



# Staff Safety

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## 2017 Annual Report to the Legislature

*As required by RCW 72.09.680*

December 2017

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This report is the seventh annual report to the Legislature as directed by Engrossed Senate Bill 5907 (2011) and contains information on staff safety concerns and mitigation strategies completed by the Department of Corrections.

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# Staff Safety

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## *2017 Annual Report to the Legislature*

### Foreword

*“It is the intent of the legislature to promote safe state correctional facilities. Following the tragic murder of Officer Jayme Biendl, the Governor and Department of Corrections requested the National Institute of Corrections to review safety procedures at the Monroe Reformatory. While the report found that Monroe Reformatory is a safe institution, it recommends changes that would enhance safety.*

*The legislature recognized that operating safe institutions requires ongoing efforts to address areas where improvements can be made to enhance the safety of state correctional facilities. This act addresses ways to increase safety at state correctional facilities and implements changes recommended in the report of the National Institute of Corrections.”*

Legislative Declaration, RCW 72.09.680 [2011 c 252 §1]

## Executive Summary

### Background

Following the murder of Officer Jayme Biendl in 2011, the National Institute of Corrections (NIC) was asked to review systems, policies, and procedures and submit recommendations to mitigate safety and security vulnerabilities at the Washington State Reformatory (a unit of the Monroe Correctional Complex).

The NIC findings and recommendations led to the introduction of Engrossed Senate Bill 5907 (ESB 5907), at the request of Governor Gregoire, with the intent to promote safer prisons. ESB 5907 was signed into law (RCW 72.09) on May 5, 2011.

### Report Overview

The Department of Corrections (DOC) promotes a culture that inspires personal responsibility for staff safety and facility security, both foundational elements of a public safety mission. In addition, the Department encourages all staff to take the initiative in actively addressing security and safety concerns and deficiencies as well as continual monitoring for safety and security improvements in all work areas, practices, procedures, policies and physical plant layout.

In this seventh annual report to the Legislature, the Department communicates the implementation status of legislative mandates to incorporate the recommendations made and its dedication to the safety of all employees, incarcerated individuals, and members of the public.

### Commitment to Safety

All citizens expect to be safe and protected in their communities, and Governor Inslee has made this a priority as recognized in Results Washington Goal 4: *Healthy and Safe Communities*. The Department's paramount duty is to improve public safety and one key goal is to enhance safer operations. The Department through Results DOC, measures improvements related to safer operations with outcome-based measures that include staff safety, incarcerated individuals' safety, providing basic needs, ensuring safe environments, and managing emergencies. The Department promotes a culture of staff safety and facility security and remains deeply committed to, and actively engaged in, improving employee, individual, and community safety.

Robert Herzog, Assistant Secretary for the Prisons Division, offers, *"One of the most important reports we complete each year is our annual Staff Safety report. This year's report again confirms our deep commitment to staff safety and facility security and details the efforts taken each year to improve in this area of risk. Staff responsibilities include working with incarcerated individuals in unpredictable and often dangerous settings, and despite great personal risk, staff continue to perform their duties with the utmost professionalism, pride, and belief in how our work together helps to make safer communities. Staff safety is a continuous commitment and efforts to provide safer environments is work that is never over."*

# Prison Safety

## Security Advisory Committees

The Security Advisory Committees are comprised of local and statewide committees that support and encourage staff to take the initiative in identifying and reporting staff safety concerns and facility security gaps as well as furnish an avenue to address them.

DOC employees continue to suggest innovative solutions to everyday challenges and actively engage in the process to increase their own safety as well as the safety of others. The success of this approach can be attributed to the support received from all levels of the Department. By incorporating multidisciplinary staff from all classifications, the submittals are broad and diverse, the work is progressive and impactful, and the resolutions highly successful. **Table 1** provides a summary of the suggestions submitted to date.

**Table 1. Security Concerns & Suggestions**

Year	Total Received	Completed at Local Level	Referred Statewide	Completed Statewide
2011	548	508	40	33
2012	714	689	39	19
2013	755	722	10	15
2014	501	469	12	9
2015	397	343	10	10
2016	368	189	34	12
2017*	285	139	14	6
<b>Total</b>	<b>3568</b>	<b>3059</b>	<b>159</b>	<b>104</b>

\* As of October 2017

## Local Security Advisory Committees

Local Security Advisory Committees are active in all 12 prisons and meet regularly. These committees are chaired by the senior facility security/custody staff (Captains or Lieutenants) and include employees from a variety of disciplines who review and discuss security concerns and suggestions that have been submitted locally.

When a local security suggestion is submitted by an employee to the facility's Security Specialist, the suggestion is then queued for review by the Local Security Advisory Committee. Using a facility-wide, multidisciplinary approach, local committees examine each suggestion for staff safety and security benefits if the suggestion was to be implemented while also considering any unintended consequences on other areas of the facility.

Examples of submissions of local safety and security concerns at individual prisons that resulted in subsequent changes in practices in 2017 are summarized below:

- Door Alarms – This local suggestion from Airway Heights Corrections Center Identified a security vulnerability in door alarms. In the minimum custody facility, unit fire doors are protected with an alarm box to alert employees if the doors are opened. The employee discovered that using a small magnet placed on the alarm box would cause the alarm not to sound. By defeating the alarm box in this fashion, incarcerated individuals could use this door to retrieve contraband or otherwise conduct prohibited activities without alerting employees. The local committee discussed the problem with the facility electrician who determined that a simple solution would mitigate the vulnerability. The facility installed metal plates on top of each door alarm and the security risks were eliminated.
- Officer’s Workstation – This local suggestion from Clallam Bay Corrections Center (CBCC) discussed the lack of security for the religious activities officer’s workstation. The workstation offered no secured storage for personal items like a uniform jacket or a lunch box. In addition, the workstation was positioned just inside a doorway and required an officer to have their back to the incarcerated population which creates a safety and security concern. The suggestion was supported and a new workstation was built by the local maintenance department and installed in a location that offered greater visibility, secure storage, and reduced risks to staff safety.
- Door Locks – This local suggestion from Olympic Corrections Center was to replace the door locks at the Waste Water Treatment Plant. The suggested noted that during a duress alarm emergency exercise the door to the office was locked with an employee and incarcerated individuals inside. The first responders sent to conduct a health and safety check on the employee in response to the duress alarm activation did not have access to the office. The local committee reviewed the suggestion and determined a solution was needed to mitigate the risk to staff safety and facility security. The locks on the doors were changed to require a key to both lock and unlock the door. Further, procedures were modified that requires the door to be left in the unlocked position when incarcerated individuals are present and working.

Each local committee’s work has proven to be extremely effective, with over 85% of submitted suggestions being completed at the local level. This forum for reviewing staff initiated security suggestions emphasizes the strong local commitment to safety and security through the exchange of ideas, involvement of all staff and program areas, and a greater understanding of how all employees contribute to safer operations of the facility and public safety overall. The percent of suggestions referred from the local level to the statewide committee that have been completed has been decreasing in the last two years. This is mainly because the suggestions that could be done without additional funding have been completed and most of the suggestions that are not completed require additional funding. In addition, suggestions may sometimes take a year or more to complete. If a suggestion was received in 2017, and completed a year later, the suggested is considered implemented in 2018.

### Statewide Security Advisory Committee

In some cases, a Local Security Advisory Committee determines a security suggestion may have statewide impact, requires a change to Department policy, or the costs to implement the suggestion is beyond facility

budget capacity. In these, as well as other situations, the suggestion is forwarded to the Statewide Security Advisory Committee for review and consideration.

As required by RCW 72.09.680, the Statewide Security Advisory Committee meets quarterly to evaluate safety and security concerns and suggestions forwarded from local committees that may affect Department policy or require legislative approval and funding. Committee work includes evaluating suggestions, making recommendations, and taking action on safety and security concerns affecting statewide policies and practices. In addition, the Statewide Security Advisory Committee assists in the development of safety curriculum presented to staff as part of Annual In-Service training for the Prisons Division.

Examples of statewide safety and security concerns that resulted in statewide safety and security improvements in 2017 are summarized below:

- Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) Spray for Crowd Control – A request from the Washington Corrections Center (WCC) was to authorize an additional OC (pepper spray) option for areas where large groups of incarcerated individuals congregate such as the gymnasium, recreation yards, and dining facilities. The suggestion was to equip staff in these areas with larger, crowd control sized OC canisters to use in the event of multiple individual disturbances. The Statewide Security Advisory Committee decided all Correctional Sergeants should be equipped with larger, crowd control OC canisters as standard equipment. Prisons Division leadership agreed and as of summer 2017, all Correctional Sergeants have been equipped with larger OC canisters.
- New Blankets – An employee from Coyote Ridge Correction Center submitted a suggestion that noted the current blankets issued to individuals was creating a security concern with conducting accurate count. The blankets being issued were a light, khaki color which often made it difficult to distinguish between the blanket and skin. The suggestion was to switch to a blanket with a contrasting color. Due to the vital importance of ensuring an accurate count of individuals, as well as verifying the health and safety of individuals during count, the committee agreed to support a different blanket color. The suggestion was vetted with Correctional Industries and it was decided that once existing supplies were used, a new grey in color blanket would be issued. As of June 2017, new color blankets have already been issued to individuals.
- OC Spray for Non-Custody - A request from the Washington State Penitentiary was received that suggested Correctional Counselors (non-custody employees) be authorized, on a voluntary basis, to carry OC while on duty. The suggestion correctly pointed out that many times non-custody staff assigned to incarcerated individual living areas, such as counselors, are first responders to an incident in support of custody staff. The suggestion explained that having an additional force option would further non-custody employees' supporting role in self-defense and defense of another. The committee agreed with the suggestion and expanded those who would be authorized to include counselors, food service, and recreation non-custody employees, on a voluntary basis, to carry and use OC on post. As of August 2017, facilities have identified employees that volunteered to carry OC, provided training, and implemented the suggestion.

The examples above represent the complex work involved in evaluating and reviewing suggestions submitted for statewide consideration. Members of the Statewide Security Advisory Committee review each suggestion in detail, ask for additional information, or require a follow-up review with the appropriate local committee members or labor representatives before making a final recommendation.

This multidisciplinary process ensures each security suggestion that is implemented, as in the case of the examples noted for 2017, multiple staff and program areas have reviewed and agreed to support the suggestion. By the time a security suggestion is implemented, abundant sources of information have been consulted, numerous details have been worked out, and any potential negative impacts have been mitigated.

### Staff Safety Performance Audit

In March of 2016, the Washington State Auditor's Office concluded a Performance Audit on Prisons Safety and Security that assessed whether the Department could do more to ensure the safety and security staff and facilities. The State Auditor's Office published a [final report](#) which is available for public review.

Immediately after receiving the final report, the Department began taking action to review each recommendation and formulate an Improvement Plan (Appendix A) to address each of 13 areas identified for improvement. Many of the recommendations involve simply correcting gaps in policies and/or procedures and the majority of those either have been addressed or are in the final stages. However, three (3) of the recommendations (additional radios for non-custody staff, custody staffing model review, and public access staffing) require legislative funding to implement as recommended. The Department did not receive funding in the 2017-19 biennium to implement these suggestions. The Department included a request for a custody staffing model review in the 2018 supplemental budget.

### Staff Searches

One of the recommendations in the State Auditor's report was to implement staff searches upon entering the secure perimeter of a prison. Implementing this suggestion involved lengthy discussions between Department Senior Leadership, bargaining unit representatives, and the Attorney General's Office. Once stakeholders had reached consensus on policy and procedures, the Department began conducting staff searches upon entry into the secure perimeter at each of the eight major facilities in December 2016. In addition, 100% of all hand carried items are now searched before entry and a standardized authorized items list was published. As of October 2017, the draft policy is pending publication.

To fully implement staff searches at all public access points, the Department requested additional FTE's in the 2017-19 biennium. However, these FTE's were not funded by the Legislature.

### Violence Prevention Plan

Preventing prison violence is not an activity in of itself, rather it is an outcome achieved through employees at all levels doing their core work well every day. In 2016, a project team with multi-disciplinary representation from each prison was chartered to develop a comprehensive Prisons Violence Prevention Plan. The Prisons Violence Prevention Plan provides assessment tools to assist staff in identifying causal factors of prison



violence, so they may take proactive steps to mitigate those and develop corrective action plans where needed. The assessment tools include:

- Audit Checklist
- Incarcerated Individual Survey
- Staff Focus Group Questions
- Violence Characteristics Data Set

## Contraband Prevention, Discovery, and Response Plan

Preventing the introduction of, discovery, and mitigating the movement of contraband in the prison environment is critical to the Department's goal of safer operations. The Incident Management Reporting System identified nine areas where contraband has been discovered in facilities. Those areas include the mailroom, unknown method of introduction, visitation, housing units, intake, public access, off-site work crews, food services, and outer perimeter. In early 2017, a project team of Security Specialists and Performance Consultants was created with the purpose of conducting in-depth reviews at each facility. Local employees with experience in each area of known introduction points are pulled together for a three day workshop for the purpose of developing a local team charter, identifying facility specific issues related to contraband, identify current mitigation processes, empowering local teams to develop recommendations, define contraband points of entry, and implement solutions where appropriate.

## Prisons Division Training

### Prison Safety Series Curriculum

DOC promotes a culture that encourages personal responsibility for safety and security in prisons and has invested in extensive staff training programs. The content, discussions, and activities delivered through annual in-service training target strategies for improving personal safety, the safety of others, and the safety and security of the work place as required by RCW 72.09.684. The previous lesson in this series focused on *Understanding the Second Story* while the current lesson focuses on Understanding and Mitigating Security Lapses (Appendix B). The concept of *this year's lesson* is to understand how critical it is to follow established policies and procedures to prevent or mitigate problems that occur due to lapses in security and/or failures in processes and procedures. Using the 2015 Clinton Correctional Facility Escape ([New York Department of Corrections and Community Supervision](#)) as a case study, participants are asked to identify what gaps occurred in four primary security related policies and procedures (counts, facility movement, offender searches, and staff compromise) and how those gaps aided a successful escape.

Lesson Objectives:

- Recognize and compare events at the workplace concerning staff safety.
- Understand security related policies/procedures and identify at least two significant examples of where failure to follow policies and procedures contributed to the escape.

- Identify staff safety within the Department’s Goals and Measures ([Strategic Plan](#) and [ResultsDOC](#) alignment).

The curriculum for this series was developed by a multidisciplinary team, reviewed by the Statewide Security Advisory Committee, and is being offered to all Prison Division staff as a requirement per the Fiscal Year 2018 Annual Agency Training Plan (Appendix C).

## Electronic Security Technology

### Staff Accountability System

The Office of Security & Emergency Management is currently leading the efforts to create a standardized system to account for all employees within the secure perimeter at all facilities. The *electronic Facility Access and Control Tracking system (FACT)* (Appendix D) will collect, manage and track data regarding all employees, facility visitors, volunteers and contract staff who enter and exit facilities. This system will be able to account for persons within a facility in real time by reading a bar code embedded onto the identification card using a scanner connected to a networked computer system. The *FACT* system will improve accuracy and significantly reduce the amount of time it takes to conduct employee/person accountability procedures.

*FACT* final testing and deployment has been completed and the system went live at Stafford Creek Corrections Center (SCCC) in October 2017. The pilot being conducted at SCCC is expected to last through June 2018. Based on information learned from the pilot, an enterprise solution will be designed for implementation at each prison facility.

### Radio Communications

- Secured additional Mutual Aid Agreements (MAA) with law enforcement jurisdictions to support the communications needs of the Department and increase staff and public safety when working in the community.
- Purchased, configured, and deployed numerous radios and accessories to facilities per funded allotments. In most cases, older radio systems are being repurposed to support Community Corrections communication needs in the field and provided to Maple Lane to support Department of Social and Human Services operations.
- Submitted a budget decision package for the 2017-19 biennium for radio deployment per the State Auditor’s Office recommendation that all employees/contract staff within the secure perimeter of each facility be issued and carry a radio. Decision package was not funded for the additional radios and infrastructure required to complete this action plan item.
- Purchased and installed replacement communications tower at Mission Creek Corrections Center for Women in conjunction with installation of a new building by Capital Projects. Radio equipment installation in the new building and removal of the old communications mast are pending.
- Due to changes in the Washington State Patrol’s radio programming, working with Community Corrections and vendors to develop a plan and determine costs to reprogram all public safety radios.

## Security Electronic Networks

- Developing global maintenance agreement for service providers to support security electronic networks. In addition, the Department has provided training and certification to facility maintenance and information technology staff to reduce the level of support needed by vendors.
- Managing the numerous security electronic network projects in various stages of completion. From the expansion of video camera systems, to door and video control integration and replacements, to reviewing and identifying critical systems for upgrade prioritization, the enhancements being made to the security electronic networks have a direct impact on increasing staff safety and facility security.
  - Three facilities are currently operational or in the final stages of installation of security electronics network updates (cameras, door controls, and other security system integration).
  - Three other facilities have projects in various stages of design and installation.
  - In addition to prisons, three Work Release facilities have been upgraded with camera systems that work in conjunction with security electronic network systems.

## Community Corrections Safety

The Community Corrections Division (CCD) continues to update policies and procedures aligned with the CCD evidence based supervision model. The ongoing review and implementation of changes is done with a focus on staff safety and office security while maintaining accountability of those incarcerated.

### Community Corrections Security Advisory Committee

The Statewide Community Corrections Security Advisory Committee continues to meet quarterly to evaluate safety and security concerns and suggestions that may affect department policy, budget, and workload. The committee is co-chaired by a CCD Program Administrator and a representative of the Washington Federation of State Employees. The committee membership is comprised of the CCD Security Specialist and employees from around the state and a variety of job classifications. The charge of the committee is to review and develop recommendations, propose solutions, and evaluate best practices related to staff safety and office security within CCD.

In 2016, a charter was developed and a work group formed to increase the focus and visibility of the Community Corrections Security Advisory Committee. Due to this effort, improved communication processes have been developed to increase employee awareness of the committee to include:

- Committee members attending unit meetings within their respective sections to update all staff on the work of the committee.
- Establishment of electronic mailboxes to streamline the submission of security suggestions and concerns.
- Sending Security Bulletins to all staff regarding the committee work and addressing specific safety and/or security issues.

Additionally, the Community Corrections Security Advisory Committee assists in the development of staff safety and office/operational security curriculum presented to staff as part of the annual in-service training for the Community Corrections Division.

Examples of 2017 submissions of statewide community corrections safety and security concerns that resulted in improvements are summarized below:

- Identification Placards – Over the years, a number of different colors and styles of identification placards have been worn on ballistic vests and jackets that were issued to staff. This lack of uniformity caused confusion among law enforcement partners as well as members of the public. To achieve uniformity and promote staff safety, standardized placards have been purchased and distributed to Community Corrections staff with the direction to remove all outdated placards and replace with the new placards. These placards more easily identify Department of Corrections Officers and are reflective to enhance safety.
- Vehicles – The Community Corrections Division continues to update its fleet of vehicles with the replacement of over 60 older, high mileage vehicles, and acquiring an additional 22 new vehicles. In addition to new, reliable vehicles, staff have suggested vehicles be outfitted with additional safety improvements, including:
  - A recommendation that additional amber colored hazard lights be installed on vehicles to promote safety while conducting fieldwork especially in urban or high traffic areas. Through this recommendation, each new vehicle will be equipped with an amber colored light bar in the rear window to enhance safety.
  - Transport/Field vehicles will now be equipped with dual compartment screening so cross-gender transport may occur as well as keep combative individuals separated.
  - The rear windows now have security screens to prohibit individuals from kicking out vehicle windows.
- Drug Testing Process – The Department has introduced a new seven-panel drug screening urinalysis cup in addition to the existing six-panel cup. This additional drug-screening panel includes testing for the presence of marijuana (THC) for those incarcerated with a court ordered prohibition regarding the use of THC. Historically, a urine sample would have to be tested by using a separate “dip stick” which exposed employees to handling open urine collection cups. The addition of the seven-panel cup greatly reduces risks related to employee exposure.

## **Community Corrections Division Training**

Training in community corrections continues with an emphasis on skills that increase positive engagement with supervised individuals. The ability to engage individuals, and how to intervene in high-risk behaviors, promotes both staff and community safety.

## Trauma Kit Training

Working with the DOC Training and Development Unit, Trauma Kit training was developed and delivered electronically at Community Corrections employees' workstations. The purpose of the Trauma Kit is to enhance staff safety by providing Community Corrections staff with the materials to administer emergency medical care in the event of a traumatic injury while medical first responders are in route. The ability to stop serious bleeding quickly can make a significant difference in the odds of someone surviving a traumatic injury. This training included a knowledge assessment which employees had to pass in order to be issued a trauma kit. Practice kits were also distributed so employees had the opportunity to practice the skills learned during the training, including the proper use and application of the materials in the kit.

## Reducing Risk through Programming

Although not typically considered a 'staff safety' element, the Community Corrections Division offers Cognitive Behavioral Interventions (CBI) training statewide with approximately 500 supervised individuals participating at any given time. The skills taught in these classes shape behavior teaching appropriate ways to address everyday problems. Examples are considering the feelings of others, to stop and think before acting, and the appropriate way to make a complaint. Graduates of the program, although sometimes resistant to participation initially, continually state that the skills being taught assist them in violence reduction as well as greater compliance with supervision requirements. As CCD employees engage with those they supervise, the skills learned by those under supervision enhances staff safety, office/operational security, and therefore public safety.

## Appendix

# Appendix A

SAO Performance Audit Improvement Plan

**Washington State Department of Corrections  
Staff Safety Performance Audit (SAO)  
Improvement Plan**

Clarify staff accountability procedures		
SAO Reported Noted:		
<i>Although staff identified the new accountability procedures (such as sign-in/ sign-out, two-to-open/two-to-close, and staff accountability drills) as among the most effective initiatives, our experts think they could be improved.</i>		
	Review Complete	Anticipated Implementation
Improvement Plan:		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Request legislative funding to expand the proximity card accountability system.               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ 8/2/2016 – DP package was submitted to SLT per SSAC and SAO recommendations. The request was not advanced to OFM for consideration in 17-19 budget.</li> <li>○ This item will not be advanced if FACT pilot is successful and deployed as an enterprise solution.</li> </ul> </li> <li>○ Developing an IT solution to enhance prisons staff accountability processes in the event of an emergency. The business requirements phase has been complete. Once the DOC system is operational, it is scheduled for a pilot at SCCC.               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ The FACT (Facility Access Control Tracking) pilot will begin at SCCC October 2017. This pilot will help to inform an enterprise solution for all prisons.</li> </ul> </li> <li>○ Each facility has a staff accountability system and can account for staff in the event of an emergency. However, clarifying procedures in policy to increase compliance with expectations.               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ DOC 420.160 is currently in review</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	July 2016	<b>October 2017</b>
Requirements for non-custody staff to carry radios and equipment		



SAO Reported Noted:		
<i>While Department policy requires custody staff to carry radios while on duty, it is unclear whether non-custody staff should be issued or be required to carry radios or other emergency communication equipment.</i>		
	<b>Review Complete</b>	<b>Anticipated Implementation</b>
<p>Improvement Plan:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Conducted a cost analysis for providing radios and duress alarms to all non-custody staff at each prison (\$4 million). Requires legislative funding to implement. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ 8/2016 - Request for legislative funding was approved by SLT and submitted to OFM for consideration in 17-19 budget.</li> <li>○ Funding was <u>not</u> received for 2017-2019</li> </ul> </li> <li>○ Clarifying policy requirements for non-custody staff that supervise offenders to carry a radio. Current policy states who is required to be provided a radio, however, many non-custody staff chose not to carry it. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ 8/2016 – Pending having enough radios available to issue</li> </ul> </li> <li>○ Create a policy expectation for testing duress alarms. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Draft policy language completed July 2017</li> </ul> </li> <li>○ Evaluated the feasibility of deploying pepper spray to non-custody staff. Purchased additional equipment, developing training, and implementation later this year. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Completed - OC spray is now on-line and available to Classification, Food Services, and Recreation staff on a voluntary basis.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>		<b>July 2017</b>
<b>Security specialist position expectations need clarification</b>		
SAO Reported Noted:		
<i>However, our experts observed some issues, including [security] specialists...performing duties that were outside their primary role.</i>		
	<b>Review Complete</b>	<b>Anticipated Implementation</b>

<p>Improvement Plan:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Convene a stakeholder group to clarify the roles of the security specialists.</li> <li>○ Update the position description to ensure clarity and standardization. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Position description completed as of 9/2016, all security specialists have received revised PD.</li> </ul> </li> <li>○ Discuss and clarify the security specialist with security specialists, captains, superintendents, and prisons leadership. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ 8/2016 – Security Specialists role was clarified in person with security specialists, captains, superintendents, and prisons leadership.</li> </ul> </li> <li>○ Updated the security suggestion database to provide an automatic notification to the submitter when any updates occur.</li> <li>○ Directed security specialists to provide face-to-face to submitters at least once per month.</li> <li>○ Before the report published, DOC had already implemented a bi-weekly teleconference and quarterly meeting for security specialists to share best practices and lessons learned. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Conference calls and regularly scheduled quarterly meetings occurring.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<p>September 2016</p>	<p><b>August 2016</b></p>
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**Place safety musters could be better utilized**

SAO Reported Noted:

*However, in alignment with staff feedback, our experts found opportunities to improve how the place safety musters are conducted*

	Review Complete	Anticipated Implementation
<p>Improvement Plan:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Identified a group of stakeholders that are tasked with updating place safety musters including renewing facilitator training and developing training aids</li> <li>○ Included a discussion on place safety musters in FY17 annual in-service training.</li> <li>○ Piloting a new place safety muster concept at AHCC. The pilot is being reviewed for inclusion in the updated policy.</li> <li>○ Clarifying, through policy and practice, the intent of place safety musters is to provide a forum for work area staff to address safety and security concerns and should not be a facilitated using a top-down approach.</li> <li>○ <b>Actions Taken:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Attended AHCC PSM to inform policy changes.</li> <li>✓ Work group established, meeting identified policy enhancements, implementation plan.</li> <li>✓ A Place Safety SharePoint site is being developed that will create one consistent location where facilitators can pull PSM materials from.</li> <li>✓ TDU has agreed to include Place Safety Facilitator training in Supervision and Leadership. The Security Management Unit will inform curriculum development.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	October 2016	<b>2018</b>

**Local security advisory committees**

SAO Reported Noted:

*Similarly, the experts observed that while the local security advisory committee meetings were well-attended, and included a broad group of individuals from multiple disciplines as the policy intended, the approaches to managing the security suggestion process varied by facility*

	Review Complete	Anticipated Implementation

<p>Improvement Plan:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Updated the security suggestion database to provide an automatic notification to the submitter when updates occur.</li> <li>○ Directed security specialists to provide face-to-face to submitters at least once per month.</li> <li>○ The security suggestion process is electronically maintained and regularly reviewed for accuracy, follow-up, and action.</li> <li>○ The primary gap in local committee work was submitter follow-up and suggestion status which has been addressed.</li> <li>○ Conducting a review of the prisons' safety and security advisory meetings to determine needed improvements in the communication process.</li> <li>○ Increased internal communications related to staff safety topics including timely security alerts and a monthly security message. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Publish routine security alerts to prisons division as well as staff safety/security bulletins.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<p>October 2016</p>	<p><b>August 2017</b></p>
<p><b>Staff search policy is absent, and practices are inconsistent</b></p>		
<p>SAO Reported Noted:</p> <p><i>Even though the Department states all employees are subject to being searched upon entering a facility, the Department policies do not mandate that staff be searched as they enter the facilities.</i></p>		
	<p><b>Review Complete</b></p>	<p><b>Anticipated Implementation</b></p>
<p>Improvement Plan:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ As noted in the report, several facilities routinely conduct random staff searches and have implemented local procedures.</li> <li>○ Developing policies and procedures to increase random searches of staff and all persons entering a facility <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ 12/2016 employee search process initiated</li> <li>○ Policy final draft sent to Policy Office September 2017</li> </ul> </li> <li>○ Developing a standardized list of allowable items.</li> <li>○ Working cooperatively with the statewide family council to increase visitor searches. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ 8/2016 – Family council was informed of intent to increase visitor searches.</li> <li>○ Visiting subgroup will discuss the issue more in-depth.</li> <li>○ Visitor Search process currently in development, anticipated roll out 2018.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<p>December 2016</p>	<p><b>Complete</b></p>

**Cell searches are too infrequent and inconsistent across facilities**

SAO Reported Noted:

*The Department has not established a policy for cell searches at each of the custody levels, resulting in inconsistencies between and within facilities.*

- Cell search guidelines clarified for all custody levels in DOC 420.320.
- All custody levels except max custody to be searched at least once every 60 days.
- Draft policy submitted to policy office 8/2016.
- Draft policy is linked with draft Staff Search policy – will publish same time.

	Review Complete	Anticipated Implementation
<p>Improvement Plan:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Conducted a review of the policy requirements for the frequency of cell/area searches and gained stakeholder input.                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Complete - policy revised, cell searches of min, med and close cells will occur every 60 days, max cells remain the same (at least once every 7 days).</li> </ul> </li> <li>○ Piloting an electronic system at AHCC that tracks cell and facility searches and provides visual progress reports.                             <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Pilot ongoing and is successful, considering requirements and support to expand to all facilities.</li> </ul> </li> <li>○ Reviewed and discussed cell search frequency with security specialists, captains, superintendents, and prisons leadership.</li> <li>○ Revising policy to require a consistent, standardized frequency for cell searches (every 60 days in general population housing).</li> </ul>	July 2016	<b>Complete</b>

**Staffing model has not been updated**

SAO Reported Noted:

*The staffing model the Department uses is dated and inadequate for determining proper staffing needs.*

	Review Complete	Anticipated Implementation

<p>Improvement Plan:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Work in cooperation with the union to evaluate the best approach to seek legislative funding to conduct a staffing/workload audit.</li> <li>○ Anticipate including an analysis of the requirements needed to re-establish “shift musters” in the staffing/workload audit.</li> <li>○ Submit a budget proposal to fund a staffing/workload audit. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ 8/2016 – Funding requests for staffing model review that includes musters, staff searches, relief, etc., were approved and advanced to OFM for 17-19 budget consideration.</li> <li>○ Funding was <u>not</u> received for 2017-2019</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<p>September 2016</p>	<p><b>July 2017</b></p>
<p><b>Control center access policy is inadequate</b></p>		
<p>SAO Reported Noted:</p> <p><i>Our experts noted current Department policies for managing facility control centers do not adequately state who is allowed to enter them and for what purpose</i></p>		
	<p><b>Review Complete</b></p>	<p><b>Anticipated Implementation</b></p>
<p>Improvement Plan:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Although post orders and facility operational procedures address control center access, DOC will establish a policy governing control center access. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Final draft policy submitted to policy office August 2017</li> </ul> </li> </ul>		<p><b>August 2017</b></p>
<p><b>Visibility is poor in some areas</b></p>		
<p>SAO Reported Noted:</p> <p><i>Almost every facility has one or more blind spots or areas of poor visibility where staff are unable to see and prevent off ender rule-breaking or other harmful situations</i></p>		
	<p><b>Review Complete</b></p>	<p><b>Anticipated Implementation</b></p>

<p>Improvement Plan:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ To increase visibility and accountability, DOC has been adding additional camera equipment based on recommendations from a legislative mandated camera assessment.</li> <li>○ Received over \$30 million by the legislature for this effort.</li> <li>○ Currently several camera projects are underway, some in the installation phase and others in planning.</li> <li>○ In conjunction with the camera study, federal PREA requirements also direct the suggested placement of cameras and mirrors.</li> <li>○ Conducting a review of the need to establish policy language to clarify suggested/required camera placement.</li> </ul>	<p>September 2016</p>	<p><b>Ongoing</b></p>
<p><b>Monitoring and auditing activities could be more focused</b></p>		
<p>SAO Reported Noted:</p> <p><i>To further improve the evaluation of the effectiveness of the staff safety initiatives, the Department could better focus these internal audits and reviews on relevant safety related policies and procedures</i></p>		
	<p><b>Review Complete</b></p>	<p><b>Anticipated Implementation</b></p>
<p>Improvement Plan:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ As noted in the report, DOC has already taken action to increase the coordination of internal audits and reviews.</li> <li>○ Implemented an electronic corrective action plan database to continually track and report progress in addressing identified corrective actions. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ 09/2016 – The Corrective Action Tracking system (CATS) has been in use since the beginning of 2016.</li> </ul> </li> <li>○ Developing additional staff safety specific audit tools, to focus on routine assessment of the ongoing implementation of safety initiatives. The implementation of these new audit tools will be timed after implementation activities are complete.</li> </ul>	<p>July 2017</p>	<p><b>Ongoing</b></p>
<p><b>Policies surrounding offender movement need improvement</b></p>		

SAO Reported Noted:  <i>Better policies and procedures could help ensure all offenders, including those who are given permission to be somewhere they were not originally expected, are accounted for during movement periods.</i>		
	<b>Review Complete</b>	<b>Anticipated Implementation</b>
Improvement Plan:  <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Currently working with facility stakeholders to determine the specific gaps in the offender movement process.</li> <li>○ Policy will be revised to close noted gaps and inconsistencies.</li> </ul>	September 2016	<b>2018</b>
<b>Specific performance goals and measures</b>		
SAO Reported Noted:  <i>Enhance the Department's current approach to assessing the effectiveness of the staff safety initiatives and how well they have been implemented at facilities to provide additional opportunities for continual improvement.</i>		
	<b>Review Complete</b>	<b>Anticipated Implementation</b>
Improvement Plan:  <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Several performance measures specific to staff safety are monitored through Results DOC in alignment with Results Washington, including a specific goal council for safer operations.</li> <li>○ Conducts an annual employee engagement survey with specific questions on staff safety.</li> <li>○ Continue to refine Results DOC and explore additional performance measures specific to staff safety for inclusion in the performance measurement system.</li> </ul>	October 2016	<b>Complete</b>



# Appendix B

Fiscal Year 2018 Annual In-Service - Staff Safety



# Prison Safety - Facilitator Guide

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**Annual In-Service FY18**

Training and Development Unit



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# Getting Started

## About This Guide

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### What’s the purpose of this guide?

This facilitator guide provides a master reference document to help you prepare for and deliver the “Prison Safety - Facilitator Guide” program.

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### What will I find in the guide?

This facilitator guide is a comprehensive package that contains

- the workshop delivery sequence
  - checklists of necessary materials and equipment
  - presentation scripts and key points to cover, and
  - instructions for managing exercises, case studies, and other instructional activities.
- 



### How is the text laid out in this guide?

Every action in the program is described in this guide by a text block like this one, with a margin icon, a title line, and the actual text. The icons are designed to help catch your eye and draw quick attention to “what to do and how to do it.” For example, the icon to the left indicates that you, the instructor, say something next. The title line gives a brief description of what to do, and is followed by the actual script, instruction set, key points, etc. that are needed to complete the action.

A complete list of the margin icons used in this guide is provided on the following page.


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### IMPORTANT NOTE

You may also occasionally find important notes such as this one in the text of this guide. These shaded boxes provide particularly important information in an attention-getting format.

## Graphic Cues

### Module Blocks



### Lesson Blocks



## The Program in Perspective

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### Why a “Prison Safety - Facilitator Guide” program?

Engrossed Senate Bill 5907

Sec. 4. (1) The department shall develop training curriculum regarding staff safety issues at total confinement correctional facilities. At a minimum, the training shall address the following issues: (a) Security routines; (b) Physical plant layout; (c) Offender movement and program area coverage; and (d) Situational awareness and de-escalation techniques. (2) The department shall seek the input of both the statewide security and local advisory committees in developing the curriculum.

---



### Performance Objectives

By the end of this class:

1. Using distributed policies, participants will recognize 2 to 3 impacts to safety.
  2. Using a case study, participants will identify the details relating to the security lapses and/or failures in their assigned policy.
- 

### Program Timing

Requires: 3 hours

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### Number of Participants

Minimum: 6

Maximum: 30

Optimum: 24

---

## Program Preparation

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### Pre-Work

Ensure that the video is pulled up and audio/visual equipment is operating properly. (Video is the introduction to the Case Study, PowerPoint Slide 4).

---

### Required Materials

- Facilitator Guide

- Participant Guides

- These guides contain Restricted Policies. Each guide must be numbered as a series to ensure accountability for the content.

- Facilitators must collect the Participant Guides and account for them at the completion of every class.

- PowerPoint

- Notepad or paper AND pens or pencils for each participant

---

### Room Set-Up

Arranged in or able to move participants into four table groups.

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### Instructor Preparation

Review facilitator guide, read and familiarize with case study.

---

### Curriculum Contributors

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
# Anticipatory Set

## How Escapes Happen

Facilitator



Time to complete this lesson: 5 minutes



Time: 5 min

### Run the activity.

1. In groups of two or three, discuss what news stories, movies, books, etc. you are aware of that involve a prison break or escape.
2. Based on these escapes, brainstorm a list of the breakdowns, mistakes, or other elements that resulted in the escape.
3. After several minutes, ask for volunteers to share some of their responses with the whole group.
4. Chart responses on a whiteboard/chart paper. These will be referred back to later in the course.



### Say something like:

At the end of this class, we will come back to this list and see how these factors can contribute to an escape occurring in Washington State.

This year's Prison Safety focus is on how to recognize and prevent security lapses and/or failures that could lead to situations like escapes.

# Introduction & Overview

## Introduction & Overview

### Facilitator



Time to complete this lesson: 10 minutes



Time: 2 min

#### Introduce yourself and any co-facilitators.

- Who you are and your position/role in DOC
- Briefly mention any relevant experience or knowledge about this topic and why you are interested in facilitating this course



Time: 8 min

#### Participant Introductions

Select an option depending on the setting and/or needs for your audience:

##### Option 1:

Ask participants to introduce themselves.

- Who they are and their position/role in DOC
- Years of experience working in prisons or regarding prison safety

##### Option 2:

- **Ask:** What comes to mind when you think about Prison Safety?

On chart paper, **create a list** of ground rules.\*\*

- Ask learners what ground rules should be put in place to ensure a successful class.
- Consider including ground rules on cell phone use, limiting sidebar conversations, and respecting other learners.

\*\*If the classroom/facility has established ground rules posted in the classroom, you may refer to these.

# Introduction & Overview

**Facilitator**



**Say something like:**

The goal for this year's Prison Safety In-Service is to prevent and mitigate problems that occur due to security lapses and/or failures in processes and procedures.



**Objectives**

- Using distributed policies, participants will recognize 2 to 3 impacts to safety.
- Using a case study, participants will identify the details relating to the breakdown(s) in their assigned policy.

2



**Performance Objectives**

By the end of this class:

1. Using distributed policies, participants will recognize 2 to 3 impacts to safety.
2. Using a case study, participants will identify the details relating to the security lapses and/or failures in their assigned policy.



**IMPORTANT NOTE**

Take a moment to share with the class that they will be encouraged to draw from real world experiences during this class, however it is important not to assign blame or point fingers.

Any stories or examples shared during this class should be intended to promote learning, not to embarrass, insult, or hurt anyone.

# Processes and Procedure

## Activity

### Facilitator



Time to complete this lesson: 35 minutes

### Slide 3



#### Process and Procedure Activity

- When was your policy last revised?
- What are the primary processes, procedures, and/or directives in your policy?
- What part(s) of this policy seems the most important to prison safety?



Time: 15 min

#### Policy Review

**Say:** Policy provides us with guidelines on the correct processes and procedures for what we do within DOC. Rather than tell you what policy says, as a class we will review and refresh each other on what certain policies say.

For the next 15 minutes you will work as a group to answer several questions about your assigned process or procedure.

Assign a recorder and spokesperson for your group to share your findings with the whole class.

1. Divide participants into four groups.
2. Assign each group one topic:
  - Counts (Participant Guide pages 2-10)
  - Movement & Inspection (Participant Guide pages 10-20)
  - Searches of Offenders (Participant Guide pages 20-26)
  - Facility Searches (Participant Guide pages 26-33)
3. Direct groups to answer the questions on the slide and be prepared to report out on their assigned policy.

## Activity

Facilitator



### IMPORTANT NOTE

The information below (pages 5-8) will be used to review and debrief each process/procedure after each group reports out on their topic.

Do not treat the “key points” as a script; use questions to draw points out, and do not read off points that participants have already covered.

## Counts

Facilitator



### Group Reports Out

Ask the group reviewing Counts to report out on their policy.

After participants have shared their findings, share any of the below key points that they may have missed or failed to emphasize.

Time: 5 min



### Make sure the following key points have been covered:

- Types of counts include formal (including standing count), informal, picture, out counts, and recounts (DOC 420.150.I.B.1-5)
- Formal counts cover the entire population at specific times (DOC 420.150.II.A); informal counts occur between formal counts and randomly throughout the facility (DOC 420.150.V.A-B)
- Offenders physically present themselves during a standing count: standing in cell, walking, or sitting upright (DOC 420.150.II.A.2.a.1).
- Obvious signs of life are observed, such as body movement, skin tone, breath sounds, chest expansion (DOC 420.150.C.1.a)
- Slips are filled out in ink and submitted to the designated employee responsible for facility count (DOC 420.150.II.C.1.h and 420.150.II.C.2)



**Ask the whole class:** Why might staff fail to conduct a count in accordance with policy? What problems might occur as a result?

## Movement & Inspections

### Facilitator



Time: 5 min

#### Group Reports Out

Ask the group reviewing Movement and Inspections to report out on their policy.

After participants have shared their findings, share any of the below key points that they may have missed or failed to emphasize.



#### Make sure the following key points have been covered:

##### Movement

- Movement is regulated to maintain facility control and security (DOC 420.155.I).
- Daily lists published to identify offenders with appointments, programs, events, meetings, work, and activities and includes time, reason, and location of appointment/activity (DOC 420.155.II.D)
- Non-scheduled movement requires Shift Commander approval and kept to a minimum (DOC 420.155.III)
- Limited movement has written procedures for recall, restricted movement, movement during limited visibility, lockdown, stop in place, and formal count (DOC 420.155.IV.A)

##### Inspections

- When completing inspections, employees must be alert for contraband, changes in equipment or other features of the facility, and conditions that would constitute a safety or security hazard (DOC 420.370.II.B)
- Management inspections will focus on reviewing security practices and safety and sanitation procedures, including but not limited to: tool and key control; offender movement; security equipment and radios; perimeter fence checks; offender, employee, and housing/facility searches; general cleanliness; adherence to safety regulations; offender and employee morale (DOC 420.370.II.D)



**Ask the whole class:** How does following policy on movement impact safety?

## Searches of Offenders



Time: 5 min

**Facilitator**

### Group Reports Out

Ask the group reviewing Searches of Offenders to report out on their policy.

After participants have shared their findings, share any of the below key points that they may have missed or failed to emphasize.



### Make sure the following key points have been covered:

Searches of Offenders

- Routine searches include electronic, canine, or pat searches (DOC 420.310.II.A)
- Routine searches will be conducted regularly at designated movement/transfer points and randomly throughout the facility (DOC 420.310.II.A)
- A pat search may include any of the following: patting hands along the fully clothed body of the offender; removal of the coat, hat, and/or shoes; a manual search of all belongings in the offender’s immediate possession; visual inspection of nasal passages, hands, ears, and mouth; and the removal of hearing aids, dentures, and/or eyeglasses (DOC 420.310.II.D.3)
- Times strip searches may be conducted include when entering/exiting IMU, or other secure areas; when a reasonable belief has been established that the offender is carrying contraband dangerous to self or others, or creates the potential to disrupt the orderly operations of the facility (DOC 420.310.III.A&B)



**Ask the whole class:** Where do breakdowns in Search policy occur? What impact can these have on safety?

## Facility Searches



Time: 5 min

**Facilitator**

### Group Reports Out

Ask the group reviewing Facility Searches and Inspections to report out on their policy.

After participants have shared their findings, share any of the below key points that they may have missed or failed to emphasize.



## Facility Searches

### Facilitator



**Make sure the following key points have been covered:**

#### Facility Searches

- For the search process: employees will not inform the offender of planned searches before they are conducted, employees will wear protective gloves and/or other protective equipment (DOC 420.320.II)
- Offender living areas, cells, and/or dorms will be inspected daily to insure cleanliness and compliance with facility regulations and to identify any safety hazards (DOC 420.320.IV.A)
- All searches must be documented in the unit/area log book and DOC 05-384 Search Report must be completed describing all items confiscated from the cell/search area (DOC 420.320.VII.A&B)



**Ask the whole class:** What can occur when searches are performed incorrectly? What about inspections?



**Say something like:**

One significant factor in all of these processes and procedures being followed is the human element.

Because of this, it is important to consider the element of staff compromise as well.

## Relationships/Contacts with Offenders

Facilitator



Time to complete this lesson: 15 minutes



Time: 10 min

### Policy Review

Direct participants to individually review the policy on Relationships/Contacts with Offenders, located on pages 33-37 in their Participant Guide. Allow class up to 10 minutes to review the policy.

As a large group, discuss the significant pieces of the policy. Use “key points” below to ensure relevant information is covered.



### Make the following key points:

Relationships/Contacts with Offenders

- Interactions will be conducted in a professional manner consistent with state law, prudent correctional practice, and Department policies and procedures (DOC 850.030.I)
- Be very aware of the appearance of improper association (DOC 850.030.I.A)
- Reactions to offenders’ needs and behaviors must be professional and not based on favoritism, biases, stereotypes, or personal judgements (DOC 850.030.I.C)
- Personal relationships between employee/staff/volunteer family and offenders or offenders’ known or immediate family or associates has potential to pose conflicts and security risks at work and will be avoided when known (DOC 850.030.II.C)



### Say something like:

Relationships/Contacts with Offenders is an area where Staff Compromise can occur.

Now that we have reviewed these processes and procedures and contact with offenders, next we will look at how they apply to a Case Study from the 2015 Prison Escape in New York.



### Break

15 minutes

# Case Study

## New York Escape

Facilitator



Time to complete this lesson: 70 minutes

Slide 4



**Say something like:**

In 2015, two convicted murderers escaped from Clinton Correctional Facility in New York State, using tools to cut out of their cells and travel through the bowels of the prison to the outside.



**Say something like:** This short clip is from BBC and was seen by international viewers when the New York Escape happened. It is to help you get a better visual of the facility where the escape occurred. Be aware that because it was made for an international audience, the term “jail” is used instead of “prison” and there are spellings different than we use in the United States.

**Play video (58 seconds)**

**Ask:** Could something like this happen here in Washington?




**Instructions for the case study activity are:**

1. Direct learners to work in their same groups for this case study (Counts, Movement & Inspection, Searches of Offenders, Facility Searches).

Time: up to 45 min for groups to

## Facilitator Guide Case Study

<p>review the case study; up to 10 min for reporting out.</p>	<p>2. Explain that participants will have up to 45 minutes to review the case study and identify where their assigned process/procedure applies and what mistakes occurred that contributed to the escape.</p> <p><u>Using our DOC policies as a reference, participants should identify one or two significant examples of where failures to follow policy contributed to the escape.</u></p> <p>The Case Study excerpt is approximately 17 pages long (out of the original 154 page Inspector General’s report); it is up to participants to decide how to divide up the work and complete the assignment in time.</p> <p>3. Explain that it is up to learners to decide how to manage their time and complete the case study. The facilitator(s) will be available to answer questions, but will not be actively facilitating this portion of the class.</p> <p>4. Direct learners to be ready to report out on their findings to the whole class (2-3 minutes per group).</p>
<p>Slide 5</p> 	<p>Case Study (continued)</p> <p>What to consider/look for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• What was the breakdown in the process/procedure?</li><li>• Why did the breakdown(s) occur?</li><li>• Are there any notable or significant details you came across?</li></ul>



### IMPORTANT NOTE

At the end of the 45 minutes, allow participants to take a 10 minute break prior to reporting out.

Groups who need additional time may use this time to continue working.

After approximately 20 minutes, if a group appears to be slow/struggling, encourage them to use the headings in the case study or to try skimming the document to find areas relevant to their topic rather than worrying about reading the entire thing.

**Take a Break (10 minutes)**

**The following is adapted from the investigation of the June 5, 2015 escape of inmates David Sweat and Richard Matt from Clinton Correctional Facility.**

*Scott, C. L., Inspector General. (2016). Investigation of the June 5, 2015 Escape of Inmates David Sweat and Richard Matt from Clinton Correctional Facility. State of New York Office of the Inspector General. Retrieved from <https://ig.ny.gov/>*

To access a full version of this report, follow iDOC→Agency→Operations→Emergency Management→Resources, “State of New York...” under **Other Resources**

The information presented in the following section of the report has been obtained from a number of sources, including sworn testimony, documents, photographic and physical evidence, and on-site observations. It is to be noted that a comprehensive account of the planning and execution of the escape must derive in part from the extensive testimony provided by Sweat, the only living witness to, and participant in, many of the relevant events. The Inspector General recognizes that questions will arise regarding Sweat’s motivation and credibility. Wherever possible, therefore, the information provided by Sweat under oath has been corroborated by other testimony and evidence. In instances where no independent corroboration exists, the Inspector General has found Sweat’s account credible and consistent with other known facts.

***David Sweat and Richard Matt (Pg. 38 in Participant’s Guide)***

David Sweat was 23 years old when he arrived at Clinton Correctional Facility in October 2003, sentenced to a term of life without parole for the July 2002 murder in Kirkwood of Broome County Sheriff’s Deputy Kevin Tarsia, who was shot multiple times by Sweat and an accomplice and run over by a vehicle driven by Sweat.

Richard Matt’s incarceration at Clinton commenced in July 2008, when, at age 42, he began serving a sentence of 25 years to life for the kidnap, torture, and murder of businessman William Rickerson, Matt’s 76-year-old former employer, in Niagara County in December 1997.

Both Sweat and Matt had criminal histories and previously served time in state prison in New York.

When Sweat and Matt re-entered the DOCCS system at Clinton in 2003 and 2008, respectively, both were designated Central Monitoring Case (CMC) inmates. According to DOCCS policy, DOCCS’s Office of Special Investigations assigns CMC designation to inmates who “because of the nature of their crime, status, or behavior, require special evaluation and tracking of their movement through the correctional system.”

Matt’s designation as a CMC inmate resulted from his history of escape; Sweat’s was due to the heinousness of his crime. In an October 4, 2011, memorandum to front gate officers, Clinton’s then deputy superintendent for security identified Sweat too as an “escape risk” and advised that “all necessary precautions should be taken whenever it is required to move the inmate outside the facility, regardless of the reason.” Matt and Sweat also appeared on what Clinton officials colloquially refer to as the prison’s “Top 40” list. According to Clinton security officials, inmates are placed on the list, which in fact contains approximately 75 names, if they are deemed an

escape, risk, committed a high-profile or sophisticated crime, or, while incarcerated, received contraband from prison staff or manipulated staff.

***Housing in Honor Block (Pg. 39 in P.G.)***

At the time of the June 5, 2015 escape, Sweat and Matt occupied adjacent cells on the third, or top, tier of A-Block, the housing unit that served as the Honor Block at Clinton. Honor housing is utilized widely in corrections in New York and elsewhere as an incentive and reward to inmates for good behavior. Under Clinton policy at the time, inmates were eligible for housing in the Honor Block without consideration of the length of their sentences, the crimes for which they were incarcerated, or previous criminal records, including histories of escape, so long as they had not committed a serious disciplinary infraction and had satisfactorily participated in prison programs during the preceding nine months. Inmates were subject to removal from the Honor Block if they received a misbehavior report resulting in seven or more days of keeplock, or confinement in their cells, or the loss of one or more privileges for 21 or more days.

As a physical structure, the Honor Block at Clinton is similar to other housing units in the maximum-security, or main, section of the prison: three tiers of cells, each approximately eight-feet by six-feet, arranged in two back-to-back rows separated by a narrow passage, or catwalk, that provides access to electrical, plumbing, and ventilation systems. Honor Block inmates, grouped into six “companies,” were subject to the same security measures as other prisoners.

Honor Block inmates were entitled, however, to a number of privileges not allowed elsewhere in the prison, including longer recreation periods on weekdays and weekends when they were allowed to remain in their cells or congregate on the “flats”, or open areas, of the first tier, where they could cook and engage in recreational and social activities. Honor Block inmates were also permitted more locker and shelf space in their cells and more frequent, and more private, showers. As a result of these benefits, according to Mr. Palmer, a tailor shop escort officer with part-time duty in the Honor Block, “none of the inmates really ran their mouths” and were less likely to misbehave. At the time of the escape, the Honor Block housed up to 180 inmates in 174 cells, including six cells that at times held two inmates.

Matt was accepted in the Honor Block in June 2009, having been incarcerated at Clinton for 11 months without any rule infractions. Matt was removed from the Honor Block and confined in Clinton’s Special Housing Unit for 30 days. Thereafter, he was housed in various blocks before returning to the Honor Block in June 2013.

Sweat was accepted in Honor Block housing in November 2010, having served more than seven years at Clinton without a disciplinary charge.

A friendship developed between Matt and Sweat in November 2010 when their housing in the Honor Block first overlapped. They occupied adjacent cells from August 2013 to September 2014 and again from late January 2015 until their escape. One inmate who was housed and worked with Matt and Sweat described Sweat as “very, very self-sufficient in all ways”; whereas Matt was “sociable” and “gregarious.” Despite their differences in age and personality, Sweat and Matt became friends, based in part on a shared interest in art. Sweat recalled admiring Matt’s paintings, including one depicting a dog in which “you could see every hair . . . [it] was absolutely beautiful.” Inspired by Matt, Sweat took up painting and drawing, and quickly developed his talents. When Matt was expelled from the Honor Block in 2011, Sweat sent him gifts of tobacco,

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rolling papers, and food. “That really strengthened our friendship,” Sweat recalled. Staff and inmates described Matt and Sweat as “buddies,” and they sat at work stations near each other during the time they were both assigned to Tailor Shop 1. Sweat and other inmates called Matt by a prison nickname, “Hacksaw,” a reference to the dismemberment of his murder victim.

### ***Joyce Mitchell’s Improper Conduct in Tailor Shop 1 (Pg. 40 in P.G.)***

***(Staff Compromise)***

Ms. Mitchell began employment at Clinton in 2008 as an Industrial Training Supervisor, a civilian position in Corcraft’s apparel manufacturing operation at the prison. Between 2008 and 2013, she worked as a “relief” employee covering staff absences in various shops and briefly as the supervisor in the tailor shop in the prison’s Assessment Preparation Program Unit. In November 2013, she was assigned to Tailor Shop 1, where she remained until the day of the escape. Ms. Mitchell’s husband, Lyle Mitchell, has been employed at Clinton since 2005 as an industrial training supervisor.... Although Ms. Mitchell had previously met both Sweat and Matt when temporarily assigned to other shops where they worked, it was in Tailor Shop 1 that she first interacted with both inmates on a regular basis and developed personal relationships with them. Recalling Mitchell’s behavior in Tailor Shop 1, Vicki-Lynn Safford, the Industry quality control supervisor, testified, “She always flirted around the shop and laughed and stood close to all inmates, but it was more so with Sweat and Matt.”

In their different ways, Sweat and Matt made strong impressions on Ms. Mitchell. Sweat “usually was pretty quiet,” Ms. Mitchell stated, and “very intelligent.” She described Matt as the “top dog” to whom other inmates gravitated. Matt, she said, was “confident,” a “dominant personality” and a “bull-shitter.” Both inmates, she recalled, were “always nice” to her, which “made me feel good.” An inmate who observed these interactions had perhaps a clearer perspective, calling Sweat and Matt “master manipulators.”

As early as 2012, Ms. Mitchell’s inappropriate interactions with inmates were noticed by coworkers and supervisors. Ms. Mitchell “treated them more as an employee or a friend . . . she didn’t keep the distance,” Safford, testified. Bradley Streeter, a general industrial training supervisor and Ms. Mitchell’s direct supervisor beginning in 2013, described her as an “inmate lover” who “tried to sweet talk them into getting things done her way.” Ms. Mitchell herself said she found it difficult to maintain a proper separation from inmates. “I will visit with the guys,” she told investigators. “It’s like you get a rapport with them because you are in that same room with them every day of the week,” she added.

### ***Matt and Sweat Manipulate Correction Officer Eugene Palmer and Others***

***(Pg. 41 in P.G.) (Staff Compromise, Movement, Searches)***

While housed in the Honor Block, Matt and Sweat developed a mutually beneficial relationship with Correction Officer Eugene Palmer, a 27-year veteran of Clinton who for the previous eight years was assigned to escort inmates to and from the Industry Building and also regularly worked weekend overtime shifts in the Honor Block. The Inspector General found that Mr. Palmer’s interactions with Matt and Sweat, as well as with other inmates, were at times unauthorized and improper.

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Mr. Palmer described himself as the “go-to guy” whom “everybody looked up to . . . in the jail.” Mr. Palmer testified:

“I was one of the people that they could come to, officers, and say ‘Hey, this guy’s giving me a problem, or in my packages, or I can’t get a hold of my wife, or, however, I need to speak to my counselor.’ So, when my job as an escort officer, I can go pretty much anywhere I wanted to . . . I’m mobile, so I can go see their counselor and say, ‘Hey, this is --, what can we do about this.’”

According to Ms. Mitchell, Matt and Sweat were “Palmer’s boys,” and Mr. Palmer was their “boy,” each looking out for the other. An inmate testified that Mr. Palmer and Matt “were tighter than two peas in a pod.” Indeed, Mr. Palmer testified that he and Matt had developed such a trusting relationship that Matt had vowed to kill any inmate who assaulted Mr. Palmer. Mr. Palmer described Matt, with whom he conversed “pretty much every day,” as a “smooth talker [who] always had something to say.” In contrast, Sweat, according to Mr. Palmer, “never said nothing . . . never caused no problems.”

More significantly, Mr. Palmer took a number of actions, some of which assisted Matt’s and Sweat’s escape. As described in detail below, these included frequent escorts of Matt from the tailor shop to his cell, bypassing metal detector checks; access for Matt and Sweat to the catwalks behind their cells; giving Matt warning of a possible cell search and concealing contraband that might be found in the search; assisting Sweat in his reassignment to the tailor shop and relocation to a cell next to Matt; and transporting contraband meat to Matt and Sweat in which escape tools were concealed.

As a result of his relationship with Mr. Palmer, Matt’s status in the Honor Block was enhanced as he was in a position to request favors from Mr. Palmer for other inmates. For example, inmates wishing to have their cells’ electrical system upgraded to operate hot plates, appealed to Matt for assistance. Mr. Palmer said he would allow Sweat access to the catwalks to perform the upgrades on the cells designated by Matt.

### ***Ms. Mitchell’s First Delivery of Hacksaw Blades (Pg. 42 in P.G.)***

***(Movement, Searches)***

Sweat felt sure that if he could get into the catwalk area behind his cell, he could find a way into the prison tunnels. But to reach the catwalk, he would need to breach the steel rear wall of his cell, and to do that, cutting tools were required. Therefore, in mid-February 2015, he requested through Matt that Ms. Mitchell smuggle in hacksaw blades.

Ms. Mitchell agreed, and for less than \$6, she purchased six blades at a Walmart store near her home on February 16, 2015. As with the earlier contraband, front gate officers did not detect the blades when Ms. Mitchell carried them into the prison in her bag. According to Ms. Mitchell, she placed the blades in the box next to Matt’s work station in Tailor Shop 1. Soon thereafter, Matt had the blades in his cell and he and Sweat divided them, each taking three.

Sweat said Matt told him he smuggled the blades from the tailor shop by taping them to his torso, afterward showing Sweat the red marks left on his skin. The tape, Sweat said, came from the shop’s supplies, and he speculated that Matt taped the blades to his side while in the shop bathroom. The Inspector General found that Matt carried the blades to his cell by walking from the shop directly to the Honor Block, or indirectly by way of the infirmary where he requested to be taken for an actual or feigned attack of sciatica. In either instance, Matt would have been in the company of an officer, almost certainly Mr. Palmer, the regular Honor Block escort officer. An



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inmate who worked in Tailor Shop 1 noted that Matt complained of back pain only on days Mr. Palmer was working, so that Mr. Palmer, not another officer, would escort Matt from the shop. According to the inmate, these escorts became more frequent close to the time of the escape. Indeed, Mr. Palmer testified that he escorted Matt from the shop to his cell on a number of occasions, without frisking him on exiting the shop and bypassing the metal detector on the route.

***Sweat and Matt Cut Through Their Cell Walls (Pg. 42 in P.G.)***

***(Searches, Inspections)***

After snapping each blade into two pieces, Sweat and Matt set to work cutting into the 3/16-inch-thick steel rear wall of their cells. Using cloth wrapped with rubber bands as makeshift handles for the blades, they cut around a 10-inch-by-10-inch air vent located near the bottom right corner of the cell behind their beds. They had taped the bottom ends of the metal bed legs so they wouldn't make noise when slid aside. Applying a single tooth at the blade tip, the two scratched at a spot on the wall until a hole formed. Once able to insert the blade through the hole, they could begin actual sawing.

According to Sweat, he and Matt cut every evening from 6:30 p.m. to 8 p.m., while most other Honor Block inmates were at the mess hall or engaged in recreation on the first-floor "flats." Sweat said officers did not question why he and Matt remained in their cell during these hours because it had long been their habit to cook their own dinners and paint in their cells. While one cut for 15 or 20 minutes until he tired, the other stood by his cell door with a mirror watching for an officer making rounds. In the event an officer approached, the cutting ceased and they quickly turned to diversionary activities such as listening to a radio on headphones, watching television, painting, or pretending to be asleep. Occupying adjacent cells, as they now did, undoubtedly assisted their efforts. If for example, their cutting was causing too much noise, Sweat said, "[J]ust a quick little knock on the wall and you know you're getting too loud." Housing in adjacent cells also positioned them to serve most effectively as lookouts for each other when officers were nearby, and facilitated their passing tools back and forth. Describing the ease with which he and Matt exchanged tools, Sweat stated, "Roll them up in a piece of paper" and "just hand them over."

Sweat stated that the Honor Block afforded a "slight" advantage over other housing units in that the din emanating from inmates' recreation two floors below covered the sound of the sawing. As Sweat described it, "[Y]ou get more noise, because everybody goes downstairs in their rec areas, and they'd be at the tables down there, card tables, and playing dominoes, and these guys got bad habits of slamming dominoes . . . So, when they're doing that . . . nobody's really going to hear you unless they're your neighbor, and both of our neighbors always went out for rec." In one instance recalled by Sweat, however, the inmate on the other side of Matt had remained in his cell and heard the cutting. He called out, "What the hell you doing over there?" Matt replied that he was cutting a piece of canvas for a painting, and the inmate didn't ask again.

Sweat estimated that by cutting approximately two inches each evening, he completed a 17-inch-by-12½-inch opening in his cell wall in about three weeks, using a single blade. Matt, less proficient, required an additional week to complete an 18½-inch-by-14½-inch hole, telling Ms. Mitchell when he had finished the job. Once completed, Matt and Sweat removed sections of the cell walls containing the air vents with attached ducts. During this time, Sweat claimed, he hid his blades in his locker; Matt secreted his in a bag. After the holes were complete, Matt gave his

blades to Sweat “so he didn’t have nothing in there.” As a further precaution, Sweat said, he used magnets he took from a machine in the tailor shop to collect the metal filings produced by his sawing, which he then flushed down his cell toilet. Magnets were found in both Sweat’s and Matt’s cells after their escape.

In the aftermath of the escape, questions were raised about Sweat’s and Matt’s ability to cut through their cell walls using only a hacksaw blade. To address these concerns, the Inspector General conducted a test utilizing a 3/16-inch-thick steel plate and a hacksaw blade of the type used by Sweat and Matt, and was able to penetrate the steel plate in less than four hours.

***Holes in Cell Walls Go Undetected (Pg. 43 in P.G.)***

***(Counts, Searches, Inspections)***

Sweat took particular care in masking the hole in his cell wall. After re-inserting the cut-out section of steel, he taped over the cut lines and painted the tape to match the color of his cell interior. He was able to do this, Sweat said, because correction officers provided inmates, upon their request, with paint to touch up their cell interiors. Sweat said his cut-out section was so securely replaced and well disguised that he did not fear discovery if his cell was searched. He was less confident about Matt’s work, and said he once told him to improve his “cobble job where he put a bunch of tape and stuff over it . . . I yelled at him . . . made him [do] that again.”

He need not have been worried. On March 21, 2015, as part of Clinton’s random cell search program, security staff purportedly conducted an unannounced search of Matt’s cell that failed to detect the 18½-inch-by-14½-inch wall breach or any contraband. The officer who performed the search stated that while he did not remember this specific search, it was not his practice to inspect the ceilings, walls, vents or toilet areas “unless something pointed me in that direction” during a visual inspection. Sweat and Mr. Palmer said they did not recall any such search and expressed doubt that it had actually occurred. Both stated that Matt certainly would have mentioned a search to them, but did not. Further, Mr. Palmer testified that officers on occasion would “forge” reports falsely indicating that cell searches had occurred and no contraband uncovered.

In addition, weekly inspections of all cells requiring checks of cell integrity from the catwalks, were not done. Unquestionably, thorough searches and inspections would have discovered the holes in both cells and stopped the escape. In another instance, Sweat related, an officer was “messing around” on the catwalk and shining a “big flashlight” on the back of Matt’s cell, yet did not notice the cut.

From first breaching his cell wall until the escape – nearly three months – Sweat said he was out of his cell “every single night” with three or four exceptions when relief officers were on duty and “I didn’t know . . . whether or not they’d [do their rounds] or not.” On all other nights, Sweat said, he did not fear his absence would be noticed because, he claimed, officers never conducted required rounds between the 11 p.m. and 5:30 a.m. counts. According to Sweat, he knew when an officer was making his last round for the night:

“If they’re walking by, if the guy ain’t got a flashlight, he’s not coming back. If the person, when they’re walking, is only using a flashlight [to read inmate call-out slips for the morning] and they’re not looking in your cell at all, they’re not coming back because they’re not interested. They know you’re in there, they figure you’re secure.”

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Further, on occasions when he and Matt had stayed up into the early morning hours “just painting, just for no reason,” they noticed “a couple of the COs . . . weren’t walking [the rounds].” DOCCS policy requires that officers making rounds must observe “skin and breathing or other movement” for every inmate. Consistent with Sweat’s claim, the Inspector General’s investigation found evidence that many, if not most, night rounds were not conducted at all, or negligently conducted, in the Honor Block. If only one of more than 400 required checks was properly performed during the time Sweat was out of his cell, the escape would have been instantly foiled.

Before exiting his cell each night, Sweat placed a dummy in his bed to deceive officers who might make a round. He fashioned it by stuffing a pair of pants and a hooded sweatshirt. Although roughly body-like in shape, the dummy lacked any material resembling human flesh, which, as noted, officers conducting rounds are required to observe.

The Inspector General interviewed all officers currently assigned to the Honor Block on all shifts, as well as all officers, including relief officers, who worked the night shift during the three-month period Sweat was out of his cell and in the tunnels below the prison. All the officers testified that they conducted all hourly counts and rounds.

Ronald Blair, who worked on the Honor Block the night of the escape, testified he conducts a count at 11 p.m. when he arrives for his shift, and wakes any sleeping inmates to ensure they are present and alive in their cells. As for subsequent counts and rounds, Mr. Blair said, “They don’t want us waking them up . . . If they look . . . alive to you, you move on to the next one.” When asked what he does if he does not see skin or movement, Mr. Blair claimed, “If I feel that something is wrong, I wake them up.”

Mr. Blair purportedly conducted the night rounds at 12 a.m., 2 a.m., and 4 a.m., and signed count slips reporting that all inmates in the Honor Block were present. Mr. Blair testified that he was certain he made the rounds on the night of the escape, and that he thought Matt and Sweat were in their cells that night:

“That’s been eating me up. I thought they were in their cells. I thought they were alive. Believe me, if I wouldn’t have thought that, I wouldn’t have waited to the 5:30 count, the live count, to call it in.... I honestly thought that they were in their cells.”

Investigators asked Mr. Blair whether, based on his familiarity with conducting rounds for more than 13 years, he may have been too inattentive in checking for human movement. Mr. Blair conceded, “That is possible . . . I’m not going to rule that out.”

Correction Officer Thomas Renadette, who worked with Mr. Blair on the Honor Block the night of the escape, also testified he conducted all required counts and rounds, and signed the corresponding count slips. He noted, however, that it is difficult to observe “skin and breathing or other movement,” as policy mandates, because inmates often sleep with their heads covered.

While both Mr. Blair and Mr. Renadette stated they never slept during their shift, Mr. Blair testified he observed Mr. Renadette reclining in his chair or with his feet on the desk in the control room. Mr. Blair recalled, “Feet up? Yep. We’d get lazy. You’ll be doing a crossword, whatever, I’ll be reading a book. We get lazy. But we’re still paying attention to what’s going on in the block. . . .”

Contrary to the claims of officers, former Honor Block inmates interviewed by the Inspector General testified that officers did not conduct counts and rounds after the 11 p.m. count and

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before the 5:30 a.m. count. Sweat, as noted, said he was confident enough these rounds were not conducted to exit his cell nearly every night to work on the escape route without fear of discovery. Seven other inmates also testified that officers failed to conduct these counts. One of these inmates testified:

“They do their initial count, 9:15 [p.m.], 9:30 [p.m.], and everybody locks in, and they’ll come maybe about 20 minutes after 10 [p.m.], some different officers will come closer to 11 [p.m.], that’s very rare. After that, you don’t see them . . . One of the best things I like about, put the curtain up and just you’re by yourself . . . Dead quiet, by 9:30 [p.m.], it’s the best thing about that whole block, 9:30 [p.m.] it’s dead quiet.”

Similarly, another inmate testified that many officers working on the Honor Block did not conduct rounds after the 11 p.m. count. According to yet another inmate, this was the norm, stating that after an officer conducts the 11 p.m. count, “you don’t see him ‘til 5:30. I’ve been up a few nights on the weekend. They don’t come back.” A fourth inmate testified, “The COs do a round at 11:45 p.m. around the whole block 1-6 companies and don’t walk again until 5:30 a.m. count.”

[Further information provided by Sweat revealed that] Sweat placed the cut-out portion of the wall and its attached air duct in a bin under his bed, and, once out of his cell, reached in from the catwalk and covered the hole with a painting secured by magnets taped to the back of the painting

“Acting like a Ninja,” Sweat said, he donned the same clothes each night he was out of his cell: his prison-issued green pants, a long-sleeved brown shirt, and a brown tee-shirt he ripped up and wore on his head like a do-rag. “Everything [down] there is dirty and brown, brown and grey in color, so you blend right in,” he said.

Around mid-March, when Sweat first crawled from his cell onto the catwalk, he was in familiar surroundings. On at least four occasions since January 2015, including twice during the weeks immediately preceding the escape, Mr. Palmer had allowed Sweat onto the catwalk, through a door at the end of the tier, to perform unapproved modifications to the electrical connections for his and other inmates’ cells. The modifications involved re-wiring the cell circuitry to accommodate inmates’ usage of higher-amperage hot plates - a practice prohibited by Clinton policy but long overlooked by officers. Following the escape, Clinton maintenance staff examined the wiring of cells throughout the prison and found that approximately 50 percent of the cells had unauthorized modifications similar to those Sweat performed in the Honor Block. Mr. Palmer admitted to the State Police that he allowed Sweat unauthorized access onto the catwalk, and provided him pliers and a screwdriver for this work, which he retrieved when the work was complete. Mr. Palmer said that Sweat was on the catwalk for 5-10 minutes each time, not always under visual supervision. Sweat also recalled that he had observed the catwalk space when officers left the doors to the area open.

Matt too was familiar with the catwalk area. Incredibly, Mr. Palmer testified that around August or September 2014 he had allowed Matt onto the catwalk to hide tubes of contraband oil-based paint he had in his cell. Mr. Palmer said he did so “because [Matt] probably wasn’t supposed to have that many paints in his cell,” or have any oil-based paints. According to Mr. Palmer, Matt placed the tubes in an approximately 8-inch-by-8-inch cardboard box that they then hid in a recess on the catwalk. Even more troubling, Mr. Palmer testified that he did not examine the box containing the paints to determine if Matt had hid other contraband items as well. Mr. Palmer said he was able to recall the approximate date of this event because it occurred at about the

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time concerns were raised about an inappropriate relationship between Sweat and Ms. Mitchell as a result of the anonymous inmate note. Concerned that an investigation of the relationship might lead to a search of Sweat's and Matt's cells, Mr. Palmer was worried that the contraband paints, some of which he had provided to Matt, would be discovered. After two weeks passed without a search, Mr. Palmer let Matt back onto the catwalk to retrieve the paints.

In effect, Mr. Palmer's actions served to provide warning to Matt of a possible impending cell search. Further, Ms. Mitchell testified that Matt told her that Mr. Palmer warned him of impending prison lockdowns, which would include cell searches, and removed contraband from his cell. Similarly, an inmate who had been housed on the Honor Block testified that Mr. Palmer alerted both Matt and Sweat to impending lockdowns and hid their contraband. According to the inmate, he would thereby learn of upcoming cell searches from Matt.

### ***Sweat Begins Search for Escape Route Under Prison (Pg. 47 in P.G.)***

***(Inspections)***

The first night Sweat exited his cell, he immediately set to work searching for an escape route. He walked to the far end of the catwalk before climbing down through the narrow space between the catwalk and the cell backs, descending three tiers to the prison's subterranean level. At the bottom, Sweat found himself in an inch or two of standing water littered with cigarette butts, Styrofoam cups, light bulbs, scraps of paper, plastic bottles, and other detritus discarded by officers from the catwalks or inmates through their cell vents. He then traveled from beneath the Honor Block through a series of 90-degree turns below the laundry building and into the basement of B-Block. He said he was surprised at the relatively free passageways he found.

While lights on the catwalks provided some illumination in the space directly beneath housing blocks, some parts of the tunnels were totally dark. In these unlit areas, Sweat said, he navigated with a small LED light that Ms. Mitchell had provided to Matt and that he hung on a lanyard around his neck. "Just enough to see but not enough to be bright if there was somebody at the other end," Sweat recalled. Sweat said he was careful not to create any unnecessary noise, moving with particular caution when he passed under a catwalk. He said he never encountered anyone in the tunnels, although on several occasions he observed correction officers on the catwalks above him in several housing blocks, but apparently without being seen himself. One night, Sweat said, he was nearly struck by a lit cigarette butt discarded by an officer.

Never without a watch, Sweat said he made sure to be back in his cell by 4 a.m. That gave him time to change his clothes, wash himself, reseal the hole in his cell wall, and sleep for a short time before the morning count. Crawling and working on his hands and knees also left him with "bruises and scrapes all over the place . . . it was pretty bad." Sweat's inevitable exhaustion did not go unnoticed. Bradley Streeter, Ms. Mitchell's supervisor, seeing Sweat several weeks prior to the escape, thought, "My God, what the hell has happened to him? He looked like he had been wrung through a knothole . . . frail and exhausted . . . not the person I knew." Ms. Mitchell said that Matt too looked tired, and when she asked him about it, he told her he had been "up all night" working below. This was boasting by Matt, who, in Sweat's account, left his cell to work in the tunnels only twice prior to the escape.

### ***Breaching the Brick Wall (Pg. 47 in P.G.)***

***(Inspections)***

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Having discovered no viable alternate route in his exploration of the tunnels, Sweat settled on attempting to breach the brick wall separating C-Block and the Industry Building tunnel. In approximately late-March he began “scraping” and “picking” at the bricks above the steam pipe, aided by tools he fashioned from “things I found that were down there that maintenance workers left around.” With a hacksaw blade he shaped a length of steel into a makeshift pry bar and sharpened a foot-long, inch-thick bolt to form a pick-like implement. But even with these tools, progress was laborious and slow. “I was having a hell of a time,” Sweat said. He said he was able to remove only three or four bricks a night from the three-layer-thick wall, and “[b]ecause [of] fat-ass Matt . . . [I] had to take out a couple of extra bricks.”

The work was further slowed by Sweat’s precaution of replacing the bricks every night before returning to his cell. As he worked, Sweat stacked the removed bricks behind him on the steam pipe and another large pipe - bricks from the exterior side of the wall on one pipe, those from the interior side, which were different in size and color, on the other. This made it easier, Sweat said, to replace the bricks in their original positions, “so that if somebody come over and look with a flashlight, you couldn’t tell the difference.”

In fact, Sweat had little reason to worry that his handiwork would be discovered by prison staff. Soon after assuming his position in April 2014, Clinton First Deputy Superintendent Donald Quinn had implemented what he said were “quarterly” inspections of the tunnels beneath the main prison and annex. However, the newly ordered inspections were not performed quarterly, but only twice yearly, and alternated between the main prison and annex. Thus, the main prison tunnels had only been inspected in September 2014, and would likely not be inspected again until months after the escape. Sweat testified that he was “not worried about” tunnel inspections, “because they’re lazy, to be honest.” Sweat added, “You could tell that nobody had gone down there in, looked like, forever, because they had thick layers of dirt and dust and stuff on the floor.”

The work of breaching the brick wall became easier when, in early April, Sweat serendipitously came upon an eight-pound sledge hammer that, in violation of policy, had been left unsecured beside a locked contractor’s “gang box” in the tunnel near E-Block. Sweat said several shovels and a rake were also outside the box. Sweat recalled his reaction to finding the hammer: “Oh, man, I couldn’t have asked for anything better.”

Working at the wall with the sledge hammer, makeshift pry bar, and pick, Sweat said he timed his blows to coincide with the loud sounds from pipes that “bang like a son of a bitch down there . . . So I wait until they start banging, and then I would bang.” In this manner, Sweat recalled, after about two weeks “I knocked the wall out.”

Seeking additional tools, Sweat said, he returned to the gang box, picked the lock, and was pleased to now find many useful items, including three power drills, an angle grinder and spare grinding disks, rechargeable battery packs, disposable breathing masks, an LED light on a headband light, a steel punch, and a two-pound sledge hammer. Sweat said he took the hammer, thinking, “perfect, a baby sledge hammer,” as well as the punch, two breathing masks, and the light. Sweat said he ignored the drills because they were no use without concrete bits. Sweat stated that each morning before returning to his cell, he replaced the two-pound sledge hammer in the box, which he re-locked. On successive nights and mornings, he repeated these actions.

Notably, Sweat never returned the eight-pound sledge hammer he had found earlier beside the box, nor the light and masks he found inside the box. In addition, he said he broke and discarded

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the steel punch. Within a few days, he said, he noticed a new punch in the tool box, but thought it wise not to use it. Clinton records do not show that prison security staff or the contractor ever reported any missing tools or other items.

### ***Ms. Mitchell Smuggles in More Tools and Joins Plan to Leave with Matt and Sweat***

*(Pg. 49 in P.G.) (Staff Compromise)*

In the four months preceding the escape, Sweat and Matt drew Ms. Mitchell more deeply into their plot. Aware of the escape plan since the beginning, Ms. Mitchell provided further help by smuggling additional escape tools and other contraband into the prison at Sweat's and Matt's request. Before long, she agreed to join them after the breakout.

Soon after deciding that he and Matt would try to escape, Sweat set about manipulating what he knew were Ms. Mitchell's feelings for him. At this time, Ms. Mitchell recalled, Matt asked her, "What would you do if Sweat were to grab and kissed [you], would you [tell] anybody?" By answering, "Probably not," Ms. Mitchell understood she was revealing her openness to an intimate relationship with Sweat. Soon thereafter, Sweat began sending notes to Ms. Mitchell through Matt, some instructing her about tools needed in the escape plan, others of an explicitly romantic or sexual nature. In the notes, Ms. Mitchell recalled, Sweat "was telling me that he loved me and that he wanted to spend his life with me." "[H]e's like, 'I love you, can't wait to get you in my arms, make love to you all night long.'" Ms. Mitchell admitted that in her notes she was "saying those things back," seduced in part by her believing that "a younger guy would actually like an older woman."

Sweat said he wrote his notes on post-it size slips of paper, which he folded as small as possible and handed to Matt in the morning. According to Ms. Mitchell, Matt delivered the near-daily notes to her by slipping them into her desk drawer while he stood at the platform in Tailor Shop 1. She said she wrote a response to every note, which she either handed to Matt or Matt retrieved from her drawer, to take to Sweat. At least some of these exchanges were noticed by an inmate who testified he saw Matt "going up the desk, reach in, and grab shit out." Both Ms. Mitchell and Sweat said they destroyed all the notes immediately after reading them. "Never keep notes," Sweat told investigators.

Ms. Mitchell made little attempt to hide other interactions with Matt, admitting she was at his work station or talking with him elsewhere in the shop for "30 minutes" each day. That is an underestimate, according to an inmate who observed Ms. Mitchell's and Matt's interactions and commented, "It would blow me away . . . she would go over to his machine every day and would spend . . . 85 percent of the time at his machine," even ordering the inmate who sat next to Matt to move so that she could sit there. Matt, the inmate added, "never seemed to do much work because he was especially chummy" with Ms. Mitchell . . . I had never seen anything like it." Another inmate had a similar observation, recalling that Ms. Mitchell was "bent over in front of [Matt] . . . she would literally stand in front of the fucking guy's machine all day."

The two inmates described Trombley, the correction officer assigned to the shop, as negligent. As one of the inmates testified, "The officer was sitting up there all the time, watching this whole thing. It was just amazing. I would shake my head." According to the second inmate's testimony, Mr. Trombley spent considerable time every day reading "books, novels." A third inmate testified, "A lot of times, Officer Trombley would, every day he'd have a different book or magazine." Mr. Trombley's blatant disregard of his duties was noticed by civilian staff as well. When Mr. Trombley

worked as a relief officer in Tailor Shop 2, according to the industrial training supervisor in that shop, he sat at his desk reading most of the day.

***Ms. Mitchell and Matt Have Sexual Encounters in the Shop (Pg. 50 in P.G.) (Staff Compromise)***

Matt, as Sweat had earlier, told Ms. Mitchell he had romantic feelings for her. Ms. Mitchell testified that Matt told her, “You know I love you.” Over time, Ms. Mitchell’s and Matt’s relationship turned sexual. According to Ms. Mitchell, one day while she and Matt were alone in the adjoining Tailor Shop 9 to retrieve a machine part, “Matt grabbed me . . . and he kissed me . . . I was scared shitless. . . .” Asked by a State Police investigator, “Scared but excited?” Ms. Mitchell responded, “Yeah.” Ms. Mitchell claimed that while the encounter meant nothing to her, Matt might have seen it differently. “What makes it a relationship in his [opinion]?” the State Police investigator asked. “Maybe because I didn’t go to anybody and say anything,” Ms. Mitchell answered. Ms. Mitchell admitted that a second sexual encounter occurred in Tailor Shop 9 not long after the first. In that shop again to retrieve a part, Ms. Mitchell stated, she performed oral sex on Matt.

While Ms. Mitchell stated that only two incidents of sexual contact occurred in Tailor Shop 9, an inmate testified that Matt and Ms. Mitchell entered Tailor Shop 9 for sexual encounters “six, seven, eight times.” According to the inmate, Matt, referring to Ms. Mitchell, said, “I’m gonna get that . . . I’m gonna take her in the room, we already talked about it, she’s saying I can, I gotta be quick.” . . . In fact, Ms. Mitchell herself admitted further sexual contact with Matt after the incidents in Tailor Shop 9. Almost “daily,” she testified, Matt stood by her desk and asked her to fondle his penis by reaching into his pants through a hole he had cut in his prison clothing. “He wanted me to tell him how much I wanted it and how much I liked it. It’s like he needed his ego fixed or something.” Ms. Mitchell said she fondled Matt on a number of occasions, but refused other times. Several times, according to Ms. Mitchell, Matt also followed her to her locker in the shop and asked to see or touch her breasts. She said she refused. Another inmate account of an incident at Ms. Mitchell’s locker contradicts her claim. This inmate testified he witnessed Matt placing his hand between Ms. Mitchell’s legs, and that she didn’t appear to resist. This inmate also said Ms. Mitchell allowed Matt to keep his headphones and other personal items in her locker, and that Matt retrieved items from the locker each day.

In April or May 2015, Ms. Mitchell said, she took photographs of her naked body at home. After making prints on her home printer, she took copies into the tailor shop for Matt and Sweat. Ms. Mitchell said she took the pictures at Matt’s request, whereas Sweat said Matt told him they were Ms. Mitchell’s idea. Around this same time, coworkers, both civilian and security, noticed that Ms. Mitchell’s appearance and dress began to change. Ms. Mitchell admitted she had begun dieting and dressing more attractively, but claimed it was so she would look better for her husband.

During this period, Matt and Sweat asked Ms. Mitchell for further assistance in the escape plot, which she willingly provided. Eventually, Ms. Mitchell said, she decided she would join Sweat and Matt after their breakout, agreeing to meet them in her vehicle and drive away with them. Sweat and Matt “zoned in on my unhappiness,” Ms. Mitchell testified, until she became “caught up in the fantasy . . . of a different life.”

Matt kept Ms. Mitchell informed about Sweat’s progress beneath the prison, and, in addition to smuggling in tools, Ms. Mitchell began to assemble equipment and other items they would need after the escape and which she planned to have in her vehicle when she picked them up. She



## Case Study Facilitator Guide

purchased a pair of black cargo pants Sweat had specifically requested, and on April 2, as evidenced by a sales receipt obtained by the Inspector General, she bought a compass. Other equipment needed for life on the run – a tent, sleeping bags, fishing poles, a hatchet, a rifle, a shotgun, and ammunition – she or her husband already owned. Ms. Mitchell testified that Matt had told her that he intended to cut down the barrel of the shotgun. According to Sweat, Ms. Mitchell had purchased additional hacksaw blades for this purpose, which she kept under the seat of her vehicle. In fact, Ms. Mitchell had used her debit card to purchase two hacksaw blades from a local store on May 17.

In mid-April, Sweat requested from Ms. Mitchell maps for their post-escape flight. Ms. Mitchell thought maps were unnecessary as her vehicle was equipped with a GPS, but Sweat wanted a back-up plan. Ms. Mitchell then purchased a United States road atlas and smuggled it into the prison, contrary to prison policy prohibiting maps. Ms. Mitchell said she handed the atlas to Matt, who examined it at his work station in the shop for five or 10 minutes. Worried that the spiral binding of the atlas would set off the metal detector on the return to the Honor Block, Matt asked Ms. Mitchell to photocopy four pages of maps of sections of New York State. Sweat said he believed Ms. Mitchell made the copies in the prison. Ms. Mitchell gave the copies to Matt, who carried them to his cell and handed them to Sweat. The copies didn't fully satisfy Sweat, who told Matt he should have brought the entire atlas so they would have more than just New York State maps. When Matt explained his concern that the binding could be detected, Sweat replied, "So take the damn spiral out and put some thread through it." Asked if Matt had viewed the atlas in the tailor shop, Sweat responded, Matt "wouldn't know how to find a fucking place on there anyway." Sweat said he taped the pages together to create a map of the entire state.

### ***Two Incidents Imperil Escape Plan (Pg. 51 in P.G.)***

In the days immediately prior to the escape, two incidents potentially threatened Matt's and Sweat's plan. The first occurred on Sunday, May 31, when a fight involving approximately 30 inmates erupted in the prison's main recreation yard. After the disturbance was quelled, Clinton Superintendent Steven Racette requested authorization from DOCCS central office to impose a lockdown of the entire prison and a search of all cells and other areas. Such a search might have discovered the holes in Sweat's and Matt's cells and the breaches in the walls and steam pipe below. DOCCS Deputy Commissioner for Correctional Facilities Joseph Bellnier denied Racette's request, and no prison-wide lockdown or search took place. Interestingly, Sweat stated he was not concerned that a search would have detected the hole in his cell wall, as "I did a pretty good job of covering it up." He was less confident about Matt's work, stating, "They probably would have seen his. He's kind of a dumb-ass." Nonetheless, anticipating a search, Sweat said he and Matt disposed of the pepper they had accumulated and intended to use to interfere with tracking dogs they assumed would be part of a manhunt for them after the escape.

On Friday, June 5, just hours before the escape, a second incident occurred, this time involving Ms. Mitchell and Matt in Tailor Shop 1. The day before, the correction officer replacing Trombley had begun his permanent assignment in the shop. This officer had previously worked as a relief officer in the shop, and Ms. Mitchell resented his stricter adherence to regulations. "He glares down at the inmates," Ms. Mitchell said of the officer. Indeed, when Ms. Mitchell learned that the officer was to be assigned full-time to the shop, she created a scene in front of other employees by slamming to the floor the clipboard holding the announcement. According to Mr. Palmer, Ms.

Mitchell was worried that the officer posed a threat specifically to Matt, telling Mr. Palmer, “He’s going to come here . . . and he’s going to lock up Matt.”

As it happened, the officer came close to taking action against Matt on the day of the escape. As noted, that morning Ms. Mitchell received word from Matt and Sweat that the breakout would occur that night. The information appears to have unsettled her. “The rest of the day,” Sweat said Matt told him, “she was acting funny . . . she was acting like she was sick, like she was holding her stomach the whole time.” Even so, Ms. Mitchell was determined that nothing would interfere with the plan, and her usual overly familiar interaction with Matt continued. Throughout the day, the officer said, Ms. Mitchell was “sitting right at inmate Matt’s machine. She was just sitting there chit-chatting. It’s all personal conversation and stuff. I don’t know what she’s saying, but you don’t sit at a machine with an inmate all day long . . . that’s what you have a desk for. You’re there to do a job. . . .” By afternoon, the officer said, he “had enough of it.” Moreover, after observing Matt and other inmates idle at their machines, the officer told them to get back to work. At that point, Ms. Mitchell intervened, yelling across the room at the officer, “Leave my fucking inmates alone. If they don’t have any fucking work, they can’t do no work now, can they?” The officer said he responded, “Ma’am, I am security . . . we can’t be having this in the shop.”

Seeking an ally in her effort to force the officer to back down, Ms. Mitchell called Scott Scholl, the superintendent of industry, asking that a sergeant be summoned. Instead, Scholl sent Bradley Streeter, Ms. Mitchell’s direct supervisor. Upon his arrival in the shop, Streeter reprimanded Ms. Mitchell, telling her, “[the officer is] security . . . deal with it.” Ms. Mitchell, however, remained defiant, recalling to investigators: “My supervisor comes in and says, ‘You can’t yell at your officer.’ I said, ‘Fuck I can’t.’”

Unfortunately, despite the officer having quickly identified Ms. Mitchell’s improper interaction with Matt, the imminence of the escape precluded effective intervention. Even if the officer had issued Matt a misbehavior report that Friday afternoon, Matt most likely would only have been keeplocked in his cell pending a later hearing. In the meantime, the escape could have proceeded. It is probable, however, that if the officer had begun his assignment in Tailor Shop 1 just a few weeks, or even days, earlier, he would have taken action against Ms. Mitchell and Matt, thereby foiling the escape. Ms. Mitchell recalled a final gesture Matt made to her as he was leaving the shop at the end of the workday on Friday. Instead of the usual “see you Monday,” Matt offered his raised fist as he headed back to his cell.

***Sweat’s and Matt’s Final Preparations*** (Pg. 52 in P.G.)

**(Count)**

Sweat stated that he and Matt had informed no one other than Ms. Mitchell of their escape plan. However, he said he gave a “heads up” to another inmate who had confided in Sweat his own intent to attempt to escape that same weekend. According to Sweat:

“I said, ‘Listen, don’t plan on doing anything this weekend.’ He said, ‘Why?’ I said, ‘Well, there’s some stuff going on and the whole jail’s going to be locked down’ . . . He says, ‘What are you talking about?’ I said, ‘Well, there’s going to be some changes.’”

In addition, the inmate in the cell on the other side of Matt in the Honor Block stated that on the morning of June 5, Matt gave him his color television set, a much-prized item at Clinton. The inmate said Matt had promised him the television two weeks earlier, but told him to keep quiet about it.

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Back in their cells from the tailor shops late Friday afternoon, Sweat and Matt discussed the likelihood of Ms. Mitchell showing up at the midnight rendezvous. When Sweat expressed doubt about Ms. Mitchell's reliability, Matt told him not to worry. As Sweat recounted:

"[Matt] told her, he said, 'Listen, you have to be there at twelve.' She's like, 'I'll be there, I'll be there' . . . And he told her, 'If you're not there, we're dead, they're going to kill us.' He says, 'You understand if you don't show up, they're going to kill us, we're dead.' 'No, no, I'm going to be there. I'm going to be there.'"

Sweat and Matt packed for the escape, filling, according to Sweat, a soft fabric guitar case and backpack. In these they stowed various supplies, including, Sweat said, "clean tee-shirts, underwear, socks, sweater." Sweat said he took with him a new pair of boots he had obtained from another inmate in exchange for a drawing. Although Matt had also recently purchased new boots, by mail-order, he left them behind. According to Sweat, "He had bought new boots and the dumbass wore his old ones." In addition, Sweat said, they took "like 20 packs of peanuts . . . 40 granola bars . . . probably 12 sticks of pepperoni." Asked by an investigator how long he had been hoarding food, Sweat replied that he purchased it all at the commissary the day before the escape. In fact, commissary records are consistent with Sweat's statement. The two also prepared a final meal of chicken and salad, which they shared with the same inmate to whom Matt had given his television. According to the inmate, while passing by Matt's and Sweat's cells at about 9:45 p.m. on his return from recreation he was handed bowls of food and told by Sweat, "Enjoy it. I'll get the bowl back in the morning. Don't worry about it."

According to Sweat, he and Matt chose Friday night to leave because they wanted the escape to occur on the work shift of Correction Officer Ronald Blair. In fact, Sweat had made notations on the calendar in his cell tracking Mr. Blair's work schedule. Sweat said he harbored a particular dislike for Mr. Blair because he considered him unnecessarily disruptive in conducting the 11 p.m. count, when he "went there with a flashlight and banged on [inmates'] feet." Sweat claimed that because Mr. Blair failed to conduct required hourly checks throughout the night, he would face disciplinary charges after the escape. Sweat's plan had the consequences he intended: both Ronald Blair and Thomas Renadette, the second officer working the night shift on the Honor Block, were suspended in the aftermath of the escape.

As was his practice, Mr. Blair conducted the 11 p.m. count and determined all inmates were present. After the count, Sweat and Matt completed their preparations by placing dummies in their beds. Matt left two handwritten notes in his cell. One, on a note pad left on a table, stated, "You left me no choice but to grow old & die in here. I had to do something." A second note, written on a wall calendar illustrated with reproductions of his own artwork, read, "Time to Go Kid!" with the date "6-5-15."

### ***Sweat's and Matt's Empty Cells Discovered (Pg. 54 in P.G.)***

Ronald Blair and Thomas Renadette, the officers working on the Honor Block at the time of the escape, were responsible for conducting hourly rounds to ensure that inmates were in their cells. On the night of June 5-6, Mr. Blair and Mr. Renadette filed count slips reporting they had conducted rounds at 11 p.m., 12 a.m., 1 a.m., 2 a.m., 3 a.m., 4 a.m., and 5 a.m., and found nothing amiss. Not until 5:17 a.m., while conducting the 5:30 a.m. standing count, when inmates

## Facilitator Guide Case Study

are required to present themselves by sitting up in bed or standing, did Mr. Blair notice Sweat's and Matt's absence.

Mr. Blair described the moment he made the discovery:

"I came up the back steps . . . two cells, they didn't have their lights on, the gallery lights were on . . . [I went to] the 23 cell . . . the light wasn't on, they weren't up, I yell to him, no movement. I think I reached in, grabbed the bed, shook it, no movement. I grabbed the sheet and I almost threw up, then saw the dummy. I started off the company . . . I stopped at 22 cell, I did the same thing, saw the dummy, and then . . . off on a dead run. After that, [I was] falling down the stairs."

Mr. Blair reported his discovery to Mr. Renadette, who was conducting the standing count of other companies in the Honor Block, and they made a quick search of the remainder of 6 Company, finding no trace of Sweat and Matt. Mr. Blair then phoned the watch commander, who immediately dispatched two sergeants and other security staff to the Honor Block.

Surprisingly, this was not Mr. Blair's first encounter with an inmate placing a dummy in his cell. While conducting rounds at Clinton in 2001, he had reported all inmates present in their cells. However, after finishing work and going home, he was called back to the facility and confronted with the discovery of a dummy in one of the cells he claimed to have checked. Fortunately, the missing inmate had not escaped, but was found in another inmate's cell with that inmate. As a result of this incident, Mr. Blair stated, he has since made sure he is the officer that conducts the first round of the night at 11 p.m., making certain that he has observed all inmates.

Notification that Sweat and Matt were missing from their cells was relayed to Clinton's First Deputy Superintendent Donald Quinn, who arrived at the prison within minutes from his residence nearby. After a briefing by the watch commander, Mr. Quinn hurried to the Honor Block, observed the holes in the cells, and ordered the area secured as a crime scene. Thinking that Sweat and Matt might have climbed to the roof of the Honor Block, Mr. Quinn checked there but found nothing. Accompanied by a sergeant, he then began a search of the tunnels and soon came upon the hole between B-Block and C-Block, the notes left by Sweat, and other evidence of the escape. While below, he received a radio call from security staff reporting discovery of the cut into the steam pipe just inside the main wall. Mr. Quinn raced to the front gate, obtained a firearm from the prison armory, and, accompanied by a State Police officer and police dog, proceeded to the steam plant. From inside the plant, Mr. Quinn and the officer climbed a ladder and entered the steam pipe tunnel leading to the prison. According to Mr. Quinn, the dog would not follow.

Mr. Quinn and the officer reached the escape manhole and noticed the severed chain. While the officer remained at that spot, Mr. Quinn continued alone through the tunnel until he came to the exit hole in the steam pipe. At that moment, Mr. Quinn realized that Sweat and Matt were on the loose outside the prison.

Concurrent with Mr. Quinn's arrival at the prison, security staff initiated DOCCS's escape response. This included notification to DOCCS central office and police agencies, establishment of roadblocks, and other measures. A siren atop the power plant, installed years earlier to alert village residents in the event of an escape, was not sounded. Clinton Superintendent Steven Racette testified that because so many years had passed without an escape, it was believed that if the alarm was sounded now, no one hearing it would know what it signified.

## Case Study Facilitator Guide

Matt and Sweat remained fugitives for approximately three weeks until they were tracked down some 45 miles northwest of the prison. A U.S. Customs and Border Protection officer fatally shot Matt, armed with a shotgun he had taken from a hunting cabin during his flight, in a wooded area in the Town of Malone on June 26. Ms. Mitchell said Matt had told her that if he managed to escape, he would “go down shooting” rather than return to prison. A State Police sergeant shot and apprehended Sweat in the Town of Constable on June 28 after Sweat, fleeing across an open field, ignored the officer’s orders to halt.



### Reporting Out

Have each group share their two examples of where their policy applied to the case study (approximately 2-3 minutes per group).

Time: 10 min

Use the Key Points below as each group reports out.



### Use the following key points for the Reporting Out:

#### Counts

- Counts were improperly conducted or not done at all
- Did not observe/check for movement or signs of life

#### Movement & Inspection

- Mr. Palmer allowing them to do work on the catwalk; getting around searches with unscheduled movement to medical
- Tunnel inspections that did not occur as frequently as intended

#### Searches of Offenders

- Mr. Palmer providing escorts around search points and metal detectors
- Contraband items not located

#### Facility Searches

- cursory cell searches that omitted examination of cell wall integrity
- Missing tools were not documented and were replaced

#### Other areas of note (Offender Contacts/Relationships and Staff Compromise)

- The failure to search containers carried by employees entering the prison’s front gate
- Breakdowns in security and civilian employee supervision in the prison’s tailor shop where Ms. Mitchell was employed and improperly interacted with Sweat and Matt.



Time: 1 min

**Say something like:**

Before you get to hear how the story ends, here is what the Inspector General’s report on the escape found:

- A combination of factors made the escape possible, the most obvious being:
  - Sweat’s ingenuity and persistence
  - Matt’s ability to manipulate Ms. Mitchell and Mr. Palmer
  - Ms. Mitchell’s willingness to commit criminal acts
  - Mr. Palmer’s negligence in delivering escape tools
- These factors, however, do not fully account for the escape. The events of June 5, 2015, could not have occurred except for failures in fundamental security operations at Clinton, as well as inadequate oversight of these operations by Clinton management and DOCCS.
- Joseph Bellnier, DOCCS deputy commissioner for correctional facilities since 2011, testified that these multiple failures amounted to a “culture of carelessness” regarding security at Clinton.



Time: 3 min

**How the Story Ends**

**Share the following “Question and Answers” with participants.**

**Q: Did Ms. Mitchell go through with the plan to meet them?**

**A:** No. After completing work at Clinton at 3:30 p.m. on Friday, Mitchell and her husband drove home together and she then suffered a “panic attack” and went to the hospital. She remained at the hospital until about 11:30 a.m., when she turned on her cell phone and learned that the State Police had been trying to contact her.

**Q: Were Matt and Sweat apprehended?**

**A:** Offenders Richard Matt and David Sweat remained fugitives for approximately three weeks until they were tracked down some 45 miles northwest of the prison.

A U.S. Customs and Border Protection officer fatally shot Richard Matt, armed with a shotgun he had taken from a hunting cabin during his flight, in a wooded area in the Town of Malone on June 26.

A State Police sergeant shot and apprehended David Sweat in the Town of Constable on June 28 after Sweat, fleeing across an open field, ignored the officer’s orders to halt.

**Q: What happened to the facility staff involved in the escape?**

**A:** The Inspector General’s investigation identified a number of Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS) employees who committed criminal acts and violated DOCCS directives and policies. Many of these employees have resigned or have been terminated.



*NOTE: If learners have further questions on what charges were filed against Ms. Mitchell, Mr. Palmer, and/or Sweat, you may share the following supplemental information:*

### Ms. Mitchell

- Within hours of the escape, State Police investigators questioned Ms. Mitchell, whose involvement in the escape was almost immediately suspected.
- On June 12, the State Police arrested Ms. Mitchell on a felony charge of Promoting Prison Contraband and misdemeanor Criminal Facilitation.
- Ms. Mitchell was suspended and subsequently resigned from DOCCS employment.
- July 28: Ms. Mitchell pled guilty in Clinton County Court to both charges.
- September 28: sentenced to a term of 2½ to 7 years in state prison.
- November 6: ordered to make restitution of \$79,841 and a 10 percent surcharge to the state for costs relating to the repair of the walls in Matt’s and Sweat’s cells and pipes and walls in the tunnels.


### Mr. Palmer

- Mr. Palmer was arrested by the State Police on June 24.
- He was charged with two counts of Promoting Prison Contraband (felony), Tampering with Physical Evidence (felony), Tampering with Physical Evidence (misdemeanor)
- February 29: Mr. Palmer pled guilty to felony and misdemeanor counts of Promoting Prison Contraband and one count of Official Misconduct, a misdemeanor, and was sentenced to six months in county jail and fined \$5,000.
- As part of his plea, Mr. Palmer resigned from state service effective that date and waived his right to appeal.

### Sweat

- DOCCS initiated disciplinary charges against Sweat for the escape, and, after being found guilty in a disciplinary hearing, he was sentenced to six years of confinement in special housing, where he is confined for 23 hours a day, and six years of loss of package, commissary, and telephone privileges.
- August 20: arraigned in Clinton County Court on felony charges of Escape and Promoting Prison Contraband.
- November 13: pled guilty to all counts.
- February 3, 2016: sentenced to 3 ½ to 7 years on each of two counts of First Degree Escape and one count of First Degree Promoting Prison Contraband and ordered to pay \$79,841 in restitution.

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	<p><u>Other employees</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>– Following the escape, DOCCS took action against Clinton executive management officials and other employees.</li><li>– Superintendent Steven Racette, First Deputy Superintendent Donald Quinn, Deputy Superintendent for Security Stephen Brown, and numerous uniformed staff were suspended.</li><li>– Mr. Racette later retired and Brown later resigned.</li><li>– Additionally, Assistant Commissioner Patricia LeConey retired during the Inspector General’s investigation.</li></ul>
 <p>Time: 5 min</p>	<p><b>Debrief</b></p> <p><b>Ask:</b> Considering the series of events, where could steps have been taken to report and bring <u>immediate attention</u> to what was happening?</p> <p><b>Say something like:</b> A lot of the contributing factors in the escape come down to actions and inactions on the part of the individuals involved, directly and indirectly.</p> <p><b>Ask:</b> Thinking about what we saw in the policies and what we covered in the case study, what are specific actions or behaviors we can take away from this and/or do differently in our daily work?</p> <p><i>Chart responses on paper/white board.</i></p> <p><i>Answers may vary, but should focus around personal changes and actions staff can make beginning immediately (examples: following up a verbal concern with an email, modeling the behavior they want to see in others, reporting small things that don’t seem right, asking others for honest feedback on their work/performance, etc).</i></p> <p><b>Say something like:</b> Each of us should look at this list and take one or two of these away from this training today to increase our safety and the safety of our coworkers, the offenders, and the community.</p>



# Critical Incident Review

## CIR Process

Facilitator




Time to complete this lesson: 10 minutes

Slide 6



Time: 10 min



**Transition - Say something like:**

Despite our best efforts and intentions, sometimes things can happen that require a careful review afterwards.

For DOC, this is when a Critical Incident Review (CIR) may occur.



**Ask:**

What are examples of critical incidents that you have heard of or can imagine occurring at your workplace?

(Allow for participants to respond; examples may include dangerous contraband, fights, riots, assaults, death, staff compromise, etc.)



**Say something like:**

- After a critical incident occurs...
  - Behind the scenes, a CIR number is assigned and at Headquarters, the Emergency Operations Unit (EOU) assembles a team and loops in stakeholders and other relevant parties.

## CIR Process

**Facilitator**

- After the team arrives at the location where the incident occurred, they conduct an investigation.



**Ask:**

What gets reviewed during an investigation?

**Answers may include:**

- Documentation
- Photos
- Video
- Audio
- Interviews
- Physical inspections



**Say something like:**

- Following the investigation, a report is drafted, reviewed, submitted, and finalized.
- A Corrective Action Plan (CAP) is developed from recommendations. This plan is implemented, monitored, and reported back on.
- The prison leadership team received monthly reports on the CAP and CIR completion.



**Ask:**

What are some examples of changes that might occur following a CIR? What recommendations might the CAP include?



**Make the following key points:**

- A lot of the changes that are made from CAPs resulting from CIRs have to do with local processes or tweaks (small, local changes).
  - A good example of this is the use of ICS terminology, the location of the Incident Command Post at a facility, and radio communications.
  - There may be a memo to all staff stating how radio communications should happen, drills may occur that require using plain talk, camera angles move slightly in one direction or another, mirrors get installed, and even the process on how offender workers process laundry may be changed.
  - Staffing changes and corrective actions may occur, however these decisions are also made on a case by case basis and in accordance with policy.

## CIR Process

**Facilitator**

- Positive acknowledgements and better educational opportunities may also occur.
- These often times are the result of someone from the outside looking in giving insight on how to improve facility operations and avoid a similar incident from occurring.
- Bigger changes may include the addition of cameras, additions to staffing, additional training and policy change.
  - There have been a few over the last few years that have affected the way we process violators into our facilities, how we document use of force, the process and authorization for restraint bed and chair placement, and how we develop our annual training for staff.



**Ask:**

Are there any questions regarding the CIR process?



**Transition - Say something like:**

As we have seen in the Case Study, failures to report concerns can have serious impacts on the safety and security at a facility.

Submitting security concerns and suggestions is one way staff can be proactive in keeping themselves and the community safe.

## Being Proactive



Time to complete this lesson: 5 minutes

**Slide 7**



**Have a suggestion?**

1. Complete the form.
2. Submit to the Security Specialist at your facility.

iDOC → Toolbox quick links  
→ Forms → 21-566

The screenshot shows a form titled "SECURITY CONCERNS/SUGGESTIONS" from the Department of Corrections. The form is addressed to the Local Security Advisory Committee. It includes fields for Facility, Date, TO, and FROM. There are checkboxes for Category: Technology, Employee/Contract Staff/Volunteer, Physical Plant, and Policy/MI Procedure. A text area is provided for Concern/Suggestion. The form is signed by the Local Security Advisory Committee.

## CIR Process

**Facilitator**



**Say something like:**

In your Participant Guides on pages 56 & 57 you can see the full form that is used to submit a security concern or suggestion.

Notice that only the top portion needs to be filled out by you with the category and the write up of the concern/suggestion.

The rest of the form shows the progression the suggestion takes as it moves up. Concerns and suggestions can move beyond local to statewide levels and can be reviewed by Headquarters and the Secretary/Designee.



**Spend 2-3 minutes checking knowledge and discussing the following:**

What do you know about what happens to these concerns/suggestions after they are submitted?

What do you know about your Security Specialist, Local Security Advisory Committee (LSAC), etc?

**Slide 8**



After It's Submitted...

- Open Security Concerns  
<http://wadoc/sites/prisons/Lists/Security%20Concerns%20%20Suggestions/Statewide%20%20Local.aspx>
- All Security Concerns submitted  
<http://wadoc/sites/prisons/Lists/Security%20Concerns%20%20Suggestions/All%20Column%20View.aspx>

Show slide and explain that anyone can see what happens to submitted concerns on Sharepoint using these links.

You may briefly follow these links to show learners what the pages look like. Only spend 1-2 minutes as a brief overview (do not spend too much time on this).



**Ask:**

Are there any questions about your role, or how to submit a suggestion or concern?

# Closing

Facilitator



Time to complete this lesson: 5 minutes

Slide 9



Time: 5 min

Objectives Review

- ✓ Using distributed policies, participants will recognize 2 to 3 impacts to safety.
- ✓ Using a case study, participants will identify the details relating to the breakdown(s) in their assigned policy.

Say something like: We reviewed policies and a case study today to meet these objectives. Let's take a moment to see what we have learned.



**Ask:** What are two or three things you learned today? (Allow time for participants to respond).

**Ask:** Looking back at the list we made at the beginning of the class on what can lead to a prison escape, is there anything you would change or add? Why?

**Acknowledge** how much participants already knew and applied to the new material.



**Say something like:**

Ask if there are any remaining questions or concerns and thank them for their attendance.



**IMPORTANT NOTE**

Before dismissing the participants, collect the Participant Guides and ensure that each one has been returned/is accounted for.

# Appendix C

Fiscal Year 2018 Annual Agency Training Plan



# FY18 Training Plan FY17 Training Report

Training and Development Unit

06/30/2017

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## Policy Driver for This Report

Washington DOC Policy DOC 880.100 II.A.1 directs that “The Department will have a written Annual Agency Training Plan.”

## Introduction

Training and Development Unit (TDU), in conjunction with key stakeholders, has determined the Agency Annual Training Plan for Fiscal Year 2018 (FY18) as set forth in this document. This plan reflects compliance to agency policy and federal and state law and is effective July 1, 2017 through June 30, 2018. In addition to the FY18 Agency Annual Training plan, this document contains the Fiscal Year 2017 (FY17) Annual Training Report for the Training and Development Unit.

## Training and Development Unit (TDU)

“The intent of the legislature is that all corrections personnel employed by the Washington department of corrections are prepared to carry out the demands of their position that they are likely to encounter during their daily duties. The protection of the public, department employees, and inmates are a primary reason to ensure that everyone is adequately trained and knowledgeable in routine and emergency procedures.

To best carry out this mission it is necessary for the Washington state department of corrections to have the authority, discretion, and ability to design and conduct mandatory training that best meets the needs of its changing offender population.” [2009 SSB 5987:c 146 § 1]

## Statutory Authority for Agency Training

RCW 43.101.220: Training for corrections personnel

(3)(a) The Washington state department of corrections is responsible for identifying training standards, designing curricula and programs, and providing the training for those corrections personnel employed by it. In doing so, the secretary of the department of corrections shall consult with staff development experts and correctional professionals both inside and outside of the agency, to include soliciting input from labor organizations.

(3)(b) The commission and the department of corrections share the responsibility of developing and defining training standards and providing training for community corrections officers employed within the community corrections division of the department of corrections.

## TDU Identity

We are a learner-centered, quality-focused, future-oriented unit that welcomes innovative thinking and practices in the pursuit of improved outcomes.


## TDU Mission

We will build and deliver courses that serve learners and contribute to the agency mission by building a competent, confident workforce.

## TDU Vision

Training will be a first thought in our organization, not an afterthought.

## TDU Organization



## TDU Locations

Lacey	Walla Walla	Monroe
Southwest Region	Mill Creek	Captain Jimmie Evans
Performance Center (SWRPC)	Performance Center (MCPC)	Performance Center (CJEPC)
4255 Pacific Avenue	1405 W Pine St	16550 177th Ave SE
Lacey, WA 98503	Walla Walla, WA 99362	Monroe, WA 98272

## TDU Stakeholder Partners

### Governance Council

While not yet formalized, in 2015 a charter was proposed for an official TDU Governance Council to consist of the agency's Senior Leadership Team (SLT) whose purpose was to help prioritize training projects and resources when there are competing interests. In FY17, the SLT was instrumental in establishing annual in-service for FY18. It is TDU's goal to formalize the advisory role and function of the Governance Council when it issues its administrative directive on training committees in FY18.

### Facility Performance Coordinators

Each of the twelve prisons employs a Facility Performance Coordinator (FPC). The FPCs are invaluable partners in pre-service training for prison staff and are instrumental in the delivery of annual in-service in the prisons division. During FY17, TDU sought to strengthen and formalize the relationship between TDU staff and FPCs. We will continue that work in FY18.

## TDU Strategic Plan 2017 – 2019

In alliance with the HR Director, and in furtherance of the agency's mission, the TDU Leadership Team established objectives for continued development and improvement of unit operations and unit employees. The Leadership Team operationalized these goals and developed a three-year strategic plan.

The team worked with statewide stakeholders to build vision and identity statements and to launch the three major initiatives from the strategic plan. To that end, the unit has established a communication portal to share updates and information from leadership and stakeholder team meetings and all meeting minutes are posted there.

The Leadership Team has revamped the frequency, type, duration, and purpose of team meetings: tactical meetings are conducted each week to address short-term objectives. Agenda items for these meetings move off the agenda in 90 days or less. Strategic meetings are held 2-3 times per quarter to address the long-term objectives i.e. course conversions, team development, annual scheduling, unit restructuring, data systems reorganization, etc. The strategic plan is updated at every meeting.

Each TDU Manager is instrumental in pushing the unit vision out to stakeholders and for making business decisions that align with the identity statement.

The pages that follow contain a summary of the nature, intent, and progress on the three major initiatives contained in the strategic plan.



## Strategic Initiative 1: Training Policy Update

In addition to updating policy DOC 880.100, the unit will establish a series of administrative directives that govern unit practice and process. These directives will establish standards, speak transparently to agency stakeholders, increase efficiency, and reduce waste.

A policy matrix was established and the team has produced first drafts of about one third of these directives. As drafts are updated and approved by the unit policy team, they will be presented to stakeholder focus groups for vetting before final draft and implementation.




## To date, the following directives have been established or are being developed:

- |  |  |  |   |
|--|--|--|---|
| <b>101</b> Training Committees               | <b>107</b> Contractor Training Requirements      | <b>113</b> Case Management Academy             | <b>119</b> Quality Assurance            |
| <b>102</b> Training Needs Assessment         | <b>108</b> Training Registration                 | <b>114</b> Work Release Academy                | <b>120</b> Training Evaluation          |
| <b>103</b> Annual Training Plan              | <b>109</b> Training Exemptions and Extensions    | <b>115</b> In-Service Training                 | <b>121</b> Training Information Systems |
| <b>104</b> Curriculum Development            | <b>110</b> New Employee Orientation              | <b>116</b> Supervisory and Management Training | <b>122</b> Data Management              |
| <b>105</b> Instructor Certification          | <b>111</b> Correctional Worker Core              | <b>117</b> Non-Mandatory Training              | <b>123</b> Unit Operations              |
| <b>106</b> New Hire/New Appointment Training | <b>112</b> Community Corrections Officer Academy | <b>118</b> Training Records                    |   |



## Strategic Initiative 2: Build Unit Capacity

Continued professional development is critical to building and sustaining effective business practices and building resiliency. To face current and future challenges, the unit will strive to build professional capacity, establish solid, efficient business practices, and incorporate research and data into unit operations. To that end, the unit targeted specific practices for improvement.



### Strategic Initiative 3: Course Revisions

As the mission of the agency shifts to a re-entry model and incorporation of evidence-based practices, the training for employees must shift to support the new standards of work. Additionally, it is the training unit’s responsibility to ensure that training is designed using sound, research-informed practices. To that end, the unit is in the process of a comprehensive audit and revision of all major catalog items and is actively pursuing the development and/or acquisition of tools that will establish or sustain best practice going forward.


						<b>CWC</b>
						Completed interim revisions for content improvement, establishment of future practice, and more efficient business practices
					<b>NEO</b>	Implemented interim revisions for continuity and more efficient business practices
				<b>Annual In-Service</b>	Conducted needs assessment with agency extended leadership team	Conducted collaborative focus group with statewide stakeholders to establish pre-NEO processes for new prisons employees
			<b>BESI</b>	Completed comprehensive policy review and established database with policy and statutory training drivers for future cross-reference ability	Updated content to bring in new research	Presented business case to prisons leadership for adoption of a pre-NEO administrative orientation for all new employees
		<b>CCOA</b>	Completed functional analysis as framework for establishing future course outline	Implemented interim schedule revisions for incorporation of new case management practices	Updated use of force assessment to mitigate agency risk	Updated use of force assessment to mitigate agency risk
	<b>Leadership Development</b>	Full-time position added to the unit roster to manage the supervisory training program	Piloted learning type measure instrument for potential inclusion in rewrite	Updated use of force assessment to mitigate agency risk	Verified occupational analysis data	Modified physical training class length to reduce employee injury
<b>Instructional Materials</b>	Completed visioning session with senior leadership team to establish leadership vision and values for the agency					Conducted occupational analysis as framework for rebuild of course
Purchased software that automates basic functions, standardizes course materials, and catalogs content items for write-once, use-many capacity						

## TDU Teams


### TDU Leadership Team (TDULT)

The leadership team has the responsibility for ensuring that operational mandates and business needs are addressed while also implementing the unit strategic initiatives. Each manager is responsible for performance management within their respective teams and they're also tasked with improving the performance of the unit as a whole. They act as collaborative stakeholders with every division in the agency.

The primary developmental focus for this team in FY17 was leadership. Each member of the team participated in a leadership 360 evaluation. In addition to using the data from that evaluation, the team is using the aggregate data to establish a developmental objective for the entire team as we seek to improve our service to our direct reports.




### TDULT by the Numbers





## Curriculum Design Team

The Curriculum Design Team is responsible for management of the curriculum design process for TDU training. The team is comprised of 7 designers led by the Curriculum Manager. This team is committed to providing current and industry best-practice materials to learners while incorporating instructional techniques into their design which reflect the most effective adult learning principles. Additionally, this team is dedicated to harnessing the latest technologies in pursuit of effectiveness.



The curriculum team is currently evaluating and revising numerous academy classes. The curriculum team was recently trained in “Developing a Curriculum” (DACUM): a facilitated process that identifies the major duties and related tasks of a job as well as the knowledge, skills, and traits related to successful completion of tasks. This is a cost-effective and thorough analysis and is the foundation of legally defensible training. DACUM charts for Community Corrections Officer and Instructor were validated during FY17 and those results will be utilized to develop curriculum in FY18.

## Curriculum Development by the Numbers

### Curriculum Revision

During Fiscal Year 2017, the curriculum unit, with the assistance of subject matter experts, reviewed and revised **74** lesson plans or online training courses.

### Design Team

The Design Team attended **16** courses and **3** conferences.




### Instructional Team

The Instructional Team attended **3** courses and **1** conference to aid in instructional delivery.


## Instructor Development Team

The Instructor Development Team is housed at the Southwest Region Performance Center. The team consists of an instructional specialist and an instructional coordinator who are responsible for preparing new instructors to facilitate both TDU courses and other agency training courses. This is accomplished through the delivery of foundation skills courses and content-specific facilitator development courses also known as T4T. This team continues to refine how facilitators are prepared to deliver course materials. The foundations course has recently been updated to include current methods and theories of instruction and the T4T model has been updated to include a new emphasis on facilitation skills.

This team also maintains the instructor certification database of instructor credentials and is playing a key role in building a quality assurance protocol for instructional delivery.




## Instructor Development by the Numbers



## Southwest Region Team


The Southwest Region Performance Center is the regional hub for the Southwest Region of TDU. The SWR Team consists of eight full-time instructors and one Regional Training Manager. In addition to providing CWC and NEO for all new staff, this team supports annual in-service, BESI, Supervision and Leadership, instructor development workshops, work release academies, and specialized courses such as Corrections Fatigue to Fulfillment.



The Southwest Region Team supports the following agency stakeholders:


- Community Corrections: Section 3, Section 4, Section 7
- Work Release Facilities: Clark County, Longview, Olympia, Peninsula, Progress House, Rap/Lincoln
- Prisons: CBCC, CCCC, LCC, MCCCW, OCC, SCCC, WCC, WCCW
- Other: Headquarters, CI Headquarters

## Southwest by the Numbers



## Northwest Region Team


The Captain Jimmie Evans Performance Center is the regional hub for the Northwest Region of TDU. The NWR Team consists of five full-time instructors and one Regional Training Manager. In addition to providing CWC and NEO for all new staff, this team supports annual in-service, BES1, Supervision and Leadership, instructor development workshops, work release academies, and specialized courses such as Corrections Fatigue to Fulfillment.



The Northwest Region Team supports the following agency stakeholders:


Community Corrections: Section 5, Section 6  
Work Release Facilities: Bellingham, Bishop Lewis, Helen B. Ratcliff, Reynolds  
Prisons: MCC

## Northwest by the Numbers



### East Region Team

The Mill Creek Performance Center is the regional hub for the East Region of TDU. The ER Team consists of five full-time instructors and one Regional Training Manager. In addition to providing CWC and NEO for all new staff, this team supports annual in-service, BESI, Supervision and Leadership, instructor development workshops, work release academies, and specialized courses such as Corrections Fatigue to Fulfillment.




The East Region Team supports the following agency stakeholders:

Community Corrections: Section 1, Section 2

Work Release Facilities: Ahtanum View, Brownstone, Eleanor Chase House, Tri-Cities


Prisons: AHCC, CRCC, WSP

### East Region by the Numbers



## Area Training Team


The Area Training Team covers program areas for the entire state. The team consists of two instructors, two program coordinators, and an Area Training Manager. The primary target audience for the delivery team is community corrections division staff. The program coordinators focus on agency-wide programs including annual in-service and supervisory training.



The Area Training Team supports all agency stakeholders for the following programs:


- Supervisory Training
- Case Management Academy
- Work Release Academy
- Annual In-Service Training
- Community Corrections Officer Academy

## Area Training by the Numbers



## Registration and Reporting Team


The Registration and Reporting Team (R&R) is responsible for managing the agency's training data. The team consists of two registrars, three analysts and the R&R Manager. This team is responsible for consolidating, linking, analyzing, and reporting data. In addition to maintaining the agency's training information systems, this team works collaboratively with Results DOC staff and the Veteran's Administration. The focus of the team during FY17 and forward is to link systems in order to maximize efficiency and accuracy. This team is leading the charge on implementation of Lean processes and practices in the unit.



The R&R team is responsible for the following statewide agency functions:

- Training registration for agency courses
- Training registration for DES courses
- Employee training records
- Training program records
- Reporting
- Information systems maintenance
- LMS help desk

## R&R by the Numbers



TDU FY17 Accomplishments



HR Employee of the Year  
Tina Sylliaasen



30 Years of Service  
Shelby Leifer



30 years of Service  
Scott Schave



30 Years of Service  
Donna Hubbs



30 years of Service  
Kari Cummings



20 Years of Service  
Juline Norris



20 Years of Service  
Dave Neissl



HR Director's Leadership  
Award Amanda Hall



## TDU Training Programs

TDU is responsible for designing, delivering, and recording statutorily mandated training courses, instructor development courses, and the agency's annual in-service training. This plan describes these programs and details the FY18 delivery plan.

### TDU Academies


TDU academies are taught by both TDU staff and practitioner instructors. These academies provide the foundational knowledge staff need in order to perform their duties. TDU Academies include:

- Case Management Academy (CMA)
- Community Corrections Academy (CCOA)
- New Employee Orientation (NEO)
- Correctional Worker Core (CWC)
- Supervision and Leadership (S&L)
- Work Release Academy (WRA)

### TDU Training Programs

In addition to the training academies, TDU provides professional development courses including instructor development and annual in-service.

### TDU Training by the Numbers FY18



### Case Management Academy (CMA)

Case Management Academy (CMA) is a one (1) week academy for employees who make classification and community supervision decisions regarding offenders. Employees must successfully complete CMA within six (6) months of their permanent appointment.

The following employees are required to attend CMA:

- Community Corrections Officers
- Classification Counselors
- Community Corrections Specialists
- Community Corrections Supervisors
- Community Residential Program Managers
- Correctional Unit Supervisors
- Community Employment Specialists

This course facilitates the agency goals of safer operations, supporting successful transition, and promoting positive change.

### CMA Delivery Dates FY18 \*

Start Date	Region	Capacity
July 24, 2017	Southwest	24
September 11, 2017	Southwest	24
October 16, 2017	Southwest	24
January 22, 2018	Southwest	24
March 5, 2018	Southwest	24
April 23, 2018	Southwest	24

### CMA Course Agenda

Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Day 4	Day 5
Academy Expectations (1.0) Case Management (2.0) Chronological Entries (1.0) Custody Facility Plan (2.0) Offender Release Plan (1.0) Offender Supervision Plan (1.0)	Structured Interviewing Skills (2.0) Official Document Research (4.0) Victim Rights and Services (2.0)	Offender Risk Assessment (5.0) ISRB (2.0) Interstate Compact (1.0)	Impacting Behavior Change (8.0)	Impacting Behavior Change (6.0) Written Assessment (2.0)

\*Additional dates may be added to the training calendar to meet stakeholder needs.

### Community Corrections Officer Academy (CCOA)

Community Corrections Officer Academy (CCOA) is a three (3) week academy for employees who supervise offenders in the community. The following employees are required to attend CCOA:

- Community Corrections Officers
- Community Corrections Specialists
- Community Corrections Supervisors

Employees must successfully complete CCOA within six (6) months of their permanent appointment to any of the positions listed above.

Prior to attending CCOA, employees must complete the following prerequisites:

- New Employee Orientation
- Case Management Academy

This course facilitates the agency goals of safer operations, supporting successful transition, and promoting positive change. Completion of the course within mandated time frames is tracked in Results DOC Outcome Measure OM04.C.

### CCOA Delivery Dates FY18 \*

<u>Start Date</u>	<u>Region</u>	<u>Capacity</u>
July 31, 2017	Southwest	24
September 18, 2017	Southwest	24
October 23, 2017	Southwest	24
January 29, 2018	Southwest	24
March 12, 2018	Southwest	24
April 30, 2018	Southwest	24

\*Additional dates may be added to the training calendar to meet stakeholder needs.

CCOA Course Agenda

	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Day 4	Day 5
Week 1	Foundations of Behavior (4.0) Use of Force Overview (4.0)	Tactical Verbal Skills (4.0) Defensive Tactics (4.0)	Mental Illness (2.0) Restraints, Pat Searches, Transports (2.0) Defensive Tactics (4.0)	Contact Strategies (2.0) Incident Response (2.0) Defensive Tactics (4.0)	Quiz (0.5) Skill Practice (1.5) Use of Force Reports (2.0) Defensive Tactics (4.0)
	Day 6	Day 7	Day 8	Day 9	Day 10
Week 2	Failure to Obey all Laws (3.0) Detainers and Warrants (1.0) Defensive Tactics (4.0)	TVS Assessment (2.0) Skill Practice (2.0) Defensive Tactics (4.0)	Restraint and Pat Search Assessment (4.0) Oleoresin Capsicum (4.0)	Quiz (0.5) Evidence (3.5) Defensive Tactics (4.0)	Violations and Court Hearings (7.0) DOC Hearings (1.0)
	Day 11	Day 12	Day 13	Day 14	Day 15
Week 3	Written Assessment (2.0) Residence and Vehicle Searches (2.0) Defensive Tactics (4.0)	Arrest Planning and Implementation (8.0)	Arrest Planning and Implementation (8.0)	Skill Practice API (4.0) Skill Assessment Integrated Scenarios (4.0)	Academy Debrief and Remediation (2.0) Graduation (2.0)

## New Employee Orientation (NEO)

New Employee Orientation (NEO) is comprised of a series of both instructor-led (ILT) and eLearning (OLT) classes designed to provide new employees with the basic knowledge, information and skills necessary to build a foundation for success at DOC.

All new agency employees are required to complete the course within 45 days of their hire date. The course is offered as a companion course for employees who are also required to attend Correctional Worker Core (CWC) and as a stand-alone course for those employees who do not have to attend CWC.

This course facilitates the agency goals of engaged and respected employees and safer operations. Completion of the course within mandated time frames is tracked in Results DOC Supporting Process Measure SP01.D.

### NEO Course Agenda

Online Courses (OLT)	Day 1 ILT	Day 2 ILT	Day 3 ILT	Day 4 ILT
Policy and General Information (0.5) Confidentiality (1.0) ADA (0.5) Ethics (1.0) Initial Safety (1.0) Fire Extinguishers (0.5) Infectious Disease Control (1.0) Outdoor Heat Exposure (1.0) PREA and PREA Self Disclosure (1.25) Asbestos (1.0) Public Records (1.0) Slips Trips and Falls (1.0) WA- State IT Security Awareness (0.75) WA- State Preventing Sexual Harassment (2.0)	Welcome and Introductions (0.5) DOC Mission and Structure (1.0) Legal Foundations of Corrections (2.0) Occupational Health Nurse TB/Hep (1.0) Respect in a Diverse Workplace (3.5)	Security Mindset (2.0) Introduction to Emergency Response Procedures (2.0) Hostage Survival (2.0) Coping with Stress (1.0) CISM (1.0)	Union (0.5) Foundations and Baseline Behavior (1.0) Communication Skills (2.5) Suicide Prevention and Intervention (2.0) Tactical Verbal Skills (2.0)	Staff Professionalism (3.5) CPR, First Aid, AED (4.5)

NEO Stand Alone Delivery Dates FY18\*

East Region		Northwest Region		Southwest Region	
Start Date	Capacity	Start Date	Capacity	Start Date	Capacity
August 7, 2017	24	August 14, 2017	24	July 10, 2017	24
October 2, 2017	24	September 18, 2017	24	August 14, 2017	24
November 13, 2017	24	October 9, 2017	24	September 11, 2017	24
December 11, 2017	24	December 4, 2017	24	October 2, 2017	24
February 20, 2018	24	January 2, 2018	24	November 2, 2017	24
April 2, 2018	24	February 26, 2018	24	December 18, 2017	24
June 11, 2018	24	April 23, 2018	24	January 2, 2018	24
		June 4, 2018	24	February 12, 2018	24
				March 5, 2018	24
				April 2, 2018	24
				May 14, 2018	24
				June 4, 2018	24

\*Any session not enrolled at the minimum class size of 8 participants will be canceled and students will be enrolled in the next available session in the region.

NEO Pre-CWC Delivery Dates FY18\*\*

East Region		Northwest Region		Southwest Region	
Start Date	Capacity	Start Date	Capacity	Start Date	Capacity
July 10, 2017	56	July 3, 2017	56	July 3, 2017	28
September 5, 2017	56	August 28, 2017	56	July 10, 2017	28
October 16, 2017	56	October 30, 2017	56	August 14, 2017	28
January 8, 2018	56	January 16, 2018	56	August 21, 2017	28
March 5, 2018	56	March 12, 2018	56	September 25, 2017	28
April 30, 2018	56	May 7, 2018	56	October 2, 2017	28
				November 2, 2017	28
				November 13, 2017	28
				January 2, 2018	28
				January 8, 2018	28
				February 12, 2018	28
				February 20, 2018	28
				March 26, 2018	28
				April 2, 2018	28
				May 14, 2018	28
				May 21, 2018	28

\*\*Custody positions are given priority for enrollment in these sessions.

## Correctional Worker Core (CWC)

Correctional Worker Core (CWC) is a five (5) week academy for new DOC staff responsible for supervising, confining, and/or caring for offenders. CWC provides the skills and basic work functions needed to work in a prison setting. Employees who work in a secure facility are required to complete CWC within 60 days of their permanent appointment.

Prior to attending CWC employees must complete the following prerequisites:

- New Employee Orientation (NEO)

This course facilitates the agency goals of safer operations, supporting successful transition, and promoting positive change. Completion of the course within mandated time frames is tracked in Results DOC Outcome Measure OM04.B.

## CWC Changes FY18

CWC is under re-construction. As we rebuild the course, TDU has implemented multiple changes in the current version of CWC in an effort to begin habituating staff and stakeholders to new practices and to facilitate a successful change effort. Effective July 1, 2017 TDU will launch this “Interim CWC” statewide. This version of CWC was piloted twice in the Southwest Region in FY17. A summary of the major changes is listed below.

Delivery Methods	Content	Assessment	Successful Completion
<input type="checkbox"/> 32 hours at home facility <input type="checkbox"/> Shorter physical training sessions	<input type="checkbox"/> Additional report writing <input type="checkbox"/> Built-in remediation sessions <input type="checkbox"/> Additional non-custody classes	<input type="checkbox"/> Updated use of force <input type="checkbox"/> Weekly quizzes and debriefs <input type="checkbox"/> Midterm and final assessment <input type="checkbox"/> Report writing assessment	<input type="checkbox"/> Require passing score on assessments <input type="checkbox"/> 90% attendance requirement

In addition to the above, the new schedule allows traveling employees more time at home and reduces travel expenditures. At a minimum, ‘Interim CWC’ will be in effect for the duration of FY18.

CWC Delivery Dates FY18

**East Region**

<b>NEO Start Date</b>	<b>CWC Start Date</b>	<b>Capacity</b>
July 10, 2017	July 17, 2017	56
September 5, 2017	September 11, 2017	56
October 16, 2017	October 23, 2017	56
January 8, 2018	January 16, 2018	56
March 5, 2018	March 12, 2018	56
April 30, 2018	May 7, 2018	56

**Northwest Region**

<b>NEO Start Date</b>	<b>CWC Start Date</b>	<b>Capacity</b>
July 3, 2017	July 10, 2017	56
August 28, 2017	September 1, 2017	56
October 30, 2017	November 6, 2017	56
January 16, 2018	January 22, 2018	56
March 12, 2018	March 19, 2018	56
May 7, 2018	May 14, 2018	56

**Southwest Region**

<b>NEO Start Date</b>	<b>CWC Start Date</b>	<b>Capacity</b>
July 3, 2017	July 10, 2017	28
July 10, 2017	July 17, 2017	28
August 14, 2017	August 18, 2017	28
August 21, 2017	August 25, 2017	28
September 25, 2017	October 2, 2017	28
October 2, 2017	October 9, 2017	28
November 2, 2017	November 8, 2017	28
November 13, 2017	November 17, 2017	28
January 2, 2018	January 8, 2018	28
January 8, 2018	January 16, 2018	28
February 12, 2018	February 20, 2018	28
February 20, 2018	February 26, 2018	28
March 26, 2018	April 2, 2018	28
April 2, 2018	April 9, 2018	28
May 14, 2018	May 18, 2018	28
May 21, 2018	May 25, 2018	28



## CWC Course Agenda

	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Day 4	Day 5
WEEK 1	Academy Expectations (1.0) Organization and Operation of Prisons (2.0) <b>Foundations and Baseline Behavior (3.0)</b> <b>Addressing Behavior (2.0)</b>	<b>Tactical Verbal Skills (4.0)</b> Principles of Containment (2.0) <b>Introduction to Use of Force (2.0)</b>	<b>Introduction to Use of Force (2.0)</b> CIT/SD (2.0) <b>Emergency Response Procedures (4.0)</b>	<b>Emergency Response Procedures (2.0)</b> CIT/SD (2.0) <b>Searches and Contraband (2.0)</b> <b>Cell and Area Searches (2.0)</b>	CIT/SD (2.0) Formal and Informal Directives (2.0) Offender Discipline (2.0) Offender Property (2.0)
	Day 6	Day 7	Day 8	Day 9	Day 10 (Home Facility)
WEEK 2	Weekly Assessment and Debrief (1.0) Pat Searches (2.0) Equipment Operations (2.0) Report Writing (3.0)	CIT/SD (2.0) Offender Grievances (1.5) Offender Rights (1.5) Intro to Restraints (2.0) Skill Practice Restraints and Pat Search (1.0)	CIT/SD (2.0) Restraints (2.0) Skill Practice Cell & Area Search, Documentation (4.0)	CIT/SD (2.0) Professional Writing (2.0) Skill Practice Restraint and Pat Search (2.0) Pat Search Assessment (2.0)	Offender Programming and Offender Life (8.0)
	Day 11	Day 12	Day 13	Day 14	Day 15 (Home Facility)
WEEK 3	Midterm Assessment and Debrief (2.0) CIT/SD (2.0) Escorts (1.5) Security Information Networks (1.5) Inspections (0.5) Inventories (0.5)	CIT/SD (2.0) Cell Search and Compliant Cuffing Assessment (2.0) <b>OC Classroom and Exposure (4.0)</b>	<b>CIT/SD Practice and Assessment (4.0)</b> Professional Interactions (4.0)	Perspectives on Prison Culture (1.0) Gender and Age (1.0) Sex Offenders (2.0) Offenders with Mental Illness (2.0) Security Threat Groups (2.0)	Information Sharing (4.0) Pat Searches (4.0)
	Day 16	Day 17	Day 18	Day 19	Day 20 (Home Facility)
WEEK 4	Weekly Assessment and Debrief (1.0) Waist and Ankle Restraints (1.0) Transports (1.0) Vehicle Searches (1.0) Transport Practice (2.0) CIT/SD (2.0)	CIT/SD (3.0) Tactical Verbal Skills Assessment (2.0) Use of Force Final Assessment (1.0) Risk Assessment for NC (2.0) Strip Searches (1.0) Review, Practice, and Remediation (1.0)	Team Tactics (3.0) Use of Force Assessment Debrief (1.0) Security for NC (1.0) Drug and Alcohol Testing (1.0) Report Writing Assessment (1.5) Final CWC Assessment (1.5)	CIT/SD (2.0) Offender Pathway (4.0) Final Assessment Debrief (2.0)	Cell and Area Searches (8.0)
	Day 21 (Home Facility)	Day 22	Day 23 (Cells + 105)	Day 24	
WEEK 5	Count (2.0) 5907 (6.0)	CIT/SD (2.0) Table Top Drills or Remediation (2.0) OC Scenarios (4.0)	CIT/SD (3.0) Supervision of Offender Workers (3.0) Emergent Scenarios (4.0) Emergent Scenario Debrief (1.0)	Final CWC Debrief (1.5) Equipment Return (1.0) Graduation (1.5)	<b>RED = Custody Knock Out Class</b> Total CWC Hours = 188.0 Total CIT Hours = 32.0 Total Facility Hours = 32.0

## Supervision and Leadership (S&L)

Supervisory and managerial training is mandated and governed by WAC 357-34-055. Per statute, employees appointed to a permanent supervisory or management position must successfully complete at least twenty-four (24) hours of entry-level supervisory or managerial training. DOC requires employees to complete the required training within 180 days of their appointment to a permanent supervisory position.

Supervision and Leadership (S&L) is comprised of both instructor-led (ILT) and eLearning (OLT) classes. Prior to attending S&L, employees must complete the following prerequisites:

- New Employee Orientation
- Drug and Alcohol Free Workplace OLT
- Sexual Harassment for Supervisors OLT

This course facilitates the agency goals of engaged and respected employees; innovative, efficient, and sustainable business practices; and promoting positive change. Completion of the course within mandated time frames is tracked in Results DOC Outcome Measure OM10.A.

### S&L Course Agenda

Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Day 4	Day 5
Introduction (2.5) Building Blocks of Supervision (3.0) Personal Values and Vision (2.5)	Organization Context (8.0)	Effective Communication (2.0) Problem Solving (2.5) Conflict Management (2.0) Complex and Sensitive (1.5)	Complex and Sensitive (0.5) Labor Relations (2.0) Position Description (2.0) Candidate Selection (2.0) Performance and Development Plan (1.5)	Performance and Development Plan (1.5) Promoting Positive Performance (3.0) Hours of Work and Leave (2.5) Debrief (1.5)

### S&L Delivery Dates FY18\*

East Region		Northwest Region		Southwest Region	
Start Date	Capacity	Start Date	Capacity	Start Date	Capacity
August 21, 2017	24	August 21, 2017	24	August 21, 2017	24
October 16, 2017	24	October 16, 2017	24	October 9, 2017	24
January 22, 2018	24	February 26, 2018	24	February 26, 2018	24
April 16, 2018	24	April 23, 2018	24	April 16, 2018	24
June 18, 2018	24			June 4, 2018	24

\*Additional dates may be added to the training calendar to meet agency needs.

## Work Release Academy (WRA)

Staff hired under contract to supervise offenders in Work Release programs will attend the Work Release Academy (WRA). The WRA is a two (2) week academy provided to staff within six (6) months of their date of hire.

This course facilitates the agency goals of safer operations, supporting successful transition, and promoting positive change.

### WRA Delivery Dates FY18

Start Date	Region	Capacity
Oct. 9, 2017	Northwest	24
April 2, 2018	Northwest	24

### WRA Course Agenda

	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Day 4	Day 5
Week 1	Expectations Work Release Overview Diversity Sexual Harassment Developing a Professional Attitude Offender Rights Foundations and Baseline	Communication: Basics Confronting Team Problem Solving Tactical Verbal Skills Manipulation	Manipulation (Practice) Manipulation (Assessment) Equipment Self Defense	PREA Motivating Change Offenders with Mental Illness Security Mindset Workplace Risk Assessment	Property Inventories Inspections Counts Searches Contraband Self Defense
	Day 6	Day 7	Day 8	Day 9	Day 10
Week 2	Writing for Work Release Logs & Observation Offender Discipline UAs & BAs Room & Area Search Pat & Bag Search Drug Identification	Skill Practice Search Assessment	Emergency Response Planning Coping with Stress Wellness Self Defense Workplace Ethics	Performance Feedback Written Assessment Self Defense ERP Review	Integrated Scenarios Small/Large Group Debrief Graduation




## Annual In-Service (AIS)

Annual In-Service (AIS) is driven by professional standards, agency policy, legal statute, administrative code, and data gathered during an annual needs assessment. AIS is comprised of both instructor-led (ILT) and eLearning (OLT) courses. All agency employees are required to complete the in-service training as it is outlined for their position no later than June 30, 2018.

This course facilitates the agency goals of safe operations and engaged and respected employees. Completion of the course within mandated time frames is tracked in Results DOC Outcome Measure OM04.A.

## Annual Needs Assessment

In FY17, the agency's extended leadership team was surveyed regarding training needs in the agency. The overall response rate on the survey was 46%. The following word clouds and data charts represent a summary of the responses. Word clouds are based on a text analysis of all responses to the question. The words most often represented are included in the cloud and the larger the word, the more often the word was used.



**Question 4:** Regarding the Core Competencies for all employees, please rate the level of need for staff in your area of operations.

	My staff need additional training in this area.	Neutral	My staff are competent in this area.	Total	Weighted Average
Safety	24.14% 7	34.48% 10	41.38% 12	29	2.93
Treats others with respect and courtesy	50.00% 15	20.00% 6	30.00% 9	30	2.30
Dependability	34.48% 10	41.38% 12	24.14% 7	29	2.55
Accountability	37.93% 11	37.93% 11	24.14% 7	29	2.48
Judgment and problem solving	20.69% 6	27.59% 8	51.72% 15	29	3.10
Leadership	64.29% 18	14.29% 4	21.43% 6	28	1.93
Communication	62.07% 18	17.24% 5	20.69% 6	29	1.97
Relationship building	56.67% 17	30.00% 9	13.33% 4	30	2.00
Ethics and integrity	24.14% 7	41.38% 12	34.48% 10	29	2.86
Embracing diversity and cultural differences	48.28% 14	20.69% 6	31.03% 9	29	2.34

**Question 5:** If your staff need additional training in any of the Core Competencies, what should they be able to do that they are not currently doing?

Answered: 25 Skipped: 5	
Answer Choices	Responses
Safety	Responses 52.00% 13
Treat others with respect and courtesy	Responses 60.00% 15
Dependability	Responses 52.00% 13
Accountability	Responses 44.00% 11
Judgement and problem solving	Responses 28.00% 7
Leadership	Responses 72.00% 18
Communication	Responses 64.00% 16
Relationship building	Responses 60.00% 15
Ethics and integrity	Responses 48.00% 12
Embracing diversity and cultural differences	Responses 60.00% 15

Based on the results of the needs assessment, a four-hour experiential learning course was proposed to SLT to address leadership, communication, relationship building, and diversity. SLT approved the course for delivery to all agency staff.

#### AIS Delivery Dates FY18

Successful delivery of AIS requires hundreds of scheduled training sessions. TDU and FPCs will work together to schedule and deliver over 300,000 hours of AIS instruction in FY18.

AIS Course Delivery Matrix FY18

AIS Course	Non-Custody Staff at Prison	Custody Staff at Prison	Unarmed CCOs, Specialists, Supervisors, FA's	Armed CCOs, Specialists, Supervisors, FA's	CCD ECD Qualified Staff	CCD OC Qualified Staff	CCD Support Staff	WR	CRU staff	Facility based Health Services	staff, HQ, CI HQ, Regional Business Office, non-facility	HQ Lieutenants	ERT, IRT	SERT	12 and 15 passenger and cargo van operators
DOC Infectious Disease Control (e-course)	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.0
WA-State IT Security Awareness Training - Refresher (e-course)	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.0
DOC Fire Extinguisher (e-course)	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.0
DOC PREA Annual (e-course)	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.0
DOC PREA Self Disclosure (e-course)	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.0
DOC Outdoor Heat Exposure (e-course)	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.0
DOC Traumatic Brain Injury (e-course)	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	0.0
12 and 15 passenger and cargo van operators (e-course)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.0
DOC Suicide Prevention	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	0.0
DOC Prison Safety (ILT)	3.0	3.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	3.0	0.0
DOC Emergency Management System (ILT)	3.0	3.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	0.0
DOC Control Impedance Tactics (ILT)*	0.0	15.5	15.5	15.5	15.5	15.5	0.0	15.5	15.5	0.0	0.0	15.5	15.5	15.5	0.0
DOC OC Refresher (ILT)	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.0
DOC Firearms Requalification (ILT)	0.0	8.0	0.0	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	16.0	0.0	0.0	16.0	16.0	32.0	0.0
DOC Electronic Control Device (ILT)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.0	2.0	2.0	0.0
DOC Verbal Behavior Management Training (ILT)	0.0	0.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	0.0	0.0	3.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Corrections Professionals (ILT)	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.0	0.0
Specialized Training (investigations, enforcement, intelligence)	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total Hours	17.3	41.3	35.8	52.3	37.8	36.3	17.3	83.8	16.3	13.3	13.3	47.3	50.3	66.3	1.0
Course Delivery	5.3	5.3	5.3	5.3	5.3	5.3	5.3	5.3	5.3	5.3	5.3	5.3	5.3	5.3	1.0
ILT Delivery	12.0	36.0	30.5	47.0	32.5	31.0	12.0	78.5	11.0	8.0	8.0	42.0	45.0	61.0	0.0

• The total time for this instructional course is 16.0 hours if the employee is not certified to carry OC.

## Instructor Development Courses

Foundations for Delivery is a foundational course on classroom facilitation for individuals who wish to instruct for the agency. The course includes a general overview of the theory and application of classroom facilitation, adult learning and retention, effective classroom practices and how to create a safe learning environment for learning. Participants will learn and practice basic classroom facilitation techniques including how to utilize classroom materials and will discuss the responsibilities and legal liability of the classroom facilitator. Through modeling of the best practices and latest techniques in delivery, participants will gain a strong foundation in the skills critical to effective classroom facilitation. Participants will be required to demonstrate facilitation techniques during the course and must show proficiency prior to course completion.

Individuals interested in attending should submit a completed instructor application and letter of agreement to their supervisor.

Facilitator Development Workshops are for individuals who have previously completed Foundations for Delivery and will be facilitating in-service or stand-alone courses. The workshop provides a short refresher of facilitation expectations covered in the Foundations for Delivery, a review of the specific lesson they will be facilitating and any additional topics needed based on course content. Through participation and discussion, both as a participant during the review of the course as well as a facilitator during the hands-on portion, individuals gain an understanding of the specific course they will be facilitating. Participants are required to facilitate portions of the course to demonstrate their proficiency and understanding of the course material to successfully complete the course.

## Instructor Development Delivery Dates FY18

Instructor development course are scheduled in various locations throughout the state on an as-needed basis.

## TDU Contact Information

<b>Subject</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Contact Number</b>
<b>New Employee Orientation</b> <b>Correctional Worker Core</b> SW NW East	Tina Miller Shelby Leifer Dave Neissl	(360) 350-6910 (360) 794-2391 (509) 394-0901
<b>Community Corrections</b> Case Management Academy Community Corrections Officer Academy Work Release Academy	Don Holevinski	(360) 350-6919
<b>Supervision and Leadership</b>	Meghan Muenchow	(360) 350-6923
<b>Training Space Reservations</b> SW Region Performance Center Captain Jimmie Evans Performance Center Mill Creek Performance Center	Brigitte Kennedy Shelby Leifer Dave Neissl	(360) 350-6925 (360) 794-2391 (509) 394-0901
<b>Annual In-Service Training</b>	Pat Gosney	(360) 350-6923
<b>Curriculum</b> Instructor Development Instructor SharePoint Access Annual Training Plan	Tamara Rowden	(360) 350-6910
<b>Learning Management System</b> Training Registration Training Reports	Chris Hanson	(360) 350-6913
<b>Academy Material Orders</b>	Brigitte Kennedy	(360) 350-6925





# Appendix D

Facility Access and Control Tracking system (FACT)



STATE OF WASHINGTON  
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS  
PRISONS DIVISION

P.O. BOX 41118 • Olympia, Washington 98504-1118

September 11, 2017

**TO:** All Stafford Creek Corrections Center Employees

**FROM:** Tomas Fithian, Administrator  
Security and Emergency Management

**SUBJECT: Facility Access Control Tracking (FACT) Pilot**

In 2012, the Department initiated a [Staff Accountability](#) policy as one of several important security processes to account for employees and ensure the safety and wellbeing of employees within the secure perimeter of all prisons. Staff Accountability prioritizes staff safety and provides a method to account for employees in the event of an incident or significant event.

To improve the efficiency and reduce the time it takes to accurately account for all employees, several programs have been tested since inception of the policy. Some of these include the addition of a body alarm system at the Washington State Reformatory, and a proximity card process at the Washington State Penitentiary. While these programs have improved staff safety at perspective facilities, the Department continues to seek a method where staff within in a secure perimeter can be quickly and accurately accounted for.

In collaboration with Information Technology, the Office of Security and Emergency Management has developed an electronic system called Facility Access Control Tracking, or FACT. The FACT system uses the barcode already on employee identification cards and scans those electronically into an OMNI based staff accountability program. FACT will simplify the accountability of employees within the secure perimeter as well as more effectively and efficiently allow for staff accountability in response to an incident or significant event.

Stafford Creek Corrections Center (SCCC) has been selected as the pilot site to test the FACT system beginning in October 2017. Once the program is operational, SCCC

employees will be required to scan their ID cards upon entering and exiting the institution. In addition, in the event a staff accountability is required, employees will be required to report to designated staff accountability locations to scan their ID card to be accounted for.

SCCC Shift Commanders, Public Access and Control Officers, and others identified will receive FACT training prior to full implementation of the program. All SCCC employees will receive information regarding entry/egress and accountability requirements as the program is phased into use.

As SCCC prepares for implementation of FACT, an ID card scanner will soon be placed at Public Access for testing and training purposes. Employees are encouraged to test scan their ID card to ensure the FACT system can easily read the barcode. The local Records Office will be available as needed to replace ID cards that are not able to be scanned successfully.

Facility specific information will be forthcoming from SCCC administration as FACT gets closer to implementation.

Please direct questions regarding the FACT system to Dan Van Ogle, Associate Superintendent, or Joe Salvaggi, Security Specialist.

cc: Scott Russel, Deputy Director  
Eleanor Vernell, Deputy Director  
Charlotte Headley, Security Management Unit Manager  
Jeanette Sevedge-App, Enterprise Project Management Director  
Casey Douglas III, IT Project Manager

# Facility Access Control Tracking

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## FACT PILOT SCCC



# Facility Access Control Tracking



## FACT

Reads the barcode listed on employee ID cards and provides an accurate accounting of employees within the secure perimeter. Entry/ egress scanners will be placed at Minor Control and the Vehicle Gate.

Designed to enhance the current Staff Accountability process, FACT will reduce the time it takes to account for all staff inside the facility during emergencies and significant events.

**Accountability Census**

Facility:

Staff and Visitors Currently in the facility

Name	Badge Category	Last In Scan Time▲	Elapsed Time	Last Scan Location	Barcode
<a href="#">DEFLITCH, KEITH</a>	DOC Employee	09/06/2017 12:47:24	2d 3h 15m 50s	P - Education	10336
<a href="#">STENBECK, MICHAEL</a>	DOC Employee	09/06/2017 13:48:28	2d 2h 14m 46s	P - Education	23330
<a href="#">TESTLAST, TEST</a>	DOC Employee	09/08/2017 12:51:02	3h 12m 11s	Q - Food Services	3078
<a href="#">ARNOLD, ROBERT</a>	DOC Employee	09/08/2017 12:55:34	3h 7m 40s	Q - Food Services	3633
<a href="#">THORNTON, CASEY</a>	DOC Employee	09/08/2017 14:26:58	1h 36m 16s	Q - Food Services	599
<a href="#">DUDLEY, BRADLEY</a>	DOC Employee	09/08/2017 15:33:02	30m 11s	Q - Food Services	234204
<a href="#">BEAUCHENE, R.</a>	DOC Employee	09/08/2017 15:39:19	23m 54s	Q - Food Services	246804

Total Count : 7

Show:  Displaying 1 - 7 of 7 Results

Shift Commanders can view real time census information for a quick listing of employees who are within the secure perimeter.

# Facility Access Control Tracking


Custody staff working in entry and exit points Minor Control and the Vehicle Gate will monitor the FACT program as employees scan in/out.

**Staff Information**

Barcode Number:

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**Salvaggi, Joe**



IN

OUT

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**Photo and Barcode Details**

Photo date: 10/02/2002      Barcode Number: 123456

**Staff Details:**


Network ID: JJSalvaggi	Facility Status: APPROVED
Badge Category: Staff	Badge Status: Active
Scanned Location: SCCC/D	Scanned In: 09/11/2017 0800      Scanned Out: 09/11/2017 1700

**Current Staff Assignment**

<b>Position Title</b>	<b>Supervisor</b>	<b>Facility Name</b>
Security Specialist	Captain	SCCC

**Staff Phone Numbers**

<b>Location</b>	<b>Phone Type</b>	<b>Phone Number</b>
SCCC	Office	3605371243



# Facility Access Control Tracking



- ✓ During a Staff Accountability event, SCCC employees will report to secure scanner locations placed in current muster areas.
- ✓ Employees will scan themselves as accounted for while another employee is present to verify person/ID.

○ SCCC Accountability Scan Locations



# Facility Access Control Tracking



- ✓ The average time it takes to clear staff accountability at SCCC is 52.5 minutes.
- ✓ Over the last 12 months, SCCC has spent over 16 hours total completing staff accountability exercises.
- ✓ The goal of the FACT program is to improve staff safety by providing a faster, more efficient method of accounting for employees.
- ✓ The FACT program is anticipated to greatly reduce the amount of time spent accounting for staff.

Fact is a tool for Shift Commanders to quickly determine who is unaccounted for. Employees who are unable to report to a scan location will be quickly identified and response teams will be rapidly deployed to render assistance.

# Facility Access Control Tracking

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## Have Questions About FACT?

- More information can be found [here](#).
- You may also contact:
  - Dan Van Ogle Associate Superintendent of Operations
  - Charlotte Headley Chief of Security
  - Joe Salvaggi Security Specialist

