hours	Community Corrections Officer 3's and Supervisors	
Performance Development Plan training	TBD	Supervisors and Managers	
HR Supervision Basics	TBD	Supervisors	

Continued on next page

Additional Training Initiatives, Continued

Seminars

The following table represents seminars that will be delivered during fiscal year 2010.

Course	Time	Audience	Comments
Self Defense for Support Staff	8 hours	Agency Non-Custody/Support Staff	Coordinated by local FPC and/or CCD In-Service Staff
Health Services Specific Courses	TBD	Health Services Staff	Coordinated by local FPC
Accessing Mental Health Treatment in the Community	2 hour	Classification Counselors, CCO's, Community Corrections Specialists	Delivered by CCD In-Service Staff
Engaging Offender Motivation	TBD	Classification Counselors, CCO's, Community Corrections Specialists	Delivered by CCD In-Service Staff

Appendix K

Staff Message on New Training Plan

Last Tuesday Ken Jennings and I facilitated the second round of in-service classes titled, Movement: A Security Routine and Physical Plant Safety. Each class was 2 hours in length and was presented to both custody and non custody staff here at CRCC. These two classes were added to the statewide in-service training agenda in response to the passage of Engrossed Senate Bill 5907. This bill was introduced and passed in response to the unfortunate death of Officer Jayme Biendl on January 29th, 2011. The bill covers many issues of which DOC is either incorporating right now, or are in the development and procurement stage of doing so. Training of staff is one such issue the bill expressly covers. With that said, It was the outstanding CRCC staff that Ken and I encountered last Tuesday that inspired me to write this email.

The term "In-Service Training" sometimes evokes negative feelings from staff. These feelings often materialize from staff believing the material being delivered doesn't apply to them, or that they are hearing it unchanged, for the 15th time. Comments such as, "This doesn't really apply to me" or, "I'm only here because I have to be." Is common. Well folks, not anymore. The times, they are a changing. The tragic death of Officer Biendl generated unfathomable sorrow amongst friends, coworkers, DOC and law enforcement staff, and many others who only knew of the sacrifice Jayme made for the citizens of Washington State. This tragedy however also generated new conversations dealing with staff safety. More so now than ever before in Washington prisons.

When I began to dialogue with the staff on Tuesday I was hoping for buy-in on the material I was facilitating. I was hoping to grasp their attention for more than the 20 minutes the average adult learner stays on task. WOW. Four hours later the staff were wanting more information on what was being delivered. Many wanted the class to be.....dare I say it.....LONGER. Why you ask? Why these ridiculous comments? It's because the topic of these two classes was the safety of each one of us in class. It was how do I make sure I go home safe each night. It was how do I ensure my coworkers go home each night safe. And, it was how do I change the culture of CRCC so that this type of thinking becomes our new paradigm. This was not a class where the instructor stands up front and lectures from the podium. This was a conversation involving all staff in the classroom. The facilitators (Ken & I) were there to remind folks when it was break time and to provide handouts. Well, kind of. The meat of these classes is to inspire conversation amongst staff here at CRCC as it relates to staff safety and awareness of our surroundings.

As I stated earlier, I was inspired by the enthusiasm staff showed in regards to wanting to think about staff safety here at work and wanting to be part of the change being brought to prisons throughout the state. It's very easy to say, "That's a custody issue. They'll deal with it". Or "That's not really in my pay range to figure out." We've all either said it or thought it once or twice in our careers. All staff are now part of the solution. Custody and non custody staff alike are providing incredible information in order to develop the blueprints for staff safety that will endure for years. And from what I witnessed in the four hours I was in class last Tuesday, they are doing a great job!!!

Thank you all for your looking out for my safety. I'll return the gesture.

Appendix L
Body Alarms Survey Form
And
Summary of Surveys Submitted

Body Alarm System Evaluation and Feedback – please evaluate each vendor’s system and provide your feedback – THANK YOU for participating!

Vendor Name:

1.	The strengths and best features of this vendor’s System are:				
2.	The weaknesses, and my concerns (if any), with this vendor’s System are:				
In this section, please rate the following statements:		Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
3.	If this vendor’s System was implemented Safety would be improved.	1	2	3	4
4.	This vendor’s System meets my expectations for a Body Alarm system.	1	2	3	4
5.	This vendor’s portable device will be reasonably durable in my work environment.	1	2	3	4
6.	This vendor’s portable device is easy to carry and use.	1	2	3	4
7.	Other comments regarding this vendor’s System:				

Vendor Name:

1.	The strengths and best features of this vendor's System are:				
2.	The weaknesses, and my concerns (if any), with this vendor's System are:				
	In this section, please rate the following statements:	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
3.	If this vendor's System was implemented Safety would be improved.	1	2	3	4
4.	This vendor's System meets my expectations for a Body Alarm system.	1	2	3	4
5.	This vendor's portable device will be reasonably durable in my work environment.	1	2	3	4
6.	This vendor's portable device is easy to carry and use.	1	2	3	4
7.	Other comments regarding this vendor's System:				

Vendor Name:

1.	The strengths and best features of this vendor's System are:				
2.	The weaknesses, and my concerns (if any), with this vendor's System are:				
	In this section, please rate the following statements:	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
3.	If this vendor's System was implemented Safety would be improved.	1	2	3	4
4.	This vendor's System meets my expectations for a Body Alarm system.	1	2	3	4
5.	This vendor's portable device will be reasonably durable in my work environment.	1	2	3	4
6.	This vendor's portable device is easy to carry and use.	1	2	3	4
7.	Other comments regarding this vendor's System:				

Vendor Name:

1.	The strengths and best features of this vendor's System are:				
2.	The weaknesses, and my concerns (if any), with this vendor's System are:				
	In this section, please rate the following statements:	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
3.	If this vendor's System was implemented Safety would be improved.	1	2	3	4
4.	This vendor's System meets my expectations for a Body Alarm system.	1	2	3	4
5.	This vendor's portable device will be reasonably durable in my work environment.	1	2	3	4
6.	This vendor's portable device is easy to carry and use.	1	2	3	4
7.	Other comments regarding this vendor's System:				

Vendor Name:

1.	The strengths and best features of this vendor's System are:				
2.	The weaknesses, and my concerns (if any), with this vendor's System are:				
	In this section, please rate the following statements:	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
3.	If this vendor's System was implemented Safety would be improved.	1	2	3	4
4.	This vendor's System meets my expectations for a Body Alarm system.	1	2	3	4
5.	This vendor's portable device will be reasonably durable in my work environment.	1	2	3	4
6.	This vendor's portable device is easy to carry and use.	1	2	3	4
7.	Other comments regarding this vendor's System:				

Vendor Name:

1.	The strengths and best features of this vendor's System are:				
2.	The weaknesses, and my concerns (if any), with this vendor's System are:				
	In this section, please rate the following statements:	Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree
3.	If this vendor's System was implemented Safety would be improved.	1	2	3	4
4.	This vendor's System meets my expectations for a Body Alarm system.	1	2	3	4
5.	This vendor's portable device will be reasonably durable in my work environment.	1	2	3	4
6.	This vendor's portable device is easy to carry and use.	1	2	3	4
7.	Other comments regarding this vendor's System:				

Additional comments not specific to a vendor are encouraged.

Use the space provided below for any additional comments.

Body Alarm Systems Evaluation and Feedback

Summary of 80 Responses

		Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	N/R
1.	After viewing the systems I believe a Body Alarm system will enhance staff safety.	52 (67%)	20 (26%)	2 (3%)	4 (5%)	2
<p>Comments:</p> <p>I believe it will help with staff safety and locating of staff in an emergency.</p> <p>I believe this for those working within the perimeter of the prisons.</p> <p>Depending on accuracy (working / tracking inside facility).</p> <p>Look at how this would effect A/L and SLL.</p> <p>I support the Visonic Technologies because it has various equipment for single and multiple posts and requires onsite responding staff to reset.</p> <p>A body alarm system would enhance staff safety by providing constant knowledge of where staff are and what situation they might be in based on body position and location in the facility in which they work.</p> <p>TSI Prism seems to be the best. <i>(2 comments like this.)</i></p> <p>All staff should wear a device.</p> <p>The systems are able to be disabled by the user.</p>						
		Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	N/R
2.	After viewing the systems I would carry a portable alarm device in my work assignment if it was available.	49 (65%)	17 (23%)	6 (8%)	3 (4%)	5
<p>Comments:</p> <p>I work outside the perimeter. If available I would but not as relevant as for inside.</p> <p>For non-custody I like the Elmo Tech small alarm – others too bulky.</p> <p>Should be assigned to A/L and SLL staff.</p> <p>As a Shift Lt. I am already one of the most protected persons on a shift, but when I am out making rounds carrying a portable would be highly advantageous.</p> <p>I think an alarm should be designated for all staff, not just custody.</p> <p>Several did not appear practical to carry due to size.</p> <p>Only if it was small and could be worn behind my ID or on my lanyard.</p> <p>Too many devices between radio and other options. Need to consolidate.</p> <p>Absolutely.</p> <p>I would carry a body alarm if it were available based on my work assignment. I am in a room by myself with an offender or offenders most every day. Since I work in a minimum security setting the monitoring is minimal and the staffing to watch my back is even more minimal. Having something like this enhances my safety and enables someone to watch my back when no one is in the immediate area.</p> <p>Not sure I would carry a device.</p> <p>If it worked for me in my area.</p> <p>Not applicable. From HQ. <i>(2 comments like this.)</i></p> <p>If visiting an institution.</p>						

		Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	N/R
3.	The portable alarm devices demonstrated appear to be well suited to my work assignment.	34 (47%)	32 (44%)	5 (7%)	2 (3%)	7
<p>Comments:</p> <p>They are well suited for the prison environment.</p> <p>Most definitely and could be used to account for non-uniform staff inside the security perimeter.</p> <p>Some did not have the smaller devices for non-custody.</p> <p>The Visonic ones were the only ones practical to me.</p> <p>The portable alarm devices do appear to be well suited to my work assignment. I have more evaluative things to say that might be helpful and I will put the information in the Additional Comments section below.</p> <p>Some.</p> <p>Small design, easy to use.</p> <p>Some were great. Others were not so good.</p> <p>Some are and some are not.</p> <p>Not applicable. From HQ. (2 comments like this.)</p> <p>Not applicable. However, I believe they are suited for corrections.</p>						
		Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	N/R
4.	The portable alarm devices demonstrated appear to be durable given my work environment.	36 (49%)	30 (41%)	5 (7%)	2 (3%)	7
<p>Comments:</p> <p>Didn't try to break.</p> <p>Impossible to know. (2 comments like this.)</p> <p>Inmates can break anything. I have confidence in the equipment working but I think it could be broken.</p> <p>All of the alarm devices appear durable.</p> <p>Durability not demonstrated. (2 comments like this.)</p> <p>Most supported offender tracking and not staff tracking.</p> <p>Not applicable.</p>						

		Strongly agree	Somewhat agree	Somewhat disagree	Strongly disagree	N/R
5.	The portable alarm devices demonstrated appear to be comfortable and easy to use.	42 (55%)	25 (32%)	9 (12%)	1 (0%)	3
<p>Comments:</p> <p>Elmo devices looked best to me.</p> <p>Bosch had many different types which works for all the different staff and positions.</p> <p>Some were very comfortable and easy. Some seemed bulky and cumbersome.</p> <p>I only saw Bosch and Elmo Tech systems. Bosch seems easier.</p> <p>TSI seems to be a good system for officers and offenders.</p> <p>The optional choices of the type of locater appeals to me, as stated above.</p> <p>Elmo Tech (watches) is my #1 pick.</p> <p>Nordicom button was not easily accessible.</p> <p>TSI system looks to be the best. (2 comments like this.)</p> <p>Only the Visonic badge devices appeared practical and comfortable.</p> <p>Visonic has reasonable devices, but the others seemed too large / cumbersome.</p> <p>All of the alarm devices appear comfortable and easy to use.</p> <p>Makes a lot of sense.</p> <p>All looked...</p> <p>I looked at three systems. All three would serve our purpose. I am certain there are huge cost differences. Actall is currently used in Snohomish County according to rep.</p> <p>Additional devices to carry are never more comfortable to wear.</p> <p>Would depend on system.</p> <p>Unable to evaluate comfort, otherwise yes.</p>						

Additional Comments:

Bosch is better.

It is so important to be able to track staff and the offenders. Any of these systems would be great.

I like Visonic – it sends the alarm immediately, it is small, you cannot turn it off without the responder coming. Gives location, date and time. #1 of all of them.

Lease and Vendor support is important to me.

Definitely a need for staff safety.

I was impressed with Bosch and Elmo Tech systems.

Each group had unique qualities that would be beneficial to our environment. I liked the camera tracking with Bosch, the inmate tracking with Trace 3 Elmo Tech. I also like how it can track where staff are which becomes staff accountability and liability.

I would like small one that can hang from my lanyard. Also, one that does not make noise when I touch it, just alarm goes off in main control. Infrared sounded like the best.

I think inmate tracking would be very helpful if used right.

Very impressive. A lot of useful technology we would benefit from. The inmate tracking system would save a lot of money in the long run. Please consider it.

Visonic appears to have the best combinations of all services and technologies.

1) Visonic, 2) Actall, 3) Bosch.

Trace 3 seems to be the most impressive and can be used for many other purposes other than accountability.

A lanyard system is a must if my radio is pulled off of me an alarm sounds.

Lanyard system useful.

Accountability. Don't pay for several systems when we can tie them together.

Tracking offenders is not as necessary as ensuring staff safety. Please keep in mind what is doable for non-custody as custody. Bosch and Actall are preferred providers. I also suggest programming the device to only be reset by another person other than the individual wearing the device.

Of the alarm devices I observed, TSI was the most impressive.

All systems rely on electrical current. We will have to add current according to our electricians to handle any extra draw on electricity.

Out of all systems I like the Bosch.

Visonic Technologies seems like a good devices.

How about not having HQ Communications person interrupt us during a demonstration. How rude!

Additional Comments:

When I evaluated each of the alarm systems I looked at cost, durability, features and flexibility, coverage area, and difficulty of install.

- a. Cost: Cost per unit appeared roughly the same across the board on all of the systems. Many of the vendors were a bit vague on price and hedging on what the install costs might be. One concern about cost is that the units run on different batteries and have differing levels of duration based on battery life. They all appeared to be able to withstand changing batteries without losing the programming in the unit and having the expense of them being reprogrammed by a technician or a person from the company,
- b. Durability: All of the carry units appeared durable. Some of the detection antenna units appeared more vulnerable than others.
- c. Features and Flexibility: The basic features of each were very similar but some came with more flexibility, better programming, and more ability to adjust to our ever changing internal environment here in DOC.
- d. Coverage Area: This was a concern as some of the products would not track staff to where they were but only give a general area that a staff might be in based on the last query of their device prior to having set it off in an emergency. When I have a problem I don't want staff searching an area for me. I want responding staff to be able to come directly to me because they know where I am for certain.
- e. Difficulty of Install: I asked primarily about whether it was a hard wired or wireless system. A wireless system is preferable. Working at SOU for a long time, I know that we have asked to have more voice and data cables pulled in the SOU Core Building. We were politely told that this was not possible without a capitol projects request. This was because all of the existing wiring runs were completely full. New conduit would have to be run which would involve drilling holes in concrete and generally would be cost prohibitive. SOU, in the larger scheme of things, as a building really isn't that old. The older buildings we have in the Department would be in even worse shape in regard to this issue. The costs could be enormous.

Each of the products seen is listed below in order of best to worst in regard to the criteria noted above. I would unreservedly recommend purchase of number one on the following list. Best choices are one of the first three in order. The worst choice is last but any of the bottom three would be a mistake in my opinion. Here you go:

1. ElmoTech TRaCe 3: It was the most impressive system seen. It has the ability to take a full institution census electronically at any time. Tracks staff and/or offenders wherever they go in the facility and keeps track of them when out of the facility. It offers a completely wireless installation. It would be an easy retrofit for all of our facilities. It appears to have an excellent array of hardware and software. It interfaces with existing facility equipment. It offers an offsite monitoring system to be used by C/O's when they are in the community with offenders on work crews to keep track of offenders. There is nothing bad to say about this system. It is state of the are. It offers many options of which DOC could avail itself. It seems flexible enough to fit ANY of our facilities.
2. TSI PRISM: The staff location software was impressive as it responds to the incident and insures that staff are identified that are near to incident to insure a rapid dispatch of aid. The actual RFID worn by staff looks cheap as the dickens but in examining it closer it appears that it is fairly robust as well. Good flexibility in application to offenders and staff. The most

robust and durable detection antenna units appeared to be those from TSI PRISM. The problem with these was that they use FRI, creating problems with receiving in institutions with a great deal of rebar surrounding areas. They insist that this can be easily overcome and has been before but RF can get lost in the maze of rebar and concrete in which we live. Not a good thing for reliability for the individual officer. RF may not be a problem. The pieces have to be hard wired. This is also a problem. Cost may be a push with #1.

3. Bosch Security Escort and Cameras: Unique in that it centers on use of cameras and even has a night vision available. This makes the situation in a given area completely observable and takes the guesswork out of the situation for strike teams and the incident commander. Offers live tracking of staff on a display screen. It can track entry into areas in the facility that should be closed for the evening such as chapels, offices, and dayrooms. The software keeps a log of what happens throughout the time staff is on duty to track where they are and have been, establish timelines, and establish patterns of movement. Receivers appear vulnerable to offender destruction if placed in areas that would be accessible to them.
4. Visonic Technologies Elpas System: There was not as much flexibility in the tags as there was in other systems. The pieces don't appear as robust as we need. The flexibility of the system as far as use with offenders wasn't as good as others. Controllers, readers, and excitors all appeared to be vulnerable to offender destruction when installed in areas. Some hard wiring would be required.
5. Actall Corporation PALS 9000 System: Uses infrared technology that locates in a particular zone but not necessarily the exact location of the person that is in trouble. It takes its last fix based on the last detector zone through which it passes. The repeaters used throughout the system look vulnerable if mounted in areas accessible to offenders. It is wireless, a big plus as it will ease install and associated costs. It appears integratable with most of our existing systems. Cost would probably be competitive.
6. Nordicom Securalert: This uses ultrasound which does not go through walls. Receiver need to be mounted in areas to monitor the area. This would not do a zone as the ultrasound will not go through the walls. There would be situations in which the receivers would have to be mounted back to back. One receiver would be needed for each cell and they would not last long in a cell with an offender as they are just not built to take the abuse they would receive. Cost of this would go through the roof dramatically. It is poorly designed for a correctional application.

Anything will at this point in time. I like the GPS systems.

I like the systems that are "active" (continuous location monitoring) vs. "passive" (requiring an alarm signal). I like the systems with the potential to upgrade to offender monitor. I disliked the system that relied on the man-down device receiving an infrared signal due to concern that offenders might defeat the infrared transmitter. I like the size and shape of the Bosch man-down device.

These body alarms need to be made available to non-custody staff, especially the staff who work in out buildings and do not have radios. We should install a system ASAP. Thanks!

Reliable wireless seem the most functional.

Appendix M
Staff Accountability Position Description
And
Job Announcement



**POSITION DESCRIPTION
WASHINGTON GENERAL SERVICE (WGS)-SUPERVISOR**

1. ▼ Position Action (Create or Maintain Position) HRMS has more fields – these are main fields <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Establish <input type="checkbox"/> Reallocate <input type="checkbox"/> Update Data (Indicate Change)			
2. Position Staffing Status <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Vacancy – Open <input type="checkbox"/> Vacancy – Occupied <input type="checkbox"/> Vacancy - On Hold		3. Date Last Reviewed (If Established Position)	
4. Object Abbreviation (Position #)	5. Current Class Title		6. Proposed Class Title ▼ Corrections Specialist 3
7. Job - Working Title Staff Accountability Specialist		8. Assignment Pay (Capture In Essential Functions) ▼ <input type="checkbox"/> Dual Language <input type="checkbox"/> Other	
9. Pay Scale Type ▼01 Classified Gov		10. Pay Scale Area (Non-Rep or Collective Bargaining Unit) ▼	11. Salary Range
12. Incumbent's Name (If Filled Position)		13. Business Area (Agency) ▼Department of Corrections	14. Org Unit (Division/Work Unit) ▼
15. Address Where Position Is Located			
16. Personnel Sub-Area ▼	17. Employee Group ▼Project Non-competitive	18. Indicate work schedule <input type="checkbox"/> Part Time <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Full Time	19. Overtime Eligible <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
20. Supervisor's Object Abbreviation (Position #) ▼		21. Supervisor's Name	
22. Supervisor's Phone			
Position Objective			
23. Discuss in a few sentences what the position is required to accomplish. Summarize the scope of impact, responsibilities, and how the position supports/contributes to the mission of the organization. Include an organizational chart. This position works closely with the locally designated Chief of Security and supports all safety and security practices in the work location. The incumbent will take a lead role with the local Security Advisory Committees by attending committee meetings, drafting or revising applicable policy language, updating post order procedures, and communicating with both the local and statewide Security Advisory Committee. This position will develop, implement, and monitor a staff accountability system. The staff accountability system must include regular communication with staff assigned to isolated or single person posts. Communication methods will be varied and may include (but is not limited to) telephone, radio, and visual contact with staff. As part of implementation, this position may also assist in evaluating the effectiveness of an electronic system designed to account for staff or locate them in an emergency.			
Supervisory Or Lead Worker Relationships			
24 (a). Is this a lead position? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No Is this a supervisory position? <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No If supervisory , list the subordinate employees by job classification and the number of hours they each work per week.			
Job Classification (Name Optional)			Hours Worked Per Week
			40 hours
24 (b). Check the boxes that apply to this position <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Assigns Work <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Instructs and Checks the Work of Others <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Evaluates <input type="checkbox"/> Corrects <input type="checkbox"/> Disciplines <input type="checkbox"/> Hires <input type="checkbox"/> Terminates Others (* Has the authority to effectively recommend these actions.)			

Summarize the following information in narrative format.

- How is work assigned?

Verbal and written direction is provided by the Chief of Security, which is in addition to a written description of job duties and responsibilities outlined in the Position Description Form.

- With whom does the position interact to accomplish work?

All persons on facility grounds.

Add any additional information that clarifies this position's lead or supervisory responsibilities.

Essential Functions

Link to [DOP Guidance](#) on essential functions:

25. List the essential functions of this position. Functions listed in this section are primary duties and are fundamental to why the position exists. (Do not assign percentage of time in this section.)

Develops, implements, and monitors a staff accountability system.

Adjust staff accountability system as necessary to ensure effectiveness.

May be required to sit or stand for an entire shift, with intermittent rest periods and a thirty (30)-minute uninterrupted meal break, unless there is need to respond to a crisis or emergency.

Writes clear and concise reports.

Read, interpret, and follow policies, rules, regulations, operational memoranda's, post orders, etc.

Identify potential safety/security breaches and/or weaknesses.

Evaluate effectiveness of program.

Create, develop, and implement tracking systems.

Establish and maintain positive/productive professional relationships.

Working Conditions

26. Describe working environment and anticipated variation in working hours. Some or all of these conditions may be noted under the essential functions section.

Assigned hours of work: (cite shift and days off).

Work forty (40) hours per week on any shift, including regular, split, and rotational, weekends, and holidays.

Recall detailed instructions, and maintain attention and concentration for extended periods of time to include multi-tasking.

Effectively communicate in routine and emergency situations.

Maintain positive and professional work relationships.

May perform work duties unarmed, in close contact with and among large groups of confined offenders who live in crowded spaces, who may have a history of violent behavior, mental illness, and who may be aggressive and/or confrontational toward other offenders and/or staff.

May eventually work with multiple video screens, electronic tracking systems, and duress alarm systems.

Remain calm and act professionally during all emergent conditions.

Work collaboratively with diverse groups of staff and offenders.

Sit or stand for entire shift with intermittent rest periods and a thirty (30)-minute uninterrupted meal break, unless there is

need to respond to a crisis or emergency.

Walk outdoors on asphalt, dirt, gravel and/or grass surfaces in all weather conditions.

Drive a vehicle, safely.

Maintain security of institution and control movement into, out of, and within the institution in accordance with established department methods and procedures.

Apply appropriate, constructive, and professional use of authority when working with a diverse population of offenders.

Handle stressful situations that involve abuse/hostility, which requires the use of de-escalation skills.

Serve as a professional representative of DOC to the public.

Perform work duties unarmed or armed, in close contact with and among large groups of confined offenders, living in crowded spaces, who may have a history of violent behavior, and who may be aggressive and/or confrontational toward other offenders and/or staff.

Work collaboratively with diverse groups of staff and offenders.

May be required to sit or stand for an entire shift, with intermittent rest periods and a thirty (30)-minute uninterrupted meal break, unless there is need to respond to a crisis or emergency.

Walk outdoors on asphalt, dirt, gravel and/or grass surfaces in all weather conditions.

Drive a vehicle.

All Department of Corrections' facilities and vehicles are smoke free.

Must provide physical residential address and home telephone number to the Department of Corrections.

Key and Other Work Activities

[Spreadsheet](#) for calculating percentages on the Department of Personnel web site

See next page...

27 (a). List and note percentage of time assigned to key work activities of the position and identify tasks performed in support of key activities.

40% - Works closely to support the designated Chief of Security at the work location and supports all safety and security practices in the work location. The incumbent will be a standing member and take a lead role with the local Security Advisory Committees by attending committee meetings, drafting or revising applicable policy language, updating post order procedures, and communicating with both the local and statewide Security Advisory Committee members.

Primary responsibility is personnel accountability. Responsible for documentation and physical accountability of all staff/personnel in the facility. This will include the inner/outer perimeter along with surrounding facility grounds. Document and track all persons moving into and out of the facility to ensure accountability and safety status of all staff/personnel. Ensure that staff are entering and exiting through authorized control point locations. Ensure that authorized control point locations are following proper Department Policy, Facility Operational Memorandums and established procedures pertaining to entrance and egress from the facility. Maintain documentation and reports for review.

30% - Establish, conduct, and document random checks for accountability of all single person posts to include custody, non-custody, contracted, and volunteer posts. Establish and maintain an Emergency Employee Accountability Plan with regular testing of plan. Establish and maintain area logs and tracking systems. Forward and maintain monthly reports pertaining to these positions and accountability tests through the Chain of Command to the Superintendent for review.

Establish, coordinate, and document audits to ensure work area supervisors have documented and verified physical accountability for staff in their Zone of Control to include custody, non-custody, contracted, and volunteer posts. Establish and maintain a tracking system for these audits. Forward and maintain monthly reports pertaining to these audits through the Chain of Command to the Superintendent for review.

Establish and coordinate contact points for staff check in/checkout at their work location or area. Establish and monitor point of contact supervisors who will initiate and document staff physical and verbal status check ins. Establish and maintain a tracking system for these supervisors. Gather and maintain monthly reports from the supervisors and forward the monthly reports through the Chain of Command to the Superintendent for review.

Establish, coordinate, and conduct weekly emergency radio drills to include panic buttons, area duress alarms, and personal body alarms where applicable. Provide guidance, resources, and instruction for all staff pertaining to proper use and handling of personal portable facility radios, panic buttons, area duress alarms, and personal body alarms where applicable. This will be done following proper Department Policy, Facility Operational Memorandums. Gather and maintain weekly reports from the drills and forward the weekly reports through the Chain of Command to the Superintendent for review.

Working with the Facility Emergency Response Management - Establish, coordinate, and clearly mark Emergency Assembly Areas for events pertaining to Internal Evacuations. Establish a system to account for staff in the Emergency Assembly Areas. Gather and maintain quarterly reports from the drills and forward the quarterly reports through the Chain of Command to the Superintendent for review.

15% - Establish and maintain a records system for reports, audits, and required documentation. Reports are completed using MS Word, MS Excel, and/or MS Access, ensuring accountability and safety status of all staff/personnel. All documentation, reports, and drills will be saved and reported or forwarded in electronic form through the Chain of Command.

5% - Work with ATLAS and the Roster Management Office to ensure proper accountability and documentation for of all staff/personnel in your assigned Complex Zone of Control. Primarily ATLAS will assist with accountability of Custody Staff. Work with the Key Control Sergeant and Records Manager to ensure proper implementation, use, and tracking of Identification Card (ID Card) and Proximity Card systems (i.e. Electronic Turnstile Monitoring System). This will include the inner/outer perimeter along with surrounding facility grounds and buildings.

5% - Establish and maintain a working relationship your counterpart personnel on different shifts and in different Zones of Control for the purpose of consistency, continuity, and thoroughness pertaining to the Key Work Activities outlined in this Position Description.

27 (b). List and note percentage of time assigned to other work activities.

5% - Other duties as assigned and s required.

Placeholder for user to incorporate the in-training plan if appropriate for position

General Qualifications

Link to DOP Guidance on [Competencies and Qualifications](#):

28 (a). Required Education, Experience, Skills and Abilities/Competencies

Graduation from high school or GED, and four years of experience as a correctional officer or higher level custody position, in adult corrections;

OR

Formal education in Criminal Justice or closely allied field may be substituted year for year of required experience.

Demonstrated skills to write clearly, factually, and concisely.

Demonstrated ability to recall detailed instructions, maintain attention and concentration for extended periods of time.

Demonstrated effective oral and written communication skills in routine and emergency situations.

CORE COMPETENCIES FOR ALL EMPLOYEES:

Safety – Complies with all safety regulations and understands why they are important. Performs work in a safe manner at all times, including while operating a vehicle or working offsite. Maintains an organized work area, free of hazards. Reports unsafe conditions promptly. Maintains and uses personal protective equipment, where required. Attends all required safety and health training. Seeks guidance from supervisor.

Treats Others with Respect and Courtesy – Consistently treats everyone with respect and courtesy, even when the other person is discourteous or unreasonable. Actively seeks feedback from customers and others s/he interacts with on the quality of services provided. Demonstrates an ability to place him/herself in the position of the customer. Listens fully to, is respectful of, and understands others' needs, concerns, and opinions.

Dependability – Reports to work every day and on time. Is fully prepared and conforms to assigned work hours and schedule. Notifies supervisor immediately when unexpected problems cause absence, lateness, or the need to leave early. Provides adequate notice for planned leave and ensures workload is managed.

Accountability – Gets the job done. Meets all deadlines or lets supervisor know immediately when deadlines might not be met and recommends alternatives. Works on tasks in order of importance. Makes sure all parts of a job are completed in full. Without making excuses, accepts personal responsibility for the quality and timeliness of his/her work and keeps commitments. Acknowledges and corrects mistakes. Asks for feedback on his/her performance from work team members and supervisor and makes efforts to improve. Explains how the work team's actions make a real difference in meeting the needs of clients, customers, and fellow employees.

Judgment and Problem Solving – Makes timely decisions based on the best information at hand. Can describe the factors that were considered in making a decision and their relative importance. Identifies and considers alternatives before making a decision. Seeks advice from others. Considers the impact of decisions on co-workers, clientele, and other program areas. Solves problems effectively.

Leadership – Creates an environment in which people can be successful. Personally exhibits excitement, enthusiasm, and commitment to the group's mission, while linking everyday work to agency mission. Sees and takes advantage of the potential in people, opportunities, and events. Takes appropriate risks to improve performance or reach a challenging goal. Knows when to compromise and when to take a stand. Willing to responsibly challenge the status quo when necessary. Actively seeks new ideas and opportunities to improve.

Communication – Presents ideas effectively, clearly, and concisely in formal and informal situations. Listens well and asks good questions. Communicates well in writing. Keeps supervisor and co-workers informed. Shares complete and accurate information with others. Actively resolves conflicts and demonstrates effective conflict management skills.

Relationship Building – Builds and maintains effective networks of contacts that are useful in achieving work-related goals. Builds voluntary cooperation through credibility, expertise, influence, and persuasion. Goes out of his/her way to establish effective working relationships. Demonstrates an ability to build effective relationships and partnerships.

Ethics and Integrity – Earns the trust, respect, and confidence of stakeholders and co-workers through consistent honesty, forthrightness, and professionalism in all interactions. Respects and maintains confidentiality. Tells the truth and is honest in all dealings. Earns the trust of others by consistently being an exemplary role model. Keeps promises and commitments made to others. Meets goals and deadlines. Avoids inappropriate situations and actions which result in and/or present the appearance of impropriety. Adheres to appropriate and effective core values/beliefs and acts in accordance with those values at all times. Demonstrates ethical behavior and teaches its importance to others. Does not misrepresent him/herself or use his/her position for personal gain. Uses public resources appropriately.

Embracing Diversity and Cultural Differences – Foster a positive attitude and openness towards the ever changing social and cultural makeup of the workplace. Work effectively with men and women of different perspectives, abilities, disabilities, races, religions, ages, lifestyle preferences and social, ethnic and cultural backgrounds. Respectfully acknowledge people's differences and recognize these differences as important and valuable. Promote inclusiveness. Be culturally sensitive and appropriate. Respect and value diverse backgrounds and traditions.

CORE COMPETENCIES FOR SUPERVISORS AND MANAGERS (IN ADDITION TO THE ONES ABOVE):

People Management – Meets regularly with each employee to set and clarify expectations, and provide feedback and coaching. Uses formal and informal methods to monitor and track each employee's performance. Distinguishes between high and low performers, and recognizes and rewards results for high performers. Actively works to identify and retain talent. Deals promptly with performance problems by working with staff to diagnose problems, develop solutions, and monitor progress. Has the knowledge and will to take effective action with employees when performance coaching efforts fail and situation warrants. Attempts to discover what motivates each employee and uses that knowledge to benefit both the individual and the organization. Identifies employees' development needs and provides meaningful development opportunities. Conducts quality performance appraisals on time. Assists with professional development and planning.

Managing for Results – Establishes performance expectations and goals for his/her team that are specific and measurable, and accepts personal responsibility for results. Ensures that each member of his/her team has the resources and tools to meet performance expectations. Meets regularly with team and talks about team performance and ways to improve.

LOCAL AND JOB SPECIFIC COMPETENCIES:

Observation - Observes and strategize personal action, based on environmental conditions and human behavior.

Technology - Learns and utilizes computer based applications in the performance of job duties.

Stress Tolerance - Remains calm and rational while handling difficult situations to include, but not limited to, volatile, threatening or other crisis/emergency situations. Expertly intervenes in response to threats.

Professional Standards - Knows and applies community corrections related law, policy, procedure, and practice. Adheres to productivity standards and timelines established by law and policy. Identifies own training needs and proactively seeks training opportunities.

Adaptability - Incorporates new information into an existing framework of understanding. Accepts change and supports the Agency through changes in law, policy and procedure.

28 (b). Preferred/Desired Education, Training, Skills and Abilities/Competencies for Recruiting Purposes

Bachelor's degree from an accredited college or university whose accreditation is recognized by the U.S. Department of Education and the Council for Higher Education Accreditation (CHEA), in sociology, public administration, criminal justice, or similar field.

Special Requirements/Conditions of Employment

29. List any licensing, certification, or other special requirements and/or conditions of employment which are beyond general qualifications.

Washington State Driver's License.

In an emergency situation employees may be asked to stay for an extended period of time and perform duties appropriate to the situation.

The job duties as defined above are an accurate reflection of the work to be performed by this position.

Date	Supervisor's Phone Number	Supervisor's Title	Supervisor's Signature
Date	Department Head or Approving Authority's Signature		

As the incumbent in this position, I have received a copy of this position description.

Date	Employee's Signature
------	----------------------

Position details and related action have been taken by Human Resources as reflected below.

For Human Resource/Payroll Office Use Only												
Effective Date		End Date		Position Short Description				Position Long Description				
EEO Category ▼			Employee Sub-Group ▼				Position Retirement Eligible <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No		Position is <input type="checkbox"/> Funded <input type="checkbox"/> Non-funded			
Workers Comp. Code ▼			County Code ▼		Business Area ▼				Personnel Area (FEIN) ▼			
Cost Center Codes												
FUND	MSTR-IX	APP-IX	PGM-IX	ORG-IX	PROJECT	OBJECT	W-C	ALLOC	BUDGET UNIT	CNTY	CITY	PRORATION %
Date		HR Designee's Name				HR Designee's Title			HR Designee's Signature			
Date		Budget Designee's Name				Budget Designee's Title			Budget Designee's Signature			

The contents of this document may be eligible for public disclosure. Social Security Numbers are considered confidential information and will be redacted in the event of such a request. This form is governed by Executive Order 00-03, RCW 42.56, and RCW 40.14.

Appendix N

Demand to Bargain Letter



TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION 117

Affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters

General Public and Private Sector Employees and Special Services Employees in King and Pierce Counties and Employees of the State of Washington

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July 29, 2011

Ms. Diane Leigh, Director
Office of Financial Management/LRO
PO Box 43113
Olympia, WA 98504-3113

Via Email Transmittal Only
labor.relations@ofm.wa.gov

Re: Demand to Bargain – Straight Eight (8) Hour Shifts

Dear Ms. Leigh:

I am writing as a follow-up to Ms. Donna Haley's letter, dated July 13, 2011, regarding continued implementation of straight eight (8) hour shifts at remaining prison facilities. The Union hereby demands to bargain implementation of these schedules at any other DOC facilities.

Unfortunately, your office was not present at the negotiations that occurred at Monroe Correctional Complex, which created issues regarding the Union's proposed changes to the parties' Collective Bargaining Agreement on shift differential pay and shift start times. The Department made a decision to reject the Union's proposal, apparently without consultation with the Office of Financial Management. It will be important to revisit that issue with your office present, as the Union has received information that the Department intends to make yet another change on shift start times that will affect shift differential pay.

Until good faith bargaining has occurred, we expect the Department to maintain the status quo and not implement the new schedules at other facilities. Feel free to contact me at (206) 441-4860, ext. 1232, if you have any questions.

Respectfully,

James V. Smith II
Director of Corrections & Law Enforcement/Staff Attorney

JVS:vj

cc: Angela Roberts, DOC LR Manager: teamsters117@doc.wa.gov - 3101
DOC Business Representatives, Teamsters Local 117

Appendix O

Isolated Post Job Aid

Principles

- Don't move until you are ready
- Deviations lead to opportunities for risk-minimize risk
- Everyone in place, on time
- Control pace, timing, access, space
- Expect something to happen
- Monitor the "white space"


Practices

- One ^{plus}
- Stop - Ask - Verify
- Don't leave a co-worker alone
- Clear your area/check your area
- One offender – two staff
- Make your presence known
- Don't walk alone
- Watch out for each other
- Minimize distractions during movement

MY safety is *my* responsibility –

YOUR safety is *my* responsibility.

Callout/Movement System Graphic



ESB 5907 Movement: A Security Routine
 In-Service/Prisons Division Security Forum - 2011
 Washington Department of Corrections

Appendix P

Policy 110.100

Prison Management Expectations



STATE OF WASHINGTON
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

APPLICABILITY
PRISON

REVISION DATE
10/24/11

PAGE NUMBER
1 of 5

NUMBER
DOC 110.100

POLICY

TITLE
PRISON MANAGEMENT EXPECTATIONS

REVIEW/REVISION HISTORY:

- Effective: 8/24/01
- Revised: 7/3/06
- Revised: 7/3/07
- Revised: 7/22/08
- Revised: 10/1/09
- Revised: 10/1/11
- Revised: 10/24/11


SUMMARY OF REVISION/REVIEW:

Added section IV. on management by walking around

APPROVED:

BERNARD WARNER, Secretary
Department of Corrections

10/18/11
Date Signed

 <p>STATE OF WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS</p> <p>POLICY</p>	APPLICABILITY PRISON		
	REVISION DATE 10/24/11	PAGE NUMBER 2 of 5	NUMBER DOC 110.100
	TITLE PRISON MANAGEMENT EXPECTATIONS		

REFERENCES:


DOC 100.100 is hereby incorporated into this policy; [ACA 4-4002](#); [ACA 4-4003](#); [ACA 4-4005](#); [ACA 4-4006](#); [ACA 4-4015](#); [ACA 4-4016](#); [ACA 4-4017](#); [ACA 4-4018](#); [ACA 4-4106](#); [ACA 4-4107](#); [ACA 4-4180](#); [ACA 4-4182](#); [ACA 4-4281](#); Collective Bargaining Agreements

POLICY:

- I. The Superintendent is responsible for all staff, offenders, volunteers, programs, and activities at or connected with the Prison. [4-4006]
- II. Superintendents will ensure operational memorandums are consistent with and supportive of the Department’s Mission Statement and Strategic Plan. [4-4002]

DIRECTIVE:

- I. Reporting Requirements
 - A. Superintendents will report to their assigned Deputy Director. The scope of this reporting is based on the:
 1. Need to ensure communication between the facility and Headquarters,
 2. Perceived need of the Deputy Director or Superintendent to discuss an issue, and
 3. Degree of supervision that the Deputy Director deems necessary according to the current operational status of the facility and the experience/functional level of the Superintendent.
 - B. Superintendents will ensure all required reports are submitted to Headquarters.
 - C. Superintendents will ensure the effectiveness of the information system as it relates to overall facility management is evaluated in writing at least annually. [4-4106]
 - D. [4-4018] Superintendents will compile quarterly reports on the following and submit them to their Deputy Director:
 1. Major incidents and developments in each department or administrative unit,
 2. Population data,
 3. Assessment of staff morale via personnel activities,
 4. Assessment of offender morale via grievance statistics and major incidents,

 <p>STATE OF WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS</p> <p>POLICY</p>	APPLICABILITY PRISON		
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5. Major problems and plans for solving them, and
6. Government Management Accountability and Performance (GMAP) assignments and status of action plans.

II. Deputy Director Responsibilities


- A. At least quarterly, Deputy Directors will make routine visits and on-site staff contact with each assigned facility to:
 1. Ensure Headquarters familiarity with facility staff,
 2. Review facility daily operation procedures, and
 3. Inspect for sanitation and condition of physical plant.
- B. Deputy Directors will complete annual performance agreements. Agreements that link directly to the Strategic Plan will include performance expectations.

III. Superintendent Responsibilities

- A. The Superintendent will formulate goals for the facility at least annually, and translate them into measurable objectives. [4-4003]
- B. Superintendents will initiate systems, operational memorandums, and/or programs to:
 1. Ensure facility compliance with all Department policies,
 2. Ensure a clean, safe facility,
 3. Strengthen public confidence in the integrity of facility staff by demonstrating and setting the tone for the highest standards of personal and professional integrity, fairness, honesty, and compliance with both the spirit and the letter of the law,
 4. Create a work environment free of discrimination and harassment,
 5. Be independent and impartial in exercising duties, avoiding actions that create even the appearance of using position or authority for personal gain or benefit,
 6. Promote an environment of public trust, free of fraud, abuse of authority, and misuse of public property,
 7. Respect and protect privileged information to which access is available in the course of official duties,

 <p>STATE OF WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS</p> <p>POLICY</p>	APPLICABILITY PRISON		
	REVISION DATE 10/24/11	PAGE NUMBER 4 of 5	NUMBER DOC 110.100
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8. Model appropriate, ethical, responsible, and respectful behavior to the public, peers, staff, and offenders,
 9. Ensure awareness of and compliance with the Department's code of ethics,
 10. Provide training and self-improvement opportunities to staff,
 11. Ensure policies and procedures comply with the Collective Bargaining Agreements,
 12. Ensure information from extended leadership is communicated to line staff,
 13. Facilitate personal contact and interaction between staff and offenders, and [4-4180]
 14. Provide 2-way communication between all levels of staff and offenders. [4-4016]
- C. Each Superintendent will develop operational management systems to:
1. Ensure effective communication within all levels of the organization,
 2. Encourage community agencies with which the facility has contact to participate in policy development, coordinated planning, and interagency consultation, [4-4005]
 3. Develop operational goals and working objectives and ensure those objectives are reached,
 4. Monitor, analyze, and evaluate operations and programs through inspections and reviews (e.g., annual security related audits, Emergency Response audits, Internal Reviews, etc.) at least annually to determine their contribution to the facility's mission, [4-4017] [4-4107]
 5. Implement policy,
 6. Ensure that no offender or group of offenders is given control or authority over other offenders, and [4-4182]
 7. Ensure that at least one male and one female staff are on duty at all times when both males and females are housed in the facility.

 <p>STATE OF WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS</p> <p>POLICY</p>	APPLICABILITY PRISON		
	REVISION DATE 10/24/11	PAGE NUMBER 5 of 5	NUMBER DOC 110.100
	TITLE PRISON MANAGEMENT EXPECTATIONS		

- D. Facility practices will protect offenders from personal abuse, corporal punishment, personal injury, disease, property damage, and harassment. [4-4281]

IV. Management By Walking Around

- A. Superintendents will ensure that each member of the facility executive staff tours selected areas of the facility at least weekly.

- 1. At a minimum, the following areas must be toured each week:

- a. Intensive Management/Segregation Unit,
- b. Food Services, including mainline operations, and
- c. Health Services.

- 2. Executive staff will routinely modify their work schedules to conduct tours and interact with staff on all 3 shifts.

- B. Superintendents will document tours in a weekly report to their Deputy Director.

V. [4-4015] Staff Meetings

- A. The Superintendent will meet at least monthly with Unit/Department Heads, including Department Heads from Health Services, Human Resources, Correctional Industries, and Business Services.

- B. The Unit/Department Heads will conduct monthly meetings with their key staff.

DEFINITIONS:

Words/terms appearing in this policy may be defined in the glossary section of the Policy Manual.

ATTACHMENTS:

None

DOC FORMS:

None

Appendix Q
Community Corrections Division
Safety Committee Roster

Appendix S – Community Corrections Division Safety Committee Members:

Union: Ton Johnson, Community Corrections Officer 3
 Aaron Cole, Community Corrections Officer 3
 Stacie Garcia, Hearings Officer
 Donald Feist, Community Corrections Officer 3
 Eric Morgan, Community Corrections Officer 3

Management: Mac Pevey, Program Administrator
 Debra Conner, Field Administrator
 Kimberli Dewing, Community Corrections Supervisor
 Ronald Pedersen, Community Corrections Supervisor
 John “Jack” Robarge, Community Corrections Supervisor

Appendix R
Community Corrections Division
Safety Task Maps

Community Corrections Safety Action Plan

Focus: Policy

Item # 1: Critical Incident Review (CIR) & Debrief

Problem Statement:

Staff reported being fearful of a CIR process and the perceived effect it may have on their career. Furthermore, staff reported they did not see the value in the process and were often excluded from the findings or disposition. The CIR process implementation has been the catalyst for much fear. The sentiment of the committee and others was organizationally we are doing much better with this but are conducting CIR's on situations which really don't warrant investigation at this level. Staff reported feeling left out of the process in terms of constructive feedback.

Tasks:

- Revise policy DOC 400.100 Reporting and Reviewing Critical Incidents to reflect the intent of this MOU.
- Obtain and evaluate Joint Legislative Audit & Review Committee (JLARC) expectations and requirements around CIR's.
- Revise CIR forms 18-024 and 18-022 that is conducive to a review/learning process for staff and our organization.
- Train staff (FA, CCS & Investigators) on investigative and interviewing techniques.
- Develop a comprehensive CIR tracking mechanism that can be referenced to identify trends.

Community Corrections Safety Action Plan

Focus: Policy

Item # 2: Dangerous Animals Condition

Problem Statement:

To improve the safety of staff who conduct field contacts and standardize a method/process for community corrections to address offenders with dangerous animals. Animals, dogs specifically, have increasingly become a threat to staff in the performance of their official field duties. To this point, there is no consistent formalized process by which to address this concern. Some staff felt dangerous animals could be defined by classification. An example of this would be to say that all pit bulls are dangerous. Many on the committee felt that not all pit bulls are dangerous and the agency would be better served by allowing broad discretion based upon cause to impose the condition

Tasks:

- Amend 390.600 Imposed Conditions to allow staff to impose a conditions specific to dangerous animals. Identify and engage policy owner on the change.
- Add a provision to the Standard Conditions, Requirements and Instructions 07-024 form to read, "I will allow DOC staff unabated access to my residence. This includes the control or securing of dangerous animals."
- Develop a memo from the CCD Assistant Secretary informing them of the standard condition and explaining why.

Community Corrections Safety Action Plan

Focus: Policy

Item # 3: Office Safety Protocol

Problem Statement:

Support Staff reported being left alone on a regular basis in offices located in rural areas to see offenders that report. The committee recognizes this proposal will be difficult to achieve and the Department should consider other options if they chose not to close the office. Furthermore, many staff indicated they did not believe they had the authority to close the office even if they felt a threat existed

Tasks:

- Develop a communication to CCS's & FA's around expectations of office closures.
- Develop local protocols around the denial of public access to field offices. Include a process to allow offenders attempting to report a means of contacting staff or other emergency responsive avenues.
- Include closure provision within draft policy DOC 110.120 Community Corrections Unit Management

Community Corrections Safety Action Plan

Focus: Policy

Item # 4: Concealment of Firearms – On Duty

Problem Statement:

Some environments do not lend to concealment. Even when concealed, public (to include offenders) are able to discern that staff are armed. Unconcealed carry allows for a quicker response to threats. Historically the concealment issue was imposed to offset angst amongst personnel who reported being fearful of the presence of firearms. Currently 60% of community corrections staff are armed.

Tasks:

- Repeal the provision within the firearms policy DOC 410.220 Firearms Program - Community Corrections that mandates staff will conceal their firearm at all times when in the public.
- Require staff to be identifiable when armed in the community while unconcealed.
- Provide a communication to staff outlining these changes.
- Coordinate identification efforts with the apparel workgroup to explore options.

Community Corrections Safety Action Plan

Focus: Policy

Item #5: Threats Against Staff

Problem Statement:

Threats by offenders toward staff must be taken seriously. Imposing a zero tolerance policy against threats reduces staff complacency and emphasizes to offenders that threats or threatening behavior is prohibited.

Tasks:

- Develop a separate notification to offenders to be included in the intake service
- Develop notification to be posted in the lobby
- DOC 420.205 contains the requirement to report and complete a TIR, update P323 User Guide
- Identify TIR code specifically for threats against staff
- Develop proposed amendment to the Behavioral Response Guide imposing a presumptive sanction of confinement for threats against staff. (seek AG advice)
- Develop proposed amendment to DOC 420.205 adding permissive language to refer threats to local prosecution
- Develop, with planning and research, to develop a database for tracking staff assault data for follow up and performance measure.

Community Corrections Safety Action Plan

Focus: Policy

Item # 6: Assaults Against Staff

Problem Statement:

Imposing a zero tolerance policy against assaults emphasizes to offenders that assaults will not be tolerated and non-compliance will be dealt with swiftly to include a referral for local prosecution.

Tasks:

- Develop a separate notification to offenders to be included in the intake service
- Develop notification to be posted in the lobby
- DOC 420.205 contains the requirement to report and complete a TIR, update P323 User Guide
- Identify TIR code specifically for threats against staff
- Develop proposed amendment to the Behavioral Response Guide imposing a presumptive sanction of confinement for assaults against staff. (seek AG advice)
- Develop proposed amendment to DOC 420.205 adding permissive language to refer assaults to local prosecution
- Develop, with planning and research, to develop a database for tracking staff assault data for follow up and performance measure.

Community Corrections Safety Action Plan

Focus: Policy

Item # 7: Multiple Sets of Restraints

Problem Statement:

Staff reported being limited by supervisors in carrying multiple sets of restraints. Often these restraints were needed to secure larger offenders and/or for particular types of arrest activities.

Tasks:

- Provide written clarification permitting staff to be issued and possess multiple sets of restraints.
- Give verbal direction to Community Corrections Supervisors permitting staff to procure and obtain multiple sets of restraints.

Community Corrections Safety Action Plan

Focus: Policy

Item # 8: Field Itinerary & Check-In System

Problem Statement:

Improve the personal safety of personnel by developing a system that accounts for staff's whereabouts. The current policy requirement is that staff complete a field itinerary prior to conducting field work. However, it does not account for their exact whereabouts specific to the time and location of the field visit, thus making it difficult to locate staff should an incident occur. The committee felt this would increase the workload for support staff or duty officers, but the value was worth further exploration. CCO's as well as support staff will push back on this issue for different reasons. CCO's because it will impose of level of accountability and support staff will not support it because of a perceived increase in workload.

Tasks:

- Communicate the need for an end of day check-in system at the statewide supervisors meeting.
- Identify what processes are currently being utilized to account for staff performing field operations by region and determine best practices.
- Develop guidelines to implementing an itinerary process that will account for personnel while performing field operations.
- Identify what barriers/opposition exists to partnering while conducting field work.
- Develop strategies for partnering while performing field operations.
- Confirm with supervisors that a system specific to their office and personnel is in place and that it has been discussed with staff.

Community Corrections Safety Action Plan

Focus: Policy

Item # 9: Standing CCD Safety Committee

Problem Statement:

Community Corrections is dynamic and often is faced with safety issues which are unique to supervision. To address these issues, provide staff with a voice to share their concerns and to capture/share best practices. CCD personnel are often faced with unique safety concerns directly related to offender supervision. There is not an informal process giving employees a voice to share their concerns. The committee made the distinction between what the Department has traditionally known as issues associated with safety those safety issues associated with offender supervision activities. The committee saw great value in addressing them separately. The committee also found there to be great value in seeing firsthand the differences in issues across the state.

Tasks:

- Determine how this committee fits within the newly established Statewide Agency Safety Committee.
- Develop a charter for the CCD Safety Committee, to include scope, mission and expectations.
- Distribute letters to the existing Safety Committee.
- Develop a memo to all CCD explaining the scope, mission and purpose of the Committee.
- Identify new membership based on size, positions and regional representation.
- Identify transition process from the current group to the new group.
- Identify committee lead(s).
- Identify length of appointment to the committee and subsequent rotations.

Community Corrections Safety Action Plan

Focus: Training

Item # 1: Training to Policy

Problem Statement:

Improvements to training can be achieved by training to policy and emphasizing verbal tactical skills in training.

Tasks:

- Identify what work has been accomplished toward achieving this goal by Organizational Development.
- Identify what work has been accomplished toward achieving this goal by Emergency Operations.
- Identify barriers and road blocks
- Verify verbal tactical skills is a component of Arrest, Search, and Seizure
- Identify specific training gaps between the policies and propose solutions

Community Corrections Safety Action Plan

Focus: Training

**Item # 2: Contingency Planning- i.e. Active Shooter
And Domestic Violence**

Problem Statement:

The Safety Committee identified concern from staff that their specific work locations did not have a contingency plan for “active shooters” or domestic violence. Planning for and training to these specific incidents increases the likelihood staff will be able to respond and survive in these types of events.

Tasks:

- Identify what offices have contingency plans for domestic violence and “active shooter”
- Identify if recognized guidelines exist to help build specific plans for emergent circumstances that would lend themselves to planning for these issues.
- Identify best practices (06-11-11 Fithian – propose to combine with continuity of Government/NIMS)
- Create guidelines to assist in the development of contingency plans and expectations
- Identify/develop subject matter expertise to evaluate proposed contingency plans and assist local offices with the development of these plans
- Train to the tenants of response
- Develop localized contingency plans

Community Corrections Safety Action Plan

Focus: Training

Item # 4: Personal Protection Planning

Problem Statement:

The Safety committee identified inconsistencies in developing personal safety plans for staff. Through sharing best practices and expectations, improvements to developing personal safety plans will increase our response to threats.

Tasks:

- Evaluate DOC 850.125 “violence in the workplace”
- Evaluate DOC 850.125 attachment 2
- Evaluate random sampling of personnel protections plans from each region
- Identify best practices
- Evaluate what steps are taken when there is disagreement pertaining to the plan between the affected staff and the supervisor
- Identify areas for improvement
- Identify protective measures and alternatives for personnel protection and safety planning

- In collaboration with ODU develop training for supervisors
- Develop guidelines on how to address if the threat comes from a third party but is directly linked to the personnel's role with the Department of Corrections
- Develop guidelines pertaining to threats which extend to family members of the affected personnel.
- Clearly identify who is responsible for initiating a personal protection plan.

Community Corrections Safety Action Plan

Focus: Training

Item #5: NIMS

Problem Statement:

The safety committee identified some concerns by staff the NIMS program created expectations of them in emergent circumstances in which they are not adequately equipped for or trained to respond.

Tasks:

- Seek clarification from Emergency Response on what the expectation of staff is relative to NIMS.
- Report to Asst. Sec. Aylward on findings.
- Evaluate on-going efforts to implement "Continuity of Government"
- Identify what are the critical functions that have to be maintained within CCD
- Evaluate current contingency plans/Identify critical contingency plans
- Identify Emergency Operations Unit into CCD (Fithian at Section Sups?)
- Identify section personnel as subject matter experts
- Identify CCD Emergency Operations Contact person (Jim Harms?)
- Set expectations for contingency planning
- Deploy Contingency Planning FEMA - 101
- Create local contingency plans (to include "active shooter" and domestic violence)

Community Corrections Safety Action Plan

Focus: Training

Item # 6: Injuries Attributed to Control and Impedance Tactics

Problem Statement:

Injuries occur while training control impedance tactics. Information was presented to the safety committee indicating separating training into two-four hour blocks would reduce injuries.

Tasks:

- Propose the question to Emergency Operations/Control Impedance instructors
- Research if there are facts to support the concept

- Identify strategies for reducing injuries and compare lessons learned with the existing AG
- Report findings to Asst. Sec. Aylward
- Determine if a team tactics modality can be added

Community Corrections Safety Action Plan

Focus: Training

Item # 9: Detecting Danger / Personal Safety Training

Problem Statement:

The best way for staff to manage risk in the community is to detect it and avoid it. We need to increase staff's ability to recognize dangerous situations.

Tasks:

- Research training curriculums on detecting danger and pre-attack indicators.
- Make decisions around the delivery and resources (i.e. in-service, one time training, etc.) of such a training module.
- Engage the Organizational Development Unit (ODU) to deploy the training to staff.

Community Corrections Safety Action Plan

Focus: Equipment

Item # 1: Office Defibrillator

Problem Statement:

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) estimates that 15 percent of workplace fatalities -- more than 400 per year -- are caused by sudden cardiac arrest. It is estimated that about 40 percent of these victims could have been saved by defibrillation within a few minutes. As it stands now, some of our larger offices are outfitted with AED's, but many of our smaller and outlying field offices are without them..

Tasks:

- Identify field offices with and without defibrillators.
- For those offices with defibrillators, inquire into the history of how we procured them to identify options in going forward.
- Work with Capital Programs to explore options in our current lease agreements.
- Work with Health Services Division to identify defibrillator options and cost.
- Develop a fiscal request specific to defibrillator procurement and deployment.
- Identify training needs for staff to utilize the equipment.

Community Corrections Safety Action Plan

Focus: Equipment

Item # 2: Office Safety – Panic Alarms & Notification Systems

Problem Statement:

Department of Corrections' offices have predominantly been pre-existing office space utilized for another purpose. Subsequently, the design is not always conducive for managing safety. Staff in the office are not always able to hear/see each other when disturbances or problems arise that may be a safety concern. Implementing an inter-office communication system increases the likelihood for an appropriate response. The ability to call for assistance should be given the same priority as the equipment and training provided to staff for their personal defense or to affect an arrest. We must increase the safety of staff by improving or providing tools for staff to signal an emergency, such as personal alarms.

Tasks:

- Procure personal body alarms.
- Develop a communication to staff in/around personal body alarms.
- Develop office protocols and exercises around responses to personal alarms.
- Deploy personal body alarms to staff.
- In coordination with the Safety Officer, identify the need for panic button and alarms in offices and explore options.
- Establish a process with Capital Programs to ensure that when we are citing offices or renewing existing leases, that we are assessing the facility for officer safety concerns and making recommendations for improvements to mitigate risk to staff.

Community Corrections Safety Action Plan

Focus: Equipment

Item # 3: Hand Held Metal Detectors

Problem Statement:

Staff reported to the safety committee that they are concerned offenders can conceal weapons and enter Field offices.

Tasks:

- Determine if the hand held metal detectors deployed to Hearings Officer's are being used or if they would loan them to CCD to pilot a project in Section 2
- Develop and implement a random search/scanning pilot
- Planning and research will develop tracking of data
- Report findings to include statistics

Community Corrections Safety Action Plan

Focus: Equipment

Item # 5: Communication Devices

Problem Statement:

Communication is essential to staff performing field work. Current communications systems leave staff unable to call for assistance in emergent situations.

Tasks:

- Identify specific locations which cell phone service is un-available.
- Determine if another carrier has better cell phone reception.
- Identify which offices have radio communications and Memorandums of Agreements
- Identify which offices are a priority for receiving radio communications
- Identify the cost of radio communications equipment
- Identify costs of associated with Memorandum of Agreements, permitting staff, at a minimum, to request assistance in emergent situations.
- Determine policy revision in DOC 890.130 or 380.240 requiring staff to carry communications devices while performing field work.

Community Corrections Safety Action Plan

Focus: Equipment

Item # 6: Vehicles

Problem Statement:

Currently there are more than 266 vehicles in the field that are more than seven years old or have over 100,000 miles. In addition there are over 14 vehicles in work releases which meet the same criteria. Staff often finds themselves in unpredictable environments in which their vehicle is their only means egress. In addition, these vehicles are used to transport offender, in custody, to detaining facilities. Sound vehicles are critical to the safety of staff in the performance of these tasks

Tasks:

- Identify, by region, how many vehicles are outside the policy scope
- Identify, by office, what type of vehicles are best suited to the environment and work to be performed (utilization)
- Develop a repair criteria
- Develop a replacement schedule
- Determine the fiscal note to bring CCD in compliance
- Prioritize a plan based upon findings to achieve policy compliance by 2015-16 budgets.

Community Corrections Safety Action Plan

Focus: Equipment

Item # 7: Electronic Immobilization Devices

Problem Statement:

Tasers provide an intermediate force option that currently does not exist. The deployment of Tasers has been proven to reduce injuries to officers and offenders in use of force situations. The presence and display of the Taser has been shown to resolve situations which would likely result in a use of force without force.

Tasks:

- Determine number of field offices
- Identify staff who want to be trained and there location(E-mail to FA's)
- Determine how many instructors are needed to support the training/will we use current use of force instructors/train the trainers
- Order the X-26 and related supplies (814.95 per Taser, 23.90 per cartridge (duty) x6 per office, 19.90 per cartridge x2 per person (training)
- Task
- Regional data port download software (159.95) and install
- Criteria for deployment planned arrest, search, and transport
- Review and determine if an update is necessary DOC 410.215 Electronic Immobilization Devices Community Corrections
- Emergency Operations develop and implement training
- Roll out Tasers

Community Corrections Safety Action Plan

Focus: Equipment

Item # 8: Identification & Apparel

Problem Statement:

It is imperative staff are able to identify themselves while performing field work. Some staff have no identifying apparel, or the identifying apparel they do have is not appropriate in the weather/environment they work in.

Tasks:

- Identify identification and clothing options that are mindful of weather and environmental differences in the state.
- Contact Correctional Industries (CI) and other vendors to explore options and costs.
- Identify agency approved options in accordance with DOC 400.230 Identification and Apparel.
- Establish a budget and fiscal request specific to the procurement of identification apparel.
- If agency provides the apparel for staff, identify a replacement strategy as items become worn, damaged or lost.

Community Corrections Safety Action Plan

Focus: Policy

Item # 9: Standing CCD Safety Committee

Problem Statement:

Community Corrections is faced with safety issues that are derived from the unique role of supervision. Implementing a Statewide Safety Committee specifically for issues of this nature will improve the agency's ability to identify and manage those issues

Tasks:

- Identify composition of the committee
- Identify scope of the committee
- Identify length of appointment and rotations
- Solicit interest in participation/ CCD Memo

Appendix S
In-service Training 2012
Community Corrections Division

CCD In-Service FY 2012

Introduction

This document provides the course titles and their duration for the Department of Corrections CCD In-Service Plan for FY 2012.

In-Service Courses

The following courses are required for all agency staff:

Course	Duration
Respectful Workplace Education	2 hours
PREA V6	1 hours
Emergency Response Plan	2 hours
Total hours:	5 hours

The following table lists the additional courses required for CCOs, CCS, Specialists, COs and optional for FAs:

Course	Duration
Arrest, Search and Evidence Workshop	8 hours
Control Impedance Tactics	15.5 hours
Oleoresin Capsicum Update (for OC certified staff only)	.5 hour (30 minutes)
Weapons Qualification (for armed staff only)	16 hours (8 hours every 6 months)
Total additional hours:	40 hours

Other Mandatory Classes

You will receive a plan explaining how additional mandatory classes such as IT Security and Fire Extinguishers will be managed.

Contact

If you have any questions, please contact:

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